

UNIVERSITY *of*  
TASMANIA

**Becoming Emblematic: Lessons from a  
mediatized megaproject conflict  
in Chile**

by

**Gabi Mocatta**

**The Media School  
School of Creative Arts and Media**

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Journalism, Media and Communications  
University of Tasmania

December 2018

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.

The research associated with this thesis abides by the international and Australian codes of human and animal experimentation, the guidelines by the Australian Government's Office of the Gene Technology Regulator and the rulings of the Safety, Ethics and Institutional Biosafety Committees of the University. The Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network's ethics clearance reference number for the research presented here is: H0012848

This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.

Gabi Mocatta

**Note:** Flash Player is needed to play the videos embedded in this document. If this software is unavailable, please use the YouTube urls provided to view the videos.



## **Acknowledgements**

Thanks and much appreciation to my supervisors, Libby Lester and Bruce Tranter for their thoughtful guidance and endless patience with the protracted process of completing this research and thesis.

My family, from whom I have lately been too absent for far too many months, have also made this possible. Phil Madsen, you are a brilliant keeper of our happy family, always fun to come home to, a tireless, kind, dependable, insightful, loving husband and father, and a fantastic cook. This is your achievement too. Inés and Raoul – you have always been so patient with mummy's 'big work', thanks for being such good friends and such sweet kids.

Many thanks go to Max Proaño, Iliana Padrón, Lorena Villamil and Soledad Villamil for their excellent work transcribing the Spanish language interviews. Many thanks to all the interviewees in Chile who shared their insights with me.

I am also indebted to all the people who have cared for my children during the course of this research and the write-up, including Svend and Meryl Madsen, Alice Haynes, Mónica Toconaz, Nita Hadi, Jen Lea, Jane Stephenson, Rachel Carvallo, Gill Course, Lisa Dobson, Bron Kimber, Lélia Meffre – and also many others.

My dear friends and running partners, especially Michelle Woods and Jane Stephenson – you have listened to my woes and my joys though the long haul of this work. Thank you for being there.

## **Abstract**

The construction of megaprojects – large, landscape transforming infrastructure projects – is booming. Megaprojects are becoming more immense and more environmentally damaging. Requiring vast, often transnational investment, megaprojects have escaped the boundaries of the nation state, and are often enacted in transnational contexts. Research has shown that megaprojects almost always rely on a combination of overstated benefits and underestimated environmental impacts in order to be approved, attract investment, and be built. Megaprojects therefore typically rely on highly targeted strategic communications and attempts to steer public discourse, in order to emphasize their advantages and downplay risks. This leads to accusations that they are insufficiently transparent, even deceptive. However, in a hyper-connected world, megaprojects and their risks are now more visible than ever, and are increasingly contested in local, national and global public arenas. Megaprojects are constructed in discourse both by project developers and their supporters, and by protest groups, as well as through their representation in the media. During the protracted communicational sparring that often accompanies them, megaprojects can become conferred with symbolic meaning.

This case study reveals the mediatized construction of a Chilean energy megaproject over eleven years from the project's inception, to its final dissolution. The proposed HidroAysén hydroelectric scheme for Patagonia was at first a largely invisible project, unknown outside the potentially affected region, until protest made the project visible. Presented by the developing company and by authorities as a nation building project to bring Chile energy independence, over time it garnered such vehement opposition that it sparked the largest protests that Chile had seen since its return to democracy. By analysing discourse in influential print and social media during the debate, using interviews with key actors, and strategic communications material from both sides, this study traces the discourse over the megaproject through several key stages. It shows what the symbolic communication of HidroAysén led the megaproject to represent, arguing that when a megaproject becomes layered with multiple symbolic meanings over time, it can become emblematic: a situation which is hard to shift. Though this study focuses on the case of one megaproject in Chile – and indeed shows how the

nation was changed by the HidroAysén debate – it also draws wider lessons from the emblematic case of HidroAysén, enabling a better understanding of the communicational unfolding of transnational megaprojects, and the frequently transnational protests that oppose them.

# Table of Contents

## Abstract

## Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The emblematic case of HidroAysén .....	p.7
1.2 Megaprojects as symbols.....	p.10
1.3 Gaps in the research.....	p.13
1.4 Thesis structure .....	p.16

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction .....	p.19
2.2 Journalists, institutions and constructing the news .....	p.19
2.2.1 <i>Journalistic practice and constructing reality</i> .....	p.19
2.2.2 <i>Media institutional structures</i> .....	p.21
2.2.3 <i>Setting agendas, constructing “pictures in our heads”</i> .....	p.24
2.3 Constructing the environment, conveying risk.....	p.25
2.3.1 <i>The origins of the environment</i> .....	p.25
2.3.2 <i>From a Risk Society to emancipatory catastrophism</i> .....	p.27
2.4 Mediatization and power in a global network society .....	p.30
2.4.1 <i>From public sphere to Network Society and mass self-communication</i> .....	p.30
2.4.2 <i>Communication Power</i> .....	p.34
2.4.3 <i>Media ownership concentration and communication power</i> .....	p.36
2.4.4 <i>Social content as commodity</i> ... ..	p.37
2.4.5 <i>Globalisation and deep mediatisation</i> .....	p.38
2.5 Two paradigms for conceptualising HidroAysén .....	p.41
2.5.1 <i>A media contest paradigm</i> .....	p.41
2.5.2 <i>A media culture paradigm</i> ... ..	p.43
2.6 Media and protest in the digital age... ..	p.45
2.6.1 <i>Technology and autonomy: result and cause</i> .....	p.45
2.6.2 <i>Media-protest hybridity and reflexivity</i> .....	p.46
2.6.3 <i>A dance for three</i> .....	p.49
2.6.4 <i>Visibility and invisibility</i> .....	p.52
2.6.5 <i>Symbolic power and discourse</i> .....	p.54
2.7 Conclusion .....	p.57

## Chapter 3: Country context

3.1 Introduction.....	p.59
3.2 Chile's energy landscape .....	p.60
3.3 Energy demand and energy security in Chile.....	p.64
3.5 Ownership of Chile's electricity market and water rights .....	p.69
3.6 Endesa and Colbún establish HidroAysén .....	p.71
3.7 Development and inequality in Chile.....	p.73
3.8 Education, environment, unrest.....	p.78
3.9 Media in Chile: a historical perspective .....	p.81

3.10	Historical roots of contemporary media ownership in Chile .....	p.84
3.11	Media and the transition to democracy .....	p.86
3.12	Media during the HidroAysén timeframe.....	p.91
3.13	Digital and social media in Chile .....	p.96
3.14	Public relations in Chile .....	p.97
3.15	Conclusion.....	p.101

## Chapter 4: Aims and Methodology

4.1	Introduction.....	p.102
4.2	Methodological framework.....	p.104
4.2.1	<i>Paradigmatic and methodological controversies</i> .....	p.104
4.2.2	<i>"Multiple ways of seeing"</i> .....	p.106
4.2.3	<i>Seeing just one case</i> .....	p.108
4.2.4	<i>Case study as ethnography</i> .....	p.111
4.2.5	<i>Paradigmatic or emblematic</i> .....	p.112
4.2.6	<i>Discourse, and its critical moments</i> .....	p.113
4.3	Data Collection and research design .....	p.117
4.3.1	<i>Case study timeframe</i> .....	p.117
4.3.2	<i>Field work, data gathering and research design</i> .....	p.118
4.3.3	<i>Interviews, strategy and use</i> .....	p.119
4.3.4	<i>Media articles and computational text analysis</i> .....	p.122
4.3.5	<i>PR and advertising output</i> .....	p.126
4.3.6	<i>Social media data</i> .....	p.129
4.3.7	<i>A note on language</i> .....	p.130
4.4	Conclusion .....	p.133

## Chapter 5: Making the invisible visible

5.1	Introduction.....	p.135
5.2	Antecedents in the discourse: Pangué and Ralco .....	p.136
5.3	The first word.....	p.140
5.4	Funding and branding the campaign: Douglas Tompkins and other international donors.....	p.142
5.5	"Low profile": HidroAysén's "invisible" beginnings .....	p.144
5.6	"Buying consciences": HidroAysén's CSR and PR initiatives in Aysén .....	p.148
5.7	"A closeness to the authorities" .....	p.151
5.8.1	<i>"Imagen país: anti-dam advertising and the "national image"</i> .....	p.156
5.8.2	<i>"Reasons to reject HidroAysén": newspaper advertisements and "censorship"</i> .....	p.161
5.8.3	<i>An anti-dams "primer": the Patagonia sin Represas book</i> .....	p.168
5.8.4	<i>"Endesa and Colbún want to raze our heritage": Patagonia sin Represas' TV and radio advertisement</i> .....	p.171
5.9	Conclusion .....	p.173

## Chapter 6: Media and megaproject

6.1	Introduction.....	p.176
6.2	Issue-attention cycles, public arenas and critical discourse moments .....	p.177

6.3 Mapping key events against media coverage .....	p.179
6.4 Sources' voices: who speaks, and how much are they heard? .....	p.184
6.5 HidroAysén enters the environmental impact assessment process .....	p.186
6.5.1 Key media make their positions known .....	p.190
6.5.2 "Rendering technical", rendering political .....	p.192
6.6 New communications strategy, new discursive characteristics .....	p.200
6.6.1 Foreigners and 'foreign-ness': The ENEL buyout of Endesa .....	p.201
6.6.2 HidroAysén's "sovereign energy" .....	p.205
6.6.3 Climate change enters the debate .....	p.209
6.7 Conclusion .....	p.219

## **Chapter 7: HidroAysén reacts**

7.1 Introduction .....	p.221
7.2 Social media, trust, protest and the HidroAysén debate .....	p.222
7.3 HidroAysén's "campaign of terror" .....	p.226
7.4 Discrediting the opposition, polarizing the debate .....	p.237
7.5 HidroAysén is approved .....	p.239
7.6 Media report HidroAysén's approval .....	p.245
7.6.1 El Mercurio .....	p.246
7.6.2 La Tercera .....	p.249
7.6.3 El Mostrador .....	p.252
7.6.4 Comparing the coverage with text analysis .....	p.256
7.7 Conclusion .....	p.262

## **Chapter 8: Invisible once again**

8.1 Introduction .....	p.264
8.2 Retreat to the region: HidroAysén ends national-scale communications .....	p.265
8.3 Keeping HidroAysén visible .....	p.275
8.4 "Uncertainty threatens the project" .....	p.280
8.5 Patagonia sin Tompkins .....	p.282
8.6 "The slow death of HidroAysén" .....	p.287
8.7 After HidroAysén .....	p.291
8.8 Conclusion .....	p.294

## **Chapter 9: Conclusion**

9.1 Introduction .....	p.296
9.2 Becoming emblematic .....	p.299
9.3 "Chile cambió" .....	p.302
9.4 Lessons from the case of HidroAysén .....	p.305
9.5 Suggestions for future research .....	p.310

## **Appendix**

<b>Timeline of the case of HidroAysén</b> .....	p.312
---	-------

<b>List of interviewees</b> .....	p.316
-----------------------------------	-------

**References** .....p.318

**Corpus media references** .....p.378

*El Mercurio*

*El Mostrador*

*La Tercera*

# Chapter 1: Introduction

## 1.1 The emblematic case of HidroAysén

“If it had been a person, HidroAysén would have been 70 years old, and it would have died this Friday”. This is how Chile’s leading national newspaper, *El Mercurio*, opened its weekend feature report at the end of 2017 on the “death” of the country’s largest ever megaproject. It continued:

Forty-eight hours ago, the directorship of this company – held by Enel Chile and Colbún, of the Matte group – approved a halt to the company’s activities, the resignation of its directorship, and the decision to renounce the water rights for the HidroAysén project: five dams in the country’s XI<sup>th</sup> <sup>1</sup> region, producing 2700 megawatts (MW) of power, flooding 5,910 hectares and with a cost of around US \$8 billion, dams and transmission line considered together. It was the largest project ever designed in Chile, an old dream of the engineers of Corfo<sup>2</sup>, first conceived in 1947 to bring electricity and progress to the country. It cost its shareholders US\$300 million, without producing a single megawatt...

(Ibarra, *El Mercurio* 19/11/2017)

The project had not just been the “old dream” of engineers. For much of the decade proceeding its final dissolution, HidroAysén had been planned and scheduled to be built, was projected to be generating power from 2020. Since 2006, HidroAysén had been a constant feature of public discourse. It had engendered a powerful social movement and provoked the largest street protests that Chile had seen since its return to democracy after the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship. It also produced an extraordinary amount of media coverage. Over 11 years, the megaproject was debated, protested, approved, challenged, became highly politically charged and the subject of vehement public opinion, weathered two elections – as a key issue in each – until finally, politically and socially unpalatable, the project’s environmental approvals were revoked in 2014. Even then, HidroAysén did not “die”. Three more years of litigation followed. Media discourse on the project continued right up until 2018, when, for example, Energy Minister Susana Jiménez was interviewed in newspaper *La Tercera*, citing the

---

<sup>1</sup> Chile is divided into 16 regions, with the Aysén Region (full name: Región Aysén del General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo) known as the XI Region. Region numbers are always expressed in Roman numerals.

<sup>2</sup> Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, the Chilean state development agency.



HidroAysén debate and noting “how important this discussion has been for the country” (Orellana & Santa María, *La Tercera* 18/03/2018).

HidroAysén was certainly a large project: a feat of engineering to build five dams on two remote rivers in Chile’s far south, and to transport that energy by means of the world’s then-longest planned transmission line of some 2300kms, to the central region of the country, home to 90% of Chile’s population and industry. The environmental and social impacts would have been significant, as this thesis makes clear. However, compared to many other mega-hydro projects concurrently being planned and constructed, in what has recently been called a “global boom” (Zarfl 2014; BBC News 6/08/18) in hydroelectric dam construction, HidroAysén was not the largest of hydroelectricity megaprojects. In Latin America alone, Brazil’s also much contested Belo Monte dam – in 2018, already mostly operational – has a total reservoir area of 66,800 hectares projected generation of 11,233 MW of power, at a cost of \$US22 billion (Gautam et al. 2018). The planned Garabí-Panambi complex, between Brazil and Argentina would flood 73,000 hectares to create 2200 MW (Garabí-Panambi 2014) and the proposed Pongo de Manseriche dam in the Peruvian Amazon, if ever built, could flood a colossal 547,000 hectares, for 7550 MW of generating capacity (*The Guardian* 27/05/2015). Planning to inundate 5910 hectares to generate 2750 MW of power (HidroAysén 2011), HidroAysén was not on the scale of these other hydroelectric dams. Communicationally, however, it was vast.

I argue in this thesis that the most significant aspect of this ultimately failed megaproject was the way in which it was communicated and deliberated in the public sphere. In this study I therefore follow and analyse the mediatized conflict around the HidroAysén megaproject for Chilean Patagonia from the time that the HidroAysén company was first established, in 2006, to the moment the company, and the project, were finally terminated, in 2017. I trace and analyse discourse in three national Chilean media outlets during the most crucial years of the debate, and I analyse key strategic communications outputs, including imagery, around the dams from both the anti-dams protest movement, and the developing company. I additionally use social media output and interviews with key actors from both sides of the dams debate to gain insights into tactics and strategies employed in the extended mediatized sparring over the

megaproject. I argue that, in the course of mediatized deliberation over HidroAysén, as the project was constructed communicationally, it became layered with distinct strata of symbolic meaning<sup>3</sup> so that ultimately, the project became *emblematic*, that is, constituted by a composite of meanings that signified much more than a large energy infrastructure project. I argue here that HidroAysén and the anti-dams protest movement Patagonia sin Represas (Patagonia without Dams) became emblematic of different and fundamentally opposed world views. I argue also that the conflict over HidroAysén became a point of inflection in decision-making about the future mode of Chile's development. In this way, strategic symbolic communication, and the ways in which symbols became attached to the project (and protest against it) over time, affected not only the course and the ultimate outcome of the megaproject, but profoundly influenced the country's socio-political, economic and energy destiny. I argue that this case offers lessons for understanding the discursive construction of other highly contested, emblematic megaprojects, for project developers, as well as for groups that protest such projects, and seek to highlight alternative modes of development. It also offers empirical detail to broader debates about development, extractivism and social movements in Latin America in particular.

Drawing on the work of Bourdieu (1979, 1991, 1998) and Thompson (1995, 2005) on symbolic power, and Foucault (1972, 1977, 1980) on the power of discursive practices, this study considers language and discourse as constitutive of power (Couldry 2000). Focusing as it does, on the role of the media as a site for discursive construction and power struggle (Cottle 2004, 2006; Lester 2010; Cottle & Lester 2011) it argues that those groups that gain the power of risk definition (Beck 1986/1992; Adam, Beck & van Loon 2000) have a greater degree of influence in mediatized sparring. Although symbolic power has begun to receive some recent recognition in the literature on megaprojects (Klein & Aubry 2017; Lopez Rego, Reis Irigaray & Lago Chaves 2017; Söderlund, Sankara & Biesenthal 2017; van Marrewijk 2017) very little scholarly attention has been paid to how the symbolic power of megaprojects is derived through

---

<sup>3</sup> Clifford Geertz' (1973) definition of symbols serves as a working definition of symbols for this thesis. For Geertz symbols are "tangible formulations of notions, abstractions from experience fixed in perceptible forms, concrete embodiments of ideas, attitudes, judgments, longing, or beliefs" (p. 91).

their media representation and the discourse that surrounds them, in all its contemporary forms. This thesis aims to address that gap.

## **1.2 Megaprojects as symbols**

The phenomenon of megaprojects, is a conflicted one. Large-scale, complex infrastructure investment projects, costing over US\$1 billion, (Flyvbjerg 2012, p. 98, Flyvbjerg 2017), they include nation-linking bridges, ocean-crossing tunnels, oil and gas pipelines, country-spanning power lines, airports, highways and large dams. Megaprojects “transform landscapes rapidly, intentionally and profoundly in very visible ways” (Gellert & Lynch 2003, pp. 15-16), affecting whole regions and the lives of millions. Megaprojects involve “creative destruction”, to extend Schumpeter’s (1947) term, and by this process, they irrevocably alter landscapes and “socio-natural conditions” (Swyngedouw 1999, p. 445).

More than simply large planning projects, megaprojects are a sociological phenomenon. Megaprojects (the internet arguably the greatest of them) are both a cause and effect of globalisation. Whether transport, energy or telecommunications infrastructure, international health or science projects, or vast networks of supply chain logistics, megaprojects arise from a human tendency towards the shrinking of distance (Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter & Bruzelius 2003, p. 3). Dams are an integral part of this space-shrinking imperative: dam megaprojects typically supply electricity, freeing industry from localised power sources. Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has termed the distance-shrinking urge “The Great War of Independence from Space” (Bauman 1998, pp. 2-3), while others have spoken of “the end of geography” (O’Brien 1992) or the advent of “frictionless capitalism” (Gates, Myrvold & Rinearson 1995). Infrastructure, argue others, has moved from being the *prerequisite* for production and consumption to being “the very core of these activities” so that “power, wealth and status increasingly belong to those who know how to shrink space or know how to benefit from space being shrunk” (Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter & Bruzelius 2003, p. 2). Megaprojects are therefore central to the “new world order” (Castells 2004b) of the globalised world and the new politics of defying distance.

Megaprojects are also inherently unequal. They create primary displacements – of soil and rocks, landscapes and ecosystems – and secondary displacements of people: those who are moved to make way for them, those whose livelihoods are altered by altered landscapes, and those who move to work on the projects. The effects and benefits of megaprojects have been conceptualised as spreading like ripples over time and space (Gellert & Lynch 2003, p. 19) so that those whose interests reside within the landscapes that megaprojects transform and displace benefit least, and that those who promote and develop megaprojects (invariably distant) benefit most. Megaprojects therefore serve the material interests of powerful actors. In this way, megaprojects – particularly dams – commonly increase poverty and underscore inequality, particularly in the developing world where their stated mission is often to do the opposite (Khagram 2004; McCully 1996).

In a globalised world, the rate of megaproject development has quickened. More, larger and more expensive, megaprojects are being built (Altshuler & Luberoff 2004; Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter & Bruzelius 2003). An estimated 8% of global GDP was spent on megaproject infrastructure in 2013 (Flyvbjerg 2017) as part of what *The Economist* has called “the biggest investment boom in history” (*Economist* 7/06/2008, p. 8). Hydroelectric dam megaproject development has particularly been experiencing a boom, especially in the Global South where energy from hydroelectric megaprojects is often characterised as being ‘needed for development’ (Ansar et al. 2015; Waisbord 2013a,<sup>4</sup> Zarfl et al. 2014,). The development of such projects has become intrinsically intertwined with the globalisation of capital. Research indicates that transnational capital uses major infrastructure investments to widen its financial networks “reflecting more its own interests than those of the territories it traverses and serves” (Dimitriou 2005, p. 6). To achieve this, it has been argued, “elements of corporate global business pressurise the similarly globally-oriented elites within each national polity to subsidise this process” (ibid.) International lending structures also encourage “Big Fix”, global-sized projects (Douglass 2005, p. 1). In a globalised world, megaprojects have therefore become larger, more expensive, more political, and more environmentally and socially damaging.

---

<sup>4</sup> Waisbord (2013a, p. 106) calls this an “extraction-as-development” model.

Megaprojects are also inherently paradoxical. Research of hundreds of projects across twenty nations, across seventy years (Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter & Bruzelius 2003, pp. 1-10; Flyvbjerg 2005) and more recent research of dam megaprojects specifically (Ansar et al. 2014) has shown that in order to get projects approved and built, megaproject developers typically rely on a formula of “underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects” (Flyvbjerg 2005, p. 18) – a notion that Flyvbjerg updated in 2014 and called “the iron law of megaprojects” (Flyvbjerg 2014, p. 6)<sup>5</sup>. At best, research has characterized this tendency as an “optimism bias” (Mott MacDonald 2002), at worst, “misrepresentation” (Kain 1990), “strategic deception” (Flyvbjerg, Garbuio & Lovallo 2009), “manipulation” (Whitworth & Cheatham 1988) and “lies” (Wachs 1989). Megaprojects are therefore usually planned and built in a conflicted space where often only lack of transparency and a “democracy deficit” (Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter & Bruzelius 2003, p. 5) ensure their completion. This widespread equation for megaproject establishment requires a downplaying of risks and uncertainties: best achieved by communicational construction, and attempts to steer public discourse surrounding such projects. Because they are so large, complex, expensive, take so much time, are therefore vulnerable to change, and embody such a high degree of risk and uncertainty, megaprojects, it seems, intrinsically need intensive communicational construction in order to be approved and built. Developers of megaprojects in many national contexts have therefore typically begun to recognize the importance of their projects’ media representation and develop sophisticated persuasive strategies to ensure such representation is favourable to the project’s success (Fischhendler et al. 2015; Lefsrud & Meyer 2012). I argue in this thesis that because megaprojects become endowed with meanings through the discourse that surrounds them in the course of their development, they are inherently symbolic undertakings. Because of the power and often, the prestige, that can become attached to megaprojects in their symbolic communication, they can also exert “a powerful magnetic spell on ambitious politicians” (Priemus 2010, p. 1023). Megaprojects are therefore also inherently political.

---

<sup>5</sup> Flyvbjerg (2012, 2014) has also conceptualised four “megaproject sublimes”: the political, technological, economic, and aesthetic sublimes. Together these help harness the conviction of megaproject developers, funders, government decision-makers, the media and the public to accept, and support, megaprojects. Flyvbjerg considers these four sublimes to be an important driver of the scale and frequency of megaprojects.

Although megaprojects have always been symbolic – the Panama Canal as a symbol of US geopolitical power, the US Space Program as a symbol of the struggle for domination between the US and the Soviet Union, the Channel Tunnel as a symbolic linkage of the UK to Europe, or the Belt and Road Initiative as symbolic of Chinese geopolitical ambitions – the literature on megaprojects has only recently begun to recognize the importance of symbolism, and the primacy of communication, in relation to megaprojects. In the field of organisational management and planning, Syn & Ramaprasad (2018) published an ontological review of the “symbolic and sublime” in megaproject management, and proposed a framework for use by megaproject decision-makers. The *Project Management Journal* recently ran a special issue on the symbolic in relation to megaprojects. This edition notes megaprojects’ “symbolic roles in society” (Klein & Aubry 2017 p. 3), explains how megaprojects are filled with “symbol manipulation and rhetoric” (Lopez Rego, Reis Irigaray & Lago Chaves 2017, p. 19), and tells us that “megaprojects can be understood as modern symbols of prestige, progress and political power” (van Marrewijk 2017, p. 48). In his contribution, van Marrewijk takes an anthropological perspective on symbolism in megaprojects, telling us that, as this study finds, “symbols can be used strategically in megaprojects for decision-making purposes”, “for the legitimation of power”, and for the enactment of “power struggles among stakeholders” (p. 49). He also tells us, as is the case for HidroAysén, that the symbolic meaning of a megaproject is “not stable, and can change over time” (p. 49). Although this collection of research on meaning-making in relation to megaprojects is enlightening from an organisational management perspective, none of these papers include any in-depth exploration of discourse in the media in relation to megaprojects, neither do they undertake any analysis of megaproject developers’ or megaproject opponents’ own strategic communications surrounding such projects, as this study does.

### **1.3 Gaps in the research**

Although the planning and project management literature has begun to discuss megaprojects as symbolic, communicationally constructed endeavours, studies of meaning-making and symbolism in the development of large infrastructure projects from a media and communications perspective are not abundant. One seminal study of

an early conflict over a large infrastructure project is Christine Oravec's (1984) publication on the Hetch Hetchy dam controversy (1908-1913). Anderson (1997) has also written on the mediatized protest against the sinking of the Brent Spar oil rig. Lester and Hutchins (2006) have documented media/protest interaction in an important Australian anti-dam protest campaign. Of particular interest to this thesis, given the Latin American context, is Waisbord's (2013a) work on contesting extractivism and Waisbord and Peruzzotti's (2009) study of protest and media representation in the process of pulp mill building on the Uruguay River. The authors find here, as the present study does, that an issue that is an environmental one can become transformed into a political issue by the nature of protest tactics and media coverage. The present study builds on Waisbord and Peruzzotti's 2009 work by additionally exploring the symbolic dimensions of discourse surrounding a contested megaproject, and analysing the communicational sparring in this debate with in-depth thick description (Geertz 1973). Most recently, Fischhendler et al. (2015) have researched the media treatment of the Dead Sea Water Canal megaproject, tracing the strategies used to promote the project in one Israeli newspaper. Using synchronic and diachronic content analysis (van Dijk, T 1988; Fairclough 1995) Fischhendler et al. seek to understand "how megaprojects are communicated to the public through the use of the media" (p. 795), by examining "uncertainties" related to the project, which changed over time. The authors confirm that such projects can become symbols (in the case of the Dead Sea Water project, symbolic of national peace) and they acknowledge the role of media representational practices both in "quelling public concern regarding risk and uncertainties and in building public support" (p. 795) for such projects. As this study does, the authors also examine the role of resistance by non-nation-state actors in the communications surrounding a megaproject. This thesis concurs with Fischhendler et al. in the argument that the success of any given megaproject and the likelihood of its eventual implementation now depends on the success of a project's communicational construction in public arenas. Fischhendler et al. (p. 807) call for future research to use "additional media sources (e.g newspapers) to test potential differences in...strategy representations according to underlying ideologies or political inclinations of the media." In surveying three slightly differently politically orientated media outlets, and noting how their stance on HidroAysén changed – or remained stable – over time, this study does exactly that.

Though Waisbord and Peruzzotti (2009) and Fischhendler et al. (2015) add much to our understanding of the way mediatized discourse over large, controversial and environmentally damaging projects unfolds over time, neither of these studies is designed to present a broader view of mediatized discourse which includes the key actors' self-representation through advertising and strategic communications, as well as intensive analysis of media coverage of a megaproject over time, including the contribution of social media to such discourse. Although these two studies do acknowledge the dynamic way in which meaning becomes attached to projects, neither aimed to present a detailed anatomy of how symbolic meanings are derived from the prevailing social context, shaped through discourse in diverse forms of media, and can become layered upon each other, until a megaproject comes to represent much more than an infrastructure-building endeavour. Likewise, though Fischhendler et al. do acknowledge strategies to "hide uncertainty" ("by telling the truth...but not ALL the truth", p. 797) about megaprojects, neither these authors' study or any others on media and megaprojects have focused on strategies to *avoid* mediatized visibility (Lester & Hutchins 2012a; 2012b) on the part of megaproject developers, as this study does. Likewise, it is difficult for studies to follow the mediatized discourse surrounding a megaproject, within its social context, over the whole period of the megaproject's trajectory, from establishment to completion, cancellation or otherwise, as this study does.

In the case of environmental conflicts in Chile specifically, some previous research has examined protest against earlier hydropower megaprojects in this national context (Carruthers & Rodriguez 2009), however, the media's role here was not addressed. The case of HidroAysén has attracted some specific research attention. Cuadra (2013) has examined protest against HidroAysén as an expression of a citizens' democratising drive – a notion which this thesis supports, and which is discussed in the thesis conclusion. Latta has written on "socio-environmental traumas" in relation to HidroAysén in its early stages (2011) and also on the company's attempts to "generate consent" (2010) for its project, from the points of view of water and environmental politics and policies in Chile. Romero (2014) has written on the political ecology of dam decision-making in Chile, in relation to HidroAysén, with brief reference to media



discourse on the dams. Schaeffer (2015) wrote her PhD study on the protest movement against HidroAysén, Patagonia sin Represas, from an anthropological and socio-political perspective. Schaeffer's study does make some mention of media framing (p.70) but media discourse is not explored in any depth in this study. Finally, Merino and Bello (2014) have examined "discourse coalitions" in the controversy around HidroAysén, by studying discourse allocutions from leaders and social actors in the debate. This study does examine the way that meaning is made through discourse in the HidroAysén debate, using Hajer's (1995, 2005) argumentative analysis. It finds meanings solidified around certain "nodal concepts", which might be compared to the symbolic meanings of HidroAysén, and the protest against it that this study identifies. However, Merino and Bello's study does not set out to examine media coverage in-depth (it only uses media coverage, media releases and websites to identify allocutions by key actors). Also, its scope is only a brief period of the HidroAysén debate, during 2011/2012.

This study is able to bring together scholarship on the symbolic dimensions of communications surrounding megaprojects and studies of mediatized discourse in environmental conflicts. It also contributes to the scholarship on media and megaprojects by offering a detailed case study of the *whole* trajectory of a debate over a contested megaproject, examining the strategic self-representation and the mediatized sparring of pro- and anti-dams positions, and noting changes in discourse over time. Additionally, this study sets HidroAysén extensively within its socio-political context in Chile, and provides a detailed account of the Chilean media ecology, to further understanding of the kinds of positions that key Chilean media outlets took in their discourse on HidroAysén. In its conclusion, this thesis offers lessons from the case of this ultimately failed megaproject, which may be of use both to the promoters of megaprojects, and to those who protest such projects, and seek to have them cancelled.

#### **1.4 Thesis structure**

After this introductory chapter, I undertake a literature review in **Chapter 2**. This chapter builds on my arguments around the symbolic nature of megaprojects above, and situates media and megaprojects within the literature on the constructed notion of the environment, mediatized environmental conflict (particularly in transnational

contexts), the significance of visibility (Thompson 2005) and invisibility (Lester and Hutchins 2012a, 2012b), public spheres, and strategic communications in relation to environmental controversies.

In **Chapter 3** I examine the country-specific background to the HidroAysén debate. I introduce the energy landscape in Chile when HidroAysén was being planned, discuss hydroelectricity development in Chile, and explain ownership of electricity generation and water rights, as rationale for the development of HidroAysén. I also discuss in detail development and inequality in Chile, laying the basis for how HidroAysén was able to come to be understood as the manifestation of an extremely unequal society. Next, I discuss environmental awareness and protest in Chile. As media construction was crucial to the trajectory and outcomes of the HidroAysén debate, for the remainder of Chapter 3 I discuss Chile's media landscape, from its historical roots to its contemporary dimensions. I argue here that many of the characteristics of Chile's media that became entrenched through the Pinochet era, and the democratisation that followed, did indeed have a bearing on discursive representations of HidroAysén. Finally in this chapter, I discuss the unique characteristics of strategic communications and public relations in Chile and explain how these may have influenced organisational communication in the case of HidroAysén.

**Chapter 4** presents the methodological framework for this study. It gives a detailed account of the literature on and the rationale for case study research, and then discusses data collection, research design, and the research questions of this study. This section addresses the media corpus that was analysed in this study, and also includes a discussion of language, given this is a cross-language study, working between Spanish and English.

In **Chapter 5**, I begin my account of the mediatized enactment of the HidroAysén debate, starting with a discussion of the megaproject's initial invisibility, and protest's attempts to make it visible, from 2006. I discuss the funding and the branding of the Patagonia sin Represas campaign, and examine some of the symbolic communication on the dams that began to emerge in the discourse in public arenas around this period.

**Chapter 6** coincides with the period in which HidroAysén was first widely covered in the media. Here, I begin to map key events in the debate against media coverage, explaining how HidroAysén often emerged and then disappeared from view in mediatized discourse. I make a detailed survey of media discourse on HidroAysén here from 2008-mid 2010, showing how HidroAysén became a “political project”, and how other new layers of symbolic meaning, including climate change and national sovereignty, began to be attached to the megaproject.

**Chapter 7** covers the period from mid-2010 to late-2011, when HidroAysén began a strongly reactive communications campaign, followed by the project’s approval, and the two-month period of vehement street protests over the project. In this period, I analyse in particular the vast amount of media coverage surrounding the protests, showing differences across publications, and changes in one newspaper’s stance on the project at this time. I show here how for the first time, anti-dams discourse was able to enter and shape public debate on the megaproject.

In **Chapter 8** I trace the attempted withdrawal of HidroAysén from national level communications once again, and its renewed concentration on communication with stakeholders in the potentially dams-affected region. I discuss a communicational strategy that was used to discredit the dams’ opponents, and analyse media discourse around the withdrawal of the project’s environmental permits. Finally, I trace mediatized discourse on HidroAysén to the very end of the megaproject in 2017.

In **Chapter 9**, I present my conclusion.

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

### **2.1 Introduction**

To provide a framework for the case study presented here, this chapter examines theories that contribute to an understanding of mediatized construction and contestation. I survey literature journalism practices, institutional structures; media, environment and risk; mediatization; communication power and protest in the contemporary media landscape. I aim with this literature survey to establish a theoretical foundation for my argument that the HidroAysén megaproject was a communicational construction. I also consider here how the ‘space shrinking’ imperative of megaprojects arises out of the same ‘space shrinking’ tendency as networked global communications. I therefore provide a framework in this chapter for conceptualising both the enabling of megaprojects and their contestation as emanating from the same global and macro-sociological trends. I additionally discuss two overarching paradigms – a media contest paradigm and a media culture paradigm – aspects of both of which serve as a conceptual framework for the multi-perspectival study undertaken here. In this review, I move (and I sometimes move back and forward) from older perspectives on how the media have constructed reality, to more contemporary explanations of a media-saturated world, bearing in mind that the timeframe of the megaproject being discussed here was just at the cusp of the digital revolution, in Chile at least, making theoretical perspectives both from older media landscapes and contemporary ones relevant to the understanding media at the time of HidroAysén. Also, this study analyses content from legacy media and from digital media, making a theoretical framework for understanding both “old media” and “new media” crucial.

### **2.2 Journalists, institutions and constructing the news**

#### *2.2.1 Journalistic practice and constructing reality*

Media research has long acknowledged that the information the media present as news is not a neutral reflection of reality (Hall et al. 1978.). A complex media matrix rather *constructs* the social worlds in which we live (Angus 2000; Benkler 2006; Castells 2000,

2011; Couldry & Hepp 2018; Hansen 1991). Media messages are therefore “a representation, rather than a transparent window onto the real” (Branston & Stafford 2006, p. 141). As purveyors of socially constructed products, the media can perpetuate ideologies on how the world is – or how it should be (Dyer 1993; O'Shaughnessy & Stadler 2002). Representations of the ‘real’ in traditional media reporting are subjected to both the processes of routine journalistic practice and the dictates of news media business which shape, and may distort, information which is presented as reality. To conceptualise mediatized communication of megaproject development, beginning with a recognition that media “realities” are constructed, is an essential starting place.

Journalists’ professional practice relies on a number of methods for uncovering information and for selecting and packaging it as news. In the interests of speed and credibility, journalists have traditionally relied on elite sources: politicians, police, heads of business (Fishman 1980; Hall et al. 1978; Schlesinger 1990; Tuchman 1972) and, as the empirical section of this thesis demonstrates, the promoters and supporters of megaprojects. Elite sources may lend the appearance of authority to reporting (McLeod & Hertog 1999) but when such sources become “primary definers” of issues (Hall et al. 1978, p. 58) journalists often become secondary reproducers of elite standpoints, cementing prevailing power structures. Though research has now indicated some disruption of this tendency through journalists’ recourse to online sources (Broersma & Graham 2013, Hermida et al. 2014) a recent meta-analysis (Lecheler & Kruikemeier 2016) found that journalists still gravitate to elite sources online.

Traditional news media have historically had limited carrying capacity (Hilgartner & Bosk 2008), and restricted space and time require journalists to use practices including selection of stories for their news values (Allern 2002; Bell, A 1991; Galtung & Ruge 1965; Harcup & O'Neill 2001; Hetherington 1985; Masterton 2005; O'Sullivan 1983), likewise contributing to the construction of news. Many of the criteria for newsworthiness promote a kind of “drama-philia” (Iyengar 1994): a predilection for reporting violence, conflicts or crises and a tendency to prefer single, sensational events over complex, nuanced, ongoing issues, making it difficult for news like social and environmental conflicts to gain longevity in reporting. More recently, scholars have

provided some valuable new taxonomies of news values (Strömbäck et al. 2012; Wendelin et al. 2017), and have shown that in the current hybrid news system (Chadwick 2013) the news events that public find most relevant on social media networks influence journalists' selection of stories to cover in their reporting (Araujo & van der Meer 2018). The ability of social media content to influence stories covered in mainstream media is observed in the Chilean context of this case study.

Journalists also use framing to make sense of complex social phenomena (Entman 1993, 2007; Gamson & Modigliani 1987; Gitlin 1980; Hannigan 2006; Hansen 2010; Lakoff 2004; Scheufele 1999;). Frames are "principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (Gitlin 1980, p. 6). With the media's inclination to cover the dramatic, the current and the novel, event-orientated episodic frames (Iyengar 1994, p. 3) dominate over more abstract thematic frames. In the case of megaproject development, environment and protest, this may mean that complicated multi-stranded debates are covered only in association with an event – and that ongoing struggles otherwise fall off media agendas (Anderson, A 1997). Once frames are established, they can endure and when journalists reproduce the frames proffered by sources, they may replicate those sources' hegemony (Lewis & Reese 2009). Ultimately, framing constitutes a sociocognitive process through which public life is constructed (Pan & Kosicki 2005). Historically, when frames have become persistent over time, they have become politically influential: "tools of power" which could act symbolically "to meaningfully structure the social world" (Reese 2001, p. 11). Recent research on framing theory, however, has discussed the "end of framing as we know it", citing dysfunction of earlier theories in the new media environment of filter bubbles and tailored information (Cacciatore, Scheufele & Iyengar 2016).

### *2.2.2 Media institutional structures*

Media institutional structures have also historically influenced the ways that media content has been constructed. Many scholars (Bagdikian 2004; Baker 2006; Golding & Murdock 1997b, 1997a; Herman & Chomsky 1988; Herman & McChesney 2000, 2001; McChesney 1999, 2003, 2008) have written on the ways in which media ownership structures influence news content. To diminish costs and control markets, media

corporations merge and enact takeovers, becoming conglomerates with increased market advantage, able to marginalize competition. Concentration of ownership and the forces of the market have been shown to have direct impact on the diversity of news-producing organisations – and therefore the range of news which is available (Curran & Seaton 1997). Though many scholars were earlier celebratory about the democratizing potential of peer-to-peer digital communications for increasing the diversity of news (Benkler 2006<sup>6</sup>; Leadbeater 2009; Tapscott & Williams 2006) such techno-utopianism is difficult to sustain in the face of the increasing convergence (Cottle 2006; Jenkins 2006; McChesney & Schiller 2003) and concentration of ownership which is now being played out in both legacy and digital media on a global scale (Arsenault & Castells 2008; Noam 2016). This trend is certainly evident in Latin America, and in Chile specifically (Godoy 2016)<sup>7</sup>. Hardy (2017) shows that convergence and media ownership concentration limits the range of news content, even in the digital environment. (I discuss the present media landscape in more detail later in section 2.4.5 of this chapter).

Though the earlier Marxist-radical “propaganda model” of media political economy (Herman & Chomsky 1988) was much criticised (Corner 2003; Klaehn 2002; Mullen 2010; Schudson 2003) for its reductive determinism, for characterising audiences as passive receivers, for paying scant attention to the social constructionist nature of news production, and for neglecting notions of conflict in source-media interactions (Robinson 2002; Schlesinger 1990; Thompson, J 1995; Wolfsfeld 1997); in the light of media convergence and ownership concentration – even in the digital domain – there has been some recent resurgence in studies from a critical political economy perspective (Hardy 2014, 2017). I draw on aspects of a critical political economy approach in this study, particularly in relationship to media ownership in Chile, but I also make use of additional paradigms, further discussed later in this chapter, for understanding the ways in which the highly contested megaproject under discussion here played out in the concentrated Chilean media.

---

<sup>6</sup> Even such communitarian optimists as Benkler have gone from celebrating the democratising potential of the internet to describing its current potential for misinformation and radicalisation (Benkler, Faris and Roberts 2018).

<sup>7</sup> Concentration of media ownership here also has its roots in Chile’s Pinochet era, and the post-dictatorship mode of development, as described in detail in Chapter 3.

Advertising is another influence on news production. Though journalism's normative commitment to autonomy has traditionally dictated separation of advertising from editorial functions, several scholars have identified how media's reliance on advertising revenue can place restrictions on news content that is critical of business (Bagdikian 2004; Baldasty 1992; Barnhurst & Nerone 2001; McChesney 1999, 2004; McManus 1994). Baker (2002) warned that "the boundary between acceptable advertising and corruption is subject to constant cultural negotiation, with commercial pressures obviously pushing to expand the realm of the acceptable" (p. 54). Diamond earlier made the observation that "there's a gray area at many publications where 'advertiser friendliness' mixes and mingles with the editorial process" (Diamond 1996, p. 31). Other surveys of journalists (Craig 2004; Soley & Craig 1992) have likewise found that businesses have used advertising revenues to threaten media and have withdrawn advertising to respond to content they viewed as unfavourable. Soley and Craig (1992) found that this led to journalists' self-censorship. Emergent practices such as online native advertising now complicate this landscape further (Carlson 2015). Advertising is a key element of megaproject publicity campaigns (Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter & Bruzelius 2003) – more so perhaps, where public opinion is pitted against a project. This thesis pays particular attention to advertising, and shows how newspapers' editorial stances sometimes dictated the content of advertisements in the HidroAysén campaign.

Interdependence between advertisers and media outlets has also created "promotional journalism" (Erjavec 2004, p. 554). Such 'tabloidisation', 'newszak' and 'dumbing down' (Dahlgren 2009; Sparks 2000; Street 2011) is often cheap to produce and formulaic, but when it is prioritized over reports on more serious issues, leads to a degradation of the democratic, Fourth Estate role of the media. To reduce costs and maximize profits, media outlets have also reduced funding for expensive content such as foreign news, investigative reporting, and current affairs programming. Investigative journalism has been found to be in peril in many contexts (Carson 2014) including in Latin America (Requejo-Alemán & Lugo-Ocando 2014), despite its demonstrated particular importance here (Waisbord 2000). In the context of debates over megaprojects, this may mean space for serious, nuanced debate may lose out to "lighter" content that sells – this at the same time as megaprojects have become larger, more environmentally damaging, often more controversial and therefore more demanding of media



investigation and public debate.

The drive to produce news at low cost and under time pressure has also led to increasing reproduction of public relations content as news (Davies 2008; Davis 2002; Moloney 2006; Moloney, Jackson & McQueen 2013). Jackson & Moloney (2015) have written of the “PR-isation” of news, and of “the growing colonisation of PR mindsets amongst journalists” (p. 764). Davis (2002) has argued that corporate elites and interest groups use PR to position their arguments against one another in the media to gain a competitive advantage over rivals, especially in public policy debates (Davis 2002, p. 11). Like megaproject developers’ reliance on advertising, PR is a crucial aspect of their mediatized self-representation. For the corporations that plan, promote and build megaprojects, creating favourable self-representation to elites matters first (Dimitriou 2009), national public opinion also matters in some stages of megaproject planning (Flyvbjerg 2012, p. 99) and as Latta (2010) has shown in relation to the case examined in this thesis, megaproject developers deploy a raft of strategies in order to “generate consent” on the ground amongst people who their planned developments most affect. The case study presented here examines the PR campaigns of a megaproject developer and a protest group in order to better understand the role of PR in constructing sparring rivals in mediatized environmental conflict.

### *2.2.3 Setting agendas, constructing “pictures in our heads”*

The sections above discuss some of the chief determinants of what becomes news, and what *kind* of news it becomes. An additional crucial factor that influences what news dominates in the public mind is *quantity* of coverage. The cumulation of media coverage on a particular issue (and with a particular frame) makes that issue more accessible in people’s minds and therefore attributed with more importance than issues that receive less coverage (Iyengar 1990; Gauntlett 2005; Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007). Media agenda-setting occurs in this way. McCoombs, Shaw & Weaver (2014) regard agenda setting at the most basic level as “the transfer of issue salience from the news media to the public agenda” (p. 787). Agenda setting theory can be traced back to Lippman’s early work which examined public opinion, media representation and “the pictures in our heads” (Lippmann 1922/1997 p. 2). McCoombs & Shaw (1972) then showed that news coverage *quantity* had a powerful agenda-setting function, significantly guiding

public opinion. Later research (McCombs & Ghanem 2001; McCombs & Shaw 2006) has questioned whether framing and agenda setting are indeed separate. Several scholars have also noted that agenda (and frame) setting can be *reversed* in the hybrid mediascape (Meraz 2009, 2011; Neuman et al. 2014; Zhou and Moy 2007) so that “online public agendas dictate media agendas, with with online attention by the public preceding the media agenda” (Araujo & van den Meer 2018, p. 8). As mentioned above, this trend can be observed in the case study that is the focus here. By agenda setting and framing, the media also *prime* their audiences to think about the world in certain ways. A concept from cognitive psychology, priming refers to the way media audiences respond to an issue in terms of prior context, and then use those perspectives to interpret subsequent information on an issue (Domke, Shah & Wackman 1998; Scheufele 2000; Arendt 2013). Agenda setting, framing and priming together have traditionally acted powerfully not just to tell media consumers what to think about, to paraphrase Cohen’s classic summation (Cohen, B 1963) but also *how* to think about those issues.

For the promoters of megaprojects, as well as for those that oppose them, to be able to influence legacy media agendas by affecting the *amount* of coverage on a project; to be able to control frames and therefore prime publics on *how to think* in these debates, are crucial goals. Together with journalistic practices, institutional factors and the news media’s interaction with PR, advertising, agenda-setting and priming have traditionally underscored the social construction of news. The representation of reality that the media offer as news is therefore a filtered and constructed reality. In unpacking the ways that the media cover megaprojects, and covered the HidroAysén project in particular, the *contingent* nature of media representation must therefore be borne in mind. In the current age of horizontal media, in which social reality is now the product of “deep mediatization” (Couldry & Hepp 2018) this picture is further complicated. I discuss in more detail below the ways that news related to the environment, and concept of “the environment” itself have become constructed, and then return later in the chapter to a survey of the current media landscape and the new ways that information is constructed here.

### **2.3 Constructing the environment, conveying risk**

### 2.3.1 The origins of 'the environment'

The social construct of 'environment' first entered the media in the later decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Nuclear testing, toxic smogs and mercury poisoning were reported with growing alarm in the 1950s and 1960s, and in 1962, Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* presented the dangers of DDT, making an early influential connection between science, nature, and human activity (Carson 1962). Then, in 1968, in images taken on the Apollo 8 mission, Earth was first seen rising above the desolate lunar landscape as a small, luminous globe set in the black abyss of space. *Earthrise from the Moon*, as the most published of these images became known, was described by US nature photographer Galen Rowell as "the most influential environmental photograph ever taken" (ABC 2009) – an eloquent portrait of the finiteness of our planet's environment. Widely reproduced in the US and global media, *Earthrise* galvanized public debate on sustaining ecosystems and the diversity of life in our fragile biosphere (Henry 2009). In the 1970s and 1980s, a series of manmade environmental disasters – the Ozone Hole (reported since the late 1970s), Three Mile Island (1979), Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986) and the *Exxon Valdez* (1989), brought environmental degradation and its toxic effects on humans under the global media spotlight (Anderson, A 1997). In Australia in 1972, protest against the Lake Pedder hydroelectric megaproject led to the establishment of the world's first green party (Lohrey 2002) and in 1983, watched by the world (Pybus & Flanagan 1990), protest brought down a government and halted a mega-hydro project (Lester & Hutchins 2006). In 1988, climate change entered the media arena when the *New York Times* reported NASA scientist James E. Hansen's statement that it was "99 per cent certain that the warming trend was not a natural variation but was caused by an accumulation of carbon dioxide and other artificial gases in the atmosphere" (Shabecoff 1988). From this critical moment the environment, and the risks environmental degradation posed for humans, including climate change (Boykoff M 2013; Boykoff, M & Boykoff 2004; Boykoff, M, Maldonado & Nacu-Schmidt 2018; Carvalho 2005; O'Neill & Boykoff 2011) assumed a permanent place in media reporting.

Of course, the concepts of "nature" and "environment" long predate their first regular appearance in the media. Throughout history, there has been a spectrum of (often competing) understandings on the interconnection of humans with nature. Torrance

(1998) traces a trajectory of representations of the “natural” across time and space from concepts of nature described in the 19<sup>th</sup> century writings of John Muir and Henry Thoreau, to medieval European epic poems, to Zen poetry and Classical Greece. As Murphy (2017) notes, imagining of human relationships with nature can also be traced back to Bible. More currently, and important to this thesis, are neoliberal, extractivist discourses of nature as a resource to be dominated and benefitted from, and coupled with this, Promethean discourses of endless growth (Dryzek 2005; Murphy 2017). What is important here is not to enumerate a list of historical and cultural narratives on nature and the environment, but to identify that these concepts are contingent on the societies in which they are embedded. Ideas on the meanings of “nature” and “environment” and human beings’ relationship to it (Anderson, A 1997; Dryzek 2005; Eder 1996; Macnaughton & Urry 1998) – including climate change (Pettenger 2007) – are socially constructed, with the parameters of each determined by the prevailing values, ideologies and politics of the societies from which they emerge, and filtered through the lenses of the media in which they are reported. The construction of nature and the environment through discourse is further discussed in section 2.6.5 below.

### *2.3.2 From a risk society to emancipatory catastrophism*

Just as ‘nature’ and ‘environment’ are socially constructed, the concept of risks associated with anthropogenic environmental damage depends strongly on social perceptions of such risks. Scholars in the social sciences have proposed a rich variety of conceptions of risk (Renn 1992). Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) and Dake (1991, 1992) saw cultural biases and social hierarchy as individuals’ sources of constructed understandings about nature and risk, but Beck’s (1992) Risk Society concept has become the most enduring theory on risk. In *Risikogesellschaft*, (1986, translated as *The Risk Society* in 1992), Beck defined risk as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself” (Beck 1992, p. 21, emphasis in the original). Beck argued that environmental risks had become the predominant product of industrial society – no longer just a manageable unpleasant side effect. For Beck, modernity is an era in which technology-induced hazards force reflexivity on all risks produced by human agency. “Reflexive modernisation”, wrote Beck, is the “inescapable ‘self-confrontation’ that accompanies the contemporary industrial way of

life" (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994, p. 5)<sup>8</sup>. For Giddens also, modernity is inherent with external and manufactured risk. Building on Beck's theory, Giddens characterised modernity as a time in which society is "increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk" (Giddens 1999, p. 5). Such risk-induced reflexive introspection can alter planned activities, so that perceived risk becomes the foundation for decision-making. In the risk society, therefore, any deliberation on social, economic and environmental issues that neglects to take risk into account is bound to fail. In the risk-laden business of megaproject development particularly, it is therefore "untenable...to act as if risk does not exist or to underestimate risk in a field as costly and as consequential" (Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter & Bruzelius 2003, p. 6).

Unlike the risks from megaprojects which can more accurately be quantified – or deliberately mis-quantified (Flyvbjerg, Garbuio, & Lovallo 2009; Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter & Bruzelius 2003) – many risks, like radiation, chemical toxicity, genetically modified organisms, even global warming, escape detection by the senses and may elude calculation. This immateriality, invisibility or illusiveness to quantification of some risks means that knowledge about risk becomes a construction: mediated, and therefore inherently contingent on interpretation (Adam, Beck & Van Loon 2000, p. 3). For Beck, the link between mediatized construction and contestation is clear. Beck (1999, 2006, 2009) attributes the media with a central role in shaping public risk perceptions (Lester 2010b, p. 54). He repeatedly acknowledges the media's centrality in conveying, contesting and evaluating environmental risk, so that for him, the risk society is always inherently "a knowledge, media and information society at the same time" (Beck 2000, p. xiv).

Media construction of meaning is now enacted in global forums and across global networks, creating a complicated web of claims and counter-claims on risk. In reporting environmental stories, competing claims are always significant. Claims that gain more coverage can set media agendas, determining how publics are primed to understand issues and how policy makers act, or fail to act, on risk mitigation. The large body of

---

<sup>8</sup> There have been several critiques of Beck's Risk Society including by Mythen (2007) for its lack of empirical detail, and on Beck's conceptualisation of the media's role in the risk society (Cottle 1998; Murdock et al. 2003; Anderson, A 1997).

literature on media coverage of anthropogenic climate change (Anderson, A 2009; Boykoff, J & Boykoff M 2007; Boykoff, M 2007, 2016; 2008; Boykoff, M, Maldondo & Nacu-Schmidt 2018; Boykoff, M & Rajan 2007; Carvalho 2005, 2007; Doyle 2011, 2016; McGaurr & Lester 2009; O'Neill & Boykoff 2011; Schäfer & Schlichting 2014), particularly the “balance as bias” issue in climate change reporting (Boykoff, M & Boykoff, J 2004), confirms the importance of who defines risks and how they are defined. Studies of media representations of the climate change risk, including in Chile (Dotson et al. 2012), show that media discourse on environmental risks does have a strong impact on public risk perceptions, and can shift the direction of public policy making. The politics of who defines risks (Beck calls these “relations of definition”, in deliberate contrast to earlier Marxist notions of “relations of production”) are therefore of great political significance, and potentially transformative, to issues and societies. Discourse on risk has become an arena where power balances can be altered, so that that “it is no longer “interests” that dominate the political horizon but rather claims about the legitimacy of particular forms of expertise and knowledge” (Adam, Beck & Van Loon 2000, p. 4). This is a landscape where it is difficult for institutional sources, like the multinational company that proposed to develop the HidroAysén megaproject, to have ultimate control over risk definition.

Since the Risk Society was conceptualised, the gravity and far-reaching effects of the global environmental crisis have become clear. In response, Beck (2015) has written of a risk-induced “metamorphosis of the world” (p. 76) which he regards as “an epochal change of horizons”, a “transfiguration of the social and political order” (p. 77). This change he calls “emancipatory catastrophism” because of hidden emancipatory possibilities which derive not from the negative side effects of “goods”, but the positive side effects of the risks or “bads” of modernisation. Such side effects (like climate change) can result in “anthropological shocks” (p. 79) which are opportunities to transform ways of seeing the world, to change politics, and which may ultimately lead to “social catharsis” (p. 79) and improved environmental and socioal justice. Using the example of flooding post-Hurricane Katrina and the issues of race and inequality in the US, Beck shows how environmental issues and debates can be effective in connecting the seemingly disconnected, so that risk that appeared “natural” was uncovered as risk that was also “social and political” (p. 80). Though the risk that Beck discusses here is

climate change derived, I build on Beck's conceptualisation in this thesis, arguing that risk from a megaproject like HidroAysén (even perceived risk, not actualised) can also result in the connection of the seemingly disconnected (in this case, dams and inequality), generating social catharsis and ultimately, greater environmental and social justice<sup>9</sup>. Crucially, Beck tells us that a such emancipatory, cosmopolitan, social catharsis does not happen automatically, and instead relies on "carrier groups engaging successfully in 'cultural work', in 'meaning work', in 'transformative work' of activists in witnessing the distant suffering of others" (p. 80, also see Kurasawa 2004, 2007). In section 2.6 below, I discuss literature in relation to media protest and activism in detail, but first I delve deeper into the antecedents to, and then the current, global media landscape in which the kind of activism that surrounded HidroAysén played out.

## **2.4 Mediatization and power in a global network society**

### *2.4.1 From public sphere to Network Society and mass self-communication*

In this section and the sections below, I move briefly through earlier theorisation on the the public sphere and the Network Society, and I discuss conceptualisations of the location of power in such a society. I then arrive at a discussion of the contemporary, globalised, communications landscape of "deep mediatization" (Couldry & Hepp 2018) which is the setting for the latter part of the megaproject debate being examined in this thesis. Because the HidroAysén controversy was situated both *before* and *during* the advent of mass digital era in Chile, historical antecedents are important in this debate, so I begin with these.

Habermas (1989 [1962]) defined the public sphere as: "a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed." Following Habermas, Dahlgren (2005) conceptualised such a sphere as "a constellation of communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of information, ideas, debates, ideally in an unfettered manner, and also the formation of political will" (p. 148). In a pre-internet

---

<sup>9</sup> Vara (2015) has also written on a South American approach to Beck's "metamorphosis" using the empirical example of lithium mining and protest against it in Bolivia, Chile and Argentina. Vara describes the current "unprecedented conditions that help traditionally disenfranchised peoples gain visibility and have a voice" (p. 103) in these countries in the lithium debate.

age, Habermas identified “newspapers and magazines radio and television” as “the media of the public sphere” (Habermas 1989 [1962], p. 49). This conception did not go unchallenged, garnering much discussion and critique (Curran 1991; Dahlgren 1995; Elliot 1986; Gitlin 1998; McKee 2005; Thompson, J 1995), including from Habermas himself who also wrote of the “refeudalisation” of the public sphere (Habermas 1989 [1962]). Despite this, many media scholars have accepted, with some contemporary caveats, the continuing importance of a public sphere<sup>10</sup> as a normative ideal for interrogating the contemporary media (Cottle 2006; Hepp & Couldry 2018; Kellner 2014; Shirky 2011). If a Habermasian public sphere required “inclusive, sincere and respectful reasoning” (Dahlberg 2007, p. 49) in debates between publically-orientated citizens who acted to scrutinise power and uphold democracy, then legacy print and broadcast media have long largely failed in this role, as a variety of scholars (Boggs 2001; Curran 1990, 2000; Gandy 2002; Kellner 2004; McChesney 1999; Savigny 2002; Thompson, J 1995) have shown. Habermas also pointed this out in his later writing, referring to the “colonization of the public sphere by market imperatives” and its effect of “polarization”, “dramatization” and “simplification” (2006 p. 422) of news.

In contrast, the internet was earlier seen as offering a forum for limitless freedom of opinion, and as a space for citizens to encounter and engage with a near-infinite range of views. Several theorists (Blumler & Gurevitch 2001; Gimpler 2001; Kellner 2004; Papacharissi 2002; Volkmer 2003) argued at this time that the new public arenas provided by the digital landscape of the internet constituted an effective space for democratic debate, and therefore represented a new, broadened public sphere<sup>11</sup>. Celebratory conceptualisations of the ways that digital technologies impacted the media and communications landscape variously regarded it as a “communication revolution” (Mansell 2002; McChesney 2007), creating a “cyberpublic” (Dahlberg, Lincoln 2007) and a “participatory culture” (Jenkins et al. 2006), enabling a real voice for “counter

---

<sup>10</sup> Fraser (2007) argues for a *transnationalization* of the public sphere – a notion supported by the transnational conflict being examined here.

<sup>11</sup> Consideration should be given to the digital divide. Currently 48% of the world’s population has access to the internet (International Telecommunications Union 2017), leaving just over half of the global population on the non-connected side of the “digital divide” (Chinn & Fairlie 2004). The digital divide in terms of access, however, has been shrinking: the ratio between internet access in OECD and developing countries fell from 80.6:1 in 1997 to 5.8:1 in 2007 (Castells 2009, p. 62). Wireless communication is leading the growth of internet access, particularly in the developing world. In 2017, 70% of the world’s 15-24 year-olds were using the internet (International Telecommunications Union 2017).



publics” and “digital democracy” (Dahlberg 2011). This conceptualisation regarded the internet as among the “technologies of freedom” (Castells 2009, p. 61), enabling a democratisation of communication so that the internet indeed resembled the Habermasian public sphere. Other scholarship at this time (Dean, Anderson & Lovink 2006; Keen 2007; Lovink 2011) considered amateur cultural production to impoverish, rather than to enrich culture, and to threaten mainstream media institutions. These scholars regarded the then relatively new landscape of digital communication as a place permeated by a “nihilist impulse” (Lovink 2007) towards a culture of “meaningless comment” (Lovink 2011) rendering new communication networks “networks without a cause” (Lovink 2011). McNair (2006) has referred to the multiplicity of voices competing for online attention as a “chaos paradigm”.

These kinds of contradictory tendencies are at the heart of Castells’ conceptualisation of the Network Society (Castells 1996c, 2000, 2004a, 2007, 2008, 2009): “a society whose structure is made around networks activated by micro-electronics based, digitally processed communication technologies” (Castells 2009, p. 23), and intrinsically a global society. This society’s networked organisation and modes of communication have therefore also been subject to the paradoxes of globalisation: where the global “space of flows” is at odds with the local “space of places” (Castells 1996b, 1996c, 2000; Castells & Ince 2003). The is a society once connected and fragmented, cosmopolitan and communitarian, autonomous and individuated, and whose structures have the capacity both to enhance democracy and perpetuate prevailing hegemony (See section 2.4.5 for greater detail on the paradoxes in “deep mediatization”).

In this context of globalising, converging media, where information is the new currency, what Castells (2007) terms “mass self-communication” has arisen. The landscape of mass self-communication is one of horizontal, interactive communication networks, facilitated by digital and wireless technologies. Castells defined this peer-produced media landscape as constituting a new medium, characterised by the fact that it is “*self-generated in content, self-directed in emission, and self-selected in reception by many who communicate with many*” (Castells 2009, p. 70, italics in original). In challenge to the traditional, institutional purveyors of information, mass self-communication has also offered access to the communication flows that construct meaning in the public mind.

The advent of this “social” form of communication, then, should have been revolutionising, particularly where contested claims-making in public debate is concerned. Now, a mouse click connects the infinitely globally networked to the local self. The media “produser” (Bruns 2006) now acts as his or her own filter of content. The role of the journalist has also changed in this context. No longer gatekeepers, practitioners of the traditional media are now increasingly “curators” (O’Sullivan 2012), “harvesters” and “managers” (Bakker 2014) of citizen-produced content. Instead of being creators and purveyors of news, they instead offer a guiding path through the fray.

Scholarly research has interrogated the notion of the social media spaces on the internet constituting a new deliberative public sphere to enhance democracy (Benkler 2006; Castells 2008; Shirky 2011), and particularly their role in protest and social movements (Alexanyan et al. 2012; Buechler 2016; Castells 2007, 2012; Mattoni & Treré 2014; Rahimi 2011; Segerberg & Bennett 2011; Valenzuela, Arriagada & Scherman 2012). Certainly, the autonomy and connectedness of mass self-communication in the network society appear to approach Habermas’ ideal realm for freedom of expression and formation of public opinion. If anyone on the internet-connected side of the digital divide can generate, transmit, receive and transform information almost instantly and almost infinitely, if collectively, “produsers” can promote issues so that they “go viral”, thereby defining the issues of the day (Goodman & Preston 2012); and if a great variety of actors can engage with a diverse spectrum of opinion and political standpoints, does this not constitute something approaching the discursive contestation of “deliberative digital democracy” (Dahlberg 2011)? Mass self-communication is a manifestation of the network society, however, and the paradoxical features of this global society – which permeate this medium as well – appear to limit its democratic potential.

Although internet-based communications connect, they also fragment (Anderson, C 2006; Iyengar & Hahn 2009; Katz 1996; Spohr 2017; Sunstein 2001, 2009, 2018), thereby limiting this medium’s potential to constitute a public sphere. Because internet users and search engines’ algorithms tailor online media experiences to fit particular world views, consuming information online often means consuming ideologically

similar information, resulting in a fragmented public sphere of multiple separate enclaves. In this landscape of “sphericules” (1998b), “echo chambers” (Colleoni, Rozza & Arvidsson 2014) “filter bubbles” (Spohr 2017) and “fake news” (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017; McNair 2017), group positions are reinforced rather than critiqued so that instead of facilitating a deliberative public sphere, the internet provides for a profusion of ideologically polarised media environments that never connect. The possibility for isolated filter bubbles to counter more cohesive institutional power in debates over the environment and development may therefore be diminished.

Castells regarded this synchronous connection and disconnection in all aspects of networks as emblematic of the network society. This “double logic of inclusion and exclusion” (Castells 2009, p. 29) he considered a structural feature of the network society itself. And the network society, of course, processes more than just information. Global capital and space-shrinking infrastructure are integral to this society, so that the logics that apply in this global society apply also to its material emblems built in steel and concrete – megaprojects. By this explanation, it is clear how globally-conceived megaprojects can run on a formula that consistently ignores or underestimates risk: actors that create the worst environmental risks are disconnected from it. By those same laws and logics, people whose lives megaprojects disrupt and displace are now, by the “death of distance” able to attract global attention to their protests, and perhaps galvanise transnational pressure against developing corporations who deny or ignore risk.

Because networks fragment and converge, connect and disconnect, incorporate and discard; power in networks is derived from the ability to control by what criteria the network conducts these functions (Castells 2009). This, crucially, is the power within networks. This is ultimately what decides which nodes remain in a network – in the case of communication networks, what information is valued as a commodity and whose voices are heard. Understanding with which actors this power lies is fundamental to understanding the power in the networked communications landscape that is the setting for battles over ‘the environment’. The following section turns to theories on where this now power lies.

#### *2.4.2 Communication Power*

Castells' network society conceptualisation builds on Touraine's ideas on social movements and identity (Touraine 1973), and Bell's conception of post-industrialism (Bell, D 1973, 1978). What Castells (2007, 2009) particularly offers, though, is a systematic appraisal of where *power* lies in networked organisation. So although Castells' theorisation on the network society has been variously criticised for being one-dimensional (Van Dijk 1999), for lacking a critical standpoint to evaluate social change (Stevenson 2002), and for offering no guidelines for future action (Lester & Hutchins 2006), this grounded theory of power in networks is still relevant, and important the study presented here. For Castells, power in the network society has four distinct forms. The last of these he calls "network making power", which he defines as having two functions:

- a) the ability to form networks and program the goals assigned to those networks; and b) the ability to connect networks so that they share common goals and resources, and can overcome competition from other networks.

(Castells 2009, p. 45)

Castells calls the holders of the first position "programmers" and the holders of the second "switchers" (Castells 2009, p. 45). For him, the programmers and switchers amongst the networks of the global network society are the fundamental holders of communication power. Who, or what, then, are these power holders?

In Castells' interpretation, the power holders in the network society are no longer nation states – networks traverse boundaries, undermining sovereignty. Neither are these power holders a power elite – this is a "simplified image of power in society whose analytical value is limited to some extreme cases" (Castells 2009, p. 47). The network society, founded on paradoxes, relies on more subtle, complex and negotiated systems of power. In the network society, programmers and switchers can be either single actors or networks of actors. These can either act in the interests of prevailing power, or they can act for counter power – both operate through the same mechanisms. A social movement therefore, may attempt to "re-program" the operation of established networks by using communication networks to campaign for and effect change: for example, mobilising the campaign for the cancellation of Third World debt. Or a politician, by investing in an election campaign, may operate the "switches" that connect

the dynamic interfaces between networks. Protest, even terrorism, may also have “switching” power, altering established connections between networks to disrupt the material infrastructure of “opposing” networks and achieve widespread media coverage – in Castells’ parlance “switching with the media”. Switching power can be bought by money, or at least the ability to generate value through a medium of exchange, for example: creating dramatic media events that increase audiences, therefore profits.

Lester and Hutchins (2015) have extended Castells’ (2009, 2012) and Arsenault & Castells’ (2008) ideas on switching points and switching power and have conceptualised “switching points” in environmental conflicts specifically as the locations where activism campaigns, journalism practices, politics and decision-making, and industry interact and intersect. These are sites in which both resistance and domination rely on the same network strategies – and both can hold power. However, Foxwell-Norton and Konkes (2018) found in their recent research on newspaper coverage of protection of Australia’s Great Barrier Reef that the voices of industry and formal politics have come, over time, to dominate discourses on environmental protection. For these authors, Lester and Hutchins’ four sites for switching therefore look more like “twin towers” (p. 19) with industrial and political discourses and definitions dominating these sites.

It is therefore those social actors who are best able to access networked flows of communication – who hold the keys to switching and programming the most networks – who ultimately dominate in such conflicts. Power lies, then, in the ability to construct discourses, frame meaning and to determine the content, direction and *interconnection* of more of the flows of information that construct the images in people’s minds. Whichever entity dominates those aspects of communication in the network society holds “communication power” (Castells 2007, 2009).

#### *2.4.3 Media ownership concentration and communication power*

Even though non-elite actors can now influence the content and connectedness of information flows, the relationship between power and counter power has not been entirely re-set. Much of the time it remains, as previously, a relationship of unequal power (Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993). The media ownership trends outlined above – consolidation, convergence, commercialization have substantial bearing on this. Media concentration in the US is highly illustrative of this tendency. In the first edition of *The*

*Media Monopoly* (1983), Bagdikian identified 50 media companies that dominated that country's media market: in 1987 there were 29, 23 in 1990, 10 in 1997, six in 2000 and five in 2004 (Hesmondhalgh 2007, p. 170). As discussed above, analysts including Arsenault and Castells (2008), Baker (2006), Campo Vidal (2008), McChesney (particularly 2008), Noam (2016), Rice (2008) and Thussu (2006), have documented a trend towards concentration of media ownership on a global scale, and as discussed above, digital media are also subject to conglomeration. Media in Latin America (Fox & Waisbord 2002; Mastrini & Becerra 2011) and specifically in Chile (Mönckeberg 2011; Godoy 2016) likewise demonstrate this trend towards conglomeration. Because actors that control the media also control the information flows that construct meaning in people's minds, the issue of media ownership concentration is fundamental to the power/counter power balance in the case study presented in this thesis. The media ownership landscape specific to Chile is addressed in detail in Chapter 3.

Network theory gives insights into why concentration of media ownership impacts plurality of information online. According to network theory, in large, scale-free networks, those nodes which already have many links acquire more, while nodes with fewer links gain fewer (van Dijk 2012). Search engine hits run on this principle – that the most popular nodes become even more popular. Castells calls this a “domino effect” (Castells 2009, p. 97). By this “power law in networks” (van Dijk 2012, p. 41), with larger networks controlling more of the flows of information online, communication inequality may be intensified, relegating alternative voices to the less influential “long tail” (Anderson, C 2006), in the myriad sphericules at the shallow end of the bitstream. When media conglomerates become larger, they therefore also gain enhanced ability to “switch” or create business partnerships with other non-media business, magnifying their financial, and ultimately their *communication* power.

#### *2.4.4 Social content as commodity*

The bottom line governing what information becomes most visible in global information networks – online and offline – depends on what sells to consumers, and what sells advertising. The value of advertising on the internet surpassed that in radio or magazines in 2008 (Castells 2009) and social media networks provide global media conglomerates new platforms and new audiences for this advertising. Major media

players have therefore sought to commodify internet-based mass self-communication in order to be able to harness autonomous user-produced content into markets (Arvidsson & Colleoni 2012, Flew 2008, Fuchs 2010, Zajk 2015). In the social media landscape, therefore, transmission of data is economised so that increasingly on the internet, “there is no ‘debating and deliberating’ that is not also ‘buying and selling’...participation is a commercial act.” (Goldberg, G 2010, p. 747). By such processes of dispossession of personal data for corporate exploitation, digital platforms such as social networking sites have therefore been conceived to “entrap individual creativity within private platforms” and “subject it to corporate control, surveillance, and the exploitation of users' immaterial labor” (Fenton & Barassi 2011). Social media and networked digital communication are thus not only channels through which citizens can exercise counter power, but constitute “a form of channeling or submitting to power” (Goldberg 2010, p. 749). Every instance of participation involves transfer of economised data, driving profitability for media companies. Therefore, as Couldry and Hepp (2018, p. 34) tell us, when they write about “datafication”, “data production is inherently asymmetrical...it is orientated to the purposes of institutions, private or governmental”. (For more on datafication see section 2.4.5 below.)

In the ways described above, then, the potential for the internet to act as a public sphere or spheres for discursive contestation is curtailed by growing media ownership concentration and the “switching” or interlocking of global corporate media and financial networks, even in the “autonomous” spheres of the internet. Global media companies have profited from convergence, deregulation and market liberalisation so that a decreasing number of multi-layered, multi-platform networked organisations now have potentially vast control over the information commodity. Despite this, the present global media landscape is no longer the one-way, vertically controlled landscape of older media paradigms. This is a diverse, interactive, global, above all *contested* media landscape. This is a landscape in which occasionally, counter power is able to “switch” and “reprogram” – often using the same mechanisms to communicate and influence as those that hold power. In section 2.5 below, I turn to a discussion of overarching media paradigms for understanding this contested media landscape, but first I examine further the current, paradoxical global landscape of deep mediatization.

#### 2.4.5 Globalisation and deep mediatization

Globalisation, as Giddens (1990) influentially wrote, is the “intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (p. 64). This process is primarily led by *media* connectedness, as I discuss above. Indeed, many scholars have argued that the globalisation of capitalism and a global social system have only been possible because of the networking capacity of digital communication technologies (Flew & McElhinney 2002; Grewal 2008; Kiyoshi, Lakshmanan & Anderson 2006; Waisbord 2013b). But, as I have already argued, the current global landscape is a paradoxical place. We are experiencing “the death of distance” (Cairncross 1997), but connectivity does not necessarily translate to social connectedness (van Dijck 2013). Globalisation, liberalisation, deregulation and digitisation both include and exclude; they both underscore inequalities (Ukpere & Slabbert 2009; Atkinson 2015) and undermine traditional systems of class. This is a society where an increased global flow of finance, people and communications (Lash & Urry 1994; Urry 2003) leads to an intensification of transnational social relations, undermining nation states; while at the same time emphasising human heterogeneity (Waisbord 2013b). It is a society where class and party-political allegiances have become weakened, and also a place where identity politics, social movements and “subpolitics” thrive (Alvarez, Dagnino & Escobar 2018; Castells 2012; Fominaya 2014). This vibrant, antagonistic landscape has both presented some opportunities for democratisation, as discussed above, and has increased fragmentation and internal contestation (Cottle 2006; Dahlberg 2007; Howard 2010). Such fragmentation has been linked to reassertions of nationalism and the rise of populism (Gerbaudo 2018; Groshek & Koc-Michalska 2017), and has been seen to threaten democracy itself (McChesney 2013; Morozov 2011; Persily 2017; Sunstein 2018). This is a landscape where elites no longer have a monopoly on knowledge claims (Cottle 2006) so that elite authority in terms of knowledge and class is diminished, and publics question more about the administration of risks and the future of the planet, fuelling an “ontological insecurity” (Giddens 1990, 1999) and a “cosmopolitan vision” (Beck 2006) that may promote environmental concern and protest.



In discussing the possibility for a metatheory of mediatization and globalisation, Waisbord (2013b; see also Gunaratne 2013) underscores that media are at the heart of this process of simultaneous connectedness and fragmentation. He writes that “the media are not simply just another system, industry or activity, but they have become the dominant system of contemporary societies”, and “the vortex of public attention, the über-system that defines public life and connects everyone” (p. 183)<sup>12</sup>. Other conceptualisations of the phenomenon of mediatization (Hepp 2012; Hjarvard 2013; Lundby 2009) also point to the fundamental interconnection and mutually constitutive nature of media and social life, and indeed, therefore, media’s essential role in constructing social reality (Couldry & Hepp 2018). In this digitally-saturated world, scholars have written of “panmediation” in which there is no discernible demarcation between the mediated and the real (DeLuca, Lawson & Sun 2012); “mediatized worlds” (Hepp & Krotz 2014); a “mediatized way of life” (Vorderer et al. 2015) and the “mediatization of society” (Hjarvard 2013; Strömbäck & Esser 2014). More recently, Couldry and Hepp (2018) have described a protracted “continuous and cumulative *enfolding* of communications within the social world”, which has culminated in the current phase of “deep mediatization” (p. 34), associated with an unprecedented level of embedding of media in social processes. This process has fundamentally intensified over the last decade. These authors use the term “media manifold” to describe the plurality and the multiply interlinked nature of contemporary media channels and interfaces (see also Hepp & Hasebrink 2018), and they see much of the present media manifold as being subsumed within the current phase of datafication so that media are no longer just a means of communication, but are also a means of collecting data about their users in real time (Hepp & Hasebrink 2018, p. 16). This means that social life is also therefore represented “in computerised data via media devices and their underlying software and infrastructure” (p. 19).

---

<sup>12</sup> Couldry and Hepp note a danger in framing mediatization in a way that is too Eurocentric, and point out that some countries in Latin America may have some differences in their modes of mediatization. I argue that in Chile’s case, such differences come mainly from the legacy of dictatorship and the mode of post-dictatorship media development. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. For more on mediatization and Latin America, see Martín-Barbero (2006) and Waisbord (2013d). Waisbord (2013d) notes many “blind spots” and “myths” (p. 112) in relation to the media globalisation paradigm. This thesis contributes empirical detail which can shed light on these kinds of blind spots.

The results of this fundamental entanglement in deep mediatization of our material systems of interdependence on normative principles such as freedom and autonomy have not yet been adequately theorised. However, empirical examples, like this study of the protracted mediatized conflict in Chile over HidroAysén can help contribute fine detail to our understanding of mediatized debates, and therefore also contribute to understandings of other inter-related metaprocesses of change, including globalisation.

In this literature review to date, I have endeavoured to detail many of the trends and influences both historical and contemporary, that constitute the media landscape in which the debate over HidroAysén megaproject debate played out. In the next section, bearing in mind the conditions of this landscape, I detail two overarching paradigms within which the HidroAysén debate can be conceptualised.

## **2.5 Two paradigms for conceptualising HidroAysén**

### *2.5.1 A media contest paradigm*

The above discussion makes clear that the media are both “the social space where contemporary power is decided” (Arsenault & Castells 2008, p. 328), and indeed, more fundamentally, a place where *reality* is constituted (Couldry & Hepp 2018). In the contemporary age of ubiquitous digital connectedness (the caveat of the digital divide considered) digitally-mediated actions are able to contest power, and sometimes to hold power. To recap, this unsettles previously established theoretical viewpoints, necessitating at least a partial shift away from earlier political economy and public sphere conceptualisations of the media (in Habermas’ sense), and necessitating also an understanding of the caveats on communication power in an age of deep mediatization and datafication. As a framework for understanding the conflicted, paradoxical landscape of the hybrid media space, Cottle (2006) described a “media contest model”, many aspects of which remain an appropriate paradigm for conceptualising a mediatized debate, like the HidroAysén controversy, which is permeated by struggles for media access and message control.

Studies that examine media reporting in periods of national (and international) disunity on policy making, those that examine how the media act (and can become *actors*) in such circumstances, and studies examining who participates in media representation of

conflict (for example, Cottle 2002, 2006; Elliot 1986; Entman 2004; Gilboa et al. 2016; Hallin 1986; Lester 2010; Livingstone & Lunt 1994; Robinson 2001; Rucht 2004) belong to what Cottle (2006) calls an overarching “media contest paradigm”. A key theorist of the media contest paradigm is Gadi Wolfsfeld, whose work on the role of media in the Middle East conflict and the Arab Spring (1997, 2004, 2011, 2018, also see Wolfsfeld, Segev & Shaefer 2013) outlines a “political contest model” that theoretically and empirically grounds the notion of both legacy and social media as sites for contest and competition. In his earlier writing, Wolfsfeld considered “the competition over the news media” as a “major element in modern political conflicts” so that national and international polities, and activist or terrorist groups and their issues or causes all “compete for media attention as a means to achieve political influence” (Wolfsfeld 1997, p. 2).

Wolfsfeld’s work, and the media conflict paradigm in general, have garnered criticism for lacking thorough explanation of how the forces of the market shape the operation of the media. This paradigm also pays scant regard to the economic, including only passing reference to media ownership structures and to the persistent frames of media genres developed to appeal to target audiences (Cottle 2006; Cottle & Rai 2006). In addition, this model in its earlier iterations attributes politics with more power to influence the media than vice versa – although much scholarship (Cohen, Tsafati & Sheaffer 2008; Lester & Hutchins 2006; Meyer & Hinchman 2002; Neumann 1996; Robinson 2001) shows that this equation is not so clear. More recent work in the media conflict paradigm including studies that unpack the interaction of social movements with both legacy and social media (McCurdy 2012; Uldam and Askanius 2013), and such interactions in the Arab Spring conflicts in particular (Cottle 2011 a & b; Hänska Ahy 2016; Rane & Salem 2012; Wolfsfeld, Segev & Shaefer 2013) show how an inextricably *hybrid* media ecology is now the location for the enactment of mediatized conflicts.

For the research presented here – a detailed case study of a mediatized symbolic struggle between unequal partners – the media contest model’s methodological approach of analytical empiricism is well suited. Appropriately for this study, this model can illuminate the complexities of media access and exclusion, and the politics, opportunities and risks of media participation. As this study does, the media contest paradigm also regards the media as public arena(s) for the waging of strategic and

symbolic contests. What Wolfsfeld's political contest model particularly lacks, for the purposes of this study, is sensitivity to signs and symbols in texts, and their role in the representation of meaning. It also confines itself mostly to media reporting, neglecting analysis of visual and audiovisual texts, which are central to the both sides' strategic communications in the conflict studied here. The media culture paradigm I now discuss below offers ideas that can address these shortcomings.

### *2.5.2 A media culture paradigm*

Arising out of the neo-Marxist theorisation of Gramsci, Williams, Thompson and Althusser, the European structuralism of Saussure, Barthes and Strauss, and the critical cultural theory of Hall (Hall 1974/1980) this conceptualisation of the media – for Cottle (2006) a “media culture paradigm” – understands struggles for hegemony as being played out through mediatized popular culture. The media culture paradigm concerns itself with how culture is mediated and how ethnic, gender, class and national identities are represented and contested in the media (Hall 1982; Turner 1996). Subsequent studies (Lehmann-Wilzig & Cohen-Avigdor 2004; Stober 2004) have also acknowledged the role that evolving new media technologies played in the cultural construction of identities and contesting power.

A key early theorist of this paradigm was Douglas Kellner (Kellner 1995, 2003), whose views on media culture and media spectacle also extended a theoretical space for interrogating contest within the media. Kellner conceptualised a culture in which mediatized image, sound and spectacle produced the fabric of everyday life, “dominating leisure time, sharing political views and social behaviour, providing the materials out of which people forge their very identities” (Kellner 1995, p. 1). Kellner wrote of this media culture as shaping people's worldview and their deepest values, defining a sense of “us” and “them”, and “what is good or bad, positive or negative, moral or evil”. It is these kinds of oppositions that led Kellner to argue for media culture as:

a contested terrain across which key social groups and competing political ideologies struggle for dominance and that individuals live these struggles through images, discourses, myths and spectacles of media culture.

(Kellner 1995, p. 2)

Kellner has also situated his media culture theory within the trajectory of globalisation, acknowledging its democratising, as well as its democracy-limiting possibilities. For this theorist, “technocapitalism”, which synthesises capital and technology in the media industries is a key territory for the cultural embodiment of social struggles. Here, “media spectacle” (Kellner 2003, p. 11) – media representations of the sensational, the scandalous, the violent, unusual or bizarre – is a key aspect in the contestation of mediatized conflict. In this model, instead of public spheres or arenas, there are “public screens” (DeLuca & Peeples 2002; DeLuca, Lawson & Sun 2012) and “image events” used as a rhetorical tactic (DeLuca 2006). *Images* are therefore a form of argumentation through which meaning is contested and created. Brunner and DeLuca (2016) have written most recently of the ways that images, particularly in environmental debates, flow through the new datascape of “panmediated networks” on “wild public screens” (where images collide, overlap are reformed and “run wild between platforms and users”, p. 284). These authors also propose the notion of “affective winds”, the force of rhetorical power of images that moves viewers to engage and interact with visual arguments; and “image events”: performances designed to be captured in images and spread across digital platforms.

The media culture paradigm was earlier criticised for being overly media centric, even media determinist, for giving only cursory treatment to media political economy, media production dynamics, social contexts and the broader trajectories of conflicts played out in the media (Cottle 2006). Being concerned primarily with the meanings that can be read *in* media texts, a study employing a purely media culture perspective could neglect important phenomena in mediatized conflicts – like those aspects of a story that frames *exclude* (Gitlin 1980), those details that sources prefer to keep *out* of the media by the kinds of strategies that Ericson calls “enclosure” (Ericson, Baranek & Chan 1989) and Thompson calls “invisibility” (Thompson, J 1995, 2000, 2005, 2011).

Several aspects of the media culture approach, however, offer a suitable theoretical framework for the study presented here. The interpretivist and structuralist epistemology of the media culture paradigm makes it suitable for enquiring into the semiotics and spectacle of image-based media texts, like the visual and audiovisual

campaign and advertising material that proliferated in the HidroAysén debate. This multiperspectival study therefore uses this strand of the media culture approach in its analysis of such material in the discourse around the megaproject.

## **2.6 Media and protest in the digital age**

### *2.6.1 Technology and autonomy: result and cause*

In a deeply mediatized world, user generated content provides opportunities to reach beyond the hyper-local of one's own online identity to the infinitely linked hyper-global of networked communication<sup>13</sup>. It is in this context that protest is now enacted. Before continuing to a survey of literature on digitally-mediated protest, however, I address an important point. While this study *does* regard the advent of the digital communication landscape as transformative, it does not attempt to advance an argument that is technologically determinist (McLuhan 1962). In considering digital media as a means for contesting power, it should be acknowledged that reasons for protest and contestation must pre-exist in order for publics to seek to exercise counter-power. Mobilisation of public opinion and the collective action of social movements cannot exist without the precursor of perceived injustices or abuses by power holders. To suggest otherwise undermines human agency – and the actions of those who put themselves in danger to advance their struggles. As Castells puts it, “neither the media, nor any other technology, for that matter, can be a source of social causation” (2012, p. 228-229). As Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheaffer (2013) note, “politics comes first”. Technology itself does not drive human action – rather, technology is a tool.

However, the networks of the internet go beyond instrumentality. While avoiding a technologically deterministic argument, the discussion here makes clear that the internet and instant, global communications have both *revealed* the juxtaposed inequalities of a globalised world, and *created* many of the conditions that facilitate and perpetuate movements of protest against such injustices. The internet has spurred individuation (Beck 1992; Castells 2009; Giddens 1991; Stiegler 2009) and it also creates a “culture of autonomy” (Castells 2012, p. 230) in which individuals tend to

---

<sup>13</sup> This is, as Hepp (2013) puts it “deterritorialized translocal communication” because in mediatized worlds, “territoriality is not constitutive” (p. 97).

structure their actions independently of societal institutions. But the technology of social networks, by providing platforms for the aggregation of individual experiences or grievances, now takes individual actors beyond the *individual* autonomy of individuation to an environment of shared experiences, thus fostering group autonomy. Group autonomy in internet-based networks is fundamental to digitally-mediated protest. It allows leaderless, networked movements to establish, to share ideas, to coordinate protest, to avoid repression, and to thrive. The circular connection between the internet and autonomy is borne out by research. Earlier survey work conducted in Spain suggests that the more autonomous people feel in their lives, the more they use the internet, and that, over time, the more internet use increased, the more feelings of autonomy increased (Castells & Tubella 2005). Similarly, internet use has been shown to increase feelings of empowerment, personal freedom and influence<sup>14</sup> – an effect noted to a greater degree in groups with lower socio-economic means, as well as in the developing world (Breuer & Grosher 2014; Kelly 2010; Sasaki 2017). Autonomy and empowerment therefore seem closely connected to frequent engagement with the networks of the internet<sup>15</sup> – and these transformative effects seem more important for the previously disempowered.

The emergence of protest in the digital landscape – made instant and ubiquitous by wireless technologies – can therefore be regarded as both the *result* of autonomy building, and its *cause*. In these networks, a culture of sharing has emerged out of the culture of autonomy, so that where people have shared their mediated sociality (Sassen 2004) it is natural for them also to share their outrage, their hope, and their struggle (Castells 2012). It is here, then, that socially networked protest and digitally-enabled social movements have been born.

### 2.6.2 Media-protest hybridity and reflexivity

The possibilities that mobile and social media have offered for facilitating and organising protest – evident, to give some disparate examples, in a host of social movements from the Arab Spring uprisings, to the transnational Occupy movement, to

---

<sup>14</sup> Social media have been shown to boost citizens' participation in election campaigns and voting, for example, by Castells (2009), Erkul and Kes-Erkul (2009) and Metzgar and Maruggi (2009).

<sup>15</sup> It should be noted, however, that the notion of a correlation between the level of social media penetration and the amount of protest in a country has been complicated, as Wolfsfeld, Segev and Shaefer (2013) show in the case of the Arab Spring uprisings.

#MeToo, to struggles against mining in El Salvador culminating in 2017, to the current (2018) *gilets jaunes* movement in France<sup>16</sup>, and of course of most interest to this study, in 2011's widespread student and environmental protests in Chile – has led to such events being labelled 'social media movements,' even Facebook or Twitter 'Revolutions'. Such dramatic claims for the democratising capabilities of social media have met with scepticism in many analyses of the Arab Spring, at least (Aouragh & Alexander 2011; Cottle 2011; Ghannam 2011; Krarroub & Bas 2016; Morozov 2009)<sup>17</sup>. Certainly, though, an important point around media use in such uprisings and social movements is the *hybridity* of the media environment that surrounded (or surrounds) their organisation, spread and reporting. Though social media have been crucial to these movements, socially networked protest must still work in tandem with traditional media to spread its message and become "creatively infused" (Cottle & Lester 2011, p. 298) inside existing transnational media networks.

In the case of the protest around HidroAysén in particular, it should be remembered that the trajectory of the megaproject began *before* social media platforms were ubiquitous in Chile, and unfolded just at a time that social media use was gaining momentum in this setting. By the time street protests over the megaproject erupted in mid-2011, social media use was indeed widespread (see detailed discussion in Chapter 3, section 3.13). A framework for understanding mediatized protest and activism surrounding HidroAysén therefore needs to take into account legacy media and protest interaction, as well as the later intersection of social media and protest, when the media arenas in which HidroAysén was constructed became a "bifurcated theoretical object" (ibid., pp. 29-30), a hybrid space of old media, interpenetrated with peer-produced social media.

Earlier seminal studies of media/protest interactions (Gitlin 1980; Halloran, Elliott & Murdock 1970; McLeod & Hertog 1992; Murdock 1981; Shoemaker 1984) show that, historically, the media have almost invariably reported protest through a delegitimising framework of law and order, habitually focusing on violence, drama and spectacle and

---

<sup>16</sup> Here, misinformation and fake news have also been a prominent factor in promoting the uprising (Henley, *The Guardian* 9/12/2018).

<sup>17</sup> Kharroub and Bas (2016, p. 1976) have noted that discussing the of the role of social media in revolutions from either utopian or dystopian perspectives is an over-simplification, and that we should now ask "how" rather than "whether" social media play a key role in such uprisings.



most often privileging or “indexing” (Bennett 1990) elite voices. Media framing of protest has long representationally denigrated or even demonised protesters and their actions – and emphasised violence (Gitlin 1980) – so that the causes of protests have tended to become trivialised and marginalised, obscured by the reporting of the protest actions themselves. Despite the intervention of the peer-produced digital landscape, the trends above remain a framework for which there has been much continuing empirical support (Archibald 2011; Bowers 2011; Cammaerts 2013; Cottle 2008; Guzman 2015; Juris 2011; Lan & Meng 2016; Lynn & Williams 2016; Power, Haynes & Devereux 2016; Murray et al. 2011; Rosie & Gorringer 2009). Waisbord (2013a) shows, however, that in the Latin America context, mainstream media is not uniformly opposed to mobilised citizens, and can sometimes be sympathetic to citizens’ demands. This is a trend observed during the height of protests over HidroAysén in at least one conservative newspaper, as discussed in Chapter 7<sup>18</sup>.

Researchers have also, however, pointed to the now changed relationships between protest, media, publics and power, noting trends in the global news arena such as an occasionally more hospitable media climate for protests (Bowers 2011; Rojecki 2002; Elmasry and el-Nawawy 2017), and the difficulty, in a globalised communications environment, for states to contain media messages – both incoming and outgoing (Hayes & Guardino 2010). In this context transnational public opinion has been shown to matter increasingly in elite decision making (Shaw 2005; Tumber & Webster 2006) so that authorities must recognise “how integrated global media, institutions and public opinion have become” (Shaw 2005, p. 75). And because there is now more mutual reflexivity (Davis, A 2009; Lester 2006) between media, publics and decision makers, reporting on global issues is also felt locally. This reflexivity and perceived interconnectedness even has the potential, according to some theorists, to generate “enforced enlightenment” (Beck 2009) or “mediated cosmopolitanism” (Robertson 2010) based on a “transnationalising ethics of care” (Cottle & Lester 2011, p. 24). Journalism itself is also influenced by this reflexive trend. The transnational flows of user-generated ideas and images which penetrate contemporary journalistic practice, can bring a degree of social media’s reflexivity to traditional media’s repertoire.

---

<sup>18</sup> For a particularly interesting case study of media, protest and extractivism in Latin America (in this case, oil drilling in the Ecuadorian Amazon) see Coryat (2015).

This notion of a symbiotic relationship between media and protest – not only in the present media landscape, but notable across several decades – has historically been conceptualised as a “tug-of-war” (Gans 1980) and also, perhaps more appropriately, as a as a “tap dance” (Castells 2004b, p. 168), which Lester (2010b, p. 114) has conceptualised as “occurring within agreed arenas and involving known steps” and yet still being “open to some improvisation”. Even in the current landscape of deep mediatization, this dance of move, response and counter move is at the heart of the relationship between media, protest and power, and defines the strategies protesters use to attract legacy media attention. Before I proceed to an analysis of some of these strategies, though, an additional important factor in the media/protest landscape should be identified.

### *2.6.3 A dance for three*

Protest invariably has an object – and an objective. The objects of protests are most often authorities: governments who persecute their citizens, institutions that reinforce global inequity, corporations that spill oil, cut trees, fish whales under the guise of scientific research, or plan environment-altering, community-displacing megaprojects. The objectives of protest may be to highlight injustices, depose leaders, stop or delay operations – and they are also almost always to get noticed by the media. Protest, of course, is also keenly noted by authorities against which it is directed, and invariably induces a mediatized response – or pre-emptive campaign – on their part. Such strategic communications responses have increasingly become a third partner in the dance of media and protest, so that public relations is now vital to the power balance in mediatized protests.

Public relations (PR) has been conceptualised, as touched on above, as an aspect of source-media relations. The use of media managers, public relations consultants, carefully framed media releases and stage-managed media events has become crucial to institutions who seek to have their messages “representationally legitimated” (Cottle 2003, p. 5) and are a means to gain “definitional advantage” (ibid., p. 7) over the promoters of opposing messages in media arenas. PR has also long had a conflicted relationship with journalism, with one prominent UK journalist describing his profession’s reliance on public relations information subsidy as “hideous and

degrading” (Peston 2014) and another describing the relationship as “an assault on democracy” (Greenslade 2012). Davis (2000, p. 40) characterised the influence of PR on access to the media as, at its simplest, a constriction or amplification of the public sphere. But other research has shown (Cottle 2003) that the “dance” between media, protest and PR encompasses most of the fundamentals of making news. Strategic communications professionals (many of them ex-journalists) produce information subsidy that coincides with news values, they provide journalists with ready-made frames, and their work, filled with legitimising quotes from elite sources, is readily used by journalists in the pressurised 24/7 news cycle. The historical logic has been that, with greater resources to buy greater strategic communications influence, better resourced institutions have greater agenda setting potential and, ultimately, greater communication power. For some theorists, this has amounted to a “crisis in public communication” (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995) which has fundamentally undermined any notion of an independent Fourth Estate (Davis, A. 2000b).

Corporations’ efforts at “generating consent” (Latta 2010) through establishing a social licence to operate can be conceived of as an additional aspect of corporate PR and corporate social responsibility (CSR) communications. (For a discussion of CSR in Chile, see section 3.14). This notion of creating consent for a project, has emerged both as a practice and a discourse in institutional decision making, and has become a key concept in relation to the study of mediatized environmental conflict (Bice 2014; Boutilier 2014; Lester 2016; Parsons and Moffat 2014). Boutilier notes, however, that institutions’ definitions of social licence often blur meaning to such a degree that they lose value as a tool for promoting collaboration (2014, p. 271). Companies also tend to “obfuscate processes of acquiring a social licence by making irrefutable assertions that present contestable claims as established facts” (Parsons and Moffat, 2014, p. 353). Such “strategic manipulation” (Flyvbjerg, Garbuio & Lovallo 2009, p. 175) in relation to attempts to generate social licence certainly occurred in the case of HidroAysén, as the discussion in the following chapters demonstrates.

Despite this kind of PR-led obfuscation, however, by using PR to engage in the “mediatised rituals” (Cottle 2004, p. 43) that have previously been the domain of official institutions and authorities, resource-poor organisations are currently able to make significant interventions in mediatized discourses. Legitimacy and authority, then, are a

form of “cultural capital” (Bourdieu 1979, 1993) which is not purely determined by economic capital. As Davis (2000, p. 50) put it:

In theory, non-official sources can use professional public relations to accumulate such capital and, in effect, simulate the authority and legitimacy of institutional sources. By providing a constant supply of information subsidies (news stories and research) to journalists, non-official sources can establish themselves in media discourses as legitimate sources. This process, in itself, encourages a larger media profile and usually results in a further accumulation of institutional legitimacy.

Several earlier studies have documented the work of environmental groups in this context (Anderson, A 1993; Hansen 1993), and have determined that PR has been able to confer some degree of definitional advantage in the context of environmental conflict. If PR can aid lesser-resourced organisations in influencing media discourses, this can contribute to a more “dynamic process of contestation” (Davis, A. 2000b) for environmental claims-makers too. In a media landscape where PR’s strategic interventions are so prevalent, however, ‘non-official sources’ are increasingly *expected* by the media to contest their claims in the same way as ‘official sources’. This means using strategic communication strategies that align more closely with the privileged formation of the space of flows, than the space of places where protest action (and the reasons for protest) are often located (Lester & Hutchins 2006). As these researchers demonstrate, this requires activists to be “part of the game” (ibid. p. 446) – that is, to be relentlessly reflexive and responsive in their communication strategies. As Lester and Hutchins also note, if protest fails to achieve this standard of communication, this “provides journalists with the leverage to ignore environmentalists or dismiss them as representing sectional interests more interested in environmental ‘marketing’ and ‘stunts’ than credible threats to wilderness” (ibid, p. 447).

For the purposes of this study, which examines the move-and-response strategic communications campaigns of a megaproject’s promoters (these aligned with the interests of government and capital, located in the space of flows); against an environment movement campaign (rooted locally, in the space of places, but obliged to conduct publicity and attract attention in the same media arena as its opponents), a clear theoretical framework for understanding PR is essential. The next chapter examines in more detail the Chile-specific media/PR landscape as further context for

this research.

#### 2.6.4 *Visibility and invisibility*

The overriding aim of protest, no matter its object, is to be seen and heard, both in digital networks and in legacy media. This relationship between media and protest is mutually beneficial: protests can provide journalists with good copy and compelling images (Lester & Hutchins 2006), and these in turn attract audiences, increasing profitability. Being noticed by the media achieves visibility for non-elite actors and mediated visibility can help to call attention to one's situation or to advance one's cause and enhance credibility. As John. B. Thompson, author of extensive analyses of visibility and publicness (Thompson, J 1995, 2000, 2005, 2011b) writes, achieving visibility through the media "is to gain a kind of presence or recognition in the public space". But equally, the inability to achieve such mediated visibility can confine a protest group to obscurity – which, in the worst cases, "can lead to a kind of death by neglect" (Thompson, J 2005, p. 49). Ultimately, an actor's (or a network of actors') degree of visibility has a strong correlation with the extent of their political power (ibid., p. 36). But, as I discuss below, the ability to be *invisible* is also an important attribute of the powerful (Lester & Hutchins 2012).

Thompson's work on mediated visibility and invisibility draws on the work of Foucault which examined the changing relations between visibility and power in Western societies. Foucault used the example of an 18<sup>th</sup> Century prison architecture ideal, a Panopticon (in which inmates were always visible to invisible prison guards) to conceptualise a model for the organisation of power relations in modern societies. This model of 'panopticonism', like the physical structure, conceived of individuals being increasingly part of a system where surveillance of them was a means of control (this in contrast to earlier models of power where citizens were *observers*, not the observed, and where for the powerful to maintain power required that citizens be the witnesses of power-infused spectacle.) Thompson points out, however, that in Foucault's Panopticon analogy of power through surveillance, he has neglected the role of the media. As Thompson puts it:

Whereas the Panopticon renders many people visible to a few, the media enable a few people to be visible to many: thanks to the media it is

primarily those who exercise power, rather those over whom power is exercised, who are subjected to a new kind of visibility.

(Thompson 2005, pp. 40-41)

This kind of visibility does not require that the observers share a common locale – which this is the crux of the importance of mediatized visibility in protest. By becoming visible in the “despatialized space” (Thompson, J 2011a, p. 63) of contemporary media – Hepp’s (2013) “deterritorialized translocal communication” (p. 97) – protesters bring the actions of the few to the scrutiny of the many, and in the digital age, this can be the transnational or global many. Peer production of protest material now arguably also brings visibility of the many to the many – a “participatory panopticon” (Cascio 2005) – fostering the kind of group autonomy and solidarity that Castells (2012) has described as a necessary pre-cursor for digitally enabled protest.

In the case of environmental protest, creating “visibility” is often a case of bringing images and news from remote, threatened, unseen places to television sets, newspaper front pages, smartphone news apps, Facebook sites or Twitter feeds. But creating visibility can also be a case of bringing to light information that industry or government would rather keep invisible. Indeed, disclosing to individuals affected or potentially affected by contamination, by global warming or by a megaproject development, for example, facts that industry or government would rather keep hidden, has been one of the defining roles of the environmental movement to date (Anderson, A 1997; Hansen 2010; Lester & Hutchins 2012). The struggle for visibility is therefore above all a struggle for *control* of information, (Lester & Hutchins 2012) waged in behind-the-scenes media and PR practices, in contested media arenas, and also at the private-public interface where the power to keep information invisible or to force its revelation can a decisive power in mediatized battles. This struggle can the sometimes lead to “unexpected outcomes” (ibid., p. 20), even a “fair fight” (Wolfsfeld 1997).

Although in the age of deep mediatization, the social movements are perhaps more visible than at any time previously, environmental protest still struggles to access legacy media and maintain legacy media attention (Hutchins & Lester 2009, 2011; Rucht 2013). And there is a persistent dependence on mainstream media to reinforce the frames of such movements to the public, so that, despite the internet, “to reach the public at large, the key channel was and is getting access to and coverage by the

established media” (Rucht 2013, p. 262). Environmental battles – so complex and protracted, and so misaligned with media’s predilection for event-orientated news can achieve some moments of success in terms of mediatized visibility, but they often lack sustained visibility or switching power. Social movements must therefore rely heavily on their own “movement media” and “self-mediation” (Cammaerts 2015, see also Cammaerts 2012, 2013; Downing 2008). Although the internet potentially allows protest to reach substantial, even transnational audiences, this is not easily achieved, and much of the communications activity of social movements may be limited to those who “tune in”, which may produce an “echo chamber” effect (Boutyline & Willer 2017). Occasionally, however, in the struggle for visibility and control of information in protest, there arise events or images – not always orchestrated media spectacles – which become iconic images, symbolic of a protest or a cause. When such attention-attracting, meaning-creating symbols arise in mediatized conflict, they can hold enormous, even decisive symbolic power.

#### *2.6.5 Symbolic power and discourse*

Montgomery, Alabama, 1955: Rosa Parks refuses to give up her seat on a bus. Bangkok, Thailand 2008: Red-shirt protesters splash their own blood under the gates of a besieged Government House. Wall Street, New York, 2011: Protesters’ placards read “We are the 99%”. Forestry coupe TN044B, Southwest Tasmania, 2013, Miranda Gibson spends her second year of internet-connected anti-forestry protest in a tree. Coyhaique, Chile, 2007: a hundred-strong horseback cavalcade, banners and flags flying, enters the regional capital after a 9-day protest journey through dam-threatened Patagonia<sup>19</sup>.

All these acts and images are products of the struggle of protest for visibility, and all share symbolic power. Arising out of theorisation of Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1977, 1991, 1998) which conceives of human “fields” of action and the “habitus” that creates cultural, social and symbolic capital, symbolic power can be defined as “the capacity to intervene in the course of events and influence the actions of others by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms” (Thompson 2005, p. 50; see also Bourdieu 1991). Bourdieu conceptualises the exercise of symbolic power as “symbolic

---

<sup>19</sup> For an interesting piece on symbols and symbolic power from a different cultural perspective, see Tang & Yang (2011); and for a perspective on the symbolic power of the transnational visibility of suffering, see Chouliaraki (2008).

violence” - the domination of the holder of greater cultural capital over the holder of less (Bourdieu 2004; Topper 2002). Symbolic power may therefore even, as a more pervading power, structure society and construct reality (Bourdieu 1991, p. 166; Couldry 2000, 2003, 2014). It is therefore:

a power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force.

(Bourdieu 1991, p. 170)

The exercising of symbolic power is never explicit. In fact, Bourdieu characterises symbolic power as “misrecognised” power, whose efficacy lies in the fact that those who benefit least from the exercise of it participate, to some extent, in its wielding (Thompson, J 2004). Symbolic power is usually exercised by those that dominate established social hierarchies, so that when it is achieved by those that seek to exercise counter-power, it can upset these established hierarchies.

For Bourdieu it is *language* that above all creates the world: the power of language determines the social structures through which meaning and symbolic power are created – and also contested. This is a notion allied to Foucault’s conceptualisation of the power of discourse:

a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment. ...Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But...since all social practices entail *meaning*, and meanings shape and influence what we do – our conduct – all practices have a discursive aspect.

(cited by Hall 1997, p. 44)

For Foucault, therefore, it is discourse, and discursive practices, that embody and legitimise power. Indeed “power/knowledge” are fundamentally linked (Foucault 1977, 1980). Those that wield power determine which “objects” can be spoken of; the “ritual” of where and how actors may speak; and also “who” can speak or whose voices are heard (Foucault 1972). This “disciplinary power” that Foucault understands as being



inherent in discourse – like Bourdieu’s “symbolic violence” – can therefore enhance or constrain truth (Strega 2005). Contesting the knowledge/power binary by controlling discourse through the creation of symbolic power must, then, be the aim of protest. When symbolic power in discourse *is* achieved by protesters (though it may not be as effective as Castells’ switching power) it can – more than mere visibility – “temporarily *destabilize* or optimally, *disrupt* the smooth functioning of capital and government” (Hutchins & Lester 2011, p. 161).

For protest in the context of the network society, attaining discursive and symbolic power occurs particularly in the production of, and facilitating the transmission via the media of, symbolic forms in image as well as text. If a protest can gain visibility in the media, the imagery, the rhetoric and the symbolic acts (for Foucault, practices) that become associated with it in the public mind may be able to achieve moments of symbolic power. Symbolic power only ever constitutes the *symbols* of resistance, not the *actuality* of resistance. Because symbolic power is only representational, not actual; the action, rhetoric and spectacle that can create it are not exclusive to resource-rich institutions. Resource-poor groups may be pitted against official institutions whose economic power is substantial, yet a “carefully targeted strategy aimed at mobilising an issue to draw attention to wider concerns can be very successful in the realm of symbolic politics” (Anderson, A 1997, p. 209). Challenging the “strategic power and routinized media interventions of dominant institutions” (Cottle 2004, p. 41) can allow resource-poor groups to effectively influence their own discursive representation in the media.

As Jeffrey Alexander lays out in his analysis of the American civil rights movement in *The Civil Sphere* (Alexander 2006), successful protests and struggles must therefore work above all to ensure their favourable discursive representation. Their primary concern, must not be “connected with force”, but rather with symbolic “efforts at persuasion” (ibid., p. 419). However, in contested media arenas, the objects of protest (for example: government, corporations, megaproject developers) may also strategically attempt to construct protesting activists negatively (Goldberg, C 2007) in an attempt to discredit them. Because of this, being able to achieve greater symbolic power than one’s opponent in a conflict is fundamental. “Power conflicts”, as Alexander puts it, are therefore “not simply about who gets what and how much” in terms of

mediatized visibility, they depend above all on discursive and symbolic representation.

They are about who will be what and for how long. Representation is critical. In the interplay between communicative institutions and their public audiences, will a group be represented in terms of one set of symbolic categories rather than another? This is the critical question.

(Alexander 2006, pp. 233-234)

In the creation and exercising of symbolic power in the discourse of mediatized conflicts, actors need therefore to be concerned with maintaining and controlling their representation on two levels. The first is to attempt to steer how the media portrays them and the second is to attempt to counter or contain what Lester terms “strategic interventions” (Lester 2010a, p. 590) against symbolic power by their opponents in the conflict. In relation to environmental conflict, Lester (ibid.) has shown how such interventions can be made by all players in contested politics: by protest groups, by those against which protest is directed, and indeed by the media themselves. The media can thus become *actors* in the discourse that surrounds mediatized conflicts: as Cottle puts it, they become “implicated within conflicts while disseminating images or ideas about them” (Cottle 2006, p. 9).

For this study, which examines a mediatized environmental conflict which is redolent both with attempts to create symbolic power, and strategic interventions to contain that power, a framework for understanding the power of symbols in the discursive contestation of power is essential. This study understands, therefore, that mediatized conflicts, as well as being a competition for visibility, are a contest for the *control* of symbolic power in discourse. A recognition that the media can become important actors in mediatized conflict is also fundamental to this case study.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

In surveying the literature on media production, the construction of “the environment”, new media landscapes and mediatization, and also on power and protest; this chapter has drawn on a multiperspectival theoretical framework for understanding this thesis’ argument on the mediatized representation of a contested megaproject. Building on the discussion of symbolic megaprojects in Chapter 1, this chapter has also surveyed the globalised media landscape and the transnationalisation of protest which I show have

arisen from the same roots as transnational megaprojects themselves. I also show that the power to control symbols in discourse, and ultimately the power over *communication*, is the definitive power in this landscape.

In the development of megaprojects, this contemporary location of power is highly significant. While historically, authorities, governments and official institutions claimed ascendancy in “relations of definition” of risk, and were routinely the holders of greater symbolic power, in a deeply mediatized world, such institutions increasingly have to counter symbolic power exercised by non-elite actors. In this environment, authorities frequently find themselves unable to *lead* mediatized discourses with their own strategic power, and increasingly, as this case study will illustrate, are required to occupy *defensive* discursive positions. The developers of large infrastructure projects like HidroAysén therefore attempt to “sanitize” or “greenwash” (Greer & Bruno 1996; Tokar 1999) their projects with public relations “spin”, “manipulation” (Whitworth & Cheatham 1988) and “strategic deception” (Flyvbjerg, Garbuio & Lovallo 2009). These communicational actions, I argue through this thesis, and the actions of protesters to demask such “deception”, are the basis for megaprojects’ symbolic construction

## Chapter 3: Country context

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter serves as background to the contentious HidroAysén megaproject. It provides country context for Chile at the time when HidroAysén was first established to enable an understanding of why the controversy over HidroAysén between 2006 and 2014 unfolded as it did. I begin with a summary of Chile's energy sector at the time HidroAysén was being contemplated. The discussion then turns to Chile's economic development, showing that although some figures attest to a highly successful development trajectory, by other measures Chile's style of development has entrenched inequality, reinforced elite closure, and stymied intergenerational social mobility. Although social inequality may seem to have little connection with a hydroelectric megaproject, this chapter builds on understandings from chapter 1, which argues that megaproject developments do indeed have much to do with inequality. I therefore provide further background here on unequal development and social unrest in Chile. By discussing this background, the chapter starts to show how the protest discourse surrounding HidroAysén – analysed in detail in subsequent chapters – was able to construct the megaproject in such a way that it became emblematic, symbolising above all the social unfairness experienced by many Chileans. As the discussion unfolds in subsequent chapters, I also show how HidroAysén came to be equated with *other* apprehensions Chileans felt about their country's mode of development, environmental damage, and its national sovereignty in the face of a transnational megaproject in a globalised world.

The final section of this chapter is an examination of Chile's media landscape. Here, historical background as well as a survey of contemporary ownership and political orientation of the most influential media outlets supports the notion of elite closure in the media sector also. Although the limitations of political economy media analysis are borne in mind in this study, as discussed in Chapter 2, the research presented here indicates that media ownership in contemporary Chile *is* significant and would have important implications for the reporting of HidroAysén. This section also examines social media use in Chile, discussing how Chileans use online and social media. As strategic communications output by HidroAysén as well as by anti-dams protest

organisations played such a key role in the discourse over the megaproject, the final section of Chapter 3 examines strategic public relations in the Chilean context.

### **3.2 Chile's energy landscape**

Chile has a sinuous geography, running 4300kms from north to south, and on average less than 200kms east to west. It spans diverse climatic zones including the driest desert on Earth – the Atacama Desert – temperate rainforests and vast southern ice caps. For all its metallurgical richness as the world's largest copper supplier and a key miner of gold, silver, lead and lithium, Chile has few of its own fossil fuel reserves: domestic production provides less than 5% of total coal demand (OECD 2013, p. 1). Domestic oil and gas production, most prominently in the Magellanes Region in the country's far south is limited, though recent exploration and new extraction technologies are expanding future extraction potential here (Mercopress 2016). Chile does have significant hydroelectric resources. With great rivers flowing east to west over the relatively short, often precipitous distance between the high, snow-capped Andes and the Pacific Coast, the potential for strongly flowing water to turn electric turbines is great. Chile's geography and climatic conditions also endow it with strong potential for generation of non-conventional renewable energy (in Spanish "energías renovables no convencionales" – henceforth, ERNCs) especially solar, wind and geothermal energy.<sup>20</sup>

Chile's unique geography has a strong bearing on its contemporary energy landscape. The country has four separate energy grids. The arid and sparsely populated far north is supplied by the Sistema Interconectada Norte Grande (SING). Here demand is dominated by mining, and energy generation is almost entirely fossil fuel, or thermally, generated. The central region, home to 90% of Chile's population, is powered by the Sistema Interconectada Central (SIC), where energy is roughly half thermal and half hydroelectric-generated (Chile Sustentable 2013). This grid supplies the bulk of the country's energy demand including that of the capital, Santiago, with a population of 7 million people. Chile's southernmost region is encompassed by two further electricity

---

<sup>20</sup> Though hydroelectricity is elsewhere often considered to be "renewable", in the Chilean context, ERNCs include only small-scale hydroelectric installations, excluding large installations with over 20MW generation capacity.

grids, the Sistema de Aysén (56% thermal, 40% hydro, 4% wind) and the Sistema de Magallanes (100% thermal) (*Ministerio de Energía* 2016). A major new infrastructure project to connect the SIC and the SING grids, the Transmisora Eléctrica del Norte (TEN) was completed in 2017 (*El Mercurio* 22/11/2017). Importantly, this project now allows energy from Chile's far south, potentially from a project like HidroAysén, to be injected into the SIC and therefore the SING grids. Critics of the HidroAysén project have pointed out that this would mean HidroAysén's energy could be used to power mining, and was not intended for households – a notion that would come to have symbolic importance in the HidroAysén debate.




Figure 1: A snapshot of the Chilean electricity matrix in 2013, during the HidroAysén timeframe. With the growth of ERNCs, the grid looks quite different today. (Ministerio de Energía, Chile, Centro de Despacho Economico de Carga, Sistema Interconectado Central 2013)

Although Chile has so few of its own fossil fuel sources, in the HidroAysén timeframe, the country relied on fossil fuel based thermal generation for 62% of its electricity supply (CCTP 2013, p. 4). Furthermore, the country's Total Primary Energy Supply, a

measure which includes fuels like petrol and diesel primarily used for transport, relies on 75% imported fossil fuels (International Energy Agency, IEA 2012, p. 2).

Historically, Chile generated much of its energy from hydropower. In the 1980s, the SIC grid (then 75% of the national energy total) was made up of 70% hydroelectric power and 30% thermal (Bauer 2009, p. 613). By the late 1990s, when Chile suffered its worst drought in a century, greatly reducing hydroelectric generation capacity and causing energy blackouts in Santiago, it was clear other means of energy generation had to be considered. Due to the availability and favourable cost of natural gas from Argentina, significant investment was made in building four gas pipelines through the Andes. Imported Argentine gas quickly became a staple of electricity generation, accounting for 26% of Chile's total energy consumption by 2004 (Nasirov & Silva 2014, p. 27). In the winter of 2004, however, Argentina reneged on supply contracts and cut gas exports to its neighbour, in order to cover domestic demand (IEA 2012, p. 15; Jarroud 2014).

To make up the resulting energy deficits, expensive diesel oil imports were required. As well as causing immediate energy shortages, the cut in gas supply, and the uncertainty about future gas availability from Argentina had longer-term ramifications. Investment in gas-fuelled power plants was halted – but investors were also reluctant to invest in alternative coal fired power stations, because of the possibility of a future return of Argentine gas (Arellano 2008, p.15). As it became clear that gas imports from Argentina would not return, Chile had to find reliable alternative energy sources. While neighbouring Bolivia produces gas and could form an alternative gas export partnership with Chile, export to Chile is stymied by a historical border dispute between the two countries.

When HidroAysén was being planned, therefore, Chile's thermal energy generation was made up of almost entirely imported fuel sources: coal (28% of total energy generation) oil (14%) and natural gas, including liquid natural gas or LNG (18%) (CCTP 2013). Liquid natural gas now filled much of the deficit created by the 2004 Argentine cut, with imports by sea from Equatorial Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago, Qatar and Yemen (IEA 2012, p. 20). LNG could use existing gas infrastructure put in place for gas imports from Argentina, and due to the increasing number of shale gas developments internationally,

imported LNG is currently becoming a cheaper energy source (Rogers 2015) making it an important part of Chile's future energy matrix.

Chile's most significant native energy source is hydroelectricity. This provided 34% of the country's electricity needs by 2012, (Chile Sustentable 2012) but Chile was using only 25% of its calculated hydroelectric potential by 2013 (Nelson 2013). Production of electricity from water in Chile is, however, increasingly affected by drought and climate change. Since the catastrophic drought of 1998, electricity generation from many hydroelectric dams in Chile has been variable. In 2007, the Fourth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicted a 15-20% drop in rainfall in central and south-central Chile within 75 years (IPCC 2007). A 2012 report by the OECD and the Climate Change Division of the Chilean Ministry of the Environment projected, by century's end, a 1-4 degree centigrade temperature rise for the whole country, dramatic glacial retreat and decreased snowpack in high alpine areas (Muck 2012). As Chile's rivers rely on melting snow and ice from the high Andes for much of their flow, such predictions make the long-term potential for hydroelectricity in Chile problematic. Indeed, a United Nations report on the issue estimated the country's overall hydroelectric generation would decline 10-20% over the next century, at cost of US\$100 million per year (Espinoza 2009). Importantly, however, the most severe effects of climate change were predicted for central and south-central Chile, with lesser effects predicted for the country's far south, including some projections of *increased* rainfall in this region (Venegas 2007). Hydropower from Chile's far southern Patagonia, as in the planned HidroAysén megaproject, could therefore potentially become especially attractive.

When HidroAysén was being considered as a key new energy source for Chile, energy costs both for industry and for households were high – among the most expensive in Latin America, with the mean household energy price per megawatt hour (MWh) in Chile being 30% higher than the OECD average (IEA 2012). Household energy costs had increased sharply, with a 30% increase between 2010 and 2014 (Jarroud 2015). Energy prices are overseen by in Chile by the Comisión Nacional de Energía (National Energy Commission or CNE), a public institution which is also responsible for energy policy and for conflict resolution. The CNE is, however, largely advisory in nature and



plays a subsidiary role to the market in terms of pricing and policy direction (Latta & Williams 2011, p. 12).

Chile's energy matrix by the end of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century was therefore heavily reliant on imports, making it vulnerable to market trends, while also vulnerable to unpredictable climate events. Its hydropower installations were subject to climate change-induced drought. Being fossil-fuel dominated, Chile's energy portfolio was also greenhouse gas producing and air polluting, contributing to the country's figure of more than double the OECD average for lung damaging PM10 air pollutant particles (OECD 2015b). For industry and for households, the cost of energy was also high. And yet with energy demand forecast to keep rising to 2020, better energy solutions were needed.

### **3.3 Energy demand and energy security in Chile**

Chile's consistent economic growth over the past quarter century has made it one of the strongest economies in Latin America. Market-driven economic policy established in the Pinochet era (1973-1990) continued under the centre-left Concertación governments that governed the country from 1990-2010. Between 2003 and 2013, Chile had an average growth rate of 5% (World Bank 2015; Nelson 2013). Growth slowed slightly in 2008 – 2010 due to the Global Financial Crisis and the 2010 Chilean earthquake, and was affected by sharply lower copper prices in 2014. But the Chilean economy was considered “resilient” by 2015 (OECD 2015c, p.1) and growth was projected to gather pace and remain at around 3% until 2020 (OECD 2015a).

Electricity demand in Chile has expanded in tandem with economic growth. As Chileans have moved to urban centres where electricity, not wood, is used for heating and cooking, and have acquired more electricity-hungry appliances, domestic energy demand has risen. In the HidroAysén timeframe, use by industry still exceeded domestic use substantially, with industrial users (including mining) accounting for 68% of total electricity demand and domestic use 31% (IEA 2012, p. 24). With Chile's robust mining sector the single largest consumer of energy, relative market shares of electricity consumption have been forecast to remain stable, with the industrial sector continuing to represent two thirds of demand by 2020 (IEA 2012, p. 24). In line with economic growth, Chile's total annual electricity demand – domestic and industrial – grew from

40 Terrawatt-hours (TWh) in 2000 to nearly 65TWh in 2012. Demand was expected to reach 100TWh by 2020 (Nasirov & Silva 2014, p. 27).

By the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it became clear that a lack of strategic planning in the energy sector by a series of governments had led to a failure to spur appropriate development in the sector. Chile was lagging on critical investment in energy, and with growing demand forecast, lack of supply threatened energy security and long-term development goals. The country now had to find new ways to make energy more secure, more affordable, and also cleaner. In order to stimulate this, in 2008, the first Bachelet government introduced Law 20,527 to oblige energy companies to obtain 5% of their energy supply from ERNCs by 2010. This increased by 0.5% annually after 2014, so that by 2024 energy generators would have to produce 10% of their power from ERNCs (IEA 2015). In 2013, Law 20,698 modified the previous legislation to set new standards so that energy utilities with over 200MW operation capacity (effectively all commercial energy generators) would be obliged to generate 20% of their capacity from ERNCs by 2025 (IEA 2015).

Such policy settings have enabled a significant turn towards ERNCs in Chile. By 2014, Chile was being described as “the world’s top renewable energy market” (Ayre 2014), in 2017, the *New York Times* described it as being in the midst of an “energy transformation” (Londoño, *New York Times* 12/08/17) and in 2018, the IEA called Chile “a world-class destination for solar and wind energy developers” with “vast renewable energy potential” (IEA 2018). Importantly, Chile’s mining industry has begun to turn to large-scale solar energy to reduce dependence on fossil fuels and reduce operating costs (Vorrath 2015). With the Chinese production dominating the world in renewable energy infrastructure, costs of generating solar energy are falling and the challenges of intermittent supply are being overcome by new technologies (Matthews 2015). So although renewable energy development historically faced barriers (Nasirov & Silva 2014, p. 28), these barriers are now being overcome. These developments are, though, very recent. Because energy planning has historically been an exercise in longer-term forecasting and construction of large, expensive infrastructure, developments such as the surge in ERNCs in Chile were not necessarily evident when planning for the HidroAysén megaproject began.

Several large coal fired power plants had been established in the decade before HidroAysén energed. By 2014, the SIC and the SING combined had 2040MW of coal powered generation, and several new plants were under construction in 2014. Despite the rise in ERNCs, installed coal capacity was expected to rise to 26% of total energy production by 2020 (Nasirov & Silva 2014, p. 30) with accompanying increased greenhouse gas and small particle pollutant emissions. As environmental awareness in post-materialist (Inglehart 1977, 1997)<sup>21</sup> Chile has grown, however, coal fired power plants have become increasingly contested, with several such projects being cancelled, suspended or moved largely due to public pressure since 2010, as discussed in the introduction to this study. The cancellation or suspension of projects like Punta Alcalde, Castilla and Barrancones coal fired power stations largely due to public pressure over these projects' projected environmental damage demonstrates how, at the time of HidroAysén, increasing coal-based power generation was also inviable.

Chile considered nuclear energy in the early 2000s, and a Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission was set up under the Ministry of Energy to research nuclear power for Chile. In 2010, in a presentation to the IEA, Chile's then-Energy Minister spoke of a start to nuclear energy production by 2024, but stated that "currently, public opinion is not favourable to nuclear energy development in Chile" (Tokman 2010). That same year, the Bachelet government submitted a major report on the issue, detailing the possibilities and challenges of the nuclear option for the country. Only weeks later, a devastating earthquake of 8.8 on the Richter scale and a damaging tsunami hit Chile. The following year, nuclear disaster occurred at Fukushima in Japan after an earthquake and tsunami. These events dampened enthusiasm in Chile for nuclear

---

<sup>21</sup> Inglehart (1997 p. 33) described post-materialism in the following way: "[A]n individual's priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment: one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply". Influenced by Maslow's hierarchy of needs Inglehart (1977, p. 42), argued that in order to survive, people must first have their basic material needs satisfied. When these needs are taken care of, people pursue higher order needs. More affluent countries have seen a "gradual shift in which needs for belonging, esteem, and intellectual or aesthetic satisfaction became more prominent" (1997, p. 34). In Inglehart's terminology, these needs are more "postmaterialist." See also Abrahamson's (2011) survey of critiques and counter critiques of the postmaterialism thesis.

power, though the nuclear option was still under consideration during the Piñera government of 2010 to 2014. In practical terms, considering both the fact that Chile is such a seismic country, and the trend of protest surrounding major new power projects, nuclear power would seem difficult to defend as a key future element of the country's energy portfolio.

Energy efficiency was first seriously considered after the 2004 Argentine gas supply failure as another element in strengthening Chile's energy security. Between 2005 and 2012, despite the growth in GDP and corresponding growth in energy demand, Chile was able to reduce its energy intensity<sup>22</sup> by 10% (World Bank 2015c). In 2010, a publically funded National Energy Efficiency Plan 2010-2020 (Plan Nacional de Acción de Eficiencia Energética) set a target of a 15% reduction on total energy use by 2020 (Chile Sustentable 2012; CCTP 2013). However, in the same year, with a change of government, this program's funding was reduced and the plan fell into obscurity (Nasirov & Silva 2014). Energy efficiency only became a key pillar of national energy policy *after* HidroAysén with a current target of 20,000 Gigawatt hours savings per year (an installed generation equivalent of 2000MW) by 2025 (Ministerio de Energía 2018).

It seemed, then, that when HidroAysén was being contemplated for Chile, the key remaining energy option was to bolster hydroelectricity production, especially in the less climate change-affected far south. The country's south still had large unexploited hydroelectric potential – the bulk of this in the Aysén region which has just one percent of Chile's population, but 30% of total precipitation, as well as glacier-fed runoff. Total unexploited hydroelectric potential in Chile was calculated to be 21 279 MW by Rudnick et al. (2008, p. 35) – a large part of this in Aysén. As Chile's total installed electricity capacity by 2015 was 19 868 MW (CNE 2015) this untapped hydroelectric capability seemed to offer significant potential for the country's future energy needs.

### **3.4 Hydroelectric development in Chile**

---

<sup>22</sup> A measure of energy efficiency calculated as units of energy per unit of GDP – not the same as total energy consumption.

Chile's first hydroelectric power plant was established to power mining in the town of Lota in 1897 and hydroelectricity had been at the core of Chile's national program of electrification since the 1940s (Kurtz 2013). Early dam building was focused on major rivers closest to the large population centres in central and south-central Chile. From 1960, larger dams were built, including the 377MW Rapel Dam on the Rapel River and the El Toro and Antuco dams on the Laja River. In 1985 the Colbún/Machicura complex added 490MW to the country's expanding hydroelectric capability (Bauer 2009, p. 613). Between 1962 and the mid 1980s, despite political and economic instability, hydroelectric generation capacity was quadrupled in Chile (Nelson 2013, p. 196). And between 1990 and 2005, 15 new hydro projects were completed in the SIC. Dam building was now moving south, including the first two dams on the upper Bío Bío River, Pangué and Ralco dams, the latter being Chile's largest hydroelectric power generator with a capacity of 690 MW (Bauer p. 614). By 2015, Chile had 45 hydroelectric installations with a generating capacity of 10MW or more, as well as many smaller installations (CCTP 2013).

The chief player in Chilean hydroelectric development had long been Endesa (Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, Sociedad Anónima or National Electricity Enterprise, Plc.). Established in 1943, Endesa operated as a state enterprise, with significant operational independence, until its privatisation. Charged with the important task of nation building through national electrification, the company's free reign reputedly included being able to negotiate loans with international banks without recourse to the Chilean Central Bank (Nelson 2013, p. 196). As a result of its independence, and because of its perceived nation building role, Endesa was under little obligation to disclose information on its hydroelectric projects or consult other stakeholders on its plans or operations. This tendency, reported also by interviewees for this study (Nikolas Espinoza, ex-HidroAysén employee interviewed 3/08/13), is perceived to have become embedded in corporate culture, so that even after the company was privatised, Endesa still operated in this way. This would eventually have important implications for the conduct of the company's largest ever project, the HidroAysén megaproject in Patagonia.

In 1982 under the military government, Chile's national electricity market was restructured according to neoliberal market principals. In 1989, Endesa was privatised.

This privatisation was controversial as many Chileans had been proud of the state enterprise's historical role in national development and resented Endesa becoming a source of private profit (Bauer 2009, p. 627) particularly as post-privatisation, Endesa's new owners and managers had close ties to the military dictatorship (Bosworth, Dornbusch & Labán 1994). In August 1997, in a turning point for Chile's electricity sector, Endesa's management announced the takeover of Endesa Chile by Endesa España, the large Spanish power company. The deal was even more controversial than the initial privatisation, criticised as contravening business ethics as well as financial regulations. The sale soon became known as a "scandal" and Endesa (Chile's) president José Juraszcek was forced to resign (Bauer 2009, p. 633; Parisi & Yáñez 2000). Today, Endesa (Chile) is controlled by Enersis S. A., the leading private power company in Latin America, which is in turn majority owned by Endesa España. The Spanish Endesa Group is a majority owned subsidiary of the Italian company Enel, one of the largest multinational power utilities with operations in more than 30 countries (Enersis 2015).

### **3.5 Ownership of Chile's electricity market and water rights**

Electricity generation, transmission and distribution in Chile are separated, and since 1982, wholly privatised. Foreign-based companies now dominate in all three sectors. Endesa is the chief player in the Chilean hydroelectric and overall electricity generation market, supplying 35% of power in Chile overall in 2015 (Enersis 2015). Other key actors include AES Gener and French-based GDF Suez and Colbún (MaRS 2015, p. 9), the only large Chilean majority-owned company in the energy generation sector. Colbún was privatised under military rule and is majority-owned by the Matte Group, property of one of Chile's powerful family "dynasties" (Millas 2007) the Matte family. Electricity transmission in Chile is dominated by Canadian-owned Transelec, which provides energy transmission to 96% of Chile's population (Transelec 2018). Chilectra (majority owned by Italian Enel group) and the Spanish-owned Compañía General de Electricidad (CGE) are the two chief actors in energy distribution. Transnational energy conglomerates therefore dominate ownership of the Chilean electricity system.

Likewise, water rights over Chile's major river systems with hydroelectric potential are today largely owned by transnational interests. The Pinochet administration's 1981 Water Code established a system of private water rights ownership for any actor who

could catalogue water flow and have it registered. Water rights were claimed for free, but once registered, these became transferrable property, creating the basis for a market in non-consumptive water rights (Bauer 1998; Budds 2004). Rights to the water in many of Chile's important rivers were originally registered by state-run Endesa, and these flowed into private hands together with the corporation's other assets on privatisation (Latta 2010). Water rights ownership form the basis of hydroelectric development in Chile, so that companies with extensive water rights ownership are well equipped to plan for large hydroelectric developments.

While foreign ownership is not necessarily problematic, the argument here is that in a landscape of ownership by large transnational corporations of the majority of a country's electricity sector and water rights, transnational energy megaprojects like HidroAysén become inevitable. Globalisation has allowed transnational corporations to escape nation states and expensive, complex projects such as HidroAysén would not be viable without a mix of private, global investors. Because the transnational business interests which invest in such projects are distant from the environmental and social damage that arises (Gellert & Lynch 2003) there may be a blurring of the line between a company's plans and a country's national interests – especially its environmental interests. In this landscape, the Chilean state had effectively relinquished control over much of national energy planning, allowing the market to respond to energy demand, rather than creating a national energy strategy. In the face of growing energy demand and the 2004 energy crisis in Chile, the government therefore had particularly strong motives to remove barriers to investment and facilitate large new energy projects, like the HidroAysén megaproject for Patagonia. The prevailing nature of ownership in the Chilean energy sector was therefore an additional crucial factor in setting the stage for HidroAysén.

In addition to the possible outcomes of foreign ownership outlined above, the notion of the 'nationality' of the HidroAysén project became an important aspect of the discourse surrounding the megaproject. HidroAysén's own communications strategy would draw strongly on the idea of hydropower being 'Chilean', while downplaying the majority foreign multinational ownership of the company. By contrast, those opposed to the project would attempt to characterise the project as foreign and neo-colonial, given the

Spanish/Italian element of the project's ownership. As the communications campaign of the eventual protest movement against the project was largely foreign funded, with many international NGOs involved, HidroAysén would in turn attempt to discredit the protest campaign as foreign. The anti-dams campaign's chief marketing strategist and also its main funder, Douglas Tompkins, would particularly be vilified as 'foreign' and his interests in protecting Chilean Patagonia would be questioned. The notion of sovereign versus foreign would therefore become crucial symbolic aspects of the mediatized representation of HidroAysén. This element of discourse on the megaproject will be examined in detail in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.

### **3.6 Endesa and Colbún establish HidroAysén**

In September 2006 Endesa and Colbún signed an agreement with Colbún to establish HidroAysén. Endesa held the controlling share at 51%, and Colbún 49% of the project and the company. The objective of the newly formed joint venture, as stated on HidroAysén's website was to:

...make use of a percentage of the hydroelectric potential existing in the Baker and Pascua Rivers to generate clean and renewable energy by means of constructing and operating five hydroelectric stations – two on the Baker River and three on the Pascua River – and adjacent works.

(HidroAysén 2011)

The two dams on the Baker River would generate 360MW and 600MW, respectively, while the three dams on the Pascua River would have generating capacities of 460MW, 500MW and 770MW (HidroAysén 2011). In addition to the dams, tunnels, canals, powerhouses and associated electromechanical equipment, "adjacent works" would include roads, ports, airports, rubbish dumps and camps to house some 5000 workers with all the necessary infrastructure to support living in a remote setting for seven to eight years during construction (HidroAysén 2011). The transmission line to feed HidroAysén's power into the SIC would stretch nearly 2300kms north from the dam sites, traversing the properties of some 5000 landowners. A key objective of the project was to maximise energy production relative to the reservoir size. HidroAysén would indeed be one of the most efficient hydroelectric projects in the world on this measure (Reinhardt & Schon 2013, p. 11). At the company's establishment, the dams were to be operational by 2020.



If HidroAysén were approved, the two companies would control more than 70% of the country's total power generation. Because of this, the joint venture had to apply for, and was granted, permission from the Chilean antitrust court (Tribunal de la Defensa de La Libre Competencia or TDLC). The TDLC particularly identified potential risks to competition in the Chilean electricity market from the concentration of ownership introduced by HidroAysén, and it imposed conditions to reduce these risks, including to the extent of the parent companies' water rights holdings (Tafur 2011), in order to limit future hydroelectric ventures by the company.

The Endesa/Colbún alliance brought formidable structural, economic and political power to the new energy project. Endesa, already Chile's largest energy supplier and backed by Enel, a company that had 61 million customers and assets worth US\$190 billion (Enel 2010), benefitted from the legitimising power of Colbún, a company perceived as thoroughly Chilean. Colbún was already one of Chile's principal generators and, importantly, the powerful billionaire Matte family has long had close ties with political power structures in Chile (Carmona Ulloa 2002; Matamala 2015). Bernardo Larraín Matte, CEO of Colbún at the time HidroAysén was established is the son of Eliodoro Matte Ossa, one of the Chicago Boys, the architects of Chile's neoliberal economic transformation under Pinochet<sup>23</sup>. The then Colbún head also reportedly had close personal ties to Sebastián Piñera, who would become Chile's president, and who was head of state when HidroAysén was approved (Benedikter & Siepmann 2013).

Colbún, however, is run by a billionaire family dynasty in a country where inequality is stark: the Matte family, reportedly worth over US \$10 billion, is one of just four families that control 47% of assets in the Santiago Stock Exchange (Escobar 2010) and whose combined income made up 12.49% of GDP in 2008 (Mercopress 2010). Although the Mattes are also known for their philanthropy, the notion of such privilege would turn out to be a liability in the communicational sparring and battle for issue definition that

---

<sup>23</sup> The Chicago Boys were a group of about 130 students from Chile's Universidad Católica that received US AID and, later, Ford Foundation scholarships, for MA and PhD study of Economics at the University of Chicago between 1955 and 1973. Their academic thought on their return to Chile emphasized monetarism and the free market, in contrast with structuralist and Marxist economic thought that dominated in Chile under Allende. From 1974, Chicago Boy economists oversaw the Pinochet regime's drastic economic changes (Brender 2010).

the HydroAysén debate would become. This was particularly so because when HidroAysén was established, aspirations for a continuing trajectory of fast-paced development in Chile were high, and yet practical barriers to a good education, social mobility and economic advancement were real. As this study will show, HidroAysén would, over time, come to symbolise the frustrations that many Chileans experience as a result of their country's unequal development. It would become emblematic of inequality itself.

### **3.7 Development and inequality in Chile**

In the last 40 years, Chile has experienced a remarkable trajectory of economic growth. Led particularly by the expansion of the mining sector, Chile's GDP increased from US\$27.57 billion in 1980 to US\$258.1 billion in 2014 (World Bank 2015a), and US\$277.1 billion in 2017 (World Bank 2018). Gross Domestic Product per capita by 2014, adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity, was \$22,346<sup>24</sup>. This put Chile ahead of every other country in Latin America, and allowed it to be classed a "high income country" by the World Bank (2015b). Chile joined the OECD in 2010 and is the only South American member of this exclusive group of the world's most economically powerful nations.

Successive governments have worked towards the goal of transitioning Chile from "developing" to "developed" economy status. During Chile's 2010 bicentennial celebrations, president Sebastian Piñera presented a plan entitled "Chile País Desarrollado" (Chile, a Developed Country) detailing 50 initiatives to reach "developed country status" by 2018 (Gobierno de Chile 2011). Though there is no established convention for the designation of "developing" and "developed" country (Nielsen 2011) – and indeed debate as to whether countries should indeed be classified in this way (Rahnema & Bawtree 1997) – international organisations consider GDP per capita and levels of industrialisation as key criteria in determining a country's development status. Countries ranked as advanced economies by organisations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the OECD tend to have diverse economies and GDP

---

<sup>24</sup> This figure is in "international dollars", which the World Bank defines as a hypothetical unit of currency allowing the same purchasing power in a national currency as a US dollar would have in the US economy at a given time (World Bank 2015b).

per capita above US\$15,000. In addition, a country's Human Development Index, a figure that takes into account life expectancy and education opportunities as well as income per capita, is a key measure of development. By 2015, Chile's Human Development Index was 0.832, putting it in the top quartile of all UN countries, and giving it "very high human development" (UNDP 2015). Chile was also included in the High Income Group of countries by the World Bank in 2015 (World Bank 2016).

Although Chile's per capita income appears relatively high, income distribution is problematic. While 10% of Chileans have incomes higher than the average per capita income in Norway, the United States or Singapore, the poorest 10% have incomes similar to the inhabitants of Ivory Coast (Zahler Torres 2011). A 2013 report based on 2010 data from Chile's own taxation department, the Servicio de Impuestos Internos (SII), found stark discrepancies between rich and poor in Chile (López, Figueroa & Gutiérrez 2013). While the richest 1% of Chilean taxpayers (83,493 people) received 14.7% of total income, the poorest 81% of tax contributors (6.6 million out of a total of 8.2 million contributors) received 34.4% of total income. Nearly 81% of Chileans fell into a group for which the average monthly income was US\$338, while the richest 1% had an average monthly income of US\$12,572. The income of the richest 1%, therefore, is nearly 40 times more than the income of 81% of the population (López, Figueroa & Gutiérrez 2013, p.5), or put another way, the bottom, 40% received only 1.65% of total income while the top 1% received 21% of the total (OECD 2015c, p. 53). Importantly, during the timeframe of the HidroAysén debate which is the focus of this study, the income gap in Chile widened, so that the percentage of national income concentrated in the richest 10% rose from 38.1 percent to 39.2 percent between 2006 and 2009 (CASEN 2013).

The 2013 study undertaken by López, Figueroa and Gutiérrez also made an international comparison of the top income earners in 20 advanced economies for which data were available (including the US, the UK, Canada, France, Spain, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Australia). This established that the percentage of total income of the richest 1% in Chile was almost twice the average (1.84 times) of this percentage for the group of countries examined (López, Figueroa & Gutiérrez 2013, p.

15). Chile's rich are therefore comparatively much richer, and income inequality more marked in this country than in other advanced economies.

The OECD reported in 2014 that income inequality in Chile was the highest of any OECD member, and that one in five Chileans was poor – compared with the one in 10 OECD average. Twenty seven percent of Chileans reported not having enough money to buy sufficient food – double the average OECD rate. And social spending was the third lowest of all OECD countries, accounting for 10.2% of GDP, in contrast to the 21.9% OECD average (OECD 2014b, p. 1). Chile's GINI coefficient (a measure of the extent of a country's income distribution inequality where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 perfect inequality) was 0.50 in 2014. This was the highest figure for an OECD country and substantially higher than the OECD average of 0.31 (OECD 2014b, p. 3). The argument, then, that there are “two Chiles” (Zahler Torres 2011) – the Chile of the top 19% who live with incomes comparable to those in a “developed” country, and the Chile of the remaining 81%, whose incomes and life possibilities are closer to those of a middle or low income country – seems to provide a more accurate representation of the country's development and unequal income distribution than the GDP per capita indicator, where the high incomes of a small percentage provide an inaccurate impression of the country's overall economic performance. The “two Chiles” divide is also particularly pronounced in Aysén, which Chile's Ministry of Social Development reports has higher levels of multidimensional poverty (20.9%) than the country average (16.9) and also higher levels of inequality than the Chilean average (CASEN 2015).

Another important source of data on Chile's economy and society, the country's biennial national socioeconomic questionnaire scheme CASEN (Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional) has also examined the very richest 0.1% of the population (which CASEN believes to under-declare incomes in such questionnaires). This section of the population is made up of some 4460 families (CASEN 2013). These Chileans are the principal shareholders of Chile's publically listed corporations, the chiefs of these corporations, the owners of Chile's banks, insurance companies, supermarkets, mining, fishing, forestry and salmon industries, and owners of Chile's media (Duran & Kremerman 2011). It is these people that are often referred to as “los dueños de Chile” – “the owners of Chile” (Carmona Ulloa 2002), in a phrase that echoes the more than

century-old declaration by Eduardo Matte Pérez: “We are the owners of Chile, the owners of capital and the land. What remains is a mass that is to be influenced and sold. This mass has no weight of opinion, no prestige” (Matte Pérez was quoted in the newspaper *El Pueblo* of 19 March 1892, cited by Durán & Kremerman 2011).

The fact that Eduardo Matte Pérez was the great, great grandfather of Colbún chief Bernardo Larraín Matte, might seem to have little bearing on his descendant’s attitudes or actions today, except that it clearly attests to the intergenerational persistence of powerful economic elites in Chile, a phenomenon that has been repeatedly documented (Núñez & Miranda 2011; OECD 2015c; Solimano 2014; Solimano & Pollack 2006; Torche, F. 2009). While of course any country has elites that occupy the top positions in its politics, industry, cultural and sporting life and knowledge generation, Chile’s elites – families like the Mattes and the other 4000-odd families that belong to the top echelons of Chilean society – have actually constructed the country’s prevailing economic system over generations (Benedikter & Siepmann 2013). In many cases, political power has also been transmitted over generations, so that daughters and sons of the perpetrators of the Pinochet dictatorship, and in some cases the individuals themselves, still have political sway. In Chile, economic power and accompanying political influence are therefore concentrated and enduring to the degree that these elites have been charged with “hijacking the country”, in the words of Chilean journalist Fernando Paulsen cited by Durán & Kremerman (2011). Chile’s elites have historically shaped and most importantly, *maintained* the structure of the country’s economy to their own advantage. The maintenance of this status quo, sometimes termed “elite closure” (Núñez & Miranda 2011; Torche 2005), is achieved through the elites’ ability to influence politics and economic policy – especially in relation to income taxation – thereby “blocking any serious attempt to shift income distribution” (Solimano 2011, p. 10), and entrenching intergenerational disadvantage. Additionally, it has been noted that income tax evasion is particularly high among Chile’s top income earners (Fairfield & Jorratt 2015). It is indeed the structure and extent of income taxation, the effectiveness of tax collection, the size of redistribution transfers (eg: unemployment benefits) and the degree of a country’s public spending (particularly on education and health) that have the most impact on reducing inequality (OECD 2015c) and increasing intergenerational social mobility. Chile’s “elite closure” and its decades of neoliberal economic policy have been

effective over generations in heading off reforms that would deliver this. Tax collection in Chile, for example, is 20.2% of GDP, compared to the 33.7% OECD average, and Chile's public expenditure as a percentage of GDP is the lowest in the OECD (OECD 2015c, p. 58). Tax evasion and avoidance have now also become key focuses of Chile's taxation regime (World Bank 2014). The OECD reports that such measures are an important step towards creating a more inclusive, less unequal Chile (OECD 2015c), where intergenerational social mobility is not restricted by the level of wealth and education of an individual's parents.

Despite the apparent entrenchment to date of inequality in Chile, research into inequality in age cohorts has shown that for *some* Chileans the social and economic divide may have diminished in recent years (Sapelli 2011). In younger age cohorts, income distribution is more equal, so that the GINI index for those born from the end of the 1960s to the late 1970s is between 8-12 points below the index for the nation as a whole. Examining education by age cohort also produces a different picture of Chile. For example, while Chileans over 45 years old have less education than the OECD average, those younger than 30 have levels that are close to the average for OECD countries (Sapelli 2011). Such research does point to an increased possibility for social mobility in younger age cohorts, independent of the social and economic status of an individual's family.

Some groups in Chile, other than an enduring elite, are therefore beginning to be able to experience more economic success, more education, and more social equity. As Inglehart (1997, 2002) tells us, societies that are focused primarily on the attainment of material well-being have different values to postmaterialist societies, where participation in civil society, defence of the natural environment, and the pursuit of individual goals, take precedence over more immediate material concerns. The young, educated and relatively more affluent groups discussed above can certainly be regarded as postmaterialist. However, equating these groups with a stable middle class in Chile is problematic. Constituting some 49% of the population, Chile's emergent middle class is still considered by the OECD to be "vulnerable" (OECD 2010) with precarious incomes, unstable employment, a high percentage of involvement in the informal economy, and often no access to a social safety net. As expectations have risen, however, there is now

a changing tolerance for both economic inequity and social hierarchy in Chile. The great financial successes of Chile's most wealthy have not gone unnoticed by Chileans who have not enjoyed such wealth, and, following Hirschman's "tunnel effect" (Hirschman & Rothschild 1973) optimism about being on the cusp of progress has turned into anger over the unfairness of Chile's prevailing social system. This is particularly so among better educated younger cohorts and the emergent middle class, whose nascent post-materialism inspires more libertarian and participatory values. Promised by their government that they would soon live in a "developed" country, and observing some of their compatriots already enjoying the country's much lauded economic success, Chileans with precarious economic situations and stunted possibilities for social mobility felt frustration. By 2011, social inequality was a powder keg, needing only a spark of ignition to light a fire of protest. Two issues that were prominent just at this time – education and the environment – would become synonymous with this discontent.

### **3.8 Education, environment, unrest**

The Chilean winter of 2011 saw the largest mobilisation of protesters on the streets of Chilean cities since the country's return to democracy. Student protests, demanding free, quality state education were frequent and sometimes violent. One of the students' chief demands was for an end to profit in higher education. Chile was the first Latin American country to introduce market-based post-secondary education, when Pinochet opened up the previously small, largely elite university system to private enterprise in 1980. By 2015, 75% of students attended private, for-profit tertiary institutions, making Chile's proportion of private spending on tertiary education the highest of all OECD countries: 76% against an OECD average of 31%. Fees are a heavy burden on students and their families, who can pay between US\$2000-US\$6000 for a year's tuition (OBHE 2015). The social mobility offered by obtaining tertiary education is therefore still beyond the reach of many young Chileans.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> In her second term of government, Bachelet attempted far-reaching education reforms, however, by the end of her presidency, these were regarded to have been largely ineffective in higher education, failing to reform for-profit education (Benedikter & Zlosilo 2017).

In addition to the economic burden of for-profit education, corruption was now also being uncovered. In 2011, a special commission of Chile's House of Representatives (Comisión Investigadora Sobre el Funcionamiento de la Educación Superior or Investigative Commission into the Functioning of Higher Education) found extensive, ongoing use of corrupt practices in Chile's private universities to maximise profits. The commission's report (Comisión Investigadora Sobre el Funcionamiento de la Educación Superior 2011) refers to widespread "legal subterfuge" and tax evasion, (p. 2), "conflicts of interest" (p.7), "abusive practices" (p.4) and "profit making on the margins of the law" (p.4) in the private university sector. At the same time, the head of Chile's National Accreditation Commission for universities (Comisión Nacional de Acreditación) was prosecuted for receiving bribes to expedite universities' accreditation, and in 2012, was sentenced to jail along with two former university rectors (Hurtado, E 2012). Students' frustrations when the 2011 unrest erupted were therefore not only a result of indebtedness, but also over the quality and fairness of for-profit education.

Perhaps most importantly, another key finding of the 2011 special commission report underscored the notion of inter-generational inequality and elite closure that already fuelled students' frustrations. As students already well knew, the report stated that: "The architects of the model of higher education who were functionaries in the epoch of the military dictatorship today are owners or directors of these establishments" (p. 7). Together with international conglomerates – for example, US-based Laureate International Universities, which owns three of Chile's largest private institutions – Chile's enduring elites therefore own, administrate and profit from close to three quarters of higher education institutions. When the student protests exploded in 2011, students knew that to surmount socio-economic barriers, they needed a good higher education, but they also understood that the economic systems set up by the country's enduring elites were the chief obstacle to them doing so. The private university system itself therefore became symbolic of social inequity in Chile.

By 2011, frustration at social unfairness also extended to Chileans' thinking on the environment. Awareness of the environment, and an imperative towards its protection had been increasing since the early 1990s, often in response to environmental damage or new environmental threats. Chile's free market, with its ever-growing economy



based on extractive industries, has not been good to its environment. In the far north, mining has re-landscaped vast swathes of the country, polluted air and drained watercourses; in the country's forested south, intensive harvesting has created serious erosion, and short-cycle single species plantations are increasingly taking the place of native forests. In the waterways of Chile's far south, the world's most intensive salmon farming industry has caused algal blooms which poison fish and shellfish, threatening the livelihoods of local fishermen. And Chile's capital, Santiago, has "one of the most serious air pollution problems in the world" (Garcia-Chevesich et al. 2014, p. 202). Research into environmental attitudes in Chile, particularly among young people, indicates high levels of environmental awareness and concern, and a strong willingness to engage in pro-environmental behaviours (Cordano et al. 2010). Of interest is that in Chile during the controversy over HidroAysén, environmental concern seems to have increased<sup>26</sup> – a trend that I discuss in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

If Chileans sought some group to blame for contaminated air, dying waterways and toxic, drying, rivers, it was easy for them to identify a culprit: those that owned and profited from environmentally damaging industries. Research confirms that in many cases, these are members of the same, elite group that are understood to be "los dueños de Chile" – Chile's "owners" (Carmona Ulloa 2002; Mönckeberg 2001). By the time protest erupted over the HidroAysén project, then, environmental threats were often symbolically equated with the prevailing and enduring social system in Chile. The fact that one of the most visible manifestations of the 11-year HidroAysén protest – street marches in Santiago and other cities in Chile – occurred concurrently with the student protests, underscored the sentiments that students and those protesting the dam megaproject shared. The anti-dams protest was therefore conferred with a layer of meaning which became difficult for the dams' proponents to shift: that the HidroAysén megaproject was a project by elites and multinational companies, whose primary beneficiaries would not be ordinary Chileans, but the elites and multinationals themselves. This notion was strongly emphasised in the anti-dams movement's communications material. To show how HidroAysén became emblematic, this study investigates to what extent and by what mechanism, issues like inequality and

---

<sup>26</sup> Franzen & Vogl (2013) measured environmental attitudes in 33 countries and found that only in Chile had environmental concern increased during the survey period.

frustration at elite closure became associated with an energy megaproject. As the construction of HidroAysén in media discourse was crucial to the outcome of the debate surrounding the megaproject, discussion now turns to the media in Chile as the landscape in which the debate unfolded.

### **3.9 Media in Chile: a historical perspective**

The media in Chile have historically been diverse. Before Pinochet's 1973 coup, the country had a vigorous and heterogenous media landscape. A partisan press with publications closely aligned to – and in many cases owned by – political parties spoke to the left and the poorer classes, as well as to the wealthy, conservative right (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2001; Tironi & Sunkel 2000; Ulloa Galindo 2014). Print media particularly were competitive and highly politicised. As in other Latin American countries, the most influential elite newspapers had been established by powerful families and expressed the political and economic ambitions of those elites (Waisbord 2010). Under the Allende government (1970-1973) there were ten daily newspapers in the capital Santiago alone, spanning the political spectrum. Circulation was, however, unevenly distributed. Newspapers which supported the Allende government had a combined circulation of 250,000, whereas right-orientated *La Tercera* alone had a circulation of 200,000 (Hudson 1994).

Radio in Chile had always been commercial in character and acted chiefly as a medium of entertainment, rather than one of information, and was much less closely tied to political parties than the print media. Perhaps due to its profitability from advertising, radio remained chiefly commercially-orientated, despite fact that the two largest national radio broadcasters Radio Agricultura (Agricultural Radio) and Radio Minería (Mining Radio) were controlled by private, conservative organisations with close links to the Chilean right (Castillo 2009, p. 16)

Television had been introduced into Chile in the 1960s, and in juxtaposition to print media and radio, the concept of private ownership of television was rejected right from the outset. Due to its perceived educational and cultural function, television remained in state and university ownership and private television broadcasters did not appear in Chile until 1990. In 1968 Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN) began broadcasting and a

general law regulating television made it the only network authorised to operate country-wide in 1970 (Hurtado, M 1989). Some smaller channels were also run by several of Chile's universities.

Freedom of the media in Chile had been protected by constitutional guarantees that dated back to the early years of the republic, after Chile asserted independence from Spain in 1810. Press freedom had been regarded by the leaders of the independence movement as an "individual natural right" (Collier 1967, p.147). The freedom of expression provisions of the first 1811 constitution had, however, been diluted by many amendments to the original media freedom provisions. The 1921 constitution, which existed until 1980, was subject to progressively more restrictions between the 1930s and the 1960s (Castillo 2009; HRW 1998) reflecting the authoritarian nature of a series of governments during this period, and attempts by a conservative legislature to curb Chile's turn towards the left. Under the Allende government, amendments to this constitution aimed to restore some of the now limited freedom of expression available to Chileans, by recognising freedom of expression and freedom of the press as "absolute, unlimited rights" of citizens (Castillo 2009, p. 20).

After the coup, freedom of expression and media freedom disappeared entirely. Media aligned with the left-wing coalition Unidad Popular were confiscated by the military and closed immediately, their property transferred to the state or sold privately. Perhaps most immediately obvious was the effect on television. The military occupied the buildings of TVN, arrested many of its staff and destroyed recordings. The TVN director was swiftly replaced by a Pinochet appointee and responsibility for TVN was transferred from the Ministry of Education to the government's General Secretariat which oversaw all political communication, including censorship and control of the press (Tironi & Sunkel 2000, p.140). Media that continued to operate were required to support the military government. The chief national print publications that remained were the publications of the *El Mercurio* chain, the newspaper *La Tercera*, the news magazine *Qué Pasa*, and the independent review *Ercilla*. Within 18 months of the coup, Chile's Journalists' Association reported that 400 journalists had lost their jobs, 200 had left the country, and fourteen had been imprisoned (HRW 1998). Journalists practiced self-censorship, and their output was also subject to prior censorship by media-embedded operatives from the military government's intelligence agency, the Dirección

de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA). Government officials also fabricated stories for publication in order to discredit perceived enemies (Castillo 2009). The threat of imprisonment and torture was real for media practitioners that refused to comply. The exact figure for journalists imprisoned and tortured under the Pinochet regime remains unknown, but it seems that 23 journalists were “disappeared” or killed between 1973 and 1990, and double that number of journalism students, print workers and other media personnel shared that fate (Carmona 1997). On the whole, media censorship during the early years of Pinochet period was therefore effective. As one Chilean journalist Eduardo Gallardo put it: “No one really resisted. It was much too dangerous” (Gallardo in Long 2015).

Some media outlets did, however, attempt to speak back against the dictatorship. Within a few years of the coup, a number of authorised media outlets began to challenge the limits of censorship. Radio, always less politicised than print media, was more free to do this (Bresnahan 2002). However, pushing the limits of freedom of expression showed that the regime maintained a close eye on radio broadcasters also. Recalcitrant radio stations were closed down, their editors banished to distant regions of the country, and recordings were removed and destroyed. By 1978, the regime had acted to minimise media challenges to its authority by replacing direct, prior censorship with a legal framework which added new crimes to the State Security law and media laws. In 1980, a new constitution established severe limitations on freedom of speech and of the media (Castillo 2009, p. 50). In 1983-4 when discontent with the regime erupted into street protests, prior censorship rapidly returned, and the media were prevented from discussing protest activity by additional legislation, which prohibited reporting any challenges to the state’s authority. Contempt of Authority provisions of the Military Code of Justice and the national security provisions of the State Security Law effectively curbed the activities of any government critics in the media, and were also used to prosecute journalists who contravened them. By 1988, even on the eve of the return to democracy, 23 journalists were still being prosecuted under the provisions of these laws (HRW 1998).

It became clear some years after the military uprising that media of the right had been instrumental in fomenting the circumstances of the coup (CIA 2000; Kornbluh 2003).

The El Mercurio Project was a push by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to incite public animosity against Allende through Chile's conservative media. The agency did this by channelling funds to the country's largest newspaper, staunchly conservative *El Mercurio*. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the newspaper had been in financial difficulty, and the El Mercurio group threatened to collapse. But after a 1970 visit to Washington by Augustín Edwards, the paper's then owner, to lobby for action against Allende, the paper received substantial CIA funding and became part of a propaganda campaign against Allende's government. Reporters and editors were put on the payroll and stories were placed, including many "virulent, inflammatory articles and editorials" which called for opposition to, and the overthrow of, Allende's Popular Unity government (Kornbluh 2003, p.92). In 1971, an employee of the Edwards group requested additional "covert support totalling US\$1 million" to ensure the group's survival. By December that year, the group had received an additional US\$1.95 million, averting its collapse, and enabling the continuation of a barrage of anti-government criticism (Kornbluh 2003, p.94). The CIA later confirmed that its propaganda effort, in which *El Mercurio* was the dominant actor, played a key part in setting the stage of the 1973 military coup (CIA 2000).

The media landscape in Chile just before the coup and during the Pinochet regime was the foundation for the media ecology that would develop once Chile returned to democracy. With the banning of any media of the left, censorship, and the legal circumscription of material deemed sensitive by the military government, as well as an immigration brain-drain of media personnel, Chile's pluralistic media would take time to recover. Another enduring aspect of the Pinochet era's effect on Chile's media was the economic influence of the 20-year dictatorship on media ownership.

### **3.10 Historical roots of contemporary media ownership in Chile**

Chile's media market was completely changed by the new economic order that followed the coup. The neoliberal imperative that guided the Pinochet-era economy was a radical juxtaposition to the socialist economic principles of the Allende period. In the second half of the 1970s, private clinics, private schools, universities, and private pension funds began to proliferate. In 1976, Chile's copper industry, nationalised under Allende, became the national corporation Codelco, in which the state worked together

with private companies for copper exploitation. In the 1980s, transport, telecommunications, water infrastructure and air transport were also privatised. The media was also affected by the neoliberal turn. In this new economic landscape, the country's two largest media organisations, which had found themselves suddenly without competitors following the coup, developed a policy of buying struggling regional media outlets or founding new ones (Ulloa Galindo 2014). Although this might have offered an opportunity for diversification and decentralisation of the media, in practice much content and the editorial line of these smaller local publications closely matched that of the parent organisation. In this way, print media ownership in Chile became concentrated in the hands of two ideologically conservative groups. The *El Mercurio* group discussed above, owned then (as today) by Chile's prominent Edwards family, dominated the market under the military government with 50% of national print media ownership. An additional 30% of national print media circulation was under the banner of Copesa (Consortio Periodístico de Chile), owned by another prominent family dynasty, the Pico-Cañas (Hudson 1994). Not only were these two groups aligned with the military government due to their political affinity, but they also became subordinated to it by the financial aid they received. While the state intended to let the market regulate these media, it was not willing to lose two ideological allies and at the time of the Latin American debt crisis in 1982, it rescued both groups, *El Mercurio* with a \$27 million subsidy from the state reserve bank, which was never repaid (González-Rodríguez 2008b, p. 66).

Radio and television remained nominally state-owned under the dictatorship, although private finance soon controlled these spheres too. In the case of radio, the regime's Radio Nacional de Chile was established in 1974, mainly as an amalgamation of radio stations confiscated at the time of the coup. It aimed to propagate the regime's ideology domestically and counteract negative opinions on the regime further afield. In television broadcasting, TVN and the smaller university-run stations remained under government control throughout the Pinochet era and, for most of this time, were managed by "ideologues" who used them for "propaganda purposes" to attempt to strengthen and maintain the regime's position (Tironi & Sunkel 2000, p. 171). Despite the important ideological nature of these media, the state was unwilling to finance them fully. By 1977 when it became clear that state television subsidies were insufficient, all previous

restrictions on commercial advertising were abolished, enabling the private sector to move into the development of this medium. In the final days of the Pinochet regime, private television was finally authorised, and two commercial channels Megavisión (Channel 9), owned by entrepreneur Ricardo Claro and La Red (Channel 4) launched by Chicago Boy banker (Valdes 2008) Álvaro Saieh appeared. Both businessmen had had close ties to the regime during the dictatorship (Castillo 2009, p. 57; Tironi & Sunkel 2000, p. 172).

Several scholars have noted that the evolution of Chile's media landscape under Pinochet allowed the formation of an exceptionally concentrated media market, the structure of which was maintained in the transition to democracy (Bresnahan 2003; Corrales & Sandoval 2003; Sunkel & Geoffroy 2001) and is largely retained even today (Mönckeberg 2011; Ulloa Galindo 2014). Of course, several other countries in Latin America, including Argentina, have experienced right-wing dictatorships and neoliberal economic restructuring with drastic effects on freedom of expression and media freedom – the influence of which, as in Chile, is demonstrably ongoing (Waisbord 2010). The genealogy of Chile's present-day media is therefore by no means unique. But in Chile's case, media repression was overlaid by a neoliberal turn so complete that Chile has been held up as “exemplar of ‘pure’ neo-liberal practices” (Harvey 2007, p. 74). In Pinochet's Chile, the concentrated media industries were active participants in and indeed *upholders* of the politics of dictatorship, the neoliberal economic order, and by extension the enduring social order. This oligopoly was the distinguishing characteristic of the media landscape when Chile began its return to democracy in 1990. The return to democracy – or to what Patricio Aylwin, at his presidential inauguration in 1990, called “a democracy as far possible” (RSF 2011) – rather than strengthening media plurality in the long term, instead intensified media concentration.

### **3.11 Media and the transition to democracy**

Towards the end of Pinochet era, Chilean media were better able to criticise the government than in the years that followed the 1973 military coup. By the late 1970s, there were underground print media run by workers' organisations, students' groups and grassroots religious groups. These were protected by their small circulation, with government censors more interested in the content of large-circulation dailies.

The first openly pro-democracy publication to appear was the magazine *Hoy*, in 1978. *Hoy* avoided censorship – though the government did close it down periodically – with a pragmatic approach and avoiding confronting the regime (Mobarec & Spiniak 2001). Current affairs magazines *Análisis* and *Apsi* appeared in the late 1970s – both harassed and closed repeatedly by the regime for their investigative reports. In 1983, investigative journalism magazine, *Cauce*, was established. Such low-circulation publications, their readership limited to an educated, sophisticated audience – where their political influence was significant – never reached a mass public. They were therefore unable to survive through market mechanisms of advertising and circulation revenues and only funding by foreign political parties, foundations and international NGOs committed to democratisation allowed them to continue (Castillo 2009). Only in the early stages of the political transition to democracy, two larger-circulation, self-financing opposition daily newspapers appeared, *La Época* and *Fortín Mapocho*. From 1987, these newspapers played, for a time, a Fourth Estate role in the Chilean media landscape, defending freedom of expression, holding the government to account and helping to rebuild democratic political culture. As the 1988 plebiscite that ended the Pinochet years approached, these papers also mobilised the electorate and reminded them how to vote.

At the same time as the print media was becoming more open, Chile's television sector, now fully part of the market system, supported by commercial advertising and now almost universal – it would reach 99% of households by 1992 (Bresnahan 2003, p. 55) – was the stage for a media event that would mark the so-called *apertura* (opening) of Chilean TV also. The 1987 visit of Pope John Paul stimulated huge public interest and Chileans watched carefully how the regime would handle the visit. The Catholic Church urged the government to broadcast the visit in full. TVN and the University of Chile's channel were accused of censorship and manipulation, while the Universidad Católica's Channel 13 broadcast the pope's speeches in their entirety, including criticisms of human rights abuses, and the pope's calls for democracy in Chile.

The "opening" of television with the pope's visit was further completed by the largely televised campaign leading up to the plebiscite. The "Yes" and the "No" campaigns – the former to keep Pinochet as leader until 1997 and the latter to return to democracy – presented highly symbolic televised content. The characteristics of these televised



campaigns are important here, as it has been suggested that prominent TV advertisements for HidroAysén recalled the negative, fear-engendering “Yes” campaign. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

This development of an opposition media and the return to a kind of pluralism that was unimaginable just a few years earlier, would seem to have been positive signs for the regeneration of a democratic media system in Chile. Despite the remarkable peacefulness of Chile’s return to democracy in 1990, though, the transition was what Chileans call “pactada” – a *negotiated* transition – so that under Aylwin and the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties for Democracy), consensus politics dominated in Chile. The transition was also notable for being characterised by what Kaltwasser terms “inter-elite pact making” (2007, p. 343), with little involvement by civil society, a tendency that he argues helped to institutionalise closed-door negotiations between elites in Chile. This is significant in the case of HidroAysén, and is addressed in Chapter 5.

The political mood of Chile in the transition was significant for the media. Now, there was less place for print media which had been established specifically to argue a pro-democracy, anti-regime standpoint. After the tumultuous years under Pinochet, Chileans seemed to have little appetite for political controversy. Of course, the generation of a “passive, depoliticised populace” (Bresnahan 2003, p. 42) had been one of the objectives of the authoritarian regime. Dismantling of democratic institutions, destruction of society’s capacity for “collective self-determination” (Kaltwasser 2007, p. 345) and a thorough “atomisation of civil society” (Kaltwasser 2007, p. 347) were some of the authoritarian regime’s power maintenance strategies. Once the regime ended, it seemed that political life was not a priority for most Chileans. Now, even human rights abuses under the regime featured little in public debate, and received little domestic media attention in the early years of the return to democracy. The literature on the role of the media in transitions to democracy indeed confirms this phenomenon. The phase of mobilisation against an old regime is often the high point of the media’s place in the transition process, a period when the media can play a “catalytic role” in democratisation. In later stages of the transition, however, the public’s “news appetite” can become “blunted by growing cynicism” (Jebiril, Stetka & Loveless 2013, p. 14) so that the media become less central to the democratisation process.

In addition to *political* consensus, this period was also characterised by an almost complete maintenance of the *economic* status quo. There was no dismantling of Pinochet's neoliberal market orthodoxy. Notably, by far the largest share of state advertising also continued to go to the larger media groups, as it had done under Pinochet (Bresnahan 2003), which amounted to a kind of state sponsorship of select media. Media therefore functioned under many of the same conditions as during the dictatorship – now without censorship, but also without any great public interest in political change which had originally galvanised the alternative media.

At the same time, mindful of the climate of consensus and in a pragmatic move to consolidate their audience, print media of the right moved closer to the center. The result was that the left-opposition media, which had always had smaller circulations and suffered precarious financial conditions, lost readership while more established print publications like those of the *El Mercurio* and Copesa groups increased theirs. Within a few years of the end of the regime, many of the former opposition publications had disappeared. Left-leaning newspaper *Fortín Mapocho* closed in 1991, political magazines *Análisis* and *Apsi* closed in 1993 and 1995 respectively. *La Época* ceased publication in 1998. In 2005, *Rocinante* and *Plan B*, leading examples of independent, political journalism in Chile, closed (González 2005; Mönckeberg 2011). In 2006, *Diario Siete*, a critical, independent newspaper, acquired in 2004 by the Copesa group on condition of non-interference in editorial matters, was closed by its new owners (González-Rodríguez 2008a). By 2006, the last of the long-standing regional newspapers, *El Sur*, which circulated in the city of Concepción, was acquired by the *El Mercurio* group. In the 16 years since the return to democracy, more publications had closed than new ones had been established.

In the broadcast media, a similar trend of conglomeration was also underway. This was particularly evident in radio broadcasting, where transnational business chains were acquiring many of Chile's major FM stations, and access to licenses for community radio stations was becoming more complicated. In terrestrial television, a mix of conservative Chilean businessmen and transnational business interests bought television stations. For example, future right-wing president and billionaire, Sebastian Piñera, acquired the channel Chilevisión during this period, and prominent supporter of the military regime, Ricardo Claro (Peña 2008) acquired the majority share of

Megavisión, with Mexican group Televisa. The channel La Red was bought by politically conservative Mexican media magnate Remigio Ángel González who was known to adjust the editorial lines of his Latin American media outlets to suit the agendas of host governments (Rockwell & Janus 2001).

It has been argued, in the context of the Chilean media, that “where Pinochet failed, democracy succeeded” (González-Rodríguez 2008a, p. 62) – that is, in democratic Chile, pluralism has become more impoverished, and the media have become more concentrated and ideologically homogenous than they had been towards the end of the Pinochet years. The post-regime Concertación governments inherited a media system shaped by the previous regime and applied a *laissez faire* approach. By leaving the “pure” neoliberal system untouched, post-Pinochet governments allowed the market to do its work in a media landscape where pluralism was still fragile. Not long after the transition, this had diminished the diversity and democratising capacity of Chile’s media. Although, as Waisbord points out, “only an economically solvent press can rail against government” (Waisbord 2000, p. 65), likewise media that have limited degrees of separation from market interests have a limited capacity to keep those interests in check, because “watchdogs do not bite their owners” (p. 6). The result in a conglomerated, advertising-saturated market like Chile was a decline in the diversity of viewpoints in both print and broadcast media, a paucity of in-depth analysis of key issues, and a corresponding trend towards infotainment. Of course, the phenomena of corporate media conglomeration (Bagdikian 1980; 2000; McChesney 1997; 2015) and the rise of infotainment (Brants 1998; Thussu 2007), as discussed in the Chapter 2, are long-term, global trends. These trends are perhaps particularly significant in newly democratising counties, however, where the replacement of state ideological control with market-driven imperatives can inhibit the democratic role that normative media theory attributes to the free media – a role may be an important factor in the democratisation process itself<sup>27</sup> (Berman & Witzner 1997; Dahl 1989)

The outcome for Chile was that by 2006, the year that HidroAysén was established, the country had a media landscape that fell short of equity and pluralism. This was a system

---

<sup>27</sup> In the literature on media and democratisation, it is still unclear whether the media *lead* or *follow* democratic change. See Jakubowicz (FreedomHouse 2012) and O’Neil (2003).

where news reporting was impoverished, where sensational crime stories and football were over-reported, while more significant news stories were often “intentionally not reported” (González-Rodríguez 2008a). In a 2005 survey of television 52,2 % of Chileans (CNTV 2005, p. 80) felt that news was presented highly superficially, and 63% (p. 80) considered news to be unfairly orientated towards just one side of politics. Importantly for this study, the same survey also indicated that 72.4% (p. 82) of Chileans felt that significant issues like the environment were underreported. This, then, was a media system with a structure and output that responded more to “the interests of the dominant sectors, rather than those of citizens and society” (González-Rodríguez 2008a, p. 75).

### **3.12 Media during the HidroAysén timeframe**

Increasing media concentration, commercialisation and trivialisation of “news” in Chile in the 15 years after Pinochet, continued through the period that the HidroAysén project was in the planning and approvals process, and was the subject of much public discussion – 2006 to 2014. The continued tendency towards economic and territorial concentration (Mönckeberg 2011; Ulloa Galindo 2014), on one hand gave Chile’s conglomerated media a capacity to accumulate Castells’ ‘communication power’, as discussed in Chapter 2; and on the other hand simply magnified opportunities for profit making in the media industries, to the detriment of in-depth treatment of news and more serious media content. In the following chapters, I discuss how these tendencies influenced media coverage of the HidroAysén megaproject.

A 2014 survey of ownership of Chilean media outlets – TV, newspapers, magazines, radio and online digital media – (Poderopedia 2014) showed that there were 509 separate registered media outlets that functioned on a national and regional level in Chile. The majority of these were held by one of 20 key Chilean and international media groups which tended to own cross-platform holdings. As under Pinochet, the El Mercurio group, property of Augustín Edwards Eastman, dominated the industry, owning 56 print, digital, radio outlets, an advertising agency and a wire service. El Mercurio’s emol digital site was the commanding presence in the country’s online media. The El Mercurio group owned three principal newspapers in Santiago, and seven provincial newspapers. Together with the Copesa consortium, publisher of *La Tercera*,

(now owned by Álvaro Saieh), the El Mercurio group held 90% of print media and attracted 90% of readers in Chile. In the magazine market, the Mexican group Televisa was the dominant holder, owning 17 of Chile's most popular magazines. The radio sector was more diverse, comprising in total some 1500 radio stations (Godoy 2016, p. 662). A total of four groups owned 70% of the market, with the Spanish group Prisa proprietor of 220 stations, accounting for 30% of the total radio market and 50% of advertising revenues in radio. In television, of the now six free to air channels, five were owned by prominent Chilean businessmen – almost all members of the conservative intergenerational elite discussed above – and prominent businessmen from other parts of Latin America<sup>28</sup>. The sixth channel, TVN, although still state run, continued to be commercially financed and therefore subject to commercial pressures on content. TVN, Mega, Chilevisión and Canal 13 – accounted for 95% of terrestrial broadcasting (Poderopedia 2014). Cable channels provided a diversity of content, but had a low audience share – with only 25% of viewers able to access these channels (Godoy 2016, p. 655). The dominant content on cable channels was children's programming, films, and entertainment content from the United States: cable was not a rich source of news or current affairs content. News programs like CNN-Chile (established in 2008) and 24 Horas Noticias (24 Hours News) established in 2009, have brought more extensive news coverage, however, these are still niche channels with low viewer numbers (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012).

Despite the large audience share of a reduced number of media outlets, some researchers point out that Chile's contemporary media landscape is in fact one of the *least* concentrated and most pluralistic in Latin America (Godoy 2016), particularly with little state interference, compared to many other countries in Latin America. Godoy's recent detailed study of the ownership structure of the Chilean media market considers the El Mercurio/La Copesa duopoly in print media, for example, to be far less problematic than the political and economic power of conglomerates like Globo in Brazil, Televisa in Mexico and Clarín in Argentina. This study stresses the "fiercely competitive" (Godoy 2016, p. 662) nature of the Chilean media market – which is

---

<sup>28</sup> For comprehensive survey data on media ownership in Chile during the period under examination the Media Map Project (2013) and Godoy (Poderopedia 2014) can be viewed. Mönckeberg (2016) can be viewed for a detailed, qualitative, long-term assessment of the evolution of media ownership since the return to democracy. See Godoy & Gronemeyer (2012) for information on digital media ownership.

certainly true in terms of competition for advertising expenditure and audience share. However, other research demonstrates that such democratising media governance reforms that have recently been enacted in countries such as Brazil and Argentina, have *not* been carried out in Chile – this due to the weakness of media reform advocacy coalitions in Chile (Mauersberger 2016). Mauersberger considers that such democratising reforms that are changing media landscapes in other parts of Latin America are “unlikely” in Chile in the future.

The legal and policy frameworks for media freedom in Chile during the period under discussion were mixed. Although Chilean law had re-established freedom of expression and freedom of the media in 2001 (Bresnahan 2003), legal weaknesses resulting from incomplete reform after military rule remained. Criminal defamation and *desacato* (contempt) laws were used during this timeframe to silence journalists. Journalists were also subject to attacks by Chile’s Carabineros (police force) while reporting at protests. Other subjects deemed too “sensitive” for media coverage during this period were protests against former military officers of the Pinochet regime, for which three journalists were arrested and beaten by police in 2007, (RSF 2008) and the subject of paedophilia. In 2011, journalist Francisco Martorell still faced the threat of imprisonment for defamation due to his reporting of a paedophilia case in which an elite Chilean was implicated (RSF 2011). After police beatings of several journalists and cameramen covering protests in 2011, police violence against journalists was described as having increased “at a frightening rate” by the President of Chile’s Foreign Correspondents Association, Mauricio Weibel. Nine attacks on media practitioners by police had been recorded by October of that year, usually related to journalists’ filming or photographing police violence against protesters (Freedom House 2012). While occurrences like these are still rare, and Chile is usually regarded by media freedom monitors like Reporters without Borders and Freedom House as one of the *least* constrained media systems in Latin America, the combination of ownership concentration and commercialisation, the use of the penal code to silence journalists, and the policy of police beatings of media personnel in 2011, prompted Freedom House to change Chile’s media freedom status in 2012 from “Free” to “Partly Free” (Freedom House 2012) – although by 2014 and in subsequent years, Freedom House has again rated Chile’s media as “Free” (Freedom House 2018). Among Chilean journalists

themselves, however, relatively rare incidents like police beatings were seen as less of a threat to media freedom than the pressure of the market – which in 2010, was regarded as the chief pressure on their work by 31.8% of journalists, second to pressure from advertising interests (29.3%) and influence of media ownership (28%) (Mellado et al. 2010b).

Despite this rather bleak assessment of Chile's media when the HydroAysén debate unfolded, there were also positive developments during these years. In 2008, during the first Bachelet presidency, Chile's Law on Transparency of Public Functions and Access to Information, was enacted. This is a useful tool for investigative journalists, obliging government agencies to respond to information requests within a required timeframe (Freedom House 2015). Some publications during the HidroAysén timeframe also gave space to alternative voices and ideological positions. Founded in 2005, *El Ciudadano* is a news outlet that is "libertarian, committed to care of the environment and human rights, and that believes in communication as a tool to strengthen democracy" (El Ciudadano 2005). The independent online news site *El Mostrador* was Chile's first fully online news outlet when it converted from a print edition (founded in 2001) to a purely online presence in 2003. *El Mostrador* is also known for its progressive politics, declaring "a commitment to independent and pluralist content" and the "defence, perfection and deepening" of democracy (*El Mostrador* 2006) as its mission. Despite its relatively small audience reach, *El Mostrador* is an agenda setting (McCombs & Shaw 1972; 2006) media outlet, sometimes leading the national news agenda with its investigative reports. Online investigative journalism site Ciper.cl (Centro de Investigación Periodística – Centre for Journalistic Investigation) is similar to *El Mostrador* in terms of its small audience, but cross-media agenda setting abilities. Finally, the weekly satirical publication *The Clinic*, founded in 1998 – the year that Pinochet was arrested and taking its name from the London clinic where that event occurred – combines parody with in-depth analysis of current affairs. *The Clinic's* print edition has a significant circulation with 140,000 readers weekly. It has 458,000 Twitter followers and 3 million monthly website visits (Watts & Franklin 2013).

During the HidroAysén debate in Chile, then, it was certainly *possible* for journalists to research and publish in-depth investigative news content, and for citizens to freely access diverse viewpoints in the media. An examination of Chileans' *actual* media

consumption, however, shows that the kinds of media most people consumed comprised much infotainment-type content, with a paucity of serious current affairs analysis or news. A key media consumption study (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012) indicates that, in the HidroAysén timeframe, most Chileans obtained their news from free to air television with 85% of the population consuming this medium every day. Sixty per cent listened to radio daily, 20% internet news and just 17% newspapers (p. 19). On television, news was one of the most watched aspects of programming: 74.5% of viewers watched newscasts daily (p. 20). However, as discussed, news agendas of free to air television are geared towards achieving high ratings, with much sensationalism and an abundance of coverage of crime, celebrities and sports. Eighty percent of viewers questioned in a 2011 survey on free-to-air television considered that free-to-air channels concentrated overly on “celebrity and showbusiness” while neglecting more serious issues (CNTV 2011, p. 81).

In print media, Chile’s four main newspapers, in terms of highest circulation and national reach in the timeframe of interest here were *El Mercurio*, *Las Últimas Noticias* (El Mercurio group), *La Tercera* (Copesa) and *La Cuarta* (Copesa).

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>El Mercurio</i> (El Mercurio SAP)	379,057	386,277	364,089	383,489	361,766	382,165
<i>Las Últimas Noticias</i> (El Mercurio SAP)	419,029	389,965	405,542	368,600	360,240	334,867
<i>La Tercera</i> (COPESA)	351,917	324,663	348,200	319,817	300,078	312,849
<i>La Cuarta</i> (COPESA)	448,353	470,862	517,408	533,042	527,090	397,363

Figure 2: Highest circulation newspapers’ weekly average readership figures 2005-2010 (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012, p. 22).

Of these, *Las Últimas Noticias* and *La Cuarta* are entertainment-orientated tabloids with little depth or breadth of news coverage. Right to center-right orientated publications *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*, pitched at Chile’s most educated, and elite, readers are the most “serious” large circulation papers. Although print media consumption was relatively much smaller than broadcast media consumption, the overall impact of news stories reported in Chile’s leading newspapers at the time of HidroAysén is significant. As discussed in chapter 1, newspapers – particularly elite newspapers – have been



shown to have agenda setting influence on other media, both print and television, on a local and a national level (Golan 2006; Protess & McCombs 2016; Trumbo 1995). Therefore, newspaper coverage of an issue like HidroAysén in influential elite print media, and the *framing* of coverage in those media, was likely to have had an impact on broadcast media coverage of this issue also, and consequently on broader media and public discourse concerning this issue. The following chapter, which clarifies the methods of this study, discusses further the choice of print over broadcast media for analysis here.

### **3.13 Digital and social media in Chile**

During the timeframe of the HidroAysén debate, a key aspect of Chile's media – online, social and mobile media platforms – underwent rapid expansion. The World Internet Project reports that in 2006, the internet was used by 40% of the population in Chile (compared to 71% for the EU overall and 50% in Japan, for example) (WIP 2015, p. 6). By 2014, 72% of Chileans accessed the internet (Internet World Stats 2014), making Chile the most internet-connected country in Latin America.<sup>29</sup> While by 2014, 39% of Chileans were able to access the internet on a smartphone, 52% had mobile phones without internet access (Pew Research Centre 2014). Internet usage was higher among the highest income level: 70.8% of this group were able to use the internet in 2014. In terms of age, young people accessed the internet most (93% of 18-29 year-olds). Internet access among lower income groups was 35%, and only 13.9% of people over 60 used the internet. By 2014, then, although there had been notable growth in availability of the internet during the years that are of interest to this study, there still existed a significant digital divide which extended particularly to lower socio-economic groups (WIP 2015).

Surveys of different types of activities online show that the largest share of internet use in Chile was for social networking at 76% (Pew Research Centre 2014). Chileans were particularly active Facebook users: together with Colombians, the most active users in Latin America. Facebook grew from 39,000 accounts in 2007 to 7.5 million accounts in

---

<sup>29</sup> This figure includes people who had access to the internet by proxy, that is, they had someone access information for them. The WIP reports that the percentage of the population accessing the internet directly *themselves* in 2014 was less than the above figure: around 51% (WIP 2015, p. 6).

2010 (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012, p. 51). By 2014, 96% of internet users in Chile were also Facebook users. Twitter was a less widely used – reaching only 10% of Chileans by 2010 (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012). However, the platform is considered influential in Chile with users including high-profile professionals, politicians and journalists. In 2010 president Sebastián Piñera and his entire cabinet opened Twitter accounts specifically to seem more accessible to his constituents (*Economist* 2010). During the HidroAysén debate, both of these social media platforms would become key sites for internet activism and organising protest for the anti-dams position, and public discourse on the megaproject in general. This aspect of social media use in the HidroAysén megaproject controversy is covered in detail in subsequent chapters.

Chileans also place great importance on the internet as a news source. By 2010, when Chileans accessed the internet for educational/informational purposes, 70% of this time was spent consuming news (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012, p. 46). Of interest to this study, however, is that although via the internet the variety of news sources available is almost infinite, the news websites two of Chile’s “old media” outlets, *El Mercurio* – whose online site is known as emol.com – and the online site of newspaper *La Tercera* – still figured in the top 10 sites accessed (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012, p. 47). In this way, traditional media, newspapers in particular, still played an important role in the provision of news online in Chile. So although online media can be considered a site for the contestation of hegemony, as discussed in Chapter 2, in Chile during the timeframe of HidroAysén some of the communication power of the traditional media extended to information online too. What this meant for Chileans consuming news online during the HidroAysén timeframe, was that they were quite likely to be consuming news which had a conservative political agenda and a tendency to report matters relating to the environment not particularly in-depth. News and deeper analysis on the dams issue was certainly available, but it seems not to have been regularly accessed within the timeframe of interest by the majority of Chileans.

### **3.14 Public relations in Chile**

Few studies exist on public relations (PR) and strategic communications in Chile (Délano 1990; Eyzaguirre 1993; Ferrari 2009; Mellado & Barría 2012; Mellado & Hanusch 2011; Mellado et al. 2010a) perhaps in part because it is a relatively new field

in this country. Although the first organisational public relations department in Chile was established by a copper mining firm in the 1950s, and PR followed foreign mining companies into the country in the 1960s (Ferrari 2009), the discipline was not well recognised. It was only after the end of the military regime, as if to fill a space that had been occupied by the regime's own communications, that PR began to develop as a profession. However, PR struggled to gain credibility. An early study of PR in Chile (Délano 1990) showed that because of lack of recognition of the strategic communications capacity of PR, public relations positions in Chilean organisations were mostly filled by "lawyers, sociologists, engineers or journalists", and that exceptions to this usually only occurred "when the professional has been trained outside Chile" (Délano 1990, p. 23). Research conducted in 1992 showed that PR as a profession had little legitimacy and was not recognised by 62.8% of Chilean executives (Flanagan 1992, cited in Ferrari 2009, p. 380). A more recent study (Mellado & Barría 2012) indicates that although PR now receives more recognition as a professional practice, it is still not necessarily considered an entirely separate profession in its own right. The relationship between PR and journalism in Chile seems to conform to the Latin American trend, that is: particularly close linkage between the two professions. In the case of Chile, as Mellado and Hanusch (2011) found, this blurring of the separation between journalism and PR makes the two groups so close that they "tend to feel they are part of the same professional community" (p. 391). This is not necessarily the case for other countries, where several studies have shown that journalists and PR professionals perceive their roles as antagonistic and their ethics and values as incompatible (Aronoff 1975; Belz, Talbott & Starck 1989; Cameron, Sallot & Curtin 1997) with journalists' opinion of public relations being more negative than the inverse (Shin & Cameron 2004; Stegall & Sanders 1986).

Of course, as noted in Chapter 2, the growth of the field of public relations and, at the same time, the approximation of the fields of journalism and PR, are worldwide trends and not unique to Chile. Given the demonstrated closeness of the two professions in the Chilean context, and the fact that Chile's media are subject to the same commercial trends that have accelerated and intensified the news cycle elsewhere, it seems in Chile as elsewhere, much news content does also originate in PR information subsidy. This means news consumers in Chile as in many other national contexts are subject to the

effects of Habermas' strategic mode of communication, that is: "one in which one actor intends to gain an advantage in the situation without the other becoming aware of those intentions" (Salter 2005, p. 92). In Chile during the HidroAysén timeframe, people consuming news on the dams debate were also the consuming strategic communications/PR of both the dam developers and the anti-dams activist coalition, without being aware of doing so.

In Chile, there is an additional aspect to the way that PR tends to function, and to the PR/journalism relationship. As discussed above, Chile has maintained many of the structures (social, cultural and economic) either built or solidified under a 17-year totalitarian regime. In the years following the transition, it seems, this included a tendency towards conservatism and hierarchy in business culture also. An early study of PR in Chilean business organisations (Ferrari 2000) found that an authoritarian culture persisted in many organisations, and that this influenced the model of PR practiced in these organisations. Out of 13 Chilean and multinational organisations examined in the study, the 6 Chilean organisations all practiced a one-way asymmetric model of PR (Grunig & Hunt 1984), based on reactive communications, while in contrast, the six multinational organisations practiced a symmetrical model based on negotiation and mediation, and one company practiced a public information model (Ferrari 2000 cited in Ferrari 2009).

A more recent study of PR in Chile has shown that the country's prevailing politico-economic and cultural/social landscape continues to shape PR in a way that distinguishes its practice in this country (and similarly other parts of Latin America) from PR practice in Anglo-Saxon and Western European countries. García (2015) examined and compared PR practice in Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) with PR practices in Chile, Mexico and Brazil, finding that clientelism (a concept "inherited from feudalism", p. 134) was a common cultural convention in these countries, that this could be identified in the work of organisations, and consequently also in the organisational behavior of PR. In clientelism, the *asymmetrical* character of social relations and organisational structure is key. Clientelism relies on individual relations of dependence, and affects all kinds of interactions: social, political and economic (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos 2002). The prevalence of this system in the

countries examined can be explained, at least in part, as a response to enduring traditional hierarchical social structures. In the societies examined, business also tends to have particularly close links with government (in the absence of the former feudal patron), and priority is given to constructing relationships with government officials, politicians and decision makers, over communication with other stakeholders. Of course, clientelistic relationships and patronage exist to some degree in many societies (Kawata 2006), but García (2015) shows that such a system is much more persistent, pronounced and culturally embedded in the countries he examines, including Chile.

Chilean business tends to run anyway on a personal influence model where a social approach and maintaining important contacts (known in Chile as “pitutos”) is key. Because of clientelism’s goal of directly influencing government and key decision makers, strategic business communications in Chile often constitute direct communication with key groups or media relations with elite media – those consumed by decision-makers – rather than relationship-building with publics.

As García puts it:

Many businesses, particularly the largest companies...consider it more of a priority to be in the financial pages of newspapers to generate perceptions among local politicians in order to obtain licenses, subsidies, or public contracts. Building relationships with, for example, their own consumers is less of a priority.

(García 2015, p. 141)

As discussed above, newspapers have a small but influential readership in Chile, comprised mostly of the business and political elite, and these are the arenas in which economic interests, try to gain political and social influence. It seems then, given Chile’s clientelistic business culture, that strategic communications output is particularly focused at gaining the attention of elite print media, emphasizing the need to examine these kinds of media (over more widely consumed media like TV and radio) in the HidroAysén debate.

The priority of Chilean PR/strategic communications to develop relationships with government/decision makers over building symmetrical relationships with their

publics, may also lead to a neglect of corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR as a corporate public relations function was nascent in Chile during the HidroAysén timeframe and seems to have been understood within the context of clientelism by some Chilean business. In clientelistic PR environments the use of gifts and the exchange of favours are considered part of the “strategic public relations menu with a persuasive purpose” (García 2015, p. 144), and this was one kind of activity which was carried out by HidroAysén, as discussed in the following chapters, to the detriment of public perception of the company in the long term.

As in some countries in southern Europe and other parts of Latin America, therefore, PR/strategic communications in Chile often seems to take place in a different kind of public sphere (Hallin & Mancini 2004; 2013; Hallin & Papathanassopoulos 2002) in which the central element is not relations with potentially affected publics, but instead the bargaining process between governments and organisations which may indeed be more successful if carried out informally (García 2015, p. 139). This kind of “inter-elite pact making” (Kaltwasser 2007, p. 343) may also mean for the PR process in a country like Chile that the best strategic communication is sometimes no communication on a public level at all, and that Thompson’s “visibility” and its counter “invisibility” as discussed in Chapter 2, may become a valuable part of an organisation’s communications strategy. The following chapters demonstrate how maintaining a low profile, was at times an intentional strategy in HidroAysén’s PR effort.

### **3.15 Conclusion**

This chapter has served as an overview of a range of relevant aspects of Chile leading up to and during the time of the HidroAysén debate. As well as discussing Chile’s energy supply and demand situation, and the country’s social and development context, I chart here the evolution of the Chilean media through the dictatorship, arguing that the media systems set up in the military era still influence Chile’s media landscape today. I also argue here that the social and business model that prevailed for many companies when HidroAysén was established was a hierarchical one, in which closed-door inter-elite negotiations rather than symmetrical communication with a spectrum of stakeholders was considered key to obtaining political favour and bureaucratic licences. The issue of *social* licence (Bice 2014; Boutilier 2014; Lester

2016; Parsons and Moffat 2014) in this context, was not seen as a priority by Chilean businesses. This, then, was the landscape in which the HidroAysén megaproject was first established, and over eleven years, emerged from relative invisibility into vigorous public debate. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 examine in detail the mediatized debate over HidroAysén. The following chapter, Chapter 4, first examines the methodology used for this study.

## Chapter 4: Aims and Methodology

### 4.1 Introduction

What might be a way to make sense of an eight-year communications battle where opposing parties' sparring for ascendancy in discourse on the disputed matter produced such a volume and variety of communications output? Where should the focus be for a study which aims to unpick the winding course of this extended narrative? How to understand the means by which one party in the conflict rendered the invisible visible? How did the two sides in this debate represent themselves, and how were these representations reflected in the media content on the dams over such an extended period of time? How should the important role of imagery and advertising in discourse like this be understood? How also should the issue of language and translation be treated in a study like this one, given that most of the source material in the HidroAysén case is in Spanish? How might one understand which of the sparring parties gained the power of definition at given moments in the debate? And how might the *amount* of media coverage help to pinpoint which moments in the lengthy discourse are critical? How, through its discursive construction did the megaproject at the centre of this conflict come to represent more than a debate over an energy infrastructure project? This chapter attempts to answer these kinds of questions as it clarifies the methodological approach taken in this study. This broader set of questions informs the research questions of this study, which are:

- How was the HidroAysén debate articulated in key Chilean media over the period 2008-2014?
- Why, and when, did the developing company seek invisibility for its project and how did a protest campaign “visibilise”<sup>30</sup> the project?
- How did HidroAysén come to represent more than an environmental conflict over a hydroelectric megaproject?
- How did HidroAysén become emblematic?

---

<sup>30</sup> I use this word occasionally in this study, meaning ‘to make visible’. It equates to the Spanish *visibilizar*, a word frequently used by interviewees for this study in relation to HidroAysén. A typical definition of *visibilizar* is “to make visible by some procedure or device that which usually cannot be seen with the naked eye” (*Spanish Oxford Living Dictionaries*).



- What lessons can be drawn from the emblematic case of HidroAysén about the communication of conflicts over megaprojects?

I begin this chapter with a brief discussion of the commonly recognised thought paradigms in the social sciences, including their differing views on methodologies. Then, I explain how some methodologies may be more suitable than others for case study research of the kind presented here. I then detail the methodologies incorporated into the multi-perspectival approach taken in this study. Following this, the discussion turns to the fieldwork and data collection that inform this study. Finally, I address the analysis of the data collected, relating this process back to the research questions of this thesis as a whole. I include in this section a discussion of language and translation. Throughout this chapter – as through the whole thesis – I am mindful of the importance of contingency and of the *limitations* of any given research method bearing in mind that no methodology offers “undebatable conclusions” (Ellis & Bochner 2000, p. 734) or is “a set of more or less successful procedures for reporting on a given reality” (Law 2004, p. 143) but is instead an enterprise which is “a messy one”, and not “a series of neat, hermetic stages” (Brewer 2000, p. 5). Through this chapter – and this study as a whole – I also consider the need to remain reflexive and to be aware of my own perspectives as a researcher, given that “the self is in fact the site of knowledge production” (Ginsburg 2006, p. 492). This chapter ends, therefore, with a discussion of reflexivity in relation to the conduct of the research that informs this study.

## **4.2 Methodological framework**

### *4.2.1 Paradigmatic and methodological controversies*

The literature has tended to identify at least four<sup>31</sup> (Guba & Lincoln 1994) ontological paradigms within the social sciences that differ fundamentally, particularly in their aims and their understanding of the nature of knowledge. Positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism have been associated with discrete and axiomatic values. All, however, have been subject to overarching questions about the nature and scope of

---

<sup>1</sup> Lincoln, Lynham and Guba add an additional, fifth, *participatory* paradigm to this list in their contribution to the 2011 edition to the same volume (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba 2011, p. 98). Other researchers, like Morgan (2014a) feel that pragmatism should also be considered a paradigm

their enquiry. Scholars in all of these paradigms have asked, for example, whether the social sciences should indeed seek knowledge in the same ways as knowledge is sought in the natural sciences. Can social science research ever demonstrate relations of cause and effect, given that social reality is not governed by any law-like phenomena? (Benton & Craib 2001). Can generalisations in social sciences ever be “truly universal, unrestricted to time and space”, leading to the possibility of making valid theoretical inferences? (Kaplan 1964, p. 91 cited in Lincoln & Guba 2000, p. 27). Perhaps the most enduring controversy is in the area in which these ontologies differ most fundamentally: in the research methodologies they favour.

The divide between advocates and practitioners of qualitative and quantitative research has been a significant philosophical fault line in the social sciences. Although the literature cautions to avoid drawing a simplistic dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative research, questioning whether qualitative research can provide the level of certainty about observed phenomena that quantitative research is perceived to provide has long been a feature social science enquiry. At opposite ends of the spectrum of ontologies, positivist research usually relies purely on ‘factual’ knowledge and measurable, discrete, empirically observable elements. Positivism is built on quantifiable observations that lend themselves to statistical analysis. The constructivist paradigm, however, is concerned with how people make sense of the world. Constructivism (sometimes termed naturalistic enquiry or interpretivism) prioritises meaning and interpretation and considers that the ways in which people understand their world constructs their own reality. Constructivist research – which is most often qualitative – takes the view that the best way to understand a phenomenon is to view it in its context.

Despite paradigmatic controversies – and past claims that positivist and constructivist ontologies and their preferred methodological styles are irreconcilable (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba 2011) qualitative and quantitative research styles should not be considered as being in opposition to one another. As Geertz predicted almost three decades ago when he wrote of a “blurring of genres” (Geertz 1988; 1993), scholarship has identified a trend of rapprochement between paradigms (together with their

respectively accompanying theorists and methodologies). By 2011, Lincoln, Lynham and Guba argued that

the various paradigms are beginning to “interbreed” such that two theorists previously thought to be in irreconcilable conflict may now appear, under a different theoretical rubric, to be informing one another’s arguments

(p. 97)

With the blurring of paradigms has come a “third methodological movement” (Teddle & Tashakkori 2011, p. 285) – mixed methods research – which holds that qualitative and quantitative methods are innately compatible. When used in combination, because these different methods may allow access to different *types* of knowledge, they can offer deeper insights into the study target (Cresswell 2011, p. 269; Teddle & Tashakkori 2011, p. 285).

#### *4.2.2 “Multiple ways of seeing”*

Mixed methods research, based on pragmatism, has been defined by Johnston et al. (Johnson, R, Onwuegbuzie & Turner 2007, p. 123) as a combination of qualitative and quantitative research approaches, “for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration”. Some scholars have described mixing methods as “methodological eclecticism” (Hammersley 1996; Yancher & Williams 2006), others as “a palette of methods” (Stake 1995, p. xi-xii), and some have emphasised its ability to “cancel out the respective weaknesses of each method” (Hammersley 1996, p. 167). Other scholars have emphasised that mixing methodologies allows the researcher “multiple ways of seeing” and therefore “multiple standpoints on what is important and to be valued and cherished” (Greene 2007, p. 20). In the context of mixed methods research, many scholars have also discouraged a binary distinction between qualitative and quantitative methodologies, (Bryman 1998; Coxon 2005; Denscombe 2008; Giddings 2006; Gorard & Taylor 2004; Vogt 2008), arguing that such a distinction does not hold in practice, is not watertight, and is instead “questionable” (Cresswell 2011, p. 272). This is because methods that prioritise numerical data usually involve qualitative judgements, and likewise quantitative studies need to consider context – usually a qualitative concern (Sandelowski, Voils & Knafl 2009). Some authors have written that

studies that include multiple strands of either qualitative *or* quantitative data should be considered mixed methods research (while others have proposed this be termed “multiple methods” (Morse & Niehaus 2009).

Although the mixed methods approach has been referred to as “a new star in the social science sky” (Mayring 2007, p. 1), the notion of combining and linking qualitative and quantitative research in the same study to facilitate data triangulation (Denzin 1978) is not new. Interest in mixing methods has been building since 1970s (Cresswell 2011) and has risen “increasingly sharply” (Fielding 2012, p. 124) since 2000, fuelled by the trend towards a delinking of paradigms and methodologies (Johnson, L & Onwuegbuzie 2004). Case study researchers, fieldwork sociologists and cultural anthropologists argue, however, that their data gathering has been mixing methods for the investigation of complex social phenomena since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (Holmes 2006 cited in Cresswell 2011). Although for Morse and Niehaus (2009), ethnography is an approach that is distinct from mixed methods research, Creswell argues that this is a debatable point, and that mixed methods are being used within *many* larger frameworks, including the kind of case study research that constitutes this study (Cresswell 2010). As Creswell also points out “collecting QUAL data and transforming it into QUAN counts” is “the procedure used in traditional content analysis” (2010, p. 52). Sandelowski, Voils and Knafl (2009) suggest that the kind of data transformation required for content analysis (a computer-assisted version of which this study employs) indeed qualifies as method-mixing. Mixed methods, therefore, are somewhat of a broad church in terms both of the thought paradigms that they bridge, overarching frameworks within which they fit, and the practical data collection and analysis methods that they encompass.

In the research presented in this study, I endeavour to make use of “multiple ways of seeing” to best understand the complex, multifaceted case of HidroAysén. This study is therefore not aligned with a single method, methodology, thought paradigm or intellectual tradition, yet builds on several. To facilitate “multiple ways of seeing”, I use mixed- and multi-methods in a detailed single case study, employing a smaller quantitative component on a corpus of media content, together with computer-assisted content analysis, to inform an overall qualitative lens. If the approach used here needs an identifying label, it might be called what Cresswell terms “mixed methods

interpretivism” (Cresswell 2011, p. 277) – where quantitative methods play a secondary or supporting role in largely qualitative research, and the overall paradigm remains a mainly constructive/interpretive one. Creswell indeed calls for more studies that employ this kind of research style.

For this study of “becoming emblematic” – essentially an analysis of a process of meaning creation – a constructivist way of thinking is often the key framework. But it is not the only one. Case study research like that presented here *does* fit appropriately within the interpretivist/constructivist paradigm where the social formation of meaning is paramount (Gillham 2000; Stake 1995; 2000; 2005). But case studies can equally fall within a more postpositivist paradigm and be conducted according to an understanding that a “real” reality can be apprehended (Yin 2003). As a mixed-methods study, the research here also draws on some aspects of pragmatism (generally considered to be mixed methods’ philosophical partner) as described by the philosopher Dewey (Dewey 1920/2008; 1922/2008). Methodologically, pragmatism departs from the qualitative/quantitative binary and philosophically, from arguments about the nature of reality and the possibility of finding truth (Morgan 2014b, p. 5) advocating rather “freedom of enquiry” (Dewey 1925/2008). Importantly, pragmatism also emphasises the *transformative* capacity of social research, and its ability to facilitate social change. Given that this research presents “lessons” from the case study examined here, and positions itself as being of practical use in understanding the communication of environmental conflict, it is certainly concerned with the possibility for application of its findings. The pragmatic approach to enquiry therefore seems a good fit for many parts of this study.

#### *4.2.3 Seeing just one case*

The term ‘case study’ has been described as “a definitional morass” (Gerring 2006, p. 17) where conflicting ideas have surrounded both what constitutes case study research, and the validity of such research. Gillham defines a case study as: “a unit of human activity embedded in the real world, which can only be studied or understood in context” and that “merges in with its context so that precise boundaries are difficult to draw” (Gillham 2000, p. 1) . A case study is therefore not a naturally existing phenomenon. Only the demarcation of the boundaries of the unit of study – the

production of what Stake (2008, p. 121) calls a “bounded system” – defines a case. Case studies are also *intensive*. They “comprise more detail, richness, completeness and variance – that is, depth – for the unit of study than does cross unit analysis” (Flyvbjerg 2011, p. 301). Flyvbjerg writes that definitive of case studies is also typically the fact that they evolve in time, often as a “string of concrete and interrelated events” which only constitute the case when seen as a whole (2011, p. 301).

The value of case study research has often been questioned. Case studies have earned much, particularly positivist, criticism for having “a total absence of control” and therefore “no scientific value”<sup>32</sup> (Campbell & Stanley 1966, p. 6-7). Critics have asked what value there can be in knowing only the unique. Case studies have also been criticised for their widely varying methodological procedures (Maoz 2002), and for their perceived lack of external validity and generalizability, which has been seen to be compounded by researcher subjectivity and a bias towards hypothesis verification (Diamond 1996). Much scholarly writing suggests, however, that case studies have earned this criticism unfairly.

While the social sciences may not yet have produced general, predictive theory, they do provide abundant context-dependent knowledge. “In the study of human affairs”, notes Flyvbjerg, “there appears to exist only context-dependent knowledge” (2006, p. 221). The case study, Flyvbjerg (2001; 2006; 2011) argues, is especially well suited to producing this kind of knowledge. To address the generalisability of the findings of case study research, many scholars now consider that the social sciences need an alternative, less positivist, way of thinking and talking about case studies, which recognises the effectiveness of even the single case for knowledge generation and transfer (Donmoyer 2000) as well as the value of case-specific knowledge *without* generalisation. Flyvbjerg (2011, p. 305) writes that:

One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas the “force of example” and transferability are underestimated.

---

<sup>32</sup> Flyvbjerg (2006) notes that Campbell later made an about-turn in his views on case study research, and by 1975 was writing of the value of this kind of research (Campbell 1975).

Others contend that case studies are so effective for generalisation that they can indeed assist theory development (Eckstein 1975; George & Bennett 2005). This case study of the HidroAysén controversy does offer lessons which may shed light on the communication of environmental conflicts in other contexts. Though its aim is not the production of empirical theory, this study *does* generalise and *does* endeavour to make the case-specific knowledge uncovered here transferrable.

On the question of possible verification bias in case study research, much reflection on this type of research shows the very opposite effect (Flyvbjerg 2011). Case studies often *refute* preconceived views and force the researcher to revise hypotheses as the phenomenon under study unfolds. “The Field”, says Geertz, “is a powerful disciplinary force: assertive, demanding, even coercive” (Geertz 1995). This has indeed been true for the case study presented here. As the HidroAysén megaproject case itself unfolded over time, and as my own field study in Chile developed over several months, I began to see that my original hypotheses had failed to adequately capture what it was that was particular about the HidroAysén case. The on-the-ground research therefore shaped the direction of this study significantly, refuting my initial beliefs and teaching me as a researcher how best to understand the phenomenon of the emblematic HidroAysén conflict.

What of researcher subjectivity and of reflexivity in case studies? Demanding extensive field work as they usually do, case studies may require that the researcher participate in the activities he or she is describing. As Flyvbjerg notes, the case study entails “close proximity to reality” and “the most advanced form of understanding” is only achieved when “researchers place themselves within the context being studied” (Flyvbjerg 2011, p. 301). Positivists/postpositivists counter that researcher subjectivity in case studies invalidates research findings. While researchers using qualitative methodologies recognise the subjectivity of the researcher guides everything from topic choice to hypothesis formulation, to the selection of methodologies, data streams and data interpretation; the same recognition of subjectivity in research choices does not always come from proponents of quantitative methods. Case study research recognises subjectivity, and indeed values it. As Flyvbjerg (2011, p. 301) points out, proximity to the object(s) of study allows “talking back”, a characteristic feature of case study research that George and Bennett describe as follows:

When a case study researcher asks a participant “were you thinking X when you did Y”, and gets the answer, “No, I was thinking Z,” then if the researcher had not thought of Z as a causally relevant variable, she may have a new variable demanding to be heard.

(George & Bennett 2005, p. 20)

Case study researchers, therefore, do not try to deny or even minimise subjective engagement with the object of study – this is in fact essential to achieving deeper insights on the case at hand.

#### *4.2.4 Case study as ethnography*

Is case study, then, ethnography? Certainly, case studies can involve many of the data collection methods that ethnographic studies do: in-depth interviews, direct and/or participant observation, analysis of documents, archives and artefacts. As discussed above, an assemblage of data from these kinds of multiple sources, common in case studies, can provide an understanding of the fine-grain structure of a phenomenon and its context. This ability to reveal such detail is akin to Clifford Geertz’ “thick description” (Geertz 1973) that seeks an assemblage of “very densely textured facts” (Geertz 1973, p. 321) “to bring us into touch with the lives of strangers” (p. 317). Geertz saw his ethnography as “not an experimental science in search of law, but an interpretative one in search of meaning” (p. 311). This kind of search for meaning is also the objective of a (mainly) qualitative case study, such as the one presented here.

Though ethnography is used in the social sciences, it is often associated foremost with research in anthropology such as that of Geertz. Willis (2007) argues, however, that social science case studies are much more similar to ethnographies than they are dissimilar and that aspects of ethnography can fruitfully be combined with case study research in the social sciences. In fact, the terms “case study” and “ethnography” are sometimes used interchangeably to describe the methodology used in a single mixed-methods research project (White, Drew & Hay 2009, p. 19). Though I do not regard the research presented here as ethnography – in part because it does not incorporate the ethnographic hallmark of extended participant-observation and the production of highly detailed field notes – this case study *does* borrow much from the ethnographer’s kit of methods, and it *does* bring multiple data together in a dense, detailed narrative



that is close to “thick description”. If what I present here is partly ethnographic, it is ethnographic in the narrative sense that van Maanen describes: in the researcher drawing “close to people and events” and then “writing about what was learned in situ”. “Ethnography is,” after all, as van Maanen also notes, “a storytelling institution” (van Maanen 1995, p. 3).

In addition, although as a researcher, I have tried to be reflexive about my own presence in the research and the subjectivity inherent in case study, unlike an ethnographer, I do not focus greatly on my own role. Although, to better understand the HidroAysén case I put myself in the setting that I wanted to study, as ethnographers do, I do not purport to present an “insider’s” view of the case here. Although I conducted numerous semi-structured, in-depth interviews with key actors in the debate, and observed several public – and private – events connected to the conflict surrounding the HidroAysén project, I was not for any great length of time an ethnographic-style participant-observer of the HidroAysén case.

#### *4.2.5 Paradigmatic or emblematic?*

Several scholars concerned with the case study methodology have written about different types of case study. Apart from the obvious distinction between single and multiple-case studies, and randomly selected versus intentionally selected cases, Yin, for example, identifies five types of single cases, which he describes as “*critical, unusual, common, revelatory or longitudinal*” cases – each concerned with revealing subtly different aspects of the case under examination (Yin 2014, p. 51). Stake additionally writes of “intrinsic” and “instrumental” cases (Stake 2005, pp. 445-448) and Flyvbjerg adds, partly overlapping with Yin, “extreme or deviant” cases, “maximum variation cases” and “paradigmatic cases” (2011, p. 306-308). It is the last of these categories that best fits the case of HidroAysén.

Flyvbjerg calls paradigmatic cases “exemplars” which have “metaphorical and prototypical value” (2011, p. 308). For Pavlich these are “pivotal cases” (2012, p. 645). A paradigmatic case “involves placing an exemplar alongside a phenomenon; by virtue of so placing, it shows or reveals key elements of that phenomenon” (Pavlich 2012, p.

646). The exemplar is, then, a singular case that becomes exemplary of a wider set.<sup>33</sup> In philosophical terms, such cases are the comparison of one paradigm with the class that the particular paradigm is designed to reveal. By being placed alongside the phenomenon it is exemplar of, a paradigmatic case renders that phenomenon intelligible (Amgaben 2002).

Paradigmatic cases, though of interest in themselves, are therefore most important for their “illustrative” (Pavlich 2012, p. 646) value because, as Flyvbjerg puts it, they “highlight more general characteristics of the societies in question” (Flyvbjerg 2011, p. 308). This study, which is concerned with how the communications surrounding a certain case caused it to become illustrative of or *metaphorical* for a particular set of characteristics of the society in which it is embedded, can certainly be considered a paradigmatic case. HidroAysén, seemingly at first purely an environmental conflict, came to represent much more than this. Because this study is concerned above all with *representation* and the discursive construction of the paradigmatic case of HidroAysén, it proposes that the megaproject became an emblem. It can be argued that the “exemplar” paradigm that serves as an illustrative pattern or model, and the symbolic emblem, that stands for or represents a particular idea or concept, are closely related – even the same thing. While this study does consider HidroAysén a paradigmatic case, it also *more* than this. The notion proposed here of a case *becoming emblematic* serves to underscore both the process of *becoming*, over time, and also the mediatized construction of the case as an emblem, in both language and images. Flyvbjerg (2011) notes that it is not always possible to determine in advance whether a given case will be paradigmatic, because being paradigmatic depends not only on the case itself, but on interpretation (for example, the public’s, the researcher’s) that informs the understanding of a case. A case therefore *unfolds* as paradigmatic. This seems closely aligned with to the notion of *becoming*. In paradigmatic cases, then, there also there is a process of *becoming*, which, at the most basic level, is what is being examined here.

#### 4.2.6 Discourse, and its critical moments

---

<sup>33</sup> Pavlich cites Foucault’s exploration of Bentham’s panopticon as a paradigmatic example of the disciplinary techniques of power. He writes “This paradigmatic case, by virtue of its being placed side by side with the phenomenon of modern power is at once an element thereof and yet serves to make such power intelligible” (2012, p. 646).

How is it that a particular case, like HidroAysén, becomes associated with certain things, to the exclusion of others? How does a case evolve so that a certain way of understanding it may become fixed over time? Scholarship has long understood social meaning as being bound up with language, so that complex practices of communication systematically construct our knowledge of the world. The study of ‘discourse’, the construction of meaning and reality through language, is widely used in qualitative research and is associated with techniques varying from linguistic analysis to the examination of the normative quality of language in discussion.

For Foucault, discourse was the way in which language constitutes the objects of which we speak (Foucault 1965; 1980) and discourse was closely linked to political power. Foucault argued that discourses embody power as they condition the perceptions and understandings of those subject to them, advancing some interests and suppressing others (Foucault 1980). Discourse can be thought of primarily in microperspective – that is, as being evident above all in *language* – and therefore as being best analysed using a detailed, textually orientated linguistic approach like Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 1995; 1998; 2003; Fowler 1991; van Dijk, T. 1988a; van Dijk, T. 1988b; 1991; Wodak, R. 1996; Wodak, R. & Chilton 2005; Wodak, R. & Meyer 2009). Or it can be understood in a macroperspectival sense, where, though embedded in language, discourse is considered a larger concept related to jointly constituted knowledge and societal-level understandings of an issue: as Dryzek puts it, “a discourse is a shared way of apprehending the world” (2005, p. 9).

Superficially, there would seem to be a fundamental disjuncture between the notion of discourse held by social theory-inspired researchers and those whose interest is in the detailed analysis of texts. Foucauldian discourse analysis, particularly, has been described as having “a high level of abstraction”, “extraordinary vagueness” and as being “an approach that eschews formalization” (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine 2011). However, as Fairclough explains, effective analysis of discourse must take into account both textual elements *and* their wider social context:

This is not, or should not be an ‘either/or’. On the one hand, any analysis of texts which aims to be significant in social scientific terms has to connect with theoretical questions about discourse (eg: the socially ‘constructive’

effects of discourse). On the other hand, no real understanding of the social effects of discourse is possible without looking closely at what happens when people talk or write.

(Fairclough 2003, p. 3)

Carvalho (2008) extends the argument for analyses of discourse to consider social processes “outside” the text, so that all analysis of discourse combines a textual dimension with a contextual one. This is perhaps particularly necessary for the analysis of discourse on the environment, where, as in the case of HidroAysén, “a diversity of actors actively try to influence the definition of the problem” and such distinct actors “exercise power through trying to impose a particular frame or discourse onto a discussion” (Hajer & Versteeg 2005, p. 177). Scholars of environmental discourses, such as Anderson (1997) and Lester (2007) have also found that to understand sources’ strategies for achieving the power of definition in mediatized debates, text analysis directed at media content and other source documents must be supplemented with additional methods, like observational analysis or in-depth interviews. As Anderson explains, only in this way is it possible “fully to assess their [sources’] success or failure in influencing agendas” (Anderson, A 1997, p. 37). Carvalho concurs with this position, calling for special emphasis to be put on “the role of actors’ discursive strategies in media discourse” and more adequate study of “the ways they and their standings are represented in the media” (2008, p. 165).

This study with its multi-perspectival approach to understanding the construction of HidroAysén and its interest in the way in which competing sources attempted to take control of risk definition in relation to the megaproject, pays particular attention to discourse. Although I view language as key to the way in which HidroAysén was constructed, I do not employ linguistic-style discourse analysis here. Rather, I understand discourse in the more constructivist sense, akin to the definition given by Hajer and Versteeg, for whom discourse is:

an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices. The ‘discussion’ in other words is the object of analysis.

(Hajer & Versteeg 2005, p. 175)

Such “discussion” here is accessed through a range of print media articles, PR and advertising material, and social media content, which were collected across the timeframe of the HidroAysén debate. I supplement this with extended semi-structured interviews with key actors in the debate. I use computer-assisted content analysis to gain language-based insights into the newspaper article corpus. For PR and advertising texts where the content is often more image-based, semiotics offer an insight into the discursive strategies of image use (as I elaborate in the sections below.) Using these kinds of content, I am able to carry out an examination of what Fairclough (e.g.: 1995) describes as the progressive transformation of texts along discursive chains. I am also able to identify certain aspects of language use that seem to have assisted in constructing HidroAysén in a particular way. I bring all these different data strands together in a thickly descriptive narrative, which is concerned with showing how the discourse surrounding HidroAysén shifted and solidified over time.

Importantly, Carvalho notes that analyses of discourse have not traditionally accounted adequately for long-term temporal context. “Most forms of analysis” she writes, “do not express awareness of the time sequence of texts nor do they clearly explain the implications of previous discursive positions on subsequent ones” (Carvalho 2008, p. 163). This study, which examines the discursive process of becoming, is fundamentally concerned with the arc of the discourse on HidroAysén over time. It also considers how media texts build on each other over time: intertextuality is a key feature of discourse in a longer-term case study. Clearly, however, an eleven-year debate produces a lot of coverage in many types of media, and a great deal of PR output. On a practical level, therefore, a study which examines discourse in an extended case like this needs to restrict in some ways both the *type* and the *amount* of media output it analyses.

Chilton (1987) offers the concept of “critical discourse moments”, events that stimulate conflict and mediatized debate, which may provide an opportunity for more in-depth coverage of an issue than is usually the case, and which lead to periods where discourse on an issue is shaped and sedimented. It is during these moments, argues Chilton, that “meaning is mobilised” (p. 17). Various factors may define these key moments: political activity or decision-making, scientific findings and other socially significant events. Critical discourse moments are not necessarily self-evident, and their identification process requires considered reflexivity.

In a lengthy case study, such moments can be pinpointed by detailed consideration of actual events within the case timeline, triangulated with research data. In this study, both to focus in on important events within the discourse, and as a means of limiting the amount of data I analyse, I identify key happenings in the unfolding case of HidroAysén (eg: key protests, key government decisions related to the project). I also examine both the quality and *quantity* of media coverage corresponding with these periods to identify whether such events were indeed considered key in the media (which may coincide with a spike in coverage or a change in the terms of discourse). I then triangulate with data from interviews in which interviewees were asked to identify moments or episodes they considered the most significant in the lengthy discourse on the case. To assist in the identification of critical discourse moments, Carvalho (2008) suggests constructing a chronology of events. I provide a timeline of the HidroAysén case in the appendix to this thesis. Using the concept of critical discourse moments, I shift the gaze of this study repeatedly between a long-term view of the developing discourse, and shorter periods where key events unfolded.

In the sections that follow, I discuss practical aspects of the research. First I give overviews of the case timeframe and fieldwork process. Then, for each different data stream, I explain the process of fieldwork and data collection, and subsequent data analysis. In doing so, I keep in mind this study's research questions, as stated above, and in alignment with the key silences in research addressed in Chapter 1.

### **4.3 Data collection and research design**

#### *4.3.1 Case study timeframe*

This study examines the communications surrounding the HidroAysén conflict over an 11-year timeframe (2006-2017) with special focus on media discourse in the years 2008-2014 (further discussed in section 4.3.4 below). Media discourse on the dams project for Patagonia began around 2006 when HidroAysén was established, and has continued right through until 2018. Of course, the discourse related to the project, both the parties' strategic communications in PR material, and debate across a range of media platforms, waxed and waned during this time. In critical discourse moments, coverage of the proposed project in traditional and social media tended to proliferate. At other times, HidroAysén almost disappeared from the media – and sometimes,

staying *out* of the media was a deliberate strategy. As a case study of the HidroAysén debate, this study surveys mediatized discourse and communications material from the project's initiation, through to its government approval, country-wide protest, the subsequent retraction of its approval, litigation in Chile's environmental tribunals, and ultimately the dissolution of the company and project.

#### *4.3.2 Field work, data gathering and research design*

The process of gathering data for this study involved fieldwork on the ground in Chile, and the collection of secondary sources, both in Chile, and also before and after my fieldwork there.

I conducted fieldwork for almost nine months in Chile, from April to December 2013. I was based for six months of this period in the country's capital, Santiago. Here, I conducted interviews, and made contacts in the anti-dams movement, as well as in the company itself. These contacts were crucial to acquiring further interviews, particularly in Chile, where, as discussed, institutions and social relations run on a personal influence model and "pitutos" – "contacts" – are all-important. During this time, as I got to know key actors on both sides of the HidroAysén debate, I was also able to observe meetings open to the public, two invitation-only events and one anti-dam demonstration in Santiago.

The remaining three months of my fieldwork period were spent in the Aysén region where the project would be based. I drove the Carretera Austral (Southern Highway – for most of its length, a rough dirt track) spending time in each of the communities close to or potentially affected by the dams. I conducted interviews in the towns/villages of Coyhaique, Caleta Tortel, Cochrane and Villa O'Higgins. In these locations, I also had many informal conversations with local people, which greatly assisted my insights on the case.

For the period that I was in Santiago, I was based in the Institute of Communication and Image at the University of Chile as a Visiting Researcher. Here, I was able to draw on the expertise of a number of journalists and media academics, which was invaluable

for grounding me in the landscape of the contemporary media in Chile. During this period in Santiago, in addition to the formal interviews I conducted, I was able to discuss HidroAysén with numerous Chileans, most of whom had strong views on the project and its meaning – beyond simply its environmental impact – whether they had ever been to Aysén or not. Although as mentioned above, I do not consider the work presented here to be ethnography, this period of immersion in the context of HidroAysén was invaluable for developing an ethnographic-like understanding of the case and its context.

#### *4.3.3 Interviews: strategy and use.*

Extended, semi-structured interviews are a mainstay of qualitative research. These “conversations with a purpose” (Burgess 1984, p. 102) are designed to have a fluid, dialogic structure and a relatively informal style, able to cover both themes initiated by the researcher, and unexpected ideas introduced by the interviewee: the “talking back” discussed above. Such interviews produce *situated* knowledge, that is, knowledge which is context-dependent, so that “meanings and understandings are created in an interaction” (Mason 2007, p. 63). This kind of qualitative interviewing therefore tends to be regarded as either the construction or at least the *reconstruction* of knowledge, rather than the excavation of it (Kvale 1996; Mason 2002). Prior to interviewing, the researcher must establish as far as possible, the facts or circumstances of the case or issue under examination so that in the interview, it is people’s interpretations and perceptions that are sought. Semi-structured interviews, then, seek subjective knowledge and are a process through which the interviewer is active in the construction of knowledge together with the interviewee. The qualitative interviewer therefore needs to be reflexive about his/her own role in this kind of interview.

My fieldwork in Chile for this examination of the HidroAysén case involved 38 semi-structured interviews. I interviewed key actors from both sides of the HidroAysén debate. On the anti-dams side, interviewees included anti-dam activists and social movement participants and leaders, environmental NGO leaders, well-known independent (ie: not affiliated with a social movement) critics of the HidroAysén project, the incumbent Senator for Aysén, the Minister of the Environment at the time HidroAysén went through the environmental approvals process, one head of local



government in Aysén, and one candidate standing for political office in Aysén on an anti-dams mandate, a local tourism operator, anti-dams writers, media strategists and PR personnel, and also the key philanthropist-funder and communications strategist of the anti-dams position. From the project development and pro-dams side I interviewed the then-HidroAysén CEO (who occupied this post 2010-2014) and the previous CEO who led the company at its establishment until 2010. I also interviewed key HidroAysén staff members, from technical personnel to those leading the communication of the project to those charged with community engagement. I was additionally able to interview two past employees of the company – one an engineer and a previous head of communications. I also interviewed the pro-dams Lower House member for Aysén, and the leader of a local pro-dams social movement seemingly established in response to the anti-dams position. A co-incidental meeting whilst waiting for a remote river punt car ferry on the (then to be dammed) Rio Baker also led to a fruitful interview in Santiago with the ex-account executive of HidroAysén's PR company. In Chile in 2013 when I undertook fieldwork, there were also several prominent observers of and commentators on, the project. Of these I was able to interview three newspaper editors or journalists, a well-known environmental scientist, a political strategy consultant, two media academics and two energy experts.

In the interviews, I was trying to find out a number of things about the communications processes of both sides in the HidroAysén debate. I was interested in understanding source strategies, that is, the way in which each side sought to shape the discourse on the megaproject through their own strategic communications output and initiatives. I was also interested in their perceptions of the extent to which this had been reflected in actual media coverage. We also discussed to what extent media coverage of their position might have changed over time. I also asked most interviewees what HidroAysén (and the protest movement against it) *meant*, symbolically, and to reflect on how the project came to mean this. Journalists and other media workers were also asked about how they perceived their role in the reporting of the conflict over HidroAysén. Additionally, I was interested in establishing practical considerations for the research: for example, what were key episodes in the debate (here called critical discourse moments) and what was the most recognised PR/strategic communications output? Because I interviewed such a diverse range of actors, not all interviewees were

asked the same questions – though I asked some set questions of almost every interviewee.

Although I believe that I was able achieve exceptionally good access to a broad section of key actors in the debate, it was important to be reflexive both in the process of interviewing, and in the subsequent treatment of the interview material. Of course, because HidroAysén was so controversial and political, I knew I ran the risk of interviewees simply telling me what they thought I wanted to hear: repeating PR “spin” – particularly in the case of interviews I conducted with the then-head of the company and with senior management and communications staff. I tried to remain as neutral as possible in these interviews (though, clearly, being neutral is also a position.) Interestingly, some employees, including the then-CEO, were critical of the way HidroAysén had communicated its project. Because I also interviewed three ex-HidroAysén employees – none of whom seemed to have any interest in defending the company – and because these ex-staff members were also critical in a similar way, I considered the self-criticism to be genuine, and that much of the material from these interviews could likewise be considered genuine.

All interviewees were informed of the nature of the project and of the intended use of the interviews by means of an information sheet in Spanish that was e-mailed to them before the interview. This summary also contained information explaining that the project had received ethics clearance from the Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee. Prior to the interview, each participant signed a consent form acknowledging their voluntary participation. Participants were given the option to remain anonymous in this study. Out of the 38 people interviewed, only two chose this option. All interviews were conducted by me in Spanish, except for two interviews with native or bilingual English speakers, which were conducted in English. Interviews were recorded, and recordings were transcribed by three different native Chilean speakers of Spanish. All interview transcripts were proofread by one of the transcribers, to check for consistency in convention and expression. I transcribed the interviews in English myself.

Interview content has been used in this study qualitatively as a means of adding to thick description of the events and discourse that made up the HidroAysén conflict.

Interview data is also used to triangulate the other data streams used here (as elaborated below). All interview material extracted for use in this thesis has been translated by me from Spanish to English. A note on language is included below to address some of the risks and challenges, but also the opportunities, of conducting a study of this nature in a two-language environment.

#### *4.3.4 Media articles and computational text analysis*

As discussed in the previous chapter, although television and radio are the most widely consumed media in Chile, these media convey little in-depth news content, particularly on issues relating to the environment. In order to explore the developing media discourse on the HidroAysén megaproject, it was therefore necessary to draw the traditional media coverage component of this study from key national newspapers. Such newspapers in Chile have both an agenda setting capacity (McCombs & Shaw 1972; 2006) and are the preferred source of news for Chile's decision-making elites. As discussed previously, this last factor is particularly important in Chile given the nature of inter-elite negotiation, influence and behind-closed-doors decision-making that is the standard way of 'doing business' in Chile (Kaltwasser 2007).

According to these criteria, I decided to compile a corpus of coverage from two important national newspapers, *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera* that covered the period of the most important developments in the lengthy discourse over HidroAysén. *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera* both have national daily print editions. Both are ideologically conservative. In order to access a view of the media discourse on HidroAysén which was *not* from a conservative news source, I additionally compiled a collection of news pieces covering the issue from the more pluralistic online news site, *El Mostrador*. The media corpus was compiled in the same way for each media outlet: that is, by keyword searching the online archive of each newspaper. Much time, thought and reading of media coverage went into the formulation of search terms. Finally, I decided to keep the search terms as simple as possible, and carried out two searches, one for the words 'HidroAysén' (because I was interested in finding every article that mentioned the project) and one for Patagonia sin Represas (because I was interested in finding

articles that likely mentioned the protest against the megaproject<sup>34</sup>). This media corpus needed to be compiled in digital format so that computer-assisted content analysis could be carried out.

The timespan of the media corpus for each newspaper covers the period of all the key developments in the debate over HidroAysén, however, the extent of each newspaper's online archive, and the earliest date HidroAysén or Patagonia sin Represas was mentioned was different for each media outlet. Because of this, I decided to limit the timeframe of the corpus to begin in late 2008 and extend until mid-2014, despite the fact that some articles covered the debate earlier. These early articles are sometimes referred to in the discussion in the following chapters, as is some of the media coverage *after* the middle of 2014, as media discourse on HidroAysén did not end when the project was dissolved.

During the data-gathering process, I also collected media coverage from two local newspapers from the region affected by the dams: *El Diario de Aysén* and *El Divisadero*. Though the coverage in these local papers is of interest, as I began to understand more about the case, it became clear that partly due to Chile's 'centralising' logic, where decisions are influenced and made in the capital, examining *national-level* discourse was the most appropriate way to observe how HidroAysén became emblematic. Gathering and reading many of these articles did help inform my understanding of local perspectives on the megaproject. Given the transnational nature of the protest against HidroAysén, I also make note of some media content from international newspapers, including the *The New York Times* and *El Mundo*.

In examining media coverage in the two key national newspapers, as well as a smaller but ideologically different news outlet, I was interested in uncovering a long-term view of the development of mediatized discourse surrounding HidroAysén. I was interested in comparing the way that the megaproject, and protest against it, were portrayed in the media over time. I wanted to know what ways of understanding HidroAysén were available and what ways were precluded. I was particularly interested in examining what happened to the discourse in critical discourse moments. Also, by

---

<sup>34</sup> I could not, for example, simply search "protest" as several other issues were being protested at the time, including the student protest, discussed in Chapter 2.

assessing the amount of discourse on the dams, I wanted to be able better to understand the concepts of invisibility and visibility in relation to HidroAysén. I wanted to know which social actors became key sources within the debate. In addition, I wanted to contrast the coverage in the two ideologically conservative, widely read and influential outlets to coverage in the ideologically more liberal and pluralistic, but less prominent publication. I considered content analysis an important tool to assist in finding insight into the media corpus.

Content analysis is one of the key methods used in mass communication research (Hansen & Machin 2013; Riffe, Lacy & Fico 2014). Holsti (1969) defined content analysis as “any technique for making inferences by systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages” (p. 14) while Krippendorff (2004, p. 18) understands it as: “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (and other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use”. Although earlier descriptions of content analysis had termed it “objective” (Berelson 1952, p. 18), such positivist claims for content analysis have since been largely abandoned. In addition, it has become clear that there is no simple relationship between frequency and salience, so that the frequency of occurrence of certain themes or symbols within a text (which content analysis usually counts) cannot usually be causally linked to any social implications. Because of this, although content analysis can be useful in providing “some indication of relative prominences and absences of key characteristics” (Hansen & Machin 2013, p. 89) within a mediatized discourse, it must be anchored firmly in context in order for its findings to be interpreted. As already discussed, this study uses content analysis as one aspect of a largely qualitative study.

Because of the very large corpus of media texts collected for this study (2385 articles in the final corpus) I understood that a sufficiently thorough manual content analysis would not be feasible for me as a single researcher. I was also interested in flexible treatment of the data, that is, being able to analyse and re-analyse it in different ways – for example, examining the whole corpus, examining critical discourse moments and comparing content across time and across publications. For these reasons, I opted to carry out content analysis using the natural language analysis software, Leximancer.

This software, developed at the University of Queensland (Smith 2000a; 2000b; 2003; Smith & Humphreys 2006) and commercialised in 2006, quantifies knowledge within text just as manual content analysis does, by coding text segments according to a set of concepts. Though manual content analysis pre-determines the concepts to be quantified, Leximancer does this automatically according to word co-occurrence statistics. Put simply, a word is defined by its context in usage. This means each word is characterised by other words that appear near it – not distant from it – in text, a concept drawn from corpus linguistics (Beeferman, Berger & Lafferty 1997; Stubbs 1996). Each word is therefore correlated with the appearance of a certain set of other words, and word co-occurrence can be calculated in terms of probability. This probability measure, based on the algorithms of Bayesian theory, reveals the relatedness between words. Using resultant co-occurrence and frequency data, the software creates a ranked list of important lexical terms based on which it builds a thesaurus for the text or texts being examined. This thesaurus “learns” a set of classifiers or concepts from the text (which can be manually “seeded” or full automated) and the text is automatically classified using these weighted term concepts, producing a concept index and a concept co-occurrence matrix. Finally, the relative co-occurrence frequencies of the concepts are calculated, and a concept map is created, illustrating concept frequency, concept connectedness and concept hierarchy (which may not be the same as frequency) (Smith & Humphreys 2006).

Apart from the ability to deal with large collections of text, especially in the era of “big data” (Lewis, Zamith & Hermida 2013) and the enhanced capacity for discovery that quick, flexible computer-assisted content analysis offers, it might be argued that such analysis allows greater “objectivity” than manual methods. While this study is not concerned with objectivity in a positivist sense, the fact that programs like Leximancer can derive concepts or classifiers *directly* from the text itself (rather than these being imposed by the researcher) may better reflect meaning embedded within text. In this way inter-coder reliability also ceases to be a concern. Having said this, Leximancer also allows manual control over many stages of the analysis process, which introduces researcher subjectivity, but may also facilitate a more nuanced understanding from the textual data. Importantly for the purposes of this study, Leximancer also handles Spanish language texts.

Computer-assisted content analysis techniques have been variously criticised for their reduced capacity to “understand” the subtleties that human coders may be able to, and for being equally as subjective as human-led coding (Conway 2006; Simon 2001). I acknowledge these kinds of drawbacks of computer-assisted techniques, and endeavor to overcome such perceived limitations by alternating a macro computer-assisted view of discourse in the media corpus and a micro, interpretative, article-scale view of meaning in key individual texts at key moments in discourse. In this way, I uncover both broad trends and small but significant instances in the discourse surrounding HidroAysén.

#### *4.3.5 PR and advertising output*

During the HidroAysén debate timeframe, both sides engaged in much PR and strategic communications activity. This ranged from events to explain, promote and defend the dams, to events to criticise and protest them. It ranged also from newspaper advertising (for both sides) to regular radio spots (particularly HidroAysén), to television ads, vast billboards beside key national highways (and lesser roads in the Aysén region), bus shelter advertising, and prominent ads at the national capital’s airport. The anti-dams campaign produced bumper stickers, (to which the pro-dams side later responded with its own), it produced badges, T-shirts and other merchandise, held photography exhibitions, and published a large-format hardcover book. Patagonia sin Represas also organised a multi-day horseride across Aysén to attract publicity locally and nationally. In addition to this, myriad pamphlets, explainers, brochures and flyers were produced by both sides. Media releases were written and distributed with the intention of influencing media coverage. Online, both had extensive websites with audiovisual presentations. Several anti-dam documentaries were made and songs were composed. HidroAysén itself produced its own video material, explaining the benefits of the project for the region and providing computer-generated simulations of how the dams would look. In addition to this, the company engaged in CSR-like activities in the potentially affected region.

How can a study like this one harness such a wide range of PR output over such a broad timespan to better understand the ways in which protest, and the object of protest, represented themselves? In order to limit the scope of analysis, a decision was

made firstly to include particularly the most well-known material that became familiar and instantly recognisable to Chilean publics. This included television advertisements, newspaper ads, billboards and bumper stickers. In addition, some material from the websites of both sides was used, as these were dynamic PR resources that were constantly available to anyone with an internet connection throughout the debate timeframe. I also needed to analyse and describe some material that was *less* widely available, and targeted at more specific publics. For example, I examined media releases from both sides in the debate, with the intention of following the discourse, where possible, from release through to journalistic text. I was interested in computer-simulated imagery of the proposed dams that HidroAysén showed privately to people in its door-to-door stakeholder engagement in the potentially-affected region. I also wanted to examine the large format hard-cover book on the dams debate that Patagonia sin Represas produced – intended mostly to occupy the desks and coffee tables of decision-making elites. I was interested, too, in events, like the Vota sin Represas (Vote without Dams) media event that I attended in Santiago in 2013.

Analysis of PR and advertising output was crucial to this study, as I needed to unpack discursive strategies of social actors on both sides, as Carvalho puts it, “in a variety of channels, both ‘before’ and ‘after’ journalistic texts” (Carvalho 2008, p. 161). Together with content from interviews where I sought clarification of the communications strategies of each side in the debate, PR content indicated how these intentions had *actually* been manifested. Of course, in a debate where natural landscapes were in contention, much of the PR discourse around HidroAysén was image-based. But this was not a debate illustrated only by gorgeous images of nature. Some of the image-based communications sparring over HidroAysén was by means of oddly hybrid, computer-manipulated images that referenced each other intertextually across the debate, over time. Some of this imagery was fundamental to understanding how HidroAysén became emblematic.

As well as using PR/advertising output in the thick description of HidroAysén, this study examines some of this output using a semiotic framework. Defined by Saussure as “a science that studies the life of signs in society” (Saussure 1966, p. 16), semiotics, particularly of the French tradition of Saussure and Barthes, has been used widely in the study of advertising (Barthes 1972; Berger 2000; Danesi & Perron 2000; Goldman &



Papson 1996; Harris 1995) and also to research marketing (Floch 2001). Semiotics is concerned fundamentally with the way we create meaning systems through signs and signification – the process of assigning meaning to and deriving meaning from a sign. Semiotics understands communication processes as being multi-layered, and, importantly for the purposes of this study, as being “concerned with the creation of the symbolic” (Kim 1996, p. 2).

Semiotic analysis can be useful in studying various types of advertising and PR output because advertising and PR are strategic communication – that is, “the purposeful use of communication by an organisation to fulfill its mission” (Hallahan et al. 2007, p. 5) – and strategic communication is inherently symbolic. Tasked with enhancing the strategic positioning and the competitiveness of an organisation, such communication seeks to promote certain definitions and discourses over others. Strategic communication has been charged with seeking to legitimise and maintain the power of the already powerful (Bourdieu 1977; Foucault 1982) although of course, it is possible for counter-power, and the actors of civil society, to be influential in the public sphere, by using strategic communication for their purposes (Habermas 2006). However, when counter-power engages in strategic communication that mirrors its discursive opponents’ communication techniques, it likewise engages in multi-layered ideological discourse which, as Eco explains is “a series of semiotic statements, more or less explicit. . . ignoring or hiding other properties” (Eco 1976, p. 636). This kind of ideological communication from *either* side in a discursive conflict, therefore, hides the existence of other possibilities or premises, and may reduce the complexities of reality. Strategic communications, then – typically an attempt by one group to seek influence over another – need to be understood on two levels, the “surface” meaning of what the communication appears to be about and the “underlying” meaning of the communication. Semiotics is a useful framework for examining such communication because the goal of semiotics is “ultimately to unmask the arrays of hidden meaning in the underlying level” (Beasley & Danesi 2002, p. 20). This means that semiotics can be applied effectively to a wide range of strategic organisational communications output – including as (Catellani 2011) does, to strategic communications on the environment of large corporations, and environmental protest *against* such organisations.

In the case of HidroAysén *and* the protest against it, strategic communication created a complex discourse in images and text, in which surface layers of meaning obscured hidden ones. HidroAysén and Patagonia sin Represas became discursive sparring partners in this debate, so that one adversary's symbolic PR/advertising output began to reference the other's intertextually. Over time, the strategic communications sparring ground between Patagonia sin Represas and HidroAysén came to be a rich source of rhetorical meaning making where semiosis ("the psychological processes prompted by signs after signs and their meanings form a certain structure") (Kim 1996, p. 3) strengthened and solidified so that HidroAysén *itself* became a sign. This sign signified many things related to the society in which the megaproject was embedded, making HidroAysén much more than an environmental conflict.

#### 4.3.6 Social media data

During the timeframe of the HidroAysén debate, internet use grew exponentially, as noted in Chapter 3. Social media use among internet users was almost universal, with 94% of internet users accessing social media in Chile in 2012 most of these Facebook (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012, p. 50). Twitter usage in Chile has always been smaller: by 2014 only 5% of Chileans had Twitter accounts, 7.2% by 2017 (Statistica 2017). As noted in Chapter 3, the elite nature of Twitter users in Chile make this social media platform an important site of influence, opinion making and "shoulder rubbing with politically influential people" (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012, p. 50).

Recent research on social media use in Chile has confirmed that, as in other countries studied, Chileans who are frequent social media users are also more politically active. This was especially true for younger people who, in the HidroAysén timeframe used social media, particularly Facebook, for protest organising as well as online protest discourse (Valenzuela 2013; Valenzuela, Arriagada & Scherman 2012). During the protests of 2011, the student movement and the anti-dams movement also both began to focus on gaining national and international media coverage and support for their protests. Until this point, social

media-based cyber activism in Chile had largely been focused on attracting attention of and interacting with others already within the movements. At this point, social media also seems to have attracted government attention for the first time: the government announced in June 2011 that it would start monitoring Twitter and Facebook “to listen to what citizens have to say” (Matamoros 2011). Social media therefore played a varied and changing communications role in Chile the timeframe of the HidroAysén debate.

This study uses content from Facebook and Twitter created by both HidroAysén and Patagonia sin Represas, and other users, qualitatively in the thick description of discourse surrounding HidroAysén. Using social media content in this way, I am able to trace themes, sometimes even particular phrases, to show how they proliferated in social media and became part of wider media discourse. I also show how social media content was occasionally able to operate mainstream media “switches” – as conceptualised by Arsenault & Castells (2008) and Castells (2009) – and enter mainstream media, so that the discourse of activism became the discourse used even in conservative publications like *El Mercurio*.

#### *4.3.7 A note on language*

This study can be regarded as a cross-language study, in that almost all its source material is in Spanish, with the study itself written in English. Any of the Spanish source material that is quoted within the text presented here is therefore translated. Working in two languages – and likewise across two cultures – adds complexities, but also has advantages. Some qualitative studies that call for much translation have been accused of making “disadvantageous methodological choices” including failing to acknowledge the subjectivity of translation as a study’s possible limitation (Squires 2009). On the other hand, studies that examine media and its discourse outside the Anglophone orbit are both necessary and important, as they have the potential to contribute to the de-westernisation and increase the cosmopolitanism of media and communication studies (Curran & Park 2000; Thussu 2009; Waisbord 2016; Wang 2011), and also counteract “aggressively monoglot views of the world” (Cronin 2003, p. 3). Waisbord (2014) writes in this context of “scholarship without borders” (p. 66), and considers the presentation of Latin American cases, like this one, in English as one important step in undoing the

intellectually unjustifiable practice of “compartmentalizing research in geographical boxes” (p. 73). In a world of globalised media, and globalising scholarship, communications researchers are therefore increasingly called upon to use translation in their work.

There is now a growing body of literature in translation studies (Bassnett 2014; Eco 2001; Pym 2014) and most theorists agree on the role of the translator as being more than simply a mechanical one of finding word equivalence. As Bassnett writes:

Translation is not just the transfer of texts from one language into another, it is now rightly seen as a process of negotiation between texts and between cultures, a process during which all kinds of transactions take place, mediated by the figure of the translator.

(Bassnett 2005)

One of the dilemmas of a cross-language study like this one, where most of the data is in another language, is therefore the role the translator. Can the researcher be the translator or should these roles be kept separate? To what degree should the translator be reflexive of this practice, and to what degree should this be explicit in the subsequent write-up of the study? Should the translator be ‘visible’, and, as Temple and Young (2004) put it, “why should it matter if translator and translation disappear?” (p. 164). The answers to these kinds of questions have their base in the researcher’s approach to knowledge. A positivist study might seek to produce “correct” translations or equivalencies of any other-language text, offering ways to increase validity and promising objectivity once translation problems are “solved” (Temple & Young 2004, p. 163). In contrast, a study with a constructivist understanding that knowledge is situated in, and produced by, the social world must acknowledge that translation is ultimately subjective, and that translation forms part of knowledge *production*. This study, situated for the most part on the ground of social constructivism, considers language in general as value-laden. Language is much more than morphology and lexicology: it is rhetoric, discourse and power. There can be little objectivity, then, when it comes to word choice in *any* language, and in translation especially, words that are chosen above other words are more than lexical choices. All of this makes translation “a far from innocent and politically neutral activity” (Sigismondi 2016). Any cross-language study therefore

demands that the researcher be reflexive about the non-neutral, culture-spanning, power-laden business of translation. I describe below how my own experience of translating and interpreting several languages in a variety of contexts has equipped me well for thoughtful reflexivity in translation here.

In this cross-language study, I combine the roles of researcher and translator. The literature on translation indicates that combining these two roles can be acceptable in terms of academic rigour, and practicality, but the researcher should make these dual roles explicit, and remain “visible” in the process of translation (Birbili 2000; Temple 1997; Xian 2008). Birbili (2000) points out that the quality of the translation depends on the autobiography of the researcher-translator, and Squires (2009) admonishes the authors of many cross-language studies for failing to provide a description of the translator’s or interpreter’s credentials. To counter this, mine are as follows. I have a First Class Honours degree in Modern European Languages (University of Durham) in German, Russian and Spanish. During this degree, I studied simultaneous interpreting from German to English and translating from Russian to English. In 1998 I worked as a Russian/English interpreter on remote geology expeditions in Siberia. For my Masters degree in Political Science at the University of Melbourne, I interviewed Russian journalists in Russian during fieldwork in Moscow. The interviews were used qualitatively in my thesis with my translation into English. I have been studying and speaking Spanish for 26 years, for the last 14 years only Latin American Spanish, and had worked in several countries in Latin America before my field work in Chile. In Australia, I have worked as a Spanish/English interpreter, mainly in medical and legal settings. In 2007 I spent three months in Chile, and was therefore already familiar with Chilean Spanish and Chilean culture – including the unique cultural identity of Chilean Patagonia – before I commenced the fieldwork for this study.

Though I am competent in Chile’s language and culture, as an Australian I was never an “insider” during fieldwork for this study. This meant, for example, that in interviews some of the unique Chilean colloquialisms may have been less used by interviewees, and also that some events and tendencies – for which there might have been cultural shorthand in a conversation between Chileans – were probably described more explicitly to me. In examining media content, there were also language challenges: in social media content, no colloquialisms are spared. In PR output, language is

particularly redolent with multiple layers of meaning. In newspaper content, language is more formal, but I was concerned I would miss (or mis-translate) important phrases and intertextual references, or understand language with several layers of meaning on face value. For this reason, in the earlier stages of my research, I often referred language and translation-related questions to one of the interview transcribers, a Chilean graduate student in law who is fluent in English and who has closely followed the HidroAysén case. As my research progressed, I found that I had learned ‘the language of HidroAysén’ – meaning that I had become very familiar with the concepts, expressions, phrases, events and sources that populated the debate over HidroAysén and I found cultural and language mediation less necessary. In any translation for this study, however, I am always strongly reflexive in terms of lexical choice, the possibility (or not) of equivalency and the ‘value-laden-ness’ of any word choice. When a Spanish word has more than one possible translation equivalent in English, and where choosing just one variant would change the meaning, I am explicit about this in my text. I remain aware that my translation here is subjective to a degree, but argue also that my many years of interpreting and translation work and study, as well as my experience of cross-language academic research, equip me well to take the role of reflexive researcher/translator in this case study of HidroAysén.

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

In this chapter I have described in detail how I work with the abundant communications material which formed the discourse over HidroAysén. I have explained how I build on several intellectual and methodological traditions to examine the case of HidroAysén from multiple perspectives. In the chapters that follow, using this mix of methods, I build a description of discourse over the key years of the HidroAysén controversy, 2008-2014, and I also examine some of the discourse before and after this timeframe. The next chapters are set out chronologically. Chapter 5 covers 2006 to 2008, a period during which HidroAysén was at first largely invisible. Chapter 6 focuses on discourse on the dams from mid-2008 to early 2010, when the anti-dams campaign had made HidroAysén visible nationally. Chapter 7 covers the phase when HidroAysén reacted with an aggressive communications campaign. Chapter 8 charts the way in which, after the vehement 2011 protests, HidroAysén sought to be invisible once again. This chapter also examines discourse on HidroAysén *after* the project was finally rejected. Following

these research chapters, I present some lessons from this case study in Chapter 9, which concludes this thesis.

## Chapter 5: Making the invisible visible

### 5.1 Introduction

Why, and in what circumstances, would a company developing the largest and most costly infrastructure project in a country's history endeavour to keep that project low profile? How might such a project's degree of visibility matter? How could a protest group make an undertaking like the project in question visible? And how might the ways in which such a project did finally become visible 'set' the discourse surrounding it, so that mediatized frames and narratives that became attached to the project might persist over time? This chapter addresses these questions in relation to the early stages of the lengthy mediatized sparring between Patagonia sin Represas and HidroAysén. I account here for HidroAysén's "low profile" beginnings, and the opposing campaign's effort to bring the project to national public attention. In this chapter, I understand the Patagonia sin Represas campaign as a two-fold struggle for visibility: that is, both to place HidroAysén under scrutiny by bringing the megaproject into public discourse, and to stimulate debate over the megaproject within an *anti-dams* frame. Through analysis of Patagonia sin Represas' advertising campaign, I also identify key themes which started to contribute towards HidroAysén becoming layered with symbolic meaning.

In this chapter, I use Thompson's (2005) and Lester & Hutchins' (2012) framework, discussed in chapter 2, of visibility and its inverse, or as Lester and Hutchins (p. 847) put it, "the power of the unseen". I also draw here on Beck's work on risk, noting that those actors whose communication of risk was the most visible – Beck's "relations of definition" – (Beck 2009b) seemed to have a strategic advantage over less visible actors. As Cottle (2000) Lester & Hutchins (2012) and Thompson (2005) tell us, ultimately an actor's (or a network of actors') degree of visibility – and the power to control that visibility – has a strong correlation with the extent of their political power. The Patagonia sin Represas campaign recognised the primacy of this kind of visibility and sought to gain this for itself, as well as to make its opponents visible.

However, in the HidroAysén case, the kind of *invisibility* that Lester and Hutchins have identified is also key. As these authors point out:



Questions of control and strategy in the contemporary media landscape cannot be fully understood without paying serious attention to the idea of invisibility, or the planned and coordinated avoidance of media communication, attention and representation in order to achieve political and/or social ends.

(2012, p. 849)

This chapter accordingly examines HidroAysén's motives and strategies for initially attempting to maintain relative invisibility on a national level, while working to generate public consent locally. I also examine here how, while attempting to remain low profile, HidroAysén was cultivating close relationships with those authorities relevant to progressing the megaproject through the environmental approvals process. While the analysis here builds on a theoretical framework that is not specific to the Latin American context, I am mindful in this chapter of how cultural context and historical precedents influence the ways in which the concepts of invisibility/visibility may play out in a Chilean context.

Occasionally, in the struggle for visibility and risk definition in conflicts over megaprojects, images, actions or rhetoric arise that achieve symbolic power. As Anderson (1997) tells us lesser-resourced groups, like Patagonia sin Represas<sup>35</sup>, can succeed "in the realm of symbolic politics" (p. 209). This chapter therefore also analyses the ways in which Patagonia sin Represas sought to utilise symbolic power in order to intervene in the development of the HidroAysén megaproject. I document here how this protest organisation worked intentionally and strategically to construct HidroAysén symbolically, to make it represent more than a conflict over dams.

## **5.2 Antecedents in the discourse: Pangué and Ralco**

The narrative of the emblematic case of HidroAysén begins with the story of another river and another set of hydroelectric projects entirely. Between 1990 and 2004, the Bío Bío River, 500kms southeast of Chile's capital Santiago, was the site of struggles over the building of two (out of a planned six) hydroelectric dams by Endesa. These two dams

---

<sup>35</sup> Later in the mediatized sparring between Patagonia sin Represas and HidroAysén, the developing company, and the media, attempted to represent Patagonia sin Represas as a "millionaire campaign" (Carmona, *El Mostrador* 06/06/2011) However, despite the assistance of foreign NGOs and donors that this chapter documents, it seems clear across the whole course of the controversy, that HidroAysén's advertising, communications and CSR spending was far greater than that of the anti-dams campaign.

and the opposition to them set a precedent both in terms of the extended legal wrangling that accompanied their development, and for the kind of discourse that began to solidify around dam building and its opponents. Both these factors would have important implications for HidroAysén.

In 1990, the year of Chile's return to democracy, Endesa was given approval to build the 467MW Pangué Dam, to be operational from 1996. Pangué, situated on land occupied by indigenous Pehuenche people, was a landmark project, bringing issues surrounding indigenous rights, water rights, and environmental harm from hydroelectric dam building in Chile to national and even international attention for the first time. During Pangué's construction, Endesa was taken to court over water rights by the project's opponents – residents and irrigators – who initially won a halt to the project in Chile's Court of Appeals, triggering heated political debate. The ruling was reversed by the Supreme Court, however, supported by the Dirección General de Aguas (DGA, National Water Authority) in what has been described as "flawed" legal reasoning (Bauer 2004) representing "a major transfer of wealth...to electric companies" (Ibid. p. 111). The Pangué ruling, and many legal judgements on similar projects that followed, have been criticised for their "narrow legalistic position", adopted specifically to avoid political challenge in the face of difficult policy and regulatory issues. This kind of institutional arrangement has been seen as symptomatic of the neoliberal system where the state plays a subsidiary role to the interests of business, leaving a dangerous "partial vacuum" in regulatory decision-making, so that, as Bauer puts it, "the more powerful actors can generally do as they please" (Ibid. p. 112). In this case, the private, foreign-owned company Endesa was that powerful actor.

Following Pangué, Endesa began work on a 690MW hydroelectric project, the Ralco Dam. For almost a decade during Ralco's construction, Endesa faced legal disputes from the Pehuenche, now supported by international environmental organisations like the US-based International Rivers Network. Two independent reports showed that Endesa had not compensated the Pehuenche affected by Pangué as agreed, and that, despite the company's commitments to the contrary, the dam had contributed to the further impoverishment of an already marginalised people (Johnston & Garcia-Downing 2004). The case against Endesa to stop Ralco was drawn as a rights issue, and was taken to the

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, on grounds of ethnocide. This court ruled against Endesa in 2003, but by then, the dam was close to complete, and the Chilean government treated Ralco as a “fait accompli” (Gonzales 2004). When Ralco was inaugurated in 2004, environmentalists re-iterated that the government had neglected to protect the territorial, cultural and human rights of indigenous families, and the ecosystem in which they lived, as recognised in Chilean law. Ralco, then, was “essentially the expression of unbalanced development, that favours economic interests over the needs of the community” as head of the Chilean environmental NGO, Instituto de Ecología Política, Manuel Baquedano put it (quoted in Gonzales 2004). This kind of sentiment would be echoed repeatedly in the discourse that surrounded HidroAysén. And it was on the date of the inauguration of Ralco that Endesa announced plans to develop dams in Aysén.

During the Ralco conflict, mainstream media discourse over the environment and hydroelectric dam building began to sediment in certain ways. One important discourse was of nature as resource (foundational, of course, for the neoliberal project in general and not unique to Chile). Rivers were “hydraulic potential” (*El Mercurio* 20/03/03), hydroelectric power was “Chile’s petroleum” (Fontaine, *El Diario* 09/05/2003). A discursive connection was also made between energy and progress so that Ralco represented “an undeniable and necessary contribution to the development and growth of the country” (Ingendesa, 2002, p. 2, cited in Latta 2007, p. 232) any delay to which “could check the progress of economic growth” (*La Tercera* 08/08/1998). Another discourse was the importance of ‘native energy’. In an interview with the conservative magazine *Caras*, the CEO of Endesa emphasised, in support of Ralco, that it was “quite clear that hydroelectricity is the only autonomous, national energy that we have” (quoted in Sepulveda 1996 cited by Latta 2007). There was also abundant discourse on scarcity. Headlines emphasised the danger of energy running out, for example: “New delay in Ralco would put supply in danger” (*Estrategía* 2002). Ralco, and other projects like it were deemed “necessary”, with headlines like: “The country needs the Ralco project” (Sepulveda 1996 cited by Latta 2007). Such discourse drew hydroelectric energy into the ideological space of the nation’s growth and development, and even its national security. Its implication was that those who were “for” the project were “for” the country’s common good. Transnational corporations developing such projects as Ralco (and later HidroAysén) were, therefore, “exemplary citizens” (Latta 2007, p. 233) who had at heart

the needs of all Chileans in their heroically challenging undertakings that harnessed the power of Chile's natural heritage. In discourse on hydroelectric development, private investment therefore came to equal public good. Opponents, were, in contrast, detractors from the national project who were fundamentally misguided. At the time of Ralco, their beliefs came to be described in media discourse as "green fundamentalism" (*Estrategía* 2003). Phrases like this were also used to describe anti-dam protesters in the discourse surrounding HidroAysén.

When Ralco was mentioned in media coverage at the time that HidroAysén was being debated, therefore, it was shorthand for a certain set of discourses on hydroelectric projects. These same discourses – both pro- and anti-dams – quickly became associated with HidroAysén. One 2011 article which appeared in *El Mercurio's Sábado* (Saturday), reminded of the human rights issues that had accompanied Ralco. The article took the journalist to the dams' region, to survey the situation of the Pehuenche. The journalist found the municipality to be the poorest in Chile, with – despite the presence of the country's largest energy generator – Chile's highest electricity costs. The journalist also found a kindergarten built by Endesa which had never been staffed by the teachers the company had promised; she found 90% unemployment, communities divided, a sense of dislocation, hopelessness, alcoholism, despair and suicide – despite the US\$20 million that Endesa had contributed towards the resettlement and assistance of some 400 Pehuenche when Ralco was built. She also found that Endesa's assistance had ceased once the dam was built. The article quoted a 2010 report by 10 parliamentary representatives which states:

Six years since the installation of the dam, it is evident that the negative effects associated with these hydroelectric projects have been greater than the benefits for the communities of the Alto Biobío. Economic and social growth have not been noted. On the contrary, environmental damage and underemployment seem to be the major contributions.

(Drysdale, *El Mercurio* 2011)

Despite such negative conclusions (which were not often reflected in *El Mercurio*, a newspaper which was usually strongly pro-business) the then-CEO of HidroAysén, Hernán Salazar, asked in an interview if the experience of Ralco offered any lessons for

the conduct of HidroAysén, had stated that “Ralco was a good project. I have no doubt of that” (Riveros, *El Mercurio* 07/10/2006). This, then, was the already complex discursive situation which surrounded hydroelectric megaprojects when Endesa and Colbún established HidroAysén in 2006.

### **5.3 The first word**

In October 2006 HidroAysén CEO Hernán Salazar made the first public presentation on the megaproject in the town of Coyhaique, Aysén, as an invited speaker at conference entitled “Chile and its Energy Dilemmas”. *El Mercurio* described him as “nervous” as he presented to a “more than difficult public” (Riveros, *El Mercurio* 07/10/2006) which included Aysén locals, environmental leaders from Santiago and a prominent representative of the salmon farming industry who opposed the project. The newspaper also described this first face-to-face meeting with the project developers as being “dominated by a climate of tension”. During Salazar’s session, a group of activists entered the venue wearing T-shirts bearing the words: “Aysén: without dams” and silently stood up on chairs to signal their rejection of the project (Merinchés, *El Mercurio* 15/10/2006).

Communication of the HidroAysén project had begun before this, however, on a local level in Aysén at least. Local environmental groups had recently gained organising experience through protesting Canadian company Noranda’s planned project Alumysa, which, until the project was withdrawn in 2003, proposed six dams in Aysén watersheds to power a giant aluminium smelter in a coastal fjord. The Aysén division of the national environmental NGO Comité Pro Defensa de la Fauna y Flora (Committee for the Defence of Fauna and Flora) or CODEFF, had been active in this campaign and from it, a Coalición Ciudadana Aysén Reserva de Vida (Citizens’ Coalition for Aysén Life Reserve) had emerged in January 2006. Alert to further megaprojects planned for Patagonia, this group began a local communication campaign on HidroAysén during 2006 before the company had begun its communications in the region. The coalition dropped leaflets in letterboxes, called public meetings and pasted posters in local communities. The work was small-scale, carried out by volunteers. By January 2007, the coalition had become part of a larger Consejo de Defensa de la Patagonia Chilena or CDP (Council for the Defence of Chilean Patagonia) and in April 2007, this group launched the Patagonia sin Represas

campaign which began to garner international funding for the protest. Diverse activist groups joined the campaign so that by May 2013, CPD consisted of 68 local, national and international NGOs (Orrego 2013).

Despite being established directly in response to the arrival in Patagonia of HidroAysén, the campaign's intention was never to protest this project alone, but instead also to "visibilise" the several other hydroelectric projects proposed for this part of Chile. Over time, however, as the controversy surrounding HidroAysén became more intense, the campaign began to focus on HidroAysén as an emblematic project. 'Patagonia without Dams' seemed therefore to mean, Patagonia (and Chile) without all the things that *HidroAysén* became emblematic of, and that other projects seemed able to avoid representing.

Interviewed in May 2013, Mitzi Urtubia, journalist and communications consultant to Santiago-based Ecosistemas, one of the key CDP members, recalled the start of the Patagonia sin Represas campaign:

Our campaign was highly proactive. It began even before the project began its own campaign and because of this, the discussion and information given to people by us was even before the company was able to inform on the megaproject it wanted to construct. So we started first and because of this, over time, we began winning, communicationally. It was we that started to inform people, to tell people there [in Patagonia] that they could oppose certain processes. And because of that head start we gained a lot of time.

(Urtubia, interviewed 15/05/2013)

It was not only the anti-dams' movement's commitment to communicate *first* that gave it a communicational advantage, however. The strategy of the project developer at this early stage was initially to communicate as little as possible, on a national level at least, and to focus its communications in the local communities. In the face of HydroAysén's low profile, Patagonia sin Represas initiated a national "citizen's alert". Urtubia explained how creating "visibility" was important for Patagonia sin Represas:

We believed that visibility was key. You have to be visible, and not establishing this kind of project, shall we say, behind the backs of the public.

(Urtubia, interviewed 15/05/2013)

It is clear from the literature on corporate communications and reputation management as reviewed in Chapter 2 (Anthonissen 2008; Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen 2005; Doorley & Garcia 2010) that rapid, proactive public relations communications, rather than attempted invisibility, are essential from an organisational stance in order to engender stakeholder confidence. This is especially so in the face of a crisis or impending crisis situation, where a company risks “undesired visibility” (Doorley & Garcia, p. 330) as HidroAysén would in terms of the protest against it. As mediatized discourse on the project unfolded, HidroAysén’s early attempts to remain low profile on a national level ceded an early communicational advantage to the dams’ opponents.

#### **5.4 Funding and branding the campaign: Douglas Tompkins and other international donors**

When the CDP was formed in 2006, it counted on thousands of volunteer hours and much goodwill and enthusiasm to get the job of protecting Patagonia done. That volunteer spirit was needed as, historically, there had been little Chilean-sourced funding for environmental protest. Interviewees for this study commented that, despite the experience of Ralco, there was no Chilean-based funding for environmental NGOs. Flavia Liberona, head of Santiago-based environmental NGO Terram explained:

Environmental NGOs by definition don’t have any Chilean resources. If you want to have funding in Chile and be environmentally focused, you have to get your money from the miners or electrical companies. There is no funding from the state. Nothing’s legislated. Nothing comes from Chile. Zero. 100% of our finances come from overseas.

(Liberona, interviewed 27/06/13)

The CDP’s Patagonia sin Represas campaign would be almost entirely funded by international environmental NGOs and granting foundations, making it a transnational campaign from the outset. CDP organisations received grants from the US-based Tides, Weeden and Holloman Price Foundations, and from the Global Greengrants Fund. They also gained funding from the US-based International Rivers Network and the Natural

Resources Defense Council, as well as smaller NGOs and granting bodies in the US (Carmona, *El Mostrador* 06/06/2011). In terms both of funding and experience in activism, the campaign additionally had the advantage of being supported by the American millionaire environmental philanthropist Douglas Tompkins<sup>36</sup>.

Tompkins (who died in a kayaking accident in Aysén in 2015, aged 72) was the founder of North Face and Esprit clothing brands. In the late 1980s, having become “disenchanted with consumer culture” (*Tompkins Conservation* 2015) Tompkins established the Foundation for Deep Ecology and moved to Chilean Patagonia. With his wife Kris, he bought large tracts of land here and in neighbouring Argentina where he carried out restoration and conservation work to re-establish natural habitats in places damaged by farming and forestry. The Tompkins have protected more land than any other private individuals (almost 2 million hectares), and their restored land is handed back to national governments to become national parks (Pimm 2010).

Interviewed in 2013 Tompkins described himself as “a kind of hybrid activist/conservationist” who had long been close to the anti-dams movement. In his words: “I’ve participated in dams campaigns from India to Quebec and California and so forth” (Tompkins, interviewed 05/12/2013). He had also participated in activism against the Bío Bío dams<sup>37</sup>. In the case of the dams proposed for the Baker and Pascua rivers, Tompkins’ involvement was personal, as the proposed project would impact his wife’s Patagonia National Park project and his own Pumalín Park:

So we had a direct biophysical involvement, that is, they were cutting right through the very landscapes that we were working on for conservation, so that of course got our energies flowing. Mobilised us.

Tompkins was therefore involved in the Patagonia sin Represas campaign from the beginning. He brought his expertise derived from 25 years of activism and advocacy advertising, as well as financial means to pay for the campaign’s advertising output

---

<sup>36</sup> For a discussion of the networks of a “transnational conservation elite” see Holmes (2011), bearing in mind, however, Tompkins’ adherence to Deep Ecology, not neoliberalism. See discussion of Deep Ecology in section 5.8.3.

<sup>37</sup> This detail regarding Tompkins’ longstanding involvement in the anti-dams movement is important because later Tompkins would be accused of becoming involved in the Patagonia sin Represas campaign purely out of self-interest, to protect his own land holdings in Patagonia.



(though he declined to reveal how much had been spent on the campaign). Tompkins also functioned as the “art director” and brand advisor of the campaign, as he explained.

We took the slogan, the name, Patagonia sin Represas, as our brand so to speak, and we developed it along the lines of how you would develop a brand so that you can communicate with the audience that you are trying to direct your message to. Here we are trying to sell an idea. The idea is that these dams shouldn't be built because it's bad development. We also created a brand image, or an issue image so that all the Chilean public and the press and the politicians would know when they saw – just from the logotype and the image itself – who and what was behind it.

(Tompkins, interviewed 05/12/2013)

This brand and this logo, and the environmental message behind them, would need to become ubiquitous in order to bring the project Tompkins and Patagonia sin Represas opposed from near “invisibility” to national attention. However, as discourse over the dams continued, the involvement of Tompkins and other international donors (always openly declared and never hidden) would become a controversy used by the anti-dams campaign's critics to question the motives and detract from the credibility of Patagonia sin Represas' campaign. This alleged ‘foreign-ness’ and ‘elite-ness’ of opposition to HidroAysén would indeed become an unintended part of Patagonia sin Represas' ‘brand’.

### **5.5 “Low profile”: HidroAysén's “invisible” beginnings**

Near the end of 2005, Endesa announced the start of a feasibility study into building the complex of dams that would become the HidroAysén megaproject. The HidroAysén company was formed in 2006 and established offices in Coyhaique and Cochrane from 2007. Only in mid-2007, the company first presented its project in the region, with what it termed “*casas abiertas*” – open houses – in Coyhaique, and also in the small towns and villages closest to the proposed dam locations on or near the Baker and Pascua Rivers: Cochrane, Caleta Tortel and Villa O'Higgins. These were public spaces where, for one day, locals could come to discover the scale and location of the project, talk to project staff, hear presentations, and take away the company's publicity material. The company's strategy at this stage was the “generation of confidence” in its “zone of influence” on the ground in Aysén according to María Irene Soto, then HidroAysén's

Manager of Communications and Community Engagement (interviewed 14/11/2013). Publicising the project nationally was not a priority. In 2013 HidroAysén's then-Technical Manager confirmed that: "until 2010, there was no national communications strategy at all" (Carlos Briso, interviewed 6/08/2013). Even if HidroAysén's PR reached every Aysén resident, which seems unlikely, considering that the total population of the region was almost 92,000 in 2005 out of Chile's total population of some 16.3 million that year (*Chile: Ciudades, Pueblos, Aldeas y Caseríos* 2005), HidroAysén was communicating the largest energy infrastructure project in the country's history with barely 0.5% of the population. As media coverage of the project was still limited in 2006/2007, HidroAysén was almost invisible to most Chileans outside Aysén.

The first CEO of HidroAysén, Hernán Salazar, explained in an interview for this study that to "focus communication in the region" and on a national level, to keep the project "low profile" was a directive from the project's owners Endesa and Colbún, who were perhaps keen to avoid the difficulties Endesa had experienced on the Bío Bío. Salazar explained the shareholders' reasoning as having been that this would "generate less conflict", although by the time he left the company in 2010, he felt it was clear "without doubt" that this strategy had *increased* the conflict that HidroAysén was creating (Salazar, interviewed 4/12/13).

One interviewee, Nicholas Espinoza, an environmental planning consultant who worked at HidroAysén from 2010-2012, understood the company's early communications strategy as follows:

I think that HidroAysén from its beginning, was a project that cultivated a low profile and tried to generate a closeness to the authorities, and, shall we say, directly to the immediate community...to the potentially affected. And it didn't have, despite being a national project, any policy of communication at a national level. [It was] invisible at a national level, and it appeared in the arena only *because* it was opposed.

(Espinoza, interviewed 7/08/2013)

Whether the lack of communication on a national level was a deliberate attempt to remain invisible to avoid conflict, or a crucial misreading of the prevailing social and communications landscape, is unclear. Several interviewees attributed the company's

silence to corporate culture, in concordance with the discussion of HidroAysén's corporate lineage in Chapter 3. For Espinoza, the organisational mentality of HidroAysén still had much of "the culture of a state enterprise", led by engineers, where projects were created for national benefit and were a source of national pride. In this "traditional methodology, from 20 or 30 years ago" there was no need to have a considered, sustained program of communications with stakeholders because "you were developing the country...you were received with open arms"<sup>38</sup> (Espinoza, 7/08/2013).

HidroAysén's communications director, Soto, added that in Chile, in the past, "more information was hidden" because of the way large energy projects were conducted:

In general energy in Chile has been developed in a very technical way, and the engineers didn't feel the necessity to come to communities and explain projects. Or if they did, it was: first you develop your engineering project, then you communicate. You appear, in some ways like a teacher, and you explain to the communities just how the project is. You don't develop the possibility for dialogue.

(Soto, interviewed 14/11/2013)

It may be legitimate that in Chile, when HidroAysén was established, the practice of early stakeholder engagement in megaproject development had not been routine. Two-way PR dialogue and corporate social responsibility initiatives with potentially affected communities may indeed have been in their infancy (Desta 2010; Dobers & Halme 2009; Hansen & Machin 2008; Rwabizambuga 2007). This may have been particularly so for Chile, where, as discussed in Chapter 3, clientelism, inter-elite pact making, and personal influence are still a dominant framework for doing business. However, HidroAysén's majority shareholder, Endesa was owned by Enersis, and ultimately the Spanish multinational Endesa España, and subsequently the Italian company Enel<sup>39</sup>, both of which

---

<sup>38</sup> This notion recalls the "rhetoric of the technological sublime" described by Leo Marx (1964/2000), Nye (1994) and Frick (2008) where technological achievements (often in conquering the forces of nature) inspire awe and wonder. Flyvbjerg has incorporated the "technological sublime" into his four megaproject sublims, noted in Chapter 1.

<sup>39</sup> As Spanish and Italian-based businesses respectively, Enel and Enersis might be considered to be run on a Southern European and Latin American business model of clientelism, where PR relationships with the public are less important than generating positive media coverage, sometimes staying "invisible" by avoiding media coverage is important, and cultivating personal relationships with decision makers is key (Rodrigo & Orrego 2007, p. 13). However, Enel and Enersis are large multinational business organisations

do business in many developed countries including much of Europe, where early stakeholder engagement and credible CSR *are* routine. It seems, therefore, that the HydroAysén shareholders' push for the project to stay low profile on a national level was more because in Chile, up to this point, staying low profile *had* been possible. Until the time of Ralco and then HidroAysén, a low level of corporate communication on a national level about large infrastructure projects had been an *acceptable* way of doing business. Local communities bore the impacts of megaprojects, but in doing so, as the dominant discourse went, they were helping to build the country. So despite it being a "proyecto país" – a nation building project – as key commentators and much media coverage began to describe HidroAysén (for example Ostornol, *El Mercurio* 25/04/2007) it seemed the project developers felt discussion on the project could be confined to the potentially dams-affected area, and to talks between decision makers in the capital. Large-scale national publicity and generation of social licence to operate were thought unnecessary in Chile.

However, there is also some evidence in the data collected for this study that HidroAysén's stakeholders opted for invisibility for the project because of the perception that this might make the project's trajectory quicker, and therefore more profitable. As HidroAysén's Soto put it:

From the point of view of the shareholders, in general, they want to spend the least quantity of resources and get a project running at the least possible cost. The point of view of the business in question here was: what can we do more quickly? You have to consider that processes of dialogue and generation of confidence are long ones. If I'm going to build a project, I can't attempt to gain the confidence of the communities in one year. It's a long-term process.

(Soto, interviewed 14/11/2013)

Interviews and media coverage also seem to confirm that there was an intentional strategy on the part of the company of "hiding" or not informing in order to avoid conflict. As one ex-HidroAysén manager who preferred to remain anonymous, put it:

---

which must *adapt* their business practices to frameworks acceptable in the national contexts in which they do business.

“What was done, right from the beginning, was always that things were hidden. Better that people didn’t know” (interviewed 21/05/2013). And, according to Patricio Segura, journalist and spokesman for Patagonia sin Represas: “I’m not sure if hiding is the right word, but certainly they kept some things covered because they didn’t want to generate conflict (Patricio Segura, interviewed 18/05/13). Urtubia felt that “there was a strategy of not informing, to avoid conflict – something which evidently generates more conflict” (Urtubia, 05/05/13). And even Daniel Fernández, HidroAysén CEO from 2010-2014 also later referred to “hiding”. Speaking in *El Mercurio* about the company’s new communications strategy in 2010, he said:

Another decision is that we won’t continue hiding the project and we’ll participate in every instance possible, speaking with sincerity and not stating anything that isn’t correct.<sup>40</sup>

(Esturillo, *El Mercurio* 21/08/2010)

That HidroAysén sought invisibility initially also seems to be suggested by the company’s media relations strategies. In the two years between the company’s establishment in 2006 and mid-2008 HidroAysén produced four media releases. Then once HidroAysén entered the environmental approval process in 2008 there were 12 releases. The yearly figure for releases thereafter were again lower (2009: 5; 2010: 3; 2011 to July: 7), until the second half 2011 (when the company again opted for invisibility) withdrawing from national-level communications initiatives almost entirely, so that there were only 3 releases between August 2011 and the end of 2014 (*HidroAysén* 2014) (see table in Chapter 6). The following two chapters examine PR output and quantity of media coverage more closely, but this detail seems to support the argument here concerning the company’s low profile, which appears to have been an intentional strategy for the first two years after HydroAysén was established.

## 5.6 “Buying consciences”: HidroAysén’s CSR and PR initiatives in Aysén

---

<sup>40</sup> This public admission of communicational errors on the part of the company’s CEO might perhaps have formed part of a strategy that included a corporate apologia (García 2015) as an element of the company’s crisis communication. This is discussed further in Chapter 8.

If HidroAysén's early strategy was to maintain a low profile nationally, on the ground in Aysén the company's intentions were different. In its "open houses" it promoted the megaproject as a source of growth, employment and modernization in a remote, undeveloped region, distant from the mining-rich regions of Chile's north. As part of the company's commitment to the region, and to become closer to its "*vecinos*" (neighbours) as the HidroAysén communications material often refers to the people of the region, it promised improvements to the region's chief road route – still mostly unpaved. It also undertook to employ 20% of a peak dam building workforce of 5000 directly from the region for the decade the project would take to build. And to diffuse the claim that Aysén would be sacrificed to produce power for other parts of the country without injecting energy into the region, HidroAysén proposed a mini-hydroelectric project, '*Energía más Barata*' (Cheaper Energy), to lower local energy costs (HidroAysén 2011).

Other CSR initiatives were also directed at local stakeholders. HidroAysén offered post-secondary scholarships, sponsored football clubs and local fire brigades, delivered presentations on energy in schools, engaged in training and capacity building for local people, sponsored parks, donated to dental and veterinary clinics, and even brought food parcels to the retirement home in the regional capital Coyhaique (HidroAysén 2008-2009). The company also began running a program of competitive grants in regional towns and villages through which community groups and individuals could apply for funds for projects (HidroAysén 2008). It also ran a radio program, *Conversemos con HidroAysén* (Let's talk with HidroAysén), which was broadcast weekly by three local radio stations, and featured HidroAysén staff and invited guests discussing the project. *Conversemos con HidroAysén*, however, was much criticised by the anti-dams movement for its subjectivity:

This is not exactly a space governed by journalistic standards of truth and impartiality. On the contrary, it is evidently not only a program of public relations, but one of pure propaganda. The program makes a series of affirmations without delivering any proven evidence in support of its claims, for example, its claims about the supposed high level of support that the project has in the area.

(Mladinic 2010)

It seemed clear, then, that with its range of local CSR and communication initiatives, the company was attempting to become a constant presence in the daily lives of Aysén communities, and an integral part of citizens' imagining of the regional future.

That HidroAysén's local CSR efforts were voluntary actions that appeared to further social good beyond the company's interests and legal requirements – McWilliams et al's basic CSR definition (McWilliams, Siegel & Wright 2006) – is a possible interpretation of these initiatives. But that HidroAysén's strategic communications and CSR drive were also to diffuse dissent, create legitimacy and win social licence for the megaproject seems obvious. Although credible CSR actions are regarded as necessary and legitimising by megaproject developers and resource-extractive industries in most contemporary contexts, it was the *nature* and scope of HidroAysén's CSR that troubled many commentators. Instead of fostering co-creation with local communities in building the project and mitigating its negative impacts, HidroAysén's brand of CSR was later accused of "buying consciences" (El Mercurio 2011) by attempting to pressure locals to accept the project with gifts, favours and donations<sup>41</sup>.

The company's CSR initiatives began in 2007 and were most active in 2008, when HidroAysén submitted its Environmental Impact Study (EIS), the crucial stage of the approvals process, to the local authority in Coyhaique. Not only were decision-makers on the EIS based in Aysén, but the EIS process also allowed for the submission of citizens' questions or objections, which the company would be obliged to address in full. By generating approval for the project locally, it seems HidroAysén aimed to mitigate any objections that would delay the approval of the project, or lead to local protest when construction began. However, in early 2010 the regional representative of the Contraloría General (Comptroller General) mandated an end to HidroAysén's CSR initiatives in the region, citing a conflict of interests while the project was still in the approvals process (Contraloría General de la República de Chile 2010). Some of the company's longer-term initiatives did continue, though, until 2013, and are discussed again in Chapter 8. Interviewed in 2013, HidroAysén's director of Communications and Community recognised that the early CSR program had lacked subtlety. Although she

---

<sup>41</sup> HidroAysén's CSR actions here might be considered "CSR-washing", though Pope and Wæraas (2016) tell us that CSR washing is in fact rare.

considered that the Patagonia sin Represas campaign had introduced the idea of HidroAysén's "buying allegiances" into the discourse on the project, she said:

We also made some errors, because we didn't take into account that being such a large company, we were like a Goliath. And in addition to that we were putting money on the table, which obviously made us unequal. We didn't put ourselves on the same level as the community and it kept being a relationship of from 'up here' to 'down there'.

(Soto, interviewed 14/11/2013)

For Latta, HidroAysén's attempts at "generating consent" (Latta 2010) for the project set up a the relationship between the company and local communities that was:

reminiscent of the *noblesse oblige* embedded in the historical relationship between *patrones* and *peones*<sup>42</sup>, which lay at the core of Chile's institutions of social class rooted in the rural *hacienda*.

(Latta 2010, p. 10)

HydroAysén's CSR therefore appeared to underscore the intergenerational inequalities, persistent social divisions and also the neoliberal dominance of multinational business interests that the project was beginning to become emblematic of. Although intended to do the opposite, HidroAysén's CSR actions and CSR communication seem to have contributed to the way in which the project became emblematic of a divided, unequal Chile.

## 5.7 "A closeness to the authorities"

While apparently endeavouring to remain out of nation-wide public discourse, it seemed that HidroAysén was carrying out important work lobbying decision makers in the capital to favour the megaproject. As Espinoza (interviewed 07/08/13) put it, HydroAysén was endeavouring to cultivate a "closeness to the authorities". This was particularly so once the project entered the environmental approvals process in 2008.

---

<sup>42</sup> Patrón can be translated as patron, lord or boss, and connotes a position of wealth and power. Peón can be translated as peasant or unskilled labourer.



“There was an active lobby by the shareholders,” confirms a PR executive from Burson-Marsteller, one of the three agencies contracted by HidroAysén, and who wished to remain anonymous (interviewed 16/12/13). “This wasn’t outsourced, there wasn’t any external agency. The company’s owners did this directly, but our agency was aware of this process.” This interviewee explained that HidroAysén’s bosses could have influence over decision-makers in government “because they knew each other” and that the lobbying was done behind closed doors “on the level of power. Yes, directly to the source of power”.

As this interviewee suggested, it is clear that the elite networks linking corporate and political spheres in Chile are extensive on both the left and right of politics. Some examples of HidroAysén’s “closeness to the authorities” include the fact that Sebastian Piñera’s brother-in-law, Eduardo Morel Montes, was second-in-charge at HidroAysén until February 2012 (Poderopedia 2015). Jorge Rosenblut, president of Endesa Chile from 2009 had been Presidential Secretary during the 1998-2002 Frei government and Daniel Fernández, CEO of HidroAysén from 2010 had been head of three state corporations prior to leading the megaproject. Bernardo Matte, President of Colbún, is, like Piñera, a member of Chile’s wealthy elite, and shares social circles with the man who was president at the crucial time in HidroAysén’s approvals trajectory. Latta suggested in 2010 that “Matte undoubtedly has little difficulty securing an audience with the president” (p. 14). Because of the closeness of such inter-elite relationships, the elite closure discussed in Chapter 3, critics of HidroAysén pointed to possible conflicts of interest. Pointing out the project’s close ties with Chile’s elite became a key aspect of the Patagonia sin Represas communications campaign.

Although closed-doors negotiations are difficult to pick apart in a study of this nature, precisely because they are intended to be invisible, there were hints of this in other aspects of the discourse surrounding HidroAysén and the data collected here. For example, the general manager of Endesa in Chile explained to a shareholders’ meeting in April 2007: “we are collaborating closely with the regulating entity so that norms are established that are in accordance with our interests” (Rodrigo & Orrego 2007). Interviewees for this study also spoke of “invisible negotiations” (political strategist Carlos Martínez interviewed 12/06/13) and “subterranean negotiations” (Antonio

Horvath, Senator for Aysén, interviewed 26/11/13) between HidroAysén's directors and authorities in Santiago and in the region, intended to smooth the path of the approvals process for the megaproject.

It seemed that central government lobbying of the local assessing authorities was also a part of the behind-the-scenes negotiations on energy projects like HidroAysén. *El Mostrador* revealed in a feature in late 2008 that the then-head of the CNE, Marcelo Tokman, had a "secret weapon": two lobbyists known as "energy fast trackers" who "travelled the length and breadth of the country" meeting with local authorities and "pressuring" these decision makers in a way that was reported as "particularly unsubtle". The article confirmed that then-HidroAysén head Salazar had also met with at least one of these "fast trackers" (Urquieta, *El Mostrador* 17/11/2008).

Other instances of what seemed like lobbying for HidroAysén – or at least the fostering of a close relationship between the company and the government – were indeed more public. Following the damaging earthquake of February 2010, Endesa Chile announced a US\$10 million donation to the government's earthquake recovery fund (*La Tercera* 16/03/2010). A giant cheque was handed over by Pablo Yrarrázabal, President of Enersis (owner of Endesa) at a highly publicised media conference, only days after President Piñera and energy minister Ricardo Raineri, had met privately with Fluvio Conti, CEO of Enel (parent company of Enersis), reportedly to discuss HidroAysén (*La Tercera* 03/05/2010). Local Aysén newspaper *El Divisadero* reported the donation and its presentation as a "scandalous" case of "corporate lobby" and a "communications display with cheques as props" (*El Divisadero* 03/04/2010). In media discourse, it was also clear, however, that the affinity of HidroAysén for the authorities was reciprocal. During 2008 and 2009, both of the leading presidential candidates for the 2010 presidential election (Eduardo Frei and Sebastián Piñera) declared themselves in favour of the project, and their position was frequently quoted in the media, as a compilation of quotes published in *El Mercurio* showed (Bustamante Rocha, *El Mercurio* 25/04/2009). And, shortly before HidroAysén was due to submit its environmental impact assessment, the Minister of the Interior, Edmundo Pérez Yoma also made a controversial public declaration in support of the project (Aránguiz, *El Mercurio* 07/02/2008). Such strategic statements did not pass by the dams' opponents

unnoticed. Interviewed in *El Mercurio* in February 2008, leading environmentalist Juan Pablo Orrego condemned Perez Yoma's comments:

It seems to me completely inappropriate and bordering on illegality in terms of administrative probity...This is a political operation of the kind that we haven't seen since the Ralco scandal.

(Bustamante Rocha, *El Mercurio* 14/02/2008)

It is clear from the literature on megaprojects that the "strategic manipulation of information" (Flyvbjerg, Garbuio & Lovallo 2009, p. 175) and the lack of transparency described above and are often associated with such projects. These tendencies are perhaps more pronounced in Latin America, and Chile, given the tendency of business in this country to rely on personal influence, and informal, private negotiations between elites. Although HidroAysén's "closeness to the authorities" was not always clearly visible in media reporting on the project, this kind of closeness was understood by observers in Chile of the unfolding case of HidroAysén, because this was precisely how business had always functioned in Chile. HidroAysén's perceived closeness to the authorities therefore became part of the discursive construction of the project, so that its close ties with an intergenerational elite in Chile became one of the things the project was known, and criticised, for.

### **5.8 Patagonia sin Represas makes HidroAysén visible**

In April 2007 began what the groups behind Patagonia sin Represas described as "the most ambitious and relevant public education campaign that has ever been launched in Chile". One of the campaign's publications describes how:

With more creativity than resources, and with the participation and commitment of hundreds of collaborators, we began this crusade to educate public opinion on the project. We aimed to create awareness of its disastrous consequences, illustrate the available options in terms of alternative and sustainable energy scenarios, shed light on institutional failings in the environmental approvals process, uncover lobbying, political and economic pressure and conflicts of interests. Above all, we wanted to keep public opinion informed about a project that is both unnecessary and unsuitable for the country.

(Patagonia sin Represas 2010)

While HidroAysén's communications were almost exclusively locally focused, Patagonia sin Represas ran a local and national campaign from the outset. According to Carolina Morgado (interviewed 16/11/13) who worked with Douglas Tompkins at Tompkins Conservation and Fundación Pumalín (Pumalín Foundation), although communication in the region mattered, national communication was key because "decisions are taken at a national level". Almost all Patagonia sin Represas' publicity in the region therefore had the goal of *also* speaking to a national audience. An early example of this was the 2007 "Cabalgata sin Represas", an anti-dams horseride which was an act of local solidarity with the aim of attracting national attention, or as DeLuca (2006) would call it, an "image event". Dressed in traditional attire (still daily dress for many) 120 Aysén citizens rode for nine days across the region, to arrive in the regional capital Coyhaique where they filed on horseback, protest banners flying, past the HidroAysén offices. The organiser explained:

The objective of the ride is so that the people affected by the HidroAysén project gain visibility, and so it becomes clear that it is us, the people of Aysén, who are against these dams

(Estrada 2007)

The protest ride was reported nationally on Channel 13, which was then the most watched Chilean television channel (Canal 13 28/11/2007) and was the first high-profile, televised symbolic act of the anti-dams campaign.

To increase visibility for HydroAysén throughout Chile, the campaign immediately began to work simultaneously on two modes of national-level publicity. The first was an image-based campaign of anti-dams billboards along the length of the country's main highway, Ruta 5, in key cities, and in the Aysén regional capital, Coyhaique. Similar images appeared on posters throughout the country. Local activists were encouraged to print these direct from the campaign website for use in their vicinities. Ads also appeared on bus shelters, and a Patagonia sin Represas bumper sticker became ubiquitous. The second strategy was to publish full-page newspaper advertisements in publications including *El Mercurio*, *La Tercera*, *The Clinic*, the (small circulation) Chilean print edition of *Le Monde Diplomatique* and also in local Aysén newspapers. A third key

communications output was a large-format hard cover book, released by the campaign in 2007 and taking its name from the campaign. In 2008, around the time that HidroAysén entered the environmental approvals process, Patagonia sin Represas also strategically ran a television advertisement on key national channels, and radio advertisements were broadcast locally. The sub-sections below address each of these communications strategies individually.

#### *5.8.1 “Imagen país” – anti dam advertising and the “national image”*

Patagonia sin Represas’ advertising billboard campaign was launched in early 2007. Many of the billboards were present until 2013, with regularly renewed images, though others were swiftly censored. In Santiago’s international airport, for example, such billboards were removed less than 24 hours after they had been erected for being too “controversial” (Liberona 2007). At Balmaceda Airport, the main air access to the Aysén region, similar billboards were crudely covered, without explanation. And when Patagonia sin Represas tried to buy advertising space in the Santiago Metro, the campaign’s advertising agency was refused, on the grounds that the ads “generated controversies which were out of line with the organisation” (Ibid.). Considering that these were paid advertising spots, the actions of these state enterprises were seen as curbing freedom of expression (Ibid). HidroAysén later ran an advertising campaign throughout Santiago’s transport network.

The imagery of these billboards was simple. Each was a photomontage showing a string of high voltage electricity pylons set against iconic Chilean landscapes. As interviewee Morgado explained, the campaign used the pylons to signify HidroAysén, rather than dams, because:

Of course, if you show a dam, nobody is able to discern that this is something damaging, because you see a lake, and people do say ‘lake’ when they talk about dams. So it had to be an image of the thing that would in fact be most visually disruptive, which would be the 80-metre towers, running for some 2000kms.

(Morgado, interviewed 16/11/13)

The campaign also considered carefully the kinds of landscapes against which the pylons were depicted. Because the project’s power line would traverse so much of Chile, many landscapes and communities would indeed be affected. Initially the campaign

showed Patagonian landscapes. But in the words of one campaign publication: “because we know that people tend to protect and take care of places that they are familiar with” (Patagonia sin Represas 2010), it also singled out iconic natural landscapes in other parts of Chile. These were well-known lakes, waterfalls or volcanoes – familiar signifiers of the “national image” – that were located near each town or city where the billboards were erected. The ads depicted power lines crossing every one of these landscapes. At this stage, with the exact route of the planned power line not known, the billboards and posters were intended as symbolic communication: not as actual depictions of what HidroAysén’s power line might look like. The billboards bore anchorages such as: “Destruction is not a solution” and “The worst national image”. Importantly, all ads also incorporated the words “Chilean Patagonia without dams”, an anchorage that was used specifically to generate a feeling of national ownership and national pride over Patagonia. None of the anti-dams advertisements at this stage mentioned HidroAysén.




Figure 3: “Destruction is not a solution”




Figure 4: “The worst national image”

The anti-dams campaign also felt it important to create a single, symbolic image that would become representative of the whole campaign:

It had to be something that would immediately capture public attention, that was recognizable and appreciated...Although the region of Aysén has innumerable landscapes and places of extraordinary scenic beauty, these

weren't as well known or recognized...It was decided therefore to use an iconic image of Patagonia...recognized globally, which was the controversial image of the Torres del Paine crossed by high voltage power lines.

(Patagonia sin Represas 2010)

This image of power lines crossing the centerpiece of Patagonia's best-known national park, and perhaps Chile's most distinctive national landscape would be denounced as "misleading" (*El Mercurio* 12/12/2010) and as "propaganda", considering that the power line would actually begin several hundred kilometers to the north of the Torres. Later, when the company began to respond to the Patagonia sin Represas campaign in 2008, HidroAysén singled out this symbolic image. "They tried to demonstrate that we were lying" noted Urtubia (interviewed 15/05/13). According to another interviewee, the company's reactive effort to reject the image only reinforced its impression:

If you say 'look, we aren't going to pass the Torres', then you've already lost. In communicational terms, you've lost, because people are left with the impression that the lines will be run past the Torres.

(Espinoza, interviewed 7/08/2013)

As semiotic analysis tells us, no message contains only one meaning (Barthes 1972; 1973/1975; Miller 1987). Texts – like this series of protest advertisements – are inherently subjective and each reader finds his or her own meaning in a text. I focus now on this most recognised image in this series, the 'Torres' image, to demonstrate how HidroAysén and Patagonia sin Represas could derive such different meanings from the same advertisement. And while I focus on one advertisement in this section, much of this analysis does also apply to the series as a whole.

The 'Torres' advertisement depicts a view across Lake Pehoe to the granite spires of the Paine Massif, rising dramatically from the Patagonian steppe. The Torres (towers) and Cuernos (horns) del Paine are the much-recognised centerpiece of this iconic national park, which receives some 155,000 visitors each year, more than half of these international. Torres del Paine is a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve, and in 2013, it was voted by the TripAdvisor media group as the 'Eighth Wonder of the World' (*Parque Nacional Torres del Paine* 2014). The image of the Torres is therefore well known internationally and an instantly recognisable source of national pride for Chileans. The advertisement depicts the dawn view of these mountains, lit dramatically with early

light. Although most classic views of the Torres show them in full daylight as a snowy backdrop to the ice-blue glacier fed lake, this image depicts them partly shrouded in grey cloud. Digitally super-imposed on the image, and partially obscuring the mountain view, are two high voltage power pylons, with a web of power lines strung between them. The advertisement bears a simple anchorage which translates as: Chilean Patagonia Without Dams! and the image also includes the emblem of the CDP, which conducted the campaign.



Figure 5: Patagonia sin Represas' controversial Torres del Paine image.

While the signs that constitute the above description are clear (mountains, water, clouds, powerlines, accompanying anchorage) the codes, or rules that link the signifier to the signified rely on such associations being conventionally understood. For example, the sign of the Torres del Paine is linked by a code, or convention, which signifies magnificent natural heritage, national image and national pride in Chile. The Torres also represent a distant, perfect, natural idyll. For city dwellers in Chile – particularly those sweltering under the blanket of smog that defiles Santiago – they represent a last vestige of undefiled nature. Although distant and unobtainable for many, they are a place to be



revered and protected. The grey clouds and fiery half-light are signs which by conventional codes, often signify trouble or threat. The superimposed power lines stand in metonymically for the HidroAysén megaproject. The name of the project and images of dams are absent signifiers, not only in this advertisement, but right across this image-based campaign. In this series of advertisements, power lines became symbolic signifiers for the project. They also created a binary between the natural and the manmade. In other ads in the series, which include in their anchorages words such as “worst” and “destruction”, power lines – and thereby the megaproject – came to connote the worst of technology and development (in contrast, implicitly, to the ‘best’ of the country, as depicted in the accompanying images).

For Patagonia sin Represas, this image, and the others in the series, was used with the intention of establishing a convention or code of HidroAysén as “destruction”. And while Barthes (1973/1975) and Miller (1987) tell us that the semiotic critic is ethically bound to avoid misinterpreting or misreading a text, the megaproject developers felt no such compulsion. Reading the images with power lines more literally – and no doubt aware of the potential to undermine their opponents – HidroAysén denounced them as dishonesty on the part of the anti-dams campaign. The company’s CEO later wrote (in a Letter to the Editor of *El Mercurio*) of “a campaign of disinformation based in myths and falsehoods” in relation to Patagonia sin Represas’ ads (Fernández, *El Mercurio* 15/12/2010). Allowing a new code to become established between the signifier, Patagonia sin Represas and a signified, dishonesty, was something the anti-dams campaign wanted to avoid at all costs, because:

our absolute preoccupation from day one in order to establish ourselves as a valid interlocutor, was to provide correct information, without deception.

(Morgado, interviewed 16/11/2013)

In order to clarify the symbolic intention of the Torres del Paine image and other images in the series, therefore, the anchorage of any new images became a more explicit: “Here this would be unacceptable. In Aysén too.” When the anti-dams campaign heard a comment that “it would be equivalent to showing it [the power line] on Easter Island” (Patagonia sin Represas 2010) they made a swift intertextual response, incorporating into their campaign an image that showed power lines slung behind the moai, the unmistakable statues of Chile’s Easter Island. This too bore the new clarifying anchorage,

and the image sought to underscore the symbolism of the Torres advertisement.




Figure 6: “Here, this would be unacceptable. In Aysén too.”

This widespread visual campaign, then, was intended above all to render low-profile HidroAysén visible nationally, but it also became a significant moment in the discourse on the dams. The campaign began to solidify what HidroAysén meant or represented – destruction and threat – and what opposition to it symbolised – *rejection* of destruction by ill-considered development, defence of natural heritage and national pride. However, unintentionally, the campaign allowed another meaning to enter discourse on the dams, one that associated Patagonia sin Represas with stretching of the truth. All these meanings would become a part of the discourse surrounding the emblematic case of HidroAysén.

#### 5.8.2 “Reasons to reject HidroAysén”: newspaper advertisements and “censorship”

At the same time as the visual campaign of billboards and posters, meant to introduce

more of Chile to the dams megaproject, Patagonia sin Represas was printing advertisements in key national and local newspapers. As discussed in previous chapters, Chile's two leading newspapers are the news sources of decision-making elites. These two publications were therefore prioritised. Some 36 whole-page advertisements and letters to the president (at first Bachelet, then Piñera) were run across these four outlets from 2007 to 2010. The ads were initially alternated in turn between *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera* at the rate of two a month (Morgado, interviewed 16/11/13), and appeared with varying frequency in the other outlets. Text for the ads was written by a collective of activists drawn from the CDP with imagery designed by Think al Cubo, a creative agency in Santiago. The ads presented the anti-dams position on the insufficiencies of the EIS, failures of environmental institutional processes, the irreversible environmental impacts of the dams and their transmission line – including the loss of species and ecosystems and impacts on national parks. They also discussed the social effects on the region and negative impacts on tourism, they documented the growing monopoly in water rights ownership, and they pointed out alternatives to building HidroAysén. Overall, the ads were intended to present a summary of the anti-dams campaign's arguments directly to the places of power.

Imagery and themes used in these advertisements at first reflected the billboards and posters campaign, covering the natural environment and the way of life in Patagonia. However, around the time that the company submitted its EIS to the review process in August 2008, when HidroAysén's communications strategies changed from low-profile to reactive, and when discourse over HidroAysén evolved into a more antagonistic debate, Patagonia sin Represas changed its linguistic and visual discourse also. Now, instead of the advertisements' texts and images being straightforward, they included elements of word play, caricature and satire. Some advertisements underscored HidroAysén's closeness to the authorities, with phrases like (in the context of a discussion on water rights) "A suit made to measure for HidroAysén", and (in the context of the EIS) "timeframes moulded in favour of HidroAysén" and "HidroAysén obtains unmerited admissibility". Other ads also referred to "corporate blackmail", "false philanthropy" and "brainwashing". Patagonia sin Represas called this frank language, jokingly, their own "lobby feroz" ("ferocious lobby") after a particular advertisement which revealed HidroAysén's image-enhancing PR efforts.

# El Lobby Feroz



¿Por qué HidroAysén ha necesitado contratar tres agencias de relaciones públicas expertas en lavado de imagen?

## Lavado de Cerebro

Si el Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Aysén (PHA) fuese un buen proyecto para Chile se sustentaría en sus méritos. ¿Por qué, entonces, necesita de tres agencias de relaciones públicas y marketing expertas en lavado de imagen? ¿Por qué estas empresas eléctricas están embarcadas en una cruzada de compra de conciencias sin precedentes que degradan el tejido social y la gobernabilidad del país? Un proyecto con riesgos descabellados tal como HidroAysén (HA), transmisión incluida, no debiera ser vendido con artimañas de marketing. Dada la inviabilidad de su faraónico y codicioso proyecto, HA contrató tres agencias expertas en defender lo indefendible, en contener daños colaterales y en hacer condicionamiento social: Burson y Marsteller (B-M), Young & Rubicam y Tironi Asociados.

## La oscura historia de Burson-Marsteller que asesora a HA

Burson-Marsteller (B-M) es una de las agencias de relaciones públicas más grandes del mundo. Creada en 1953, integra en la actualidad el grupo Young & Rubicam del WPP Group. B-M se especializa, tanto en levantar y limpiar la imagen corporativa de empresas, como en perjudicar la de los adversarios de sus clientes. En 1979 representó a Babcock & Wilcox, propietaria del reactor nuclear Three Mile Island luego del segundo accidente atómico más grave de la historia después de Chernobyl. En 1984 asesoró a la Union Carbide Corporation para limpiar su imagen después de la muerte de 2.000 personas debido a la fuga masiva de gas venenoso en una de sus plantas en Bhopal, India. El 2007 representó a la empresa norteamericana Blackwater acusada del asesinato de civiles iraquíes. El prontuario de B-M sigue y suma.

## Tironi Asociados: Un Mundo Sin Valores



Un personaje clave del 'lobby feroz' del proyecto HA es Eugenio Tironi, uno de los fundadores de la Concertación, Director de comunicaciones del gobierno de Aylwin. Hoy Director de Enersis, consorcio controlador de Endesa, empresa a la que asesoró facilitando su aterrizaje en Chile y la puesta en marcha de sus grandes proyectos a fines de los '90. Tironi hoy es asesor comunicacional de HidroAysén, a través de Tironi Asociados, empresa de comunicación estratégica y de manejo de crisis de la que es fundador y socio principal. Es también asesor de muchas otras empresas que abarcan casi todo el espectro industrial. Fue asesor de contenidos de la campaña del candidato presidencial

Eduardo Frei hasta que afloraron sus conflictos de interés por su asesoría a Salcobrand, en plena crisis por la colusión de las farmacias. En el documental 'Un mundo Miserable' de Dauno Tótoro, Tironi afirma que 'un mundo donde todos nos movemos por valores no existe' y que, por lo tanto, 'debemos resignarnos a nuestra condición de seres miserables'. Sus palabras delatan los principios que mueven sus asesorías a empresas tales como GasAndes, Celco responsable de la contaminación del Santuario Río Cruces y la muerte de cisnes de cuello negro, a AES-Gener por su controvertido proyecto Alto Maipo, y a HidroAysén.

## ¿Energía Barata para Aysén?

Asesorado de esta forma hace tres años HA empezó a difundir la idea que entregarían 'energía más barata' para Aysén. Bastó un simple análisis al PHA para derrumbar esta falsa promesa: el 100% de la electricidad que generaría sería transmitida hasta la Región Metropolitana. No se podría descargar ni un solo kilowatt en Aysén ni en ninguna de las 9 regiones que serían atravesadas por la gigantesca línea de Transelco. Al quedar esto al descubierto, HA comenzó a promover la construcción de minicentrales de pasada en la región, poco menos que para regalárselas a los aiseninos. Lo insólito es que HA no tiene los derechos de agua para cumplir esta falsa promesa y, además, las tarifas eléctricas no dependen de la voluntad de una empresa sino que las fija la autoridad. Antecedente: en el Alto Biobío, a la comuna somera de las mega-centrales hidroeléctricas Pangue y Ralco, pagan tarifas eléctricas que están entre las más caras de Chile.

## ¿Proyecto País?

Luego, los asesores de HA crean el eslogan: HidroAysén: Proyecto País. Esta afirmación resulta increíble cuando las empresas privadas Colbún, Endesa y Enel de Italia son quienes percibirían utilidades multimillonarias a costa de la Patagonia. HA destruiría valor-país al degradar patrimonio cultural y natural de valor infinito. Endesa, en su ansiedad por utilizar derechos de agua privatizados en forma totalmente ilegítima a fines de la dictadura y que deben ser re-nacionalizados, se empeña en utilizar una fuente de energía obsoleta y destructiva en vez de fomentar el uso de las renovables, esto en uno de los países del mundo con mayor riqueza en energías limpias.



## ¿Qué informa HidroAysén a la Comunidad?

Más recientemente, estas agencias, cuyo trabajo consiste en confundir al público para vender proyectos que no podrían ser implementados de otra forma, han hecho que HA despliegue una ofensiva mediática cuyo concepto clave es: Informate. Paradójico, porque nada informan de los ingresos por más de 1.200 millones de dólares anuales que obtendrían a costa de la Patagonia; ni de la transformación de Aysén en batería para la industria y minería en el centro-norte de Chile; ni de la potencial muerte biológica de los ríos Baker y Pascua y la pérdida de 4.000 empleos permanentes por el impacto en el turismo; ni de la degradación de miles de hectáreas con la línea de transmisión.



## ¿Empresa Eléctrica Privada Filantrópica?

En tiempos de elecciones rebrota la condenable práctica de hacer 'ofertones' a cambio de apoyos políticos. En la Patagonia HA identificó las necesidades y carencias sociales y económicas de la comunidad y generosamente ha establecido acuerdos con municipalidades de las comunas más directamente afectadas por el PHA para financiar paquetes de obras sociales, suplantando al Estado y los gobiernos locales y regionales en este rol que no corresponde a su giro de empresa eléctrica; hoy aparece filantrópicamente pagando cuentas de servicios básicos, canastas familiares, financiando bocas deportivas, subsidios habitacionales y wi-fi para pueblos enteros.



## La Ciudadanía no se Deja Engañar

Pese a esta intensa campaña publicitaria desplegada por HA desde hace dos años, las encuestas independientes de cobertura nacional realizadas desde abril 2008 han mostrado más de 51% de rechazo a la construcción de represas en la Patagonia chilena (CERC 53%, Fundación Futuro 52,8%, Ipsos 58% y 50,6%). El dictamen ha sido claro: la mayoría de los chilenos y chilenas no se dejan engañar y se oponen a la degradación del patrimonio cultural y natural de valor incalculable de la Patagonia por un negocio privado. Esta presión social ha significado que los cuatro candidatos presidenciales deban pronunciarse sobre HA, dos lo rechazan de plano, así como siete Senadores y 21 Diputados.



**¡PATAGONIA SIN REPRESAS!**

[www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl](http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl)

Figure 7: The Ferocious Lobby: Why has HidroAysén needed to contract three PR agencies that are experts in image washing? (Source: Patagonia sin Represas website).



However, as the ads' discourse on the dams became more conflictual, *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera* were less willing to publish them. Interviewees for this study spoke of censorship: "We did suffer processes of censorship in certain periods" (Urtubia, interviewed 15/05/2013). Liberona, of Fundación Terram also spoke of "certain levels of censorship" (interviewed 27/06/2013). Morgado was more explicit:

We are constantly censored. What happens is that you have to choose. They censor you and you get angry and you don't end up publishing the ad. Or, they censor you and you fix it and they publish you. There were times when this was unacceptable, you see, because basically they didn't let us use various words, things like 'oligopoly', 'monopoly', or 'irregularities', which are words which the whole world uses. And they also changed the images that we put together to suit them better.

She added:

The local publications never censored us. It was *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*, because they are newspapers of the 'establishment'.

(Morgado, interviewed 16/11/13)

As Morgado mentioned, *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera* made it a condition of publication that satirical composite images in the anti-dams advertisement be changed. Such images were published unaltered in *The Clinic*, for example, so that the changes mandated by the two conservative newspapers were evident to any reader who made the comparison between publications. The two conservative newspapers' "censorship" focused particularly on images of government officials and HidroAysén's, Endesa's and Colbun's executives, which had to be removed or made unrecognisable before publication. The campaign quickly moved away from publishing in *El Mercurio*, because of the changes it required, because of extreme cost, and also because of the newspaper's tendency to publish the ads in page locations which compromised their content, for example opposite articles critical of the environment movement, according to interviewees Urtubia, Segura and Morgado.

## La Patagonia NO se vende

### ¿Filantropía o Compra de Privilegios?

**Falsa filantropía**  
El día de Viernes los chilenos fuimos testigos de cómo, en un acto en La Moneda, Pablo Yrarrázaval, presidente del grupo Enersis (controladora de Endesa, empresa socia del Proyecto HidroAysén), junto con el ex ministro de Energía, entregaron el Fondo Nacional de Reconstrucción, hacia un

**Reemplazando al Estado**  
HidroAysén y Energía Austral han venido entregando una serie de donaciones y aportes en la forma de becas de estudio, cursos de capacitación, equipamiento para escuelas y perfeccionamiento docente, han desarrollado concursos para emprendimientos comunitarios, redacción de libros regionales, encuentros comunitarios, donaciones de caridad, construcción de espacios comunitarios, seminarios de variado tipo e incluso insólitas asesorías técnicas para postular a subsidios habitacionales. Esto es inaceptable, al provenir de una empresa de generación eléctrica, cuya viabilidad depende de "ganarse" el apoyo de la gente y de paso el beneplácito de las autoridades, de las cuales dependen permisos y autorizaciones pendientes.

**Contraloría dictaminó ilegalidad de donaciones**  
A pesar de haberse denunciado, ni las empresas ni los municipios se hicieron cargo de las críticas a las donaciones. Luego de una presentación ante la Contraloría Regional de Aysén, ésta determinó que "los referidos municipios deberán arbitrar las medidas que correspondan a fin de abstenerse de suscribir convenios o recibir aportes de personas naturales o jurídicas que tengan o puedan tener interés en asuntos que dejen ser analizados, conocidos o resueltos por la entidad edilicia de que se trata, circunstancia que será verificada por este organismo contralor en las futuras fiscalizaciones que se disponga sobre el particular". Hoy, HidroAysén y Energía Austral han afinado la puntería: ahora las víctimas de sus actos ilegítimos son las organizaciones sociales.

**Interviniendo con dinero el SEIA**  
Ante la complacencia de las autoridades del Estado chileno, las comunidades de la Región de Aysén, están viviendo un fuerte proceso de intervención económica en donaciones y aportes por parte de las hidroeléctricas HidroAysén y Energía Austral, que pretenden reemplazar sus más importantes ríos. Al ser sus principales beneficiarios personas y municipios a quienes corresponde evaluar sus iniciativas en el marco del SEIA, estas acciones van debilitando las voluntades y cooptando a las autoridades y comunidades locales, las que se ven enfrentadas a empresas privadas que cuentan con desproporcionados recursos para intervenir el proceso.

**Compensaciones a los municipios por la instalación de proyectos eléctricos**  
Otra influencia indebida la constituye el proyecto de Ley ingresado al Congreso por el ex Ministro de Energía Marcelo Toloza que obliga a las empresas eléctricas a pagar, pero con cargo a crédito fiscal, un impuesto específico por cada megawatt instalado a los municipios donde se emplazan sus proyectos. Esta medida apunta de manera burda, a reducir la oposición de las comunidades locales a estas iniciativas, pero erosionando y debilitando la voluntad de las personas, al introducir un factor exógeno y desequilibrante en los procesos de participación ciudadana. De aprobarse esta iniciativa, el soborno social lo pagaríamos todos los chilenos, buscando en la práctica inhibir la participación de las comunidades y la rigurosidad de los municipios evaluadores, que serían los beneficiarios directos de estos recursos.

**Compensaciones a los municipios por la instalación de proyectos eléctricos**  
Otra influencia indebida la constituye el proyecto de Ley ingresado al Congreso por el ex Ministro de Energía Marcelo Toloza que obliga a las empresas eléctricas a pagar, pero con cargo a crédito fiscal, un impuesto específico por cada megawatt instalado a los municipios donde se emplazan sus proyectos. Esta medida apunta de manera burda, a reducir la oposición de las comunidades locales a estas iniciativas, pero erosionando y debilitando la voluntad de las personas, al introducir un factor exógeno y desequilibrante en los procesos de participación ciudadana. De aprobarse esta iniciativa, el soborno social lo pagaríamos todos los chilenos, buscando en la práctica inhibir la participación de las comunidades y la rigurosidad de los municipios evaluadores, que serían los beneficiarios directos de estos recursos.

## La Patagonia NO se vende

### ¿Filantropía o Compra de Privilegios?

**Falsa filantropía**  
El 16 de Mayo los chilenos fuimos testigos de cómo, en un acto en La Moneda, Pablo Yrarrázaval, presidente del grupo Enersis (controladora de Endesa, empresa socia del Proyecto HidroAysén), junto con el ex ministro de Energía, entregaron el Fondo Nacional de Reconstrucción, hacia un

**Reemplazando al Estado**  
HidroAysén y Energía Austral han venido entregando una serie de donaciones y aportes en la forma de becas de estudio, cursos de capacitación, equipamiento para escuelas y perfeccionamiento docente, han desarrollado concursos para emprendimientos comunitarios, redacción de libros regionales, encuentros comunitarios, donaciones de caridad, construcción de espacios comunitarios, seminarios de variado tipo e incluso insólitas asesorías técnicas para postular a subsidios habitacionales. Esto es inaceptable, al provenir de una empresa de generación eléctrica, cuya viabilidad depende de "ganarse" el apoyo de la gente y de paso el beneplácito de las autoridades, de las cuales dependen permisos y autorizaciones pendientes.

**Contraloría dictaminó ilegalidad de donaciones**  
A pesar de haberse denunciado, ni las empresas ni los municipios se hicieron cargo de las críticas a las donaciones. Luego de una presentación ante la Contraloría Regional de Aysén, ésta determinó que "los referidos municipios deberán arbitrar las medidas que correspondan a fin de abstenerse de suscribir convenios o recibir aportes de personas naturales o jurídicas que tengan o puedan tener interés en asuntos que dejen ser analizados, conocidos o resueltos por la entidad edilicia de que se trata, circunstancia que será verificada por este organismo contralor en las futuras fiscalizaciones que se disponga sobre el particular". Hoy, HidroAysén y Energía Austral han afinado la puntería: ahora las víctimas de sus actos ilegítimos son las organizaciones sociales.

**Interviniendo con dinero el SEIA**  
Ante la complacencia de las autoridades del Estado chileno, las comunidades de la Región de Aysén, están viviendo un fuerte proceso de intervención económica en donaciones y aportes por parte de las hidroeléctricas HidroAysén y Energía Austral, que pretenden reemplazar sus más importantes ríos. Al ser sus principales beneficiarios personas y municipios a quienes corresponde evaluar sus iniciativas en el marco del SEIA, estas acciones van debilitando las voluntades y cooptando a las autoridades y comunidades locales, las que se ven enfrentadas a empresas privadas que cuentan con desproporcionados recursos para intervenir el proceso.

**Compensaciones a los municipios por la instalación de proyectos eléctricos**  
Otra influencia indebida la constituye el proyecto de Ley ingresado al Congreso por el ex Ministro de Energía Marcelo Toloza que obliga a las empresas eléctricas a pagar, pero con cargo a crédito fiscal, un impuesto específico por cada megawatt instalado a los municipios donde se emplazan sus proyectos. Esta medida apunta de manera burda, a reducir la oposición de las comunidades locales a estas iniciativas, pero erosionando y debilitando la voluntad de las personas, al introducir un factor exógeno y desequilibrante en los procesos de participación ciudadana. De aprobarse esta iniciativa, el soborno social lo pagaríamos todos los chilenos, buscando en la práctica inhibir la participación de las comunidades y la rigurosidad de los municipios evaluadores, que serían los beneficiarios directos de estos recursos.

**Compensaciones a los municipios por la instalación de proyectos eléctricos**  
Otra influencia indebida la constituye el proyecto de Ley ingresado al Congreso por el ex Ministro de Energía Marcelo Toloza que obliga a las empresas eléctricas a pagar, pero con cargo a crédito fiscal, un impuesto específico por cada megawatt instalado a los municipios donde se emplazan sus proyectos. Esta medida apunta de manera burda, a reducir la oposición de las comunidades locales a estas iniciativas, pero erosionando y debilitando la voluntad de las personas, al introducir un factor exógeno y desequilibrante en los procesos de participación ciudadana. De aprobarse esta iniciativa, el soborno social lo pagaríamos todos los chilenos, buscando en la práctica inhibir la participación de las comunidades y la rigurosidad de los municipios evaluadores, que serían los beneficiarios directos de estos recursos.

Figure 8: Insert ad in *El Mercurio* (bottom), published 15/07/2010, demonstrating changes that Patagonia sin Represas referred to as "censorship". *El Mercurio* would not accept the image of Pablo Yrarrázaval, president of the Enersis group which controlled Endesa, donating \$10 million to the National Fund for Reconstruction. The original graphic design for the ad as published in *The Clinic* (06/07/2010) is shown above.



Figure 9: “The shameless insistence on destroying Patagonia”. This image also shows the changes that *El Mercurio* stipulated: the removal of the faces of Bernardo Larraín and Bernardo Matte Larraín of Colbún and Daniel Fernández of HidroAysén from a Patagonia sin Represas ad. The image above was published, unchanged, in *El Divisadero* in Aysén.

Both ads were published on 14/04/2010.

Despite the anti-dams campaign's claims of censorship, it could be argued that the fact that Chile's most conservative, establishment newspapers published these highly critical ads at all is indeed an indicator of the very opposite. A diversity of viewpoints within and between media is, after all, the hallmark of media pluralism. However, as the next chapter explores in detail, Chile's most widely read and most influential newspapers *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*, *did* both have clear editorial lines that were mostly strongly in favour of the HidroAysén megaproject, and in *El Mercurio* at least, this stance persisted over much of the timeline of the dams debate. Though anti-dams voices and the anti-dams ads discussed above *did* sometimes appear in these two newspapers, these publications (both the key news sources of government decision-makers and also inter-media agenda setters) most often published pro-dams discourse and were critical of the anti-dams protest movement. These tendencies, and their impact, are further discussed in Chapter 6.

Despite their small impact on Chile's key newspapers' overall editorial lines, the anti-dams movement regarded the publication of these ads in *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera* in particular as having been successful. After one ad series summarised "9 reasons" related to rejection of the dams (for example, "9 Reasons not to Destroy Patagonia", "9 Reasons to Reject HidroAysén" or "9 Reasons to Demand that Institutional Processes be Respected") "9 Reasons" became a meme which was echoed in the traditional media, in advertising and on social media soon after ads appeared (Sara Larraín, Director of Chile Sustentable, interviewed 23/08/2013). Patagonia sin Represas was gratified that the discourse of these advertisements had become widespread.





Figure 10, left: “9 More Reasons to keep Patagonia Without Dams – National Parks” and right: “9 More Reasons that the Aysén megadams aren’t necessary. Alternatives exist.”

### 5.8.3 An anti-dams “primer”: the Patagonia sin Represas book

Another aspect of Patagonia sin Represas’ campaign to make HidroAysén ‘visible’ was the publication of 5000 copies of a hardcover book entitled “Patagonia sin Represas” in 2007 (Rodrigo & Orrego 2007). Imagery in the book echoes that of the national billboards campaign, and also includes much imagery of the negative environmental consequences of dam megaprojects. Including a collection of essays by prominent Chilean environmental thinkers, the book opens by questioning, if hydroelectric megaprojects were built in Patagonia, “how would we explain this to future generations?” (Infanti de la Mora 2007). It then summarises anti-dams arguments in emotive language, characterising “megadams” and power lines as a “nightmare” (p. 62). It also criticises “growth without end” (p. 123) and discusses an alternative style of development to the neoliberal model where corporations dominate over governance by the nation state and where inequality includes “inequality in the distribution of energy” (p. 131). The book characterises the choice of direction of energy development in Chile as an “ethical imperative” (p. 139) and then presents an alternative energy plan for Chile.

The book's premises are based in the concept of Deep Ecology, first described by philosopher Arne Naess. Deep Ecology is a "rejection of the man-in-environment image" in favour of a broader view in which all life forms, not only those of utility to human needs, warrant "deep seated respect, even veneration" (Naess 1973, p. 95). This eco-philosophy is also anti-class and advocates local autonomy and decentralisation, particularly because (reminiscent of Gellert & Lynch 2003)

The vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to the weight of influences from afar, from outside the local region in which that form has obtained an ecological equilibrium.

(Naess 1973, p. 98)

Although Deep Ecology, and Douglas' Tompkins' adherence to it, would later be characterised in mainstream and social media in Chile as "extremist", "elitist" and "foreign", this eco-philosophy is in fact opposed to the kind of "Shallow Ecology" that Naess saw as being primarily concerned with the health and affluence of privileged people in affluent countries<sup>43</sup>.

The *Patagonia sin Represas* book, with its eco-philosophical foundations, positions the campaign as opposing not just dams on the Baker and Pascua Rivers, but any large dams in Chilean Patagonia. Although Endesa and Colbún, are mentioned alongside other dam project developers like Xstrata, HidroAysén is never named. In semiotic terms this "absent signifier" – a feature which is notable by its absence – may have been a useful device for the anti-dams debate. It allowed the *Patagonia sin Represas* campaign, and the book, to present its own arguments, without being seen as responding particularly to any one project. This allowed the book more effectively to present a "deep, moral critique" of the model of development HidroAysén and similar projects represented (Tompkins, interviewed 05/12/2013) and not just criticise the project itself.

---

<sup>43</sup> For a discussion of Deep Ecology, also see Dryzek (2005) pp. 183-185.



Figure 11: Path to the scaffold (alternative translation: gallows)? Magnificent southern rivers would be condemned to death.

The chief instigator of the book (which was edited by Chile's two best-known environmentalists, Juan Pablo Orrego and Patricio Rodrigo) was Douglas Tompkins, who explained the book as follows:

I have a lot of experience in this kind of stuff because we have done a lot of books. We do these because we have discovered over the years – and we have been making them for nearly 25 years now – since 1989, that these things really are useful, and they also have a psychological ‘in’, so that you are suddenly transported away from an activist carrying a placard or something, standing out in front and shouting in a street protest – those are good and you’ve got to do your street protests too, they come into this a little bit later – but it’s helpful to have a document. You can give it to the media themselves. And the media take you seriously after that. You are not the rag-tag activists, protesters that many of the people in the employ of the public relations of the big companies are trying to characterise that the resistance ‘down there’ is: just a bunch of hippies and they don’t want any progress. You have to get out of that so that you get credibility. And credibility starts right there with press, opinion leaders and politicians. So that is why we started there with the book.

(Tompkins, interviewed 05/12/2013)

The book was distributed without cost to politicians and decision-makers in Santiago and in the region, as well as to local and regional and media outlets. In terms of making HidroAysén visible the book was therefore a highly targeted strategy, presenting the

anti-dams argument to those who could most influence the approvals process. But it was also intended to set the *frame* of discourse on the dams. Framing, Entman reminds us, is to make “some aspects of a perceived reality...more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition.” (Entman 1993, p. 52). The book was therefore created with the intention of providing a frame within which those in positions of power would conceive of and refer to hydroelectric megaprojects – that is, in the terms that Patagonia sin Represas presented.

As a public relations tool, like an outsize media release, the Patagonia sin Represas book was also intended to influence journalists. Tompkins confirmed this:

It's kind of symbolic in a way, just by its weight and its size....you can hold it on your knees or put it on the table in front of you, and go through all the different components that are involved in this issue. And this, without even saying so, becomes the sort of primer, the textbook about how to frame the issue of this campaign.

(Tompkins, interviewed 05/12/2013)

This “primer” on the dams debate, unlike a brochure, pamphlet or web page material also had longevity simply because of its physical presence and large size. The impact of the book among decision-makers was judged great enough to have an additional 3000 copies printed and distributed in 2008. Copies were now also printed in English with the intention of maintaining existing overseas funding networks and fostering new ones.

#### *5.8.4 “Endesa and Colbún want to raze our heritage”: Patagonia sin Represas’ TV and radio advertisement*

For three months in the middle of 2008, Patagonia sin Represas also ran a television and radio advertisement to increase HidroAysén’s visibility nationally as the project entered the environmental approvals process. The 30-second ad was shown at prime evening viewing time on several of Chile’s principal national channels, Canal 13, TVN, Chilevisión, MEGA and La Red (Morgado, interviewed 16/11/13). As 85% of Chileans reported television as their main source of information (Godoy & Gronemeyer 2012, p. 19), the television advertisement was an important means of reaching people who did not read establishment newspapers like *El Mercurio* or *La Tercera*, or consume news in less conservative outlets online. The audio of this advertisement was also broadcast locally

in Aysén (for example on Radio Santa María, Coyhaique) as a radio advertisement and nationally on the airwaves of popular broadcasters such as Radio Bío Bío. The ad referenced the national billboard and newspaper campaign intertextually, using the signifier of high-voltage electricity pylons and wires – which was now widely understood to connote HidroAysén. The megaproject was not named in the ad. The accompanying voiceover (also the audio transcript of the radio ad) was simple:

This is *our* Patagonia. Endesa and Colbún want to raze our heritage with 2300 kilometers of pylons. This is not necessary. This is the worst national image. Patagonia without Dams!




Figure 12: (double click to play) Patagonia sin Represas television advertisement (Can be viewed at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTpYL59KWuY>)

A semiotic reading of the advertisement provides further insight into its intention. In the visual version for TV, against the snowy backdrop of a well-known Aysén landmark, Cerro Castillo, and Autumn-tinted poplar trees, a flock of black birds is seen flying. Only birdsong is heard. It instantly becomes clear that the birds are flying away from danger when the sound of chainsaws, metal on metal and falling trees is heard. Trees fall with a sound of splintering timber, leaving a path for the pylons which rise robotically and self-construct, and a whip-like sound is heard as power lines are strung between them. The birds scatter. As the pylons appear, the hills in the background lose their natural colour, and turn grey. The camera moves away from the scene. The voiceover changes from

mellifluous to angry and urgent as the pylons appear. Then, there is a flash of light and the pylons disappear, replaced by the words *Patagonia sin Represas* on the screen. Colour and birdsong return and the flock of birds is seen flying back in the direction that it had fled from.

Like the billboard campaign, the advertisement warns of HidroAysén as destruction and threat to the natural world. In this ad, the “destroyers” are named, though the project itself is not. Naming Endesa and Colbún underscores the nature of the companies behind the megaproject, which for many Chilean television viewers and radio listeners, may already have had negative associations. The ad also emphasises the notion of Patagonia as national heritage, suggesting with the words “our Patagonia” that the territory belonged to *all* Chileans (and by implication, not just to large companies like Endesa and Colbún). As in the billboard campaign, the idea of the “national image” is raised as an argument against HidroAysén. The return of light and colour to the idyllic natural scene when the words ‘Patagonia sin Represas’ appear also associates the campaign with the defence of this natural heritage. Together with other elements of this anti-dams communications effort, the radio and television ads therefore worked to make this new megaproject visible to more Chileans, and in doing so, to depict HidroAysén as an unnecessary and damaging project.

## **5.9 Conclusion**

After two years of anti-dams campaigning in the context of Chile at the time, it was evident that the position of HidroAysén in public discourse was beginning to change. In 2006, HidroAysén had been an invisible project to most of the country: the company was directing its publicity at only 0.5% of the population and was avoiding national media coverage. By the end of 2008, television viewers, radio listeners, readers of key national newspapers as well as more alternative publications and online news sites, and anyone who travelled the country’s main highway, knew of the megaproject. The *Patagonia sin Represas* bumper sticker was ubiquitous. Businesses hung anti-dams posters in their windows. *Patagonia sin Represas* had in this way brought the dams issue to public screens (DeLuca & Peeples 2002; DeLuca, Lawson & Sun 2012) across the nation. And although no direct causal connection can be made between the

Patagonia sin Represas campaign and public opinion change – it was evident that public opinion on HidroAysén *had* changed during the period that the project was brought from relative obscurity to national scrutiny. Although in 2007, 36% of people were against building the dams (Carmona, *El Mostrador* 06/06/2011) by April 2009, an IPSOS poll found that 57.6% of Chileans rejected the project (Orrego 2013).

In this chapter, in response to this thesis' first research question, I have shown how the developing company initially sought invisibility for its project, and how a protest campaign communicated symbolically to make that project visible. I have argued that HidroAysén deliberately attempted to remain low-profile in order to avoid conflict, to expedite the project's development and therefore make the megaproject more profitable. Taking a low-profile stance was initially perceived as possible: until shortly before HidroAysén's establishment, large engineering projects in Chile had always been carried out in this way. Following the Ralco conflict, a low-profile stance – combined with intensive CSR-type activities in Aysén – now also seemed *necessary* to the developing company, in order to minimise contestation. But as this chapter has shown, HidroAysén's focus on secrecy and remaining invisible on a national level began to delegitimise the project, and also left a space in public discourse which Patagonia sin Represas was able to fill with information presented according to an anti-dams frame. As Thompson reminds us, achieving “mediated visibility” is crucial because

The visibility of actions and events, and the impact of these words and images on the ways in which ordinary individuals understand what is happening in distant locales and form opinions and moral judgements about it, have, in this age of mediated visibility, become an inseparable part of the unfolding of the events themselves.

(2005, p. 49)

Patagonia sin Represas, a cobbled-together collection of Chilean and international activists and NGOs (with only a fraction of the funding of the multi-billion-dollar project that it opposed) was initially able both to render HidroAysén visible in this way, and to make its own anti-dams discourse “an inseparable part of the unfolding of” the HidroAysén debate.



In a debate of this nature, however, though any actor's own PR representation is important, representation by mass media is crucial. As Lester and Hutchins point out: "actors located throughout the political spectrum must be present in both 'legacy' media and the networks of 'mass self-communication'" (2012, p. 849) in order to have influence over public opinion and political agendas. Discussion in the next three chapters therefore turns to the articulation of HidroAysén debate in key Chilean "legacy" media, as well as in the social media networks, that were just starting (by 2009/2010) to become ubiquitous in Chile. If in this chapter, HidroAysén's period of *invisibility* has been of most empirical interest, the chapter that follows charts the beginning of a change in the company's communications. From 2008, the company began to respond communicationally, and by late 2010, reactive communication dominated. Media coverage now came to be actively sought and managed by HidroAysén – often, it seemed – with the collaboration of key mainstream Chilean media.



## Chapter 6: Media and megaproject

### 6.1 Introduction

Mediatized discourse surrounding HidroAysén began to change in 2008, when the company entered the environmental approvals process. Around the time HidroAysén submitted its Environmental Impact Study (EIS; or in Spanish, Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) document the company intensified its strategic communications with the media. This coincided with the first notable increase in coverage of the project by key national media since its inception. The project was in the environmental approvals process for nearly three years, between August 2008 and May 2011. The amount of coverage in Chile's key newspapers during this period corresponded closely with new developments in the approvals process. This meant that between 2008 when HidroAysén first became a regular topic in mainstream media coverage and 2011, when the project was approved, coverage of HidroAysén was far from consistent in terms of quantity. In Chapter 4, I discussed Chilton's concept of "critical discourse moments": moments that stimulate mediatized debate and around which "meaning is mobilised" (Chilton 1987, p. 17). In this chapter, by examining peaks in coverage against events over this period (and triangulating these with other research material, for example, data from interviews, and a timeline of events) it is possible to pinpoint critical discourse moments during the HidroAysén debate.

While examining the quantity of coverage is quite straightforward, tracking the *quality* of discourse calls for more nuanced and versatile analysis. In this chapter, therefore, I make a detailed survey of mediatized discourse surrounding HidroAysén in the period covering its trajectory through the EIS process, and the start of its rather limited national communications campaign in early 2009, in the lead up to its eventual reactive communications response to Patagonia sin Represas, in late 2010 (which is covered in the next chapter). I discuss HidroAysén's strategic communications output, the fluctuating media coverage in three prominent media outlets, and the characteristics of discourse on the megaproject (and the activism against it) over this period. I alternate between macro and micro lenses in this chapter, examining media discourse on the scale of single articles, media releases and television advertisements, and on a larger scale to reveal broad characteristics of a body of articles surrounding events or periods

of time. For this I use computer assisted content analysis on the media corpus compiled for this study. Because it was not until later in the HidroAysén timeframe (after 2010) that social media became a key forum for public discourse, I explore the crucial role of social media discourse on the megaproject in the next chapter.

Having identified in this chapter the characteristics of mediatized representation in the debate over the megaproject during the period mainly corresponding to 2008-early 2010, I am able in the following two chapters to contrast these with mediatized discourse in the following years of the HidroAysén debate, late 2010-2014<sup>44</sup> and also beyond to 2017. Together, this and the following chapter continue to address this study's research question concerning the articulation of the HidroAysén debate in the Chilean media over the period 2008-2014. In their examination of mediatized discourse surrounding HidroAysén, this chapter and the chapter that follows also build on the discussion in response to the final research question, which asks how the HidroAysén case became emblematic, and came to represent more than a conflict over the environment.

## **6.2 Issue-attention cycles, public arenas and critical discourse moments**

Over a trajectory as lengthy as that of the HidroAysén project, there were many periods in which the megaproject seems to disappear from view in the media. As already established, this was sometimes because the project developers seem to have *intended* to keep a low profile. At other times, HidroAysén's fluctuating visibility may have been an artefact of Downs' (1972, p. 38) "issue-attention cycle", or alternatively, Hilgartner and Bosk's (1988) "public arenas model". For Hilgartner and Bosk, issues appear and disappear in public arenas because of competition between the "large 'population' of social problems claims" across different institutional arenas, the "carrying capacities" (p. 56) of these arenas, and the interaction between arenas. Of significance here is that the interaction between issues and public attention to them is never linear (Petersen

---

<sup>44</sup> Although I have endeavoured to separate the distinct phases in communications evident in the discourse surrounding HidroAysén into separate chapters in this thesis, Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, it is not practical to divide all aspects of the case according to these phases. For example, in this chapter, it seems more useful to identify critical discourse moments and corresponding peaks in media coverage across the *whole* case study, rather than simply for the time period predominantly covered by this chapter. This helps to locate the research in the succession of events, allowing a more nuanced understanding of discourse over time.

2009) and is subject to positive feedback loops so that actors that work in different public arenas, can both drive and then “surf” the shifting waves” (Hilgartner & Bosk 1988, p. 67) of social problems that become part of public discourse, as the anti-dams movement did.

In the case of communicating such a long-lived, often slow-burning issue as HidroAysén, the challenge was to maintain public interest, even though the project would not impact the daily life of the majority. Caveats on Downs’ issue-attention cycle considered, Downs does remind us that:

“...we should not underestimate the...public’s capacity to become bored – especially with something that does not immediately threaten them, or promise huge benefits for a majority, or strongly appeal to their sense of injustice.”

(Downs 1972, p. 40)

It seems, in this case, that the protest movement’s symbolic communication was indeed able to appeal to many Chileans’ sense of injustice over time. It did this by constructing HidroAysén symbolically in its protracted communications effort. But getting the anti-dams point of view covered in the mainstream media was not straightforward. As this chapter demonstrates, Patagonia sin Represas usually found it difficult to gain in-depth, frequent coverage in influential conservative mainstream media. Well-known Chilean conservationist, Patagonia sin Represas leader and head of NGO Ecosistemas, Juan Pablo Orrego, commented in interview that:

We have to fight constantly to put our arguments across. We are always finding new ways to do this. If you don’t produce something new, just keep repeating the old arguments, you won’t succeed. We needed the media to cover us and the media want new stories, new perspectives. So we give them that. Also when we held events that helped us to be covered in the media, and to put our arguments forward. So we created events in order to become more visible...And getting people onto the street is the most visible event of all. When we did that, 100,000 people in the streets, they couldn’t *not* cover us. Even *El Mercurio* had to cover that.

(Orrego, interviewed 12/06/2013)

The effort not to be confined indefinitely to a “twilight realm of lesser attention” (Downs 1972, p. 40) seems indeed to have been a *driver* for HidroAysén becoming symbolic of more than an environmental issue. Patagonia sin Represas had to keep imagining new

ways to bring attention to the megaproject, sometimes with strategic advertising and new arguments against the project (as I point out in this chapter). It also attracted media, publics' and political actors' attention through street protests (as described in Chapter 7), through manufactured events (discussed in Chapter 8) and, in the last years of the debate, also by extended litigation against the dams (also discussed in Chapter 8). This discursive battle seemed to be led initially by Patagonia sin Represas. Initially, HidroAysén did little other than respond reactively to the protest movement's arguments. Over time, a large body of discursive representations was built up surrounding HidroAysén as a product of this process, and these become consolidated into a symbolic, short-hand understanding of the megaproject.

In media coverage (just one of Hilgarner and Bosk's public arenas), HidroAysén appeared, and then effectively disappeared for a time, before reappearing again, often when new arguments or events became part of the debate. If such happenings did gain much coverage, they could become critical discourse moments, which, as Chilton (1987) tells us, both provide opportunities for increased discussion of the issue, and for shifts in discourse. These are moments when HidroAysén, the nation building project can become HidroAysén, a project for and by elites and foreign multinationals, symbol of economic inequality and injustice. These moments are therefore crucial to the production of meaning in this long-running mediatized debate. To pinpoint critical discourse moments within the debate, it is important to have a clear understanding of the chain of events related to the megaproject. I have therefore compiled a detailed timeline, which appears in the thesis Appendix.

### **6.3 Mapping key events against media coverage**

As described in detail in Chapter 4, data collection for this study included compiling an archive of articles from three media outlets, *El Mercurio*, *La Tercera* and *El Mostrador*. The corpus analysed in this and the subsequent chapters spans the period from late 2008 until late 2014. This also coincides effectively with timeframe in which, as this thesis argues, HidroAysén was first made "visible" in the media (2008), subsequently engaged in reactionary communications (2009-2010), was the subject of protest (2011) and then opted for "invisibility" (late 2011-2014) as far as possible once again.

During this whole period, there were 2385 articles across the three publications that contained the key search terms ‘HidroAysén’ or ‘Patagonia sin Represas’ (many contained both) and clearly formed part of the discourse on the project (that is, they did more than just mention the key search terms; they *discussed* the project or opposition to it in some way). *El Mercurio* published 981 of these articles, *La Tercera* 816 and *El Mostrador* 588. This timeframe starts eight months before the project’s entry into the EIS process in August 2008, mentioned in the opening of this chapter, and finishes just after the Committee of Ministers appointed by the second government of Michelle Bachelet retracted the project’s EIS approval in June 2014<sup>45</sup>. To illustrate in macro version how the peaks and troughs in coverage looked over the timeframe 2008-2014, I identified how many articles from the media corpus were published for each month over this timeframe. The data were plotted as follows:




Figure 13: Quantity of media articles related to HidroAysén 2008-2014

<sup>45</sup> Media discourse on HidroAysén does not end here, however. This thesis also refers to media commentary on the case that extends into 2017 and 2018. This shows that this emblematic case came to serve as a shorthand for a particular *kind* of project, and a particular set of politics. The manner in which discourse over HidroAysén continued in the media even years after the project was rejected is discussed in the conclusion to this thesis.

Clearly, the greatest spike in coverage is in the tremendous amount of media attention HidroAysén's approval, and the protests against it, garnered in May/June 2011. Below have also located other key events in the data shown above, and it is clear that peaks usually occur when particular events or trends related to HidroAysén, or the protest against it, are on the news agenda:




Figure 14: Events in the HidroAysén trajectory plotted against time, 2008-2014.

Key: list of events labelled by number on the graph above:

- (1) HidroAysén enters the environmental approvals process, August 2008
- (2) ENEL's buyout of Endesa, February 2009
- (3) Legal appeal by CPD against HidroAysén rejected by Supreme Court, July 2009.
- (4) Two rounds of presidential elections, December 2009/January 2010
- (5) New HidroAysén CEO. Shift to a new communications offensive, October 2010
- (6) Approval of HidroAysén, May 2011
- (7) Nationwide protests against HidroAysén, May-July 2011

- (8) Supreme Court rejects appeals against HidroAysén. CDPs event in Santiago 'Luz Roja a HidroAysén' (Red light for HidroAysén), April 2012
- 9) Colbún announces withdrawal from the HidroAysén power line approvals process, May 2012
- 10) Discovery Channel documentary on HidroAysén "Desafíos Futuros" (Future Challenges) November 2012. CDP event in Santiago 'Juntos desenchufemos HidroAysén' (Together, let's unplug HidroAysén), December 2012
- 11) Vota sin Represas (Vote without Dams), July 2013
- 12) Presidential candidate Bachelet states "HidroAysén is not viable", November 2013
- 13) Committee of ministers withdraws HidroAysén's environmental permits, June 2014

As these plots demonstrate, clearly, events generate news. Identifying which events are most newsworthy, and garner the most coverage, is a first step towards determining which events are most significant to overall discourse during the timeframe under analysis here. It is not only events or trends that generate the largest *quantity* of news that can become critical in a protracted discourse. After all, Chilton (1987) tells us that that critical discourse moments can be identified by two separate characteristics: these are, *increased* coverage of an issue or idea, as well as *changes* in discourse. Sometimes, therefore, when a new aspect of a debate becomes associated with a story in the news, this can become critical to the discourse too – but this “moment” of change in the discourse may not necessarily generate a spike in media coverage. Locating moments that are indeed critical to the discourse in the HidroAysén case therefore requires a nuanced balance of the quantitative with the qualitative. In this chapter, therefore, I look both at events that garner the *most* coverage, and periods where new, important attributes became associated with HidroAysén.

Sometimes events that appear to be critical to the discourse are spontaneous news events, for example, the approval of the project in 2011. Media publicity was clearly sought by both sides surrounding this much anticipated event in order to control its framing. Other key events are concerned with *creating* publicity and making visible, as discussed in the section above. Examples of these kinds of moments in the discourse

around HidroAysén were two free public concerts organised by the anti-dams campaign in 2012 – a year in which HidroAysén was otherwise less often in the news. Other important moments in the discourse on HidroAysén appear to be manufactured by the megaproject developer itself, for example, the flurry of media coverage around the company's submission of its EIS into the environmental reviews process in 2008. In other periods, the peaks of media coverage are not so high, but are more sustained. For example, HidroAysén's late 2010/early 2011, aggressive communications strategy with a new CEO at the helm. This strategy, which included a controversial television advertising campaign, and active publicity-seeking, may have been one of the reasons for increased coverage of the project over the months immediately prior to the project's approval. The important point here is that the processes that lie behind key moments in a protracted discourse are only sometimes naturally occurring and organic. Other times, they are *manufactured* by strategic communications events and strategies to draw media attention that frequently abandons coverage of complex, long-running issues.

However, despite both sides engaging in efforts to control – and sometimes change – the discourse over the megaproject, coverage remained unequal in terms of quantity. Firstly, within the data shown above, there is more coverage that mentions HidroAysén than there is on the protest against the project. This observation comes from a simple measure of how many articles include the name of the protest group versus those that only mentioned HidroAysén. *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*, both mention HidroAysén more frequently than they do the opposition to the project, as shown in the graph below. *El Mostrador* mentions HidroAysén and Patagonia sin Represas almost equally. This count is based on the number of articles that mention each search term at least once, not a raw count of cumulative mentions.






Figure 15: Comparison of incidence of key search terms across the whole corpus, 2008-2014, shown by media outlet

#### 6.4 Sources' voices: who speaks, and how much are they heard?

Close reading of the media corpus compiled for this study also reveals basic qualitative differences. Across the whole timeframe of the media corpus, *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera* tended to cover HidroAysén in stories that were longer and more detailed. Articles that reported on the protest movement were shorter and tended to provide less information. One of the most prominent differences between coverage across the three media outlets is in source selection. As Entman (1993) and Entman & Rojecki (1993) tell us, source selection is a key marker of framing – and over time, persistent frames can solidify into symbolic representations. In the study of how HidroAysén became emblematic, it is important, therefore to consider who speaks, and how much they are heard.

Because there were so many possible sources in this wide-ranging debate, there was little scope to automate the analysis of sources across the media corpus. Over several weeks I therefore read through every article in the corpus and created a count of articles which predominantly used pro-project sources and which used sources from the anti-dams movement, where identifiable. In many articles of course, sources quoted were from neither of the two opposing sides, and there were also many pieces that did

not quote sources at all. I included in the count opinion pieces written by supporters of or detractors of the dams, and Letters to the Editor which represented opposing sides of the debate.

This close reading showed that the two more conservative newspapers included more quotes from sources related to the megaproject, and from pro-HidroAysén elite sources. *El Mostrador* was more likely to publish articles that elaborated on the background to the protest and the protesters' concerns with the megaproject, where the key sources quoted were from the anti-dams coalition. This media platform, however, also published many articles from the viewpoint of the project's proponents. Interestingly, the data here for *La Tercera* seem to indicate that this newspaper was less pro-HidroAysén than expected. Certainly, this newspaper's editorial line is regarded to have become less conservative in an effort to appeal to middle classes more (Gronemeyer & Porath 2017). Overall, *El Mostrador* published more interviews with, and opinion pieces by, those that expressed the anti-dams viewpoint than did the other two publications examined here. Between 2008 and 2014, *El Mostrador* published 367 articles where key spokespeople were clearly anti-dams. (This included 24 separate interviews with the protest leaders.) *El Mostrador* also published 71 articles where the key sources were pro-dams. *El Mercurio* published 612 articles with overwhelmingly pro-dams sources, and 48 pieces that quoted the protest movement predominantly. *La Tercera* published 487 articles in which pro-dams sources were quoted, and 90 articles in which anti-dams voices were heard. *La Tercera*, did however, publish a long series of short exchanges between project supporters and those who opposed the project, in the form of Letters to the Editor throughout the project timeframe – particularly from 2009.




Figure 16: Analysis of sources across the whole corpus shows that the two more conservative publications predominantly included pro-dam voices in their discourse on HidroAysén.

Given the worldviews of the three media outlets being examined here, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, this finding is not unexpected, and serves as an indicator of the polarisation of the debate along ideological lines. It additionally indicates how different voices expressing opposing opinions on the project *were* available in key media outlets in relation to HidroAysén. The newspapers that were the daily reading of elite decision-makers (*El Mercurio* particularly) and the educated middle class (*La Tercera* particularly) did, though, allow access to more pro-dams sources' voices. Although the data above reflects the whole of the period 2008-2014, it should also be noted that this trend seems to have changed over time, with more anti-dams voices being heard in conservative newspapers later in the course of the debate. This factor is examined in more detail in the next chapter.

## 6.5 HidroAysén enters the environmental impact assessment process

Discussion now turns to media discourse in what seems to have been the first critical discourse moment in the timeline of the HidroAysén debate – the submission of the EIS for the dams component of the project. Submitted in August 2008 to Aysén's Corema (Comisión Regional del Medio Ambiente – Regional Environment Commission), this was

a vast document. The required 44 copies of the 10,000 page tome<sup>46</sup> – three tonnes of paper in all – had to be delivered by truck from Santiago to Corema’s offices in Coyhaique (*El Mercurio*, 30/08/08). Thirty-three government agencies were charged with reviewing the study and, after the document was published on Conama’s (Comisión Nacional del Medio Ambiente – National Environment Commission) website, public responses would be possible for a period of 60 days.

The environmental approvals process was the most crucial step towards securing the necessary permits for the megaproject. Preceding the submission, HidroAysén – once an almost “invisible” project, now beginning to be made visible by the Patagonia sin Represas campaign – for the first time appeared to opt for a higher profile of its own volition. However, the company did not yet respond with any consistent or concerted public advertising campaign to counter that by Patagonia sin Represas. It seemed, instead, (in alignment with the tendency in clientelistic business environments noted in Chapter 3) that HidroAysén was attempting to steer media discourse through a highly focused campaign of media relations, instead of by communicating more directly with its potential constituents through a stakeholder-focused communications campaign. This is evidenced by, among other things, the sharp increase in media releases around the time of the EIS submission by the company, as noted in the previous chapter, and as demonstrated in the table below.

---

<sup>46</sup> The study itself is still available online (HidroAysén Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, 2008)




Figure 17: HidroAysén media releases showing peaks in 2008 and 2011 when media relations were of most concern to the company.

These releases announced the entry into the EIS process with confidence, couching it in language that made success in the process seem inevitable. None of the releases use the conditional, “would” instead they always state “HidroAysén will...”). HidroAysén also repeatedly underscored its contention that the project was environmentally sound. In this series of releases, it characterised the project as one that “protects flora and fauna”, was “committed to reforestation” (15/07/08), and was “considering a conservation area...for the preservation of the ecosystem” (02/06/08). The company also depicted itself as a good corporate citizen. The project was characterised as one that “listens to the people of Aysén” (27/05/2008), “respects local culture” and had “reduced relocations [because of flooding] to only 14 family groups” (06/05/08). The releases state that the project would contribute to “upskilling” of the region’s people to help promote tourism, and would build a cultural centre in the small town of Cochrane to “disseminate the culture” of the “project’s area of influence” (28/07/08)<sup>47</sup>. The final release before the EIS submission focuses on the study itself, underscoring its magnitude. The company emphasises here the “three years of careful work”, “high

<sup>47</sup> All the media releases were available on HidroAysén’s website ([www.hidroaysen.cl](http://www.hidroaysen.cl)) which, after disappearing in 2016, has appeared again (as of 15/10/18) in outline. Currently only media releases from 2014 appear on the website.

technical and professional standards”, the US\$12 million invested in the study as well as the “187 thousand man-hours put in by 370 specialists”. Importantly, the release states that the EIS fully complies with Chile’s Law 19.300 the detailed law<sup>48</sup> on baseline studies of the environment and social conditions in potentially affected communities prior to projects being approved. The company thus pre-emptively ticks its own scorecard for its expected success in the environmental approvals process.

The EIS process was closely followed by the anti-dams protest campaign. Patagonia sin Represas activists were on hand in the streets as the EIS truckload was delivered at Corema and they now redoubled their local and national communications efforts against the dams in a variety of ways. In August 2008, *El Mostrador* (19/08/2008) reported a new stage in the protest movement’s strategy that would now draw on “legal and scientific arguments, more than on emotion.” The article quoted the CDP’s chief, Patricio Rodrigo, saying that the organisation would now be entering a “second stage” in its campaign against the dams. The organisation would “first use the administrative avenue” to try to disrupt the dams’ approval process. “We’ll give objective and scientific reasons for why this project is unnecessary,” Rodrigo is quoted as saying. As allowed by law 19.300, the protest movement would submit “comments and observations” on the EIS, and encourage private citizens to do likewise, to which the company would be obliged to respond. In addition to its observations on the EIS, continuing advertising inserts, and political activities including lobbying local politicians in the municipal elections of that year, the protest campaign would also now explore other avenues to inform the public about the project’s impact. One example of this new strategy was to place phone calls to all the 5000 landowners along the projected route of the 2300km transmission line, informing them that their properties were likely to be affected. The campaign also set up a free call number that concerned citizens could call to learn about the project and its likely impact, from the campaign’s standpoint. The coordinator of this call centre, Carolina Morgado (interviewed 16/11/2013) reported that between August 2008 and March 2014 some 32,000 calls were made and received.

Alongside other influences on the environmental approvals process, the protest movement’s efforts appear to have had some capacity to disrupt the way the process

---

<sup>48</sup> This law can be viewed at: (<https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=30667>)

unfolded. Though the project's then-CEO, Hernán Salazar had said he expected to gain approval within fourteen months from the date of the EIS submission, (*El Mercurio*, 24/07/2008) in the event, it took nearly three years until the project was initially approved. Many of the reviewing government agencies found the EIS, despite its size, to be lacking, and requested addenda to the study<sup>49</sup>. Encouraged by the Patagonia sin Represas campaign, private citizens also submitted 11,000 objections to Conama in Coyhaique. HidroAysén was obliged to respond to each of these. The combined impact of government and private citizen EIS responses resulted in HidroAysén requesting suspension of the environmental approvals process. It did not re-enter the process with the required additional information until October 2009, and after several re-submissions, the EIS was not accepted as admissible until early 2011. At the same time, the CDP was waging a series of court battles against HidroAysén, which would continue into 2013<sup>50</sup>, even after the project received its environmental approvals in the culmination of the EIS process in 2011.

#### 6.5.1 Key media make their positions known

Some conservative media clearly announced their support for HidroAysén in the context of the EIS process. In a forceful editorial on the eve of the EIS submission, *El Mercurio* put forward its argument in favour of the megaproject, saying that “if Chile aspires to be developed” it needed investment in projects like HidroAysén. It also wrote that not supporting such projects would mean Chile “renouncing its future development” (*El Mercurio*, 19/08/08). *El Mercurio* began in this way to reflect the binary that the company was also constructing between furthering HidroAysén and a bright future for the country, versus stymying HidroAysén and a doubtful, underdeveloped future for Chile. This same binary would become clear in television advertisements that the company would begin to broadcast from late 2010, and would emerge as an important feature of the discourse around the project. In this context, the newspaper clearly appealed for the project to be approved, saying of the environmental

---

<sup>49</sup> Many of the thirty three reviewing agencies, including the Dirección General de Aguas (General Water Directorate, DGA), the Corporación Nacional Forestal (National Forestry Service, CONAF), the Servicio Nacional de Turismo (National Tourism Service, SERNATUR) responded with reviews that were not favourable to the project. These agencies submitted some submitted 2,698 questions and observations on the EIS that HidroAysén was bound to respond to in detail, adding much time and cost to the EIS process.

<sup>50</sup> As chapter 8 shows, litigation over HidroAysén began again in 2014, and continued until 2017.

impact assessment process “it is expected that on this occasion approval be obtained, in order to take the project forward through institutional channels.”

*El Mercurio* also made its position on protest against the project clear in this editorial, questioning the motives of protesters – both national and international. It said:

Of course, the visibility of the project attracts the active participation of domestic and international environmental organisations. In a country that is open to the world, this presence is inevitable, but it must not be forgotten that these organisations defend interests that do not necessarily coincide with those of Chile.

(*El Mercurio*, 19/08/08)

It continued: “This reality leads to the fact that that some environmental organisations have incentives to misinform public opinion.” And then, in relation to the EIS process specifically: “The government needs to ensure the proper functioning of our institutions, and should also denounce...assertions by interest groups which do not correspond with reality.” It was clear from this editorial – and much media discourse that followed – that *El Mercurio* had the national and especially the transnational protest movement in its sights.

Other generally right-leaning media were a little more circumspect in their coverage of the EIS submission. In support of the company, *La Tercera* (15/08/2008) emphasised the complex technical aspects of the project. This account emphasized the breadth and depth of the study, picking up many of the statistics that HidroAysén had underscored in its pre-submission media releases. Seemingly in favour of the company, this account also emphasized the US\$150 million the company reported it would be spending on environmental remediation. However, the newspaper (*La Tercera* 8/08/2008) also pointed out a study advocated by the opposition to the dams, indicating that energy efficiency measures and non-hydro renewables could contribute 7100MW to the SIC energy grid by 2025: more than double HidroAysén’s projected output.

Centre-left leaning *El Mostrador* on the other hand, was the first to publish and discuss the remarks of Michelle Bachelet’s Minister of the Environment, Ana Lya Uriarte, who controversially declared early in HidroAysén’s EIS process that the study wasn’t “up to



standard”<sup>51</sup> (10/10/2008). This declaration was one of the few government voices at the time that openly criticised the megaproject – and came after two ministers, Edmundo Perez Yoma and Marcelo Tokman, had clearly stated their support for the project in the media. Uriarte’s statement immediately provoked the ire of the company, conservative commentators and media of the right, including *El Mercurio*, which attacked Uriarte, pointing out that she was “directing” the agencies responsible for approval, and that her motives for doing so were political, rather than technical. In the days after Uriarte’s statement, *El Mercurio* interviewed Rafael Mateo, general manager of Endesa (Derosas, *El Mercurio* 18/10/2008), and also published an opinion piece authored by him (Mateo, *El Mercurio* 19/10/2008). In the interview, the journalist seems to be sympathetic to the megaproject, and asked Mateo “has the EIS process, do you think, been sullied?” Mateo replied, referring to Uriarte’s statement: “It’s possible that they [the authorities] have tried.” HidroAysén CEO Hernán Salazar, interviewed in another piece (Molina, *El Mercurio* 12/10/2008) said “industry sources confirm that the minister is trying to show Corema the direction it should take, and reject the project”.

The point here is that conservative media, particularly *El Mercurio*, were making their stance on the megaproject very clear. Though the project seemed to have support from most quarters of government, the standpoint of the Minister for the Environment on the project was troubling. Though she did not have final decision-making power, her position was influential and could indeed be seen as seeking to influence Corema and Conama’s deliberation on the admissibility of the study. Conservative media therefore openly took up the argument against Uriarte and in support of the project.

#### 6.5.2 “Rendering technical”, rendering political

There was another aspect of the EIS, briefly mentioned above, that seemed to guide media discourse on the project from around the time the environmental approvals process began in 2008. The EIS was so vast in its scale and ambition, and therefore so

---

<sup>51</sup> Interviewed for this study in 2013 (16/06) Ana Lya Uriarte said: “Yes, I protested publically at that time. I signalled that the EIS that HidroAysén had presented was a study that was very deficient in terms of the information it contained and the provisions for the impact the project would generate. That’s an opinion I maintain today...I think that the evidence in respect of the deficiencies in the project in that presentation are indisputable.”

difficult for the media to work with, that it led to media coverage that simply reported on the technical scale and scope of the EIS rather than the content of the study itself – as discussed for articles particularly in *La Tercera* above. This point was made by several interviewees for this project, including engineer and director of the NGO Observatorio Latinoamericano de Conflictos Ambientales (Latin American Environmental Conflict Observatory), Lucio Cuenca:

It seemed that the EIS intended to cover *more than* everything, so that HidroAysén couldn't be criticised for not addressing the requirements fully. Whether there was a deliberate strategy of obfuscation, it's hard to know. It had to be large: a large EIS for the country's largest ever infrastructure project. Certainly, the scale of the EIS made it seem that the company had measured everything, thought of everything and had the answer to everything – even if they didn't. It seems to me that that's what they intended.

(Cuenca, interviewed 15/10/2013)

Cuenca's comments recall a process conceptualised by Murray Li (2011) that she describes as "rendering technical". This term, that comes from a context of international development, describes the way in which neoliberal systems, often from the Global North, impose their requirements for classification on peoples and environments of the Global South. Rendering technical requires that a place be "investigated, mapped, classified, documented, interpreted" (p. 60) in order to be better governed or economically improved. The results of such processes are often vastly lengthy documents and strategies for change that propose "technical solutions" (p. 66) to all perceived problems. Rendering technical also meant long, bureaucratic process, where rigorous assessments by layers of officials would ensure that proposals for change would comply (or be seen to comply) with the letter of the law.

In the case of HidroAysén, rendering technical meant fulfilling government environmental approvals processes, and importantly, *being seen* to do so: "respecting institutionality"<sup>52</sup> as it is often called in Chile. Rendering technical can therefore be

---

<sup>52</sup> The word "institucionalidad" is often used in the Chilean media in relation to megaprojects and approvals processes. As discussed in Chapter 4, a researcher working across languages must be reflexive with translation, and transparent when there are words that may be difficult to translate definitively. The word "institucionalidad" is one such word. In the way that is used in the HidroAysén discourse, the term means 'relating to the processes of institutions'. I have sometimes translated it as "institutionality" which, though a little-used term in English, seems the best way to keep the translation close to the Spanish meaning.

regarded as the production of technical data to fit institutional requirements, the creation and maintenance of institutional frameworks that require such data, and by doing so, aim to generate institutional legitimacy as well as public confidence in decision-making. HidroAysén's "rendering technical" was to carry out baseline local studies of water, wildlife, forests, people, their societies and economies (though key aspects of the study were quickly judged by the reviewing authorities to be lacking in depth and accuracy<sup>53</sup>). But crucially, it also meant that all the seemingly insoluble environmental problems that would be produced by the megaproject were proposed to be "solved" by the developing company. HidroAysén had a lengthy technical study to hold up to every question related to environmental (or social) harm in the proposed project's region, and government authorities could also point to the magnitude and seriousness of the studies they required. The fact that the study was so long and that the responsible agencies had little time to review it initially (just 30 days) meant that the company could – and did – claim that the authorities had not reviewed their submission properly. This was the argument that Endesa General Manager, Rafael Mateo put forward in *El Mercurio*, (Derosas, *El Mercurio* 18/10/2008) saying that many of the questions and observations submitted by the reviewing agency were already answered in the EIS, but had not been correctly understood or thoroughly studied by the reviewing agencies. He also said that the public service agencies had made "erroneous conclusions" in relation to the "serious, professional, rigorous and profound" study, and that it was "unacceptable that authorities or ecologists...who may not have all the correct information, express their opinions ahead of time."

---

<sup>53</sup> HidroAysén's EIS, despite its vast size, was found by several of the reviewing agencies to be lacking in basic aspects (for example, the mapping of the area to be flooded). Two months after the EIS submission, Conama head José Pablo Sáez said in *El Mercurio*: "The EIS is lacking in essential and relevant information for the environmental assessment" (Moya & Zuniga, *El Mercurio* 10/10/2008). Even after the addendum to the study was submitted in October 2009, International Rivers, a US-based NGO which was working with Patagonia sin Represas, characterised the study as "quantity over quality" that "lacks crucial information, ignores important issues, uses incomplete data, misidentifies scientific facts and provides shoddy analyses" (International Rivers 2009). Environment Minister in 2008, Uriarte, explained in interview (16/06/2013) that the fact that the EIS was regarded inadmissible by many, including herself, should have meant the project could not progress through the environmental review process at all. The fact that HidroAysén was allowed to progress in this process was regarded as one of the many "irregularities" related to the project which would later become contested. Uriarte considered that the project was progressed through the environmental approvals process for "political reasons".

The implication here was that any public statements made against the project could not be technical objections, because everything was indeed covered in the study, as required by the bureaucratic approvals process. Any early public objections to the EIS must therefore have political motivation. This kind of sentiment coincides with Brownill's (2013) conceptualisation of rendering technical in the context of megaprojects. Brownill extends Li's "rendering technical" as a process in which technical procedures provide sufficient explanation in themselves to advocate for megaprojects – and indeed are all that are necessary. Any questioning of a project outside the realm of the technical is therefore politically motivated. Ideas around political motivation for any objections to HidroAysén are of course another of the strands which run through the complicated public discourse on this project, and if earlier in the project's trajectory, media discourse tended to emphasise technical and bureaucratic aspects, from around the middle of 2009 and into the presidency of Piñera in 2010, the media began to report on HidroAysén in terms that emphasised its political nature. Below, I demonstrate the change from coverage of the technical/bureaucratic to coverage of the political in relation to HidroAysén, using computer assisted content analysis to gain insights into specific parts of the corpus. I then drill down again with close reading of corpus articles highlighted in the content analysis to discuss HidroAysén as a "political" project.

Examining the corpus with the text analysis software Leximancer to obtain a broad view of key themes in the media coverage is a useful way to view just these kinds changes in discourse over time. This "distant reading" (Moretti 2013) allows me here to obtain a wide overall perspective of a collection of texts from within the larger dataset. It also points to evidence in individual texts which can be examined with close reading. Using these two techniques in conjunction allows a more nuanced understanding of the discourse. To demonstrate the change in mediatized discourse on the megaproject during 2008-2010, I therefore worked with Leximancer to create concept maps of all the corpus articles from the beginning of 2008-June 2009, and then from June 2009 – March 2010. The change in key concepts in this body of articles is clear.




Figure 18: Leximancer concept map of media articles from *El Mercurio*, *La Tercera* and *El Mostrador* January 2008-June 2009.

In Leximancer, the concepts (grey nodes) and themes (coloured bubbles which represent clusters of concepts) are automatically generated and reflect the most frequent and the most semantically connected notions within the corpus. In these concept maps, the relative strength of concepts is dependent on frequency of co-occurrence and their relative proximity within the text, because proximity signifies relatedness of concepts (Smith & Humphreys 2006). Theme bubbles are colour coded so that the most prominent themes are rendered in the hotter colour red, the least prominent in cooler blue and purple. Bubble *size* does not denote relative importance of a theme.

In this first concept map the key theme, in red, is of course HidroAysén. Constituting this this are concepts ‘ambiental’, ‘evaluacion’ and ‘tramite’ (‘environmental’, ‘evaluation’ and process) and also ‘servicios’ (government agencies) and Corema (Comisión Regional del Medio Ambiente - the regional evaluating agency). Endesa and Colbún appear, closely connected; also Aysén (Aysén is sometimes spelled this way), ‘iniciativa’ (initiative) and ‘proyecto’ (project). This theme, then, clearly shows that the body of texts highlights the details of the environmental evaluation process for the megaproject. The next key concepts, grouped under the theme ‘Chile’ are ‘carbón’ (coal), ‘eléctrica’ (electric) ‘generación’ (generation) ‘país’ (country) and ‘energía’ (energy) – clearly referring to Chile’s then-current mode of energy generation. Other themes include ‘proyectos’ (projects) which includes infrastructure projects other than HidroAysén, and importantly ‘acuerdo’ (agreement). These concepts are also closely connected with the theme ‘observaciones’ (comments) – and Conama (La Comisión Nacional del Medio Ambiente – the national environmental protection agency) ‘mil’ (a thousand) and respuestas (responses) – this highlighting the responses to the thousands of comments and observations HidroAysén was obliged to return to Corema as part of the environmental review process. This body of texts clearly also referred to ‘centrales’ (power stations), ‘hidroeléctricas’ (hydroelectric) – denoting hydroelectric power generation, ‘ríos’ (rivers) ‘capacidad’ (capacity) and MW (megawatts). In Leximancer, each theme and concept can be further examined and drilled down into under Ranked Concepts under each ‘project’ – meaning it is possible to review the actual line location of the occurrence of concepts that feature in the maps. The final concept, then, ‘millones’<sup>54</sup> (million) was used in relation to the costs of the project and the reported financial benefit for Aysén. Overall, the themes and concepts above clearly describe a body of articles which delineates the technical features of the megaproject, and also discusses the technical/bureaucratic process that the project was undertaking to gain environmental approvals.

In my reading of the corpus articles, I noticed, however, that in the early-mid months of 2009, the discourse on HidroAysén had begun to change. *El Mostrador* wrote in February 2009 that “only political tricks have kept HidroAysén alive” (Donoso, *El*

---

<sup>54</sup> In Spanish, billion is rendered as “thousand million”, therefore discourse around a project described as being projected to cost *billions* of dollars in English contains the word “millones” in Spanish.

*Mostrador* 26/02/2009). The politicisation of the project through the nominally technical process of environmental approvals was also underscored by the way the EIS trajectory played out within the election cycle in Chile at the time. As already noted, due to the additional material HidroAysén was required to submit for review, the megaproject's developers had opted to withdraw from the approvals process until August 2009. Final approval (or rejection) was expected in November 2009 – coinciding with the most crucial final weeks in the lead up to the 2009/2010 presidential elections. Whether due to the apparent politicisation of the EIS process, or the upcoming elections – likely both – by mid-2009, the word “political” was therefore increasingly mentioned in articles discussing HidroAysén. Creating a semantic map of media content from June - March 2009 helped to represent this visually:

Figure 19: Leximancer concept map of media articles from *El Mercurio*, *La Tercera* and *El Mostrador* June 2009-March 2010

and 'país' (country), the next most important theme is 'proyecto' (project) and the themes 'político' (political), 'proyecto' (project) and 'caso' (case). Details on the technical side of bureaucratic approvals process were now replaced with the political unfolding of the HidroAysén case. Therefore, in the next most significant theme bubble, 'debate' (debate), 'candidatos' (candidates), 'tema' (theme), again 'energy', Chile and Piñera are key concepts. The green theme bubble on the far right seems to indicate that energy policy 'política' (politics/policy) 'energética' (energy as an adjective) had now become important aspects of discourse on 'gobierno' (government). Interestingly, although the concept 'ambiental' (environmental) had been part of the key theme in the corpus articles in 2008, by 2009/early 2010, it was almost the *least* important concept. It seems, then, that discourse on HidroAysén as a political project had trumped discourse on the project's environmental aspects.

A close reading of the corpus texts shows that this tendency towards discussing the megaproject in terms of the political had already begun by the end of 2008. In November 2008, one *El Mercurio* headline read: "HidroAysén decision will be taken in the middle of the final strait of the presidential race" (Bustamante & Moya, *El Mercurio*, 20/11/2008). In mid-2009, HidroAysén then applied to take the maximum time permissible for suspension – an additional 60 days. This would mean that the decision on the project would now be the responsibility of the next government. Both leading presidential candidates had made their positions on the project amply clear in the media. In April 2009, *El Mercurio* published a roundup of (centre-left) candidate Eduardo Frei and (conservative-right) Sebastian Piñera's statements on the project. Frei was reported as having said that: "When one is in government, one has to make decisions. When we had to decide on Ralco and Pangué, my hand did not tremble in making this decision" and "I think that HidroAysén is an alternative that we cannot fail to implement." He also made scathing comments about "campaigns by environmental groups" that "obstruct energy projects...damaging the country's development." Piñera had said in relation to HidroAysén that "If I am elected president, I will prioritise the construction of the dams, because Chile needs energy" (Bustamante Rocha, *El Mercurio* 25/04/2009). It was clear, then, that postponing decision making on the project until the term of the next government would be beneficial to the project, no matter which candidate succeeded. By August 2009, *El Mercurio* reported that HidroAysén had



“transformed directly into a campaign issue” (20/08/2009). In an editorial published late that month, *El Mercurio* also said:

In the case that Piñera or Frei are elected, these candidates seem disposed to facilitate HidroAysén, if it complies with environmental norms. This seems obvious, but it isn't. Once the technical requirements have been taken care of, these decisions are, after all, political. It's very probable that because of this, HidroAysén will decide to delay the submission of its addendum, in the hope of receiving a more favourable reception in 2010.

And in October 2009, another editorial in *El Mercurio* (30/10/2009) which was highly critical of the environmental review process stated that “the impression remains, in the end, that there is influence here with political motives.” Of HidroAysén's repeated suspension of the environmental reviews process, *El Mostrador* (20/10/2009) had reported that the “the company has elected a timeframe that is most politically advantageous. This has become a political project.” In January 2010, *La Tercera* reported that the timeframe of Corema's latest response to the addenda of the EIS has been delayed to avoid further “political noises” in relation to HidroAysén at election time (*La Tercera* 19/01/2010). And later in 2010, *La Tercera* published a Letter to the Editor by Douglas Tompkins stating that the EIS evaluation had been a process of “political manipulation and pressure” (Tompkins, *La Tercera* 29/12/2010). Even after the initial approval of the project, it remained in media discourse a political issue. For example, in May 2011, *La Tercera* reported “political opportunism” by the Concertación (the coalition of parties that made up the then-opposition) in relation to HidroAysén (*La Tercera*, 29/05/11).

## **6.6 New communications strategy, new discursive characteristics**

Towards the second half of 2009 HidroAysén began a new stage in its communications. *La Tercera* reported in a detailed feature article (12/08/2009) that HidroAysén had “passed through its low-profile phase” and would now have “more exposure to the public on a national level”. Bernardo Larraín Matte, General Manager of Colbún was quoted as saying that

Today more than ever, it is necessary for energy projects, among them HidroAysén, to communicate not only with groups who have the most direct interest, the project's neighbours, but also with wider audiences.

The discourse also recognised that the communications strategy the megaproject had used to date had been effective in informing of the project's technical aspects but now communication needed to “expand its focus towards public opinion in general”. An (unnamed) director of the Enersis group was paraphrased as saying that:

...We must now give more emphasis to the strategic communication of HidroAysén. Up to now, visibility in the zone, in Aysén, has been prioritised, not visibility on a national level, because that's where the communities that relate to the project are located. But now, there's a consensus that that needs to change.

The article also quotes an (unnamed) “important source in Colbún” as saying that this new communicational phase was a result of “a change of attitude among the project's shareholders” to “make the project more visible”. Importantly, this source also commented that the change was “in the spirit of countering the sustained environmental campaign”.

In late 2009 and early 2010, therefore, HidroAysén began to conduct some new strategic communications work, aimed at increasing the megaproject's national profile. This was still a relatively low-key communications effort<sup>55</sup>, involving three separate television ads over one year, an expanded and improved company website, some newspaper advertising, and ads on public infrastructure like bus shelters in the capital Santiago. Company representatives also gave presentations to opinion leaders in the capital and other cities wherever they could be invited to do so. Some new and enduring characteristics in the ongoing discourse around the project began to emerge in this period. In early 2009, events transpired which meant that the first of these symbolic characteristics was the megaproject's ‘foreign-ness’ – a fact drawn upon and emphasised by the project's opponents.

#### *6.6.1 Foreigners and ‘foreign-ness’: The Enel buyout of Endesa*

---

<sup>55</sup> Daniel Fernández who took over from Hernán Salazar as the new HidroAysén CEO in 2010 stated in interview for this study (19/12/2013) that until 2010, on the national level, the company “did not have a strategy and did not have much communication...I believe [this was] until 2010, when we arrived. Apart from this little campaign, there was nothing else.”

A flurry of media coverage appeared around HidroAysén following the announcement in February 2009 that Italian firm Enel was involved in a buyout of Spanish companies Endesa and Acciona's shares in HidroAysén. The deal meant that the Italian multinational now owned 92% of Endesa, together with the Spanish company Enersis. Chilean company Colbún still owned 49% of HidroAysén. *El Mercurio* (02/03/2009) characteristically heralded this development with a partisan opinion piece which stated:

It is hoped that Enel will also take a more active role in conveying to the authorities and the community the importance of Endesa being able to develop its hydroelectric projects, to which there has been strong opposition.

*La Tercera* reported that the Enel takeover was indeed beneficial for HidroAysén. The CEO of Acciona it said, had had a "very ecologist discourse on energy which favoured renewable energy sources" (meaning ERNCs – not mega-hydro). It reported that Acciona had contemplated severing ties with the megaproject in the face of the level of rejection it was experiencing in Chile. Of Enel's attitude to HidroAysén, the newspaper explained: "If it is profitable and it acquires the necessary permits, Enel will support it, despite the eco-opposition" (Marticorena, *La Tercera* 21/02/2009).

Although Enel's takeover of Endesa did not result in a particularly pronounced spike in media coverage, the fact that over half of the HidroAysén megaproject was now owned by two of Europe's biggest utility companies did begin to act as a confluence for issues related to 'foreign-ness' and 'sovereign-ness' in the discourse surrounding HidroAysén. The project had, of course, since its inception been foreign majority owned but this new buyout now served as an inflection point on the foreign ownership argument, at a time when the megaproject was particularly under scrutiny. The anti-dams campaign responded to the buyout with one of its advertising inserts, shown below, published in *El Mercurio* (10/03/2009) seeming to educate the Enel's, Fluvio Conti in the background to the project and the already negative public image of Endesa within Chile.



# LA ITALIANA **Enel** PRETENDE DESTRUIR NUESTRA PATAGONIA, NUESTRO PATRIMONIO, NUESTRA BELLEZA, NUESTRA RESERVA DE VIDA.

**Sr. Fulvio Conti**  
**Director Ejecutivo Enel**

Como ciudadanos y habitantes de Chile queremos manifestarle nuestro más profundo rechazo a las centrales hidroeléctricas en Aysén, que la sociedad HidroAysén -consorcio entre Endesa, controlada por ENEL, y la chilena Colbún- hoy mantiene en su portafolio de proyectos. Dicha propuesta de construir cinco mega represas en los ríos Baker y Pascua en la Patagonia chilena, con la consecuente línea de transmisión de 2.300 kilómetros de largo, provocaría daños innumerables e irreparables a lo largo de 8 regiones, con 15.545 hectáreas intervenidas y 12 áreas silvestres protegidas devastadas.

La construcción de HidroAysén es un retroceso en nuestro desarrollo. Las mega represas son una tecnología obsoleta, y un sistema centralizado de generación de hidroelectricidad masiva que implicaría cerrar de golpe la puerta a la generación de energías renovables no convencionales y a la implementación de una matriz energética diversificada.

Proyectos como HidroAysén son anacrónicos, destructivos, innecesarios y, por lo tanto, altamente impopulares.

La única razón equivocada que impulsa el proyecto HidroAysén es que Endesa-Chile-España, y ahora

ENEL, se han apropiado de masivos derechos de agua en los ríos australes de Chile, y quisieran utilizarlos por motivos netamente comerciales. Sin embargo, deben considerar seriamente los devastadores impactos ambientales que el ejercicio de estos derechos acarrearía, a la vez que fueron obtenidos de forma cuestionable. Hay amplio consenso en Chile respecto a esto, y un creciente movimiento social para la nacionalización o recuperación de las aguas de nuestro país.

Endesa está hace décadas desprestigiada en Chile porque su accionar ha provocado graves impactos ambientales negativos y lesionando derechos humanos de comunidades locales e indígenas.

Más aún, durante los dos años de evaluación del estudio de impacto ambiental de HidroAysén ha quedado demostrado que éste tiene serias deficiencias técnicas, como lo ha señalado la institucionalidad vigente y altas autoridades del Estado. En esto, consideramos una insensatez solicitar que se acelere su tramitación, cuando contiene errores insalvables que apuntan en una sola dirección posible: su retiro por parte de las empresas controladoras o su rechazo por parte de la autoridad.

- HidroAysén es un mal proyecto para Chile
- HidroAysén NO es necesario
- HidroAysén es rechazado por una amplia mayoría de chilenos
- HidroAysén destruye nuestra Imagen País



**¡PATAGONIA SIN REPRESAS!**

[www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl](http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl)

Figure 20: The headline reads: “The Italian company Enel intends to destroy our Patagonia. Our heritage. Our beauty. Our Life Reserve”. The article points out that “Endesa has been disreputable for decades because of actions that have resulted in serious negative environmental impacts and harmed the human rights of local and indigenous communities.”

Shortly after the Enel buyout, Patagonia sin Represas published an article on its website (Patagonia sin Represas 03/03/2009) asking if it “looks bad if a multinational barges into a territory...for a motive of profits”. From this point on, the anti-dams campaign was careful to emphasise the fact that HidroAysén was majority foreign owned. Patagonia sin Represas had certainly already been underscoring in its discourse that Patagonia and its resources were *Chilean*, and belonged to all Chileans (even if it was conscious, as several interviewees reported, that most Chileans would never visit this southern extreme of the country). It had referred often in its strategic communications to “nuestra Patagonia”, in Spanish: “our Patagonia”, and now reiterated the value to all of Chile of this national asset – in binary opposition to the ‘foreign-ness’ of the project, which would only produce value for an elite few. Of course, globalisation has allowed transnational corporations to escape the boundaries of the nation state, and megaproject development by multinational companies in foreign territories is routine. But the notions of economic imperialism by foreign companies, resource extraction with resulting environmental damage and scant economic benefit to local communities hit a raw nerve in Chile, where for decades, multinational mining operations and hydroelectric schemes have degraded the country’s environment and brought few benefits to the communities they most affect.

The Patagonia sin Represas campaign therefore began now to add to its discourses the concept of neo-imperialism. Mitzi Urtubia of NGO Ecosistemas (interviewed 15/05/13) explained:

We pointed out in our communications material that the developing company was largely foreign, and we linked this to neo-imperialism, and to extractivism. These companies coming to use our water, our Chilean water, a privatised resource, that they owned.

Historical antecedents made this point particularly problematic in Chile. As Matías Asún, head of Greenpeace in Chile (interviewed 26/07/13) reminded:

Companies like Endesa were privatised in a way that was very far from transparent during the dictatorship in the 1980s. They were privatised, moreover, with a series of privileges, which in the case of the electricity companies, was with water rights tucked under their arms. And they would have these rights in perpetuity – something that I don’t think exists in any other part of the world. Because of this, there is this shadow of suspicion.

You aren't doing business for the benefit of the country, you are doing it for your own pocket. And when foreign companies came along and took over Chilean ones, when the project developers were now foreign and would be exporting their profits from Chile, people were even more concerned about this...So emphasising the foreign nature of HidroAysén was important, and this was certainly negative in relation to public opinion on the project.

By May 2010, Patagonia sin Represas was able to draw attention to such perceived neo-imperialism, or neo-colonialism, in a particularly visible way. Using the same trans-global channels that had brought Enersis and Enel to Chile in the first place, Chilean activists became Enel minority shareholders, with the right to speak for ten minutes at the annual shareholders' meeting in Rome. Conservationist Juan Pablo Orrego and the activist Bishop of Aysen, Monseñor Luis Infanti, attended the meeting, and the next day, *El Mercurio* (02/05/2010) quoted the bishop as saying:

Endesa Spain entered with force into Patagonia. Like modern colonists, they impose their economic and political power in order to realise these destructive megaprojects... Yesterday the Spanish and today the Italians.

The aim of Orrego and Infanti's presentation to Enel, and subsequent activism in Italy and Spain, was to "demonstrate to Enel its neo-colonialism in Chile, gain international visibility...and find funding and support from local environmental groups," Infanti reported in an interview for this study (20/10/2013). As a result, the Patagonia sin Represas campaign reportedly<sup>56</sup> received favourable media coverage in Italy, began to receive regular coverage in Spain's key newspaper, *El Mundo*, and two Italian and three Spanish NGOs joined the now trans-global Patagonia sin Represas campaign against the trans-global megaproject.

#### 6.6.2 HidroAysén's "sovereign energy"

HidroAysén now began to respond, and in its strategic communications material in this period, it also began to tap into ideas of 'sovereign-ness' and 'foreign-ness' in relation to the megaproject. Key Chilean media also began to pick up on the national/foreign binary. At this time, HidroAysén was beginning to make more presentations to groups in towns and villages in Aysén region, as well as in the capital. A PowerPoint

---

<sup>56</sup> Monsenñor Luis Infanti reported this when interviewed but this was not further researched or verified due to the difficulty of searching Italian-language media for a researcher who does not speak Italian.

presentation (dated 2009) that was used at these events was shared with me by Jorge Taboada, then-Manager of Administration and Development at HidroAysén. The presentation emphasises that HidroAysén is “national energy” “a sovereign resource” and offered “greater independence from other countries.” The company’s national television publicity also portrayed the megaproject in nationalistic terms calling it a source of “energía chilena” (Chilean energy) (HidroAysén 2009a) – and “energía soberana” (HidroAysén 2009b) or sovereign energy, reducing dependence on fossil fuel exports from neighbouring countries. A series of television ads and billboards that began to appear from late 2009 described the energy that would come from HidroAysén as “clean, renewable and Chilean”, and this became the common anchorage for a much of the company’s advertising outputs around this time.



Figure 21: A still from one HidroAysén’s television advertisements. The tagline for this series of ads was “clean, renewable, Chilean”.





Figure 22: One of HidroAysén’s billboards in the Aysén region, with graffiti that has altered the words “clean, renewable, Chilean” to “destructive, irreversible, Italian”.

HidroAysén’s claims here were perhaps the kind that Flyvbjerg, Garbuio & Lovallo (2009) refer to as “strategic deception”. Hydroelectricity dramatically alters watercourses, drowns landscapes, and threatens environments and species, the environmental effects of which, as the altered billboard above attests, are irreversible. In terms of the argument here on the national/the foreign, the water might be considered a geographical part of Chile at least, though water rights were foreign owned. Denoting hydroelectricity as “clean”, however, ignores the environmental (and social) damage that dams and dam building causes, and although hydroelectricity is often promoted in the face of climate change as carbon neutral, a growing body of research concludes that is not necessarily the case (Fearnside 1997, 2004, 2015; Maeck et al. 2013; Wherli 2011). Perhaps in the knowledge that long-running *environmental* issues could easily lose public attention, Patagonia sin Represas drew now on the ‘foreignness’ argument, rather than the environmental one, strongly refuting HidroAysén’s “Chilean” claim, and emphasising that the water rights in the Rivers Baker and Pascua were majority owned by foreign companies. Still, media coverage at this time seems to have replicated HidroAysén’s frame for the most part, and the notion of the ‘native-ness’ of HidroAysén persisted.



To determine from a quantitative perspective when and how discourse around the national and international aspects of the project were expressed in the media, the full media corpus of 2385 articles was examined using Leximancer each year 2008-2014. To pinpoint articles in which the media referred to the megaproject's "nationality", I loaded the corpus articles into Leximancer year by year, and used the software's 'Query' function to find all locations of the terms searched. Because multiple different terms are associated with the argument for the project's nationality, and its "nativeness", I decided instead of using the concept map function, to let Leximancer guide a close reading of whole articles in the locations of the searched terms were found. I carried out separate 'queries' for the expressions in Spanish for "sovereign" "national" "indigenous" "native" and "own". I also searched for the term "independence", because part of the nationalistic argument for HidroAysén was to allow independence from other nations in terms of energy requirements. I searched for these terms separately and then together with "energy", then "resources" and then "HidroAysén". I also searched "Chilean energy". In addition, I searched for the words "foreign", "international" "multinational", "transnational" and "overseas" (in Spanish "extranjero" – which is used both as a noun and an adjective). The instances of all these terms were noted for each year of the debate across all three media. The following graph was created from the data:




Figure 23: Discourse on HidroAysén's national status peaked in 2009/2010.

It was clear that the notable increase in these terms in relation to HidroAysén appeared in the 2009-2010 timeframe when both Patagonia sin Represas and HidroAysén were using the nationality of the project in their own strategic discourse. *El Mercurio*

appeared especially to underscore the national in relation to the megaproject. Some examples include an *El Mercurio* editorial, which in early 2009 (04/01/2009), wrote of “energía propia” in Spanish, “our own energy” in relation to hydroelectricity and HidroAysén. In April 2009 Enel executive Andrea Brentan, was quoted in *El Mercurio* (Bustamante & Orellana, *El Mercurio* 16/04/2009) as saying that HidroAysén was “national...indigenous” and shortly after, an editorial in *El Mercurio* (also strongly in favour of HidroAysén) referred to the project as “native hydraulic potential” (23/06/2009). In early 2010, ex-President of Endesa, Mario Valcarce said in an interview in *El Mercurio* that “Chile cannot allow itself the luxury...of not developing...a project that uses sovereign resources” (15/04/2010).

*La Tercera* published some interviews with opponents of the project where the international aspects of the project were discussed and where it was criticised for being a product of “overseas capital” and then also “Spanish capital” and “Italian capital” (*La Tercera* 09/05/2010) and the newspaper often described the project as “transnational”. It is noteworthy, however, that the most instances of the word “foreign” and “overseas” (as an adjective) appeared in *El Mostrador* – but not in the context that might be expected. For example, *El Mostrador* (4/10/2010) interviewed HidroAysén’s CEO, Daniel Fernández who spoke critically of “foreign interests”, “overseas funding”, “foreign people” several times to describe the anti-dams movement. Another interviewee referred to Douglas Tompkins in similar terms, for example: “this foreign person” (*El Mostrador* 21/10/2010). It is clear then that by 2010, notions of the sovereign and its opposite, the foreign, were becoming closely attached not only to the project, but also to its *opponents*. This would have important implications for HidroAysén’s symbolic construction and also the way discourse on the anti-dams position was solidifying. I revisit growing negative discourse on Douglas Tompkins and Patagonia sin Represas environmentalists in Chapter 8.

### 6.6.3 Climate change enters the debate

Although environmental concerns had not historically been the Chilean public’s key worry, in the years after the end of the dictatorship, as post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977, 1997, also see footnote 21, Chapter 3) began to emerge in some groups,

environmental issues started to assume increasing importance (Losternau et al. 2011). After 20 years of relatively unrestrained growth in the neoliberal model, the country suffered from much environmental contamination. By 2015, air pollution, soil and water contamination (particularly from mining) and climate change had become “issues of high concern” for Chileans (Pino et al. 2015). As discussed in Chapter 3, in a survey of environmental attitudes in 33 countries, Franzen and Vogl (2013) found that Chile was the only country where environmental concern had increased significantly between 2000 and 2010. I argue in the conclusion to this study that the emblematic case of HidroAysén was one of the factors that contributed to that change in perceptions on the environment. So when HidroAysén was first brought into the public arena by the anti-dams campaign, and then the megaproject developer’s early communicational responses, environmental issues – climate change chief among them – could easily become part of discourse on the project.

In early 2009, the World Bank released a study *Desarrollo con menos carbono: respuestas latinoamericanas al desafío del cambio climático – Development with less carbon: Latin American answers to the challenge of climate change* (De la Torre, Fajnzylber & Nash 2009). The study underscored the importance of developing non-fossil fuel energy resources in Chile, amongst them hydroelectricity. Although HidroAysén’s strategic communications had long been calling the project “clean” and “renewable” the World Bank’s report might be considered a critical discourse moment because of the way the mediatized debate took on a new character in connection with it. The report certainly seemed to lend weight to HidroAysén’s self-reported credentials in climate change abatement, and this newly underscored connection between HidroAysén and climate change was widely reported in the media.

Media outlets in the study corpus now made the connection between HidroAysén and climate change. In the days after the report was released, the company’s then-CEO, Hernán Salazar, authored a long feature article in *La Tercera*, ‘HidroAysén and Climate Change’ (Salazar 2009) in which he pointed out that the report had championed hydroelectricity as an avenue for promoting more climate friendly development in Chile. Here, he reminded that, with the highest level of economic activity on the continent, Chile also had the highest CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita, and that in this regard:

....the hydroelectric option appears to be the best alternative for our country. It is renewable energy, clean and sustainable, and available in our southern region. Its greater availability will give greater stability and security to our Chilean energy grid. Closing off definitively the opportunity to utilise the possibilities that this offers means closing the door to energy independence and energy security and an obligation to use less clean energy, further contributing to global warming as we have been up to now.

He also wrote that:

HidroAysén will contribute to the diversification of the energy grid towards a cleaner option, and will replace the emissions equivalent to seven fossil-fuel based thermal generation plants. If we put this into a 10-year perspective, it will substitute 160 million tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere which is equivalent to the total emitted in Chile every three years, or the pollution that all our cars produce in a decade.

To Chileans who were concerned with the drastic air pollution in their cities, this argument must have seemed a sound one: why build more fossil-fuel burning power stations to further contaminate the air, when power from HidroAysén was, as the company argued, clean and non-polluting? Why spend 8 billion dollars a year on imported fossil fuels (Hall et al. 2009) when Chile had its own, “clean” power resource? *La Tercera* now seemed to have a particular affinity for the unfolding of the HidroAysén/climate change debate. It published Letters to the Editor from representatives of Patagonia sin Represas who pointed out deficits in this argument:

Salazar omits...information concerning the negative effects of the dams, in relation to carbon emissions. For example, the dams would eliminate great swathes of forest that capture these gases, and of itself the decomposition of drowned vegetation generates CO<sub>2</sub> and methane. Neither does he consider the emissions of a decade of construction, particularly for the manufacture of cement and other materials to build the dam walls.

He added:

Letting this project become reality would mean submitting a region to the private interests of large corporations. Let us not confuse the necessity of energy development in Chile with the energy business of a few.

(Rodrigo, *La Tercera* 07/04/2009)

However, shortly after this exchange, an interview with Endesa president Mario Valcarce, also in *La Tercera*, again emphasised HidroAysén's perceived climate change advantage. Alcarce said:

HidroAysén is not a perfect solution, because in terms of energy, perfect solutions don't exist. They all have their pros and cons. But it's the most reasonable, the cleanest, and the most compatible in the fight against climate change, that will be the greatest problem of the next two decades. An analysis that does not incorporate these conditions, will inevitably be biased and incomplete.

(Astudillo, *La Tercera* 15/04/2009)

Again in *La Tercera*, Colbún general manager, Bernardo Larraín was quoted as saying that HidroAysén was part of the "worldwide crusade against global warming" (1/04/2010).

Around this time, *La Tercera* published a Letter to the Editor by Juan Pablo Orrego, part of the anti-dams campaign, in which he called the arguments in the World Bank's report "superficial". He pointed out the World Bank had itself participated in a World Commission on Dams study which showed that arguments that hydroelectricity was "clean" and "cheap" neglected empirical evidence and were deeply flawed. He also questioned the "moral authority" of the World Bank, given that the organisation had previously been "criticised by innumerable experts" for its relationship to "promoting construction of large hydroelectric dams."<sup>57</sup> On HidroAysén and climate change, he said:

It is not necessary to intervene in a life reserve when we could be undertaking more innovative energy development. This should be the contribution Chile makes to solving climate change.

(Orrego, *La Tercera* 16/03/2009)

Such "innovative energy development" – shorthand for non-conventional renewable energy sources (ERNs) – now seemed to be in the crosshairs of those promoting the dams. Interviewed in 2013 (16/12/2013) HidroAysén's ex-account executive at Burson-

---

<sup>57</sup> The connections between HidroAysén and the World Bank were made by many of the interviewees for this study, including Maria Irene Soto, HidroAysén communications chief, who spoke of "international lending" and the World Bank in relation to the project, but declined to confirm if the company had been in negotiations with the World Bank. None of the interviewees or the media coverage seem able to confirm definitively the HidroAysén/World Bank connection.

Marsteller (the megaproject's by then just-dismissed PR agency) confirmed this was a deliberate strategy of HidroAysén's. "HidroAysén took a decision to go against ERNCs. That was not the best strategy...I was never in agreement with this". HidroAysén's first national communication efforts from February 2009 therefore included two television advertisements that laid out a choice between HidroAysén and ERNCs. Known by their agency names as "Viento" (wind) and "Nieve" (snow), the two 30 second ads by Santiago advertising group 180 Grados Mullen Lowe, demonstrate HidroAysén's discursive position on the unreliability of ERNCs, in comparison to the reliability of power from hydroelectricity:




Figure 24: 'Viento', (double click on frame above to play). The script reads: Alternative energy sources, like solar and wind are a good option for Chile. But not being constant, by themselves they are insufficient. Water offers energy for Chile, and Chile has water in Aysén. In favour of a clean, renewable and Chilean energy. In favour of water. HidroAysén: Chile with energy.  
(Can be viewed at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HhSqKZeF74g>)



Figure 25: 'Nieve', (double click on frame above to play). The majority of the electricity in Chile, like that which you're using to see this commercial, generates CO<sub>2</sub>. The main gas

that's responsible for the greenhouse effect and climate change on this planet. Water is clean energy and it doesn't produce emissions, and Chile has water in Aysén. In favour of a clean, renewable and Chilean energy. In favour of water. HidroAysén: Chile with energy. (Can be viewed at: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXTV\\_gmV0Pk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXTV_gmV0Pk))

A semiotic reading of these ads, with the dark screen, menacing wind and swirling snow, seems to signify that these forces of nature are dangerous and unpredictable. Only when the wind stops, or the snow ends, does the scene light up, do the actors smile, and is the constant, predictable ice-blue water of Chile's Patagonian glacier melt seen. These signs are clearly designed to signify that only HidroAysén's energy will be reliable and constant for Chile. ERNCs are discounted almost trivially. In the two ads, a code, or convention is also established that signifies HidroAysén as a solution to further CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and climate change, and a solution to the country's energy problem that was "clean, renewable and Chilean". Mainstream media seemed largely to echo these codes in their discourse.

Later in 2009, while these ads were appearing on key national television channels, and in the lead up to the 2009/2010 elections, the HidroAysén/climate change and anti-ERNCs arguments were also underscored by the Minister for Energy, Marcelo Tokman, interviewed in *La Tercera* (Marticorena, *La Tercera* 21/11/2009). The newspaper opened this story with a headline and lead paragraph with a clearly pro-HidroAysén frame: "Tokman warns that if the dams in Aysén are not built, coal will replace them" and "the Minister for Energy said that the development of unconventional energies will not be enough to avoid increasing Chile's emissions significantly in the future". The main body of the article continued:

"If the electricity projects in Aysén are not carried out, this generation will be replaced by coal. Not bringing them to completion will have consequences from the point of view of greenhouse gas emissions," said Tokman. He added: "Due to climate change and because of the concern about increasing emissions, it is crucial that we utilise the existing hydro resources in the Aysén region."

The journalist also wrote that: "the minister recognised that the development of non-conventional renewable energies (ERNCs) would not be sufficient for combatting climate change".

At the same time, new discourse on nuclear energy began to appear<sup>58</sup>. In an editorial in June 2009, *El Mercurio* linked perceived difficulties with ERNCs to the necessity to develop nuclear power. It lauded the development of solar and wind energy, but stated, “however, such initiatives will not supply enough energy...We have to speed up the nuclear option” (23/06/2009). An energy debate between election candidates was also marked by a discussion on the relative benefits of nuclear versus HidroAysén. *La Tercera* quoted both lead candidates as supporting further evaluation of the nuclear option (Astudillo, *La Tercera*, 08/09/2009). And soon after, *La Tercera* also published a piece based on an interview with Hernán Salazar headlined ‘HidroAysén: Chile should develop its hydro potential before the nuclear option’. Here, the HidroAysén CEO was quoted as saying: “Only when countries don’t have hydroelectric resources, they decide on nuclear energy” (Astudillo, *La Tercera* 21/09/2009). As discussed in Chapter 3, the nuclear power option for Chile appeared to lose its practical attractiveness, and certainly its political palatability, after the February 2010 Chilean earthquake, the March 2011 Japan earthquake and the subsequent Fukushima nuclear disaster.<sup>59</sup> The important aspect of the nuclear option in Chile’s energy debate was, then, that it seemed to be used as a kind of threat: HidroAysén or nuclear. The construction of false dichotomies between energy forms (for example HidroAysén or nuclear, HidroAysén not ERNCs, HidroAysén or coal) and their attributes (HidroAysén or climate change) that has been noted above is reminiscent of McGaurr & Lester’s (2009) writing on “complementary problems and competing risks”. McGaurr and Lester show that climate change can be used as a “justification” (p.184) for promoting particular types of energy, that particular energy sources can be constructed as a “solution to climate change” (p. 184) and that “when environmental risks compete, media framing of one problem can clearly serve to disguise the risks of another” (p. 185). In the case of HidroAysén, presenting the megaproject as a solution to climate change persisted right through the project’s trajectory. Notably, once HidroAysén was finally rejected in 2014, there seems to have been no further contemplation of nuclear power for Chile.

---

<sup>58</sup> Discourse on nuclear energy as an option for Chile had in fact been heard intermittently since 1968 when the country first investigated the possibility of meeting its energy needs with nuclear power (*El Mercurio* 2007). The HidroAysén debate seemed to be a new inflection point in this sporadic ongoing discourse however.

<sup>59</sup> *El Mercurio* (13/04/2011) reported that by April 2011, 84.1% of Chileans were against nuclear energy for Chile, up 29% from the figure in a survey carried out in October 2009.



Patagonia sin Represas was also, meanwhile, attempting to influence the mediatized debate on HidroAysén versus nuclear versus ERNCs. It was now actively promoting “alternatives” to HidroAysén in the form of energy efficiency and the development of wind and solar. In late-2009, partly in response to Energy Minister Tokman’s declarations on HidroAysén and nuclear power, it published a new one-page advertisement in newspapers including *El Mostrador*, *The Clinic*, and once, *La Tercera*.

INSERCIÓN

# No a HidroAysén Sí a una Matriz Eléctrica Limpia para Chile

### Proyección Inflada del Crecimiento de la Demanda Eléctrica

El Ministro de Energía Marcelo Tokman y la Comisión Nacional de Energía (CNE) insisten en chantajear a la opinión pública con la falsa disyuntiva entre represas en Aysén y centrales a carbón o incluso nucleares. Este dilema no existe. La CNE proyecta tasas de crecimiento de la demanda eléctrica desmesuradas, creando un escenario alarmista de excesivo consumo y riesgo de escasez, aparentemente para fomentar el negocio eléctrico y justificar proyectos como las represas en la Patagonia. Mientras la CNE proyecta indefinidamente un crecimiento de la demanda de un 5,14% anual, cálculos más realistas indican que ésta fluctuaría entre el 2,3% (IEA) y el 4,5% (Hall y Román), de aquí al 2025, lo que cambia significativamente el panorama.

### HidroAysén NO es necesario

Según el estudio de Hall y Román (Junio 2009), la capacidad de los proyectos de generación ya aprobados y en proceso de calificación ambiental supera con creces la demanda proyectada por la CNE al 2025. Además, la recesión económica mundial ha significado una contracción de la demanda energética. En este nuevo escenario, de aquí al 2025 no solamente HidroAysén es innecesario sino que también un 40% de las centrales a carbón proyectadas. Las Energías Renovables No Convencionales (ERNC) son una opción real para Chile. Según el estudio realizado por las universidades de Chile y Técnica Federico Santa María (Agosto 2008), el potencial económicamente factible de las ERNC –con tecnologías actualmente disponibles y el marco regulatorio existente–, durante el período 2009-2025 podría satisfacer entre un 15 y un 25% de los requerimientos del Sistema Interconectado Central (SIC). En cualquier caso, esto representa una excelente alternativa sustentable a HidroAysén.

### Ahorro y uso eficiente de la Energía Eléctrica

El mencionado estudio de Hall y Román (Junio 2009) demuestra además que mediante la aplicación de medidas de eficiencia energética podríamos ahorrar 19.817 GWh/año al 2025. Este volumen no solamente permite eliminar el proyecto HidroAysén sino que también capacidad de generación en base a carbón.

### La energía nuclear No es una opción

El bien pagado lobby nuclear pretende instalar en la ciudadanía y la clase política chilena la idea de un renacimiento mundial de la energía nuclear, y que es necesaria para el país. Una falacia. El año 2007, a nivel mundial, en nueva capacidad instalada, la energía nuclear representó apenas un 10% de lo instalado en energía eléctrica. El crecimiento de la alternativa núcleo-eléctrica ha sido mucho menor al de las ERNC, y en torno a la primera siguen existiendo temas insolubles tales como la seguridad, los residuos radiactivos, el agotamiento de las reservas de uranio y la proliferación de armas nucleares. A los crecientes costos de capital y mantenimiento de los reactores, se suman los subsidios ocultos, los seguros con aval del estado y otros mecanismos perversos, sin los cuales esta fuente es definitivamente inviable.

### Menos barreras para las Energías Limpias

Las ERNC y las tecnologías eficientes se hacen cada día más competitivas frente a las convencionales. Sin embargo en Chile, las barreras legales, institucionales y distorsiones del mercado obstaculizan su despliegue, sumadas a la ausencia de incentivos suficientes y apropiados para estimular la inversión en ellas. Así lo plantearon recientemente los directivos de la Asociación Chilena de Energías Renovables Alternativas (ACERA). Por el contrario, las energías convencionales, tales como las mega-represas, están fuertemente subsidiadas al permitirse la externalización gratuita de sus costos ambientales y sociales, al contar con derechos de agua gratis y perpetuos, así como con servidumbres legales especiales para inundar.

### NO al Monopolio Eléctrico

El monopolio del mercado eléctrico que detenta Endesa en Chile nos amarra a una política energética perversa. Por el contrario, el desarrollo de las ERNC y la eficiencia energética permite diversificar actores y fuentes en el sector energético chileno. Tal como ocurre en Europa y EEUU, urge instalar en Chile las condiciones para el despliegue de sistemas de generación distribuida, acercando la generación a menor escala al consumo, e idealmente convirtiendo cada casa, edificio o industria en un auto-generador. Así, las localidades y regiones pueden abastecerse en forma autónoma evitando los enormes costos ambientales y económicos de la transmisión masiva a grandes distancias.

### Más Renovables y más Eficiencia

Con voluntad política Chile puede perfectamente transformar su matriz eléctrica en los próximos 20 años en base a la eficiencia energética y las energías renovables. Esto significa aprovechar los excepcionales potenciales eólicos, solares, geotérmicos, mini hidroeléctricos y de biomasa, que en su conjunto se estima alcanzan un potencial de 20 veces la capacidad instalada actual del SIC. Está demostrado que el aporte potencial total de las ERNC y de la eficiencia energética podría alcanzar el 43% de la capacidad instalada del SIC al año 2025, con notables beneficios ambientales, reduciendo entre 16 y 22 millones de toneladas de emisiones de CO2 por año.

### Política Energética para el Chile del siglo XXI

Es urgente definir políticas públicas que permitan el avance concreto de las ERNC y de la eficiencia energética, a fin de que se constituyan en el pilar fundamental de la matriz energética del futuro. Necesitamos un plan de transición hacia el desarrollo de una matriz eléctrica limpia e independiente de los combustibles fósiles importados. Con una mirada estratégica de largo plazo necesitamos políticas que creen las condiciones de mercado para que las ERNC se desplieguen hoy con el máximo dinamismo posible. Chile puede y debe diversificar su matriz eléctrica, desconcentrar la oferta, disminuir la demanda, y reorientar el sistema eléctrico hacia uno que sea técnicamente flexible, económica y energéticamente eficiente, y ecológicamente sustentable.

Con el uso eficiente de la energía y de las fuentes renovables es posible eliminar el proyecto HidroAysén y la pesadilla nuclear, y congelar el uso del carbón. Así evitamos los gravísimos impactos ecológicos, sociales, económicos y culturales negativos de tecnologías sucias y destructivas.

**¡PATAGONIA SIN REPRESAS!** [www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl](http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl)

Figure 26: Advertisement published in *El Mostrador*, *The Clinic* and *La Tercera*, 2009: ‘Yes to a clean electric grid for Chile. No to HidroAysén’.

This ad read:

The minister for Energy Marcelo Tokman and the National Energy Commission insist on deceiving the public with the false dichotomy between dams in Aysén and coal-based, or even nuclear, power plants. This dilemma does not exist.

The ad drew on a study by Hall et al. (2009), which had been supported by the CDP and the US-based National Rivers Defence Council. The report regarded prevailing projections for growth in energy demand as erroneous, and pointed out that with energy savings, as well as its exceptional potential to develop ERNC sources including wind, geothermal, small-scale hydro and biomass, Chile did not need a megaproject like HidroAysén. The ad made the point that ERNCs and efficient technologies were “becoming more competitive every day” against conventional forms of energy generation.

It is clear, then, that the discourse on HidroAysén turned towards the issue of climate change from 2009 onwards. To obtain an overview of the kind of language and concepts with which the media corpus as a whole described the connection between HidroAysén and climate change, I searched the corpus for articles containing the Spanish equivalent of “climate change” and “global warming” and “greenhouse effect”. Seventy-seven articles contained these terms. The first article in the range is from March 2009 and the last from November 2013. Using Leximancer, I produced a concept map below:



– highlighting the notion that the megaproject would replace coal-powered energy generation. Under the theme ‘país’ we do see mention of ‘energías’ (forms of energy) ‘convencionales’ (conventional). I queried the word ‘conventional’ in Leximancer and in fact in almost every instance the expression was “no convencionales” – that is ERNCs.<sup>60</sup> This theme intersects with ‘climático’ (climate, as an adjective), ‘emisiones’ (emissions), ‘global’, ‘calentamiento’ (warming), ‘gases’ (gasses) and ‘invernadero’ (greenhouse): so there was some discourse on warming being due to greenhouse gasses. It is clear that Patagonia sin Represas takes a significant-enough portion of the discourse to warrant its own theme bubble (far left in green) – and the anti-dams concepts connected to ‘impacto’ (impact) of the ‘megacentrales’ (megadams) and ‘alternativas’ (alternatives) does feature in the discourse. Finally, the theme of climate change ‘cambio climatico’ is rendered only peripherally in this concept map but still appears as one of the features of the discourse – along with ‘ahorrar’ (to save) and even the ‘nuclear’ option that was contemplated up until 2010.

Overall, then, the overview provided by computer-assisted text analysis, together with the close reading elaborated above, do seem to confirm that most media coverage lauded HidroAysén for its climate change-mitigating potential: certainly an advantageous position for the developing company. The voice of Patagonia sin Represas and those calling for alternative solutions like further development of Chile’s rich reserve of ERNCs was not central to the discourse. However, with the cost and viability of ERNCs falling, Patagonia sin Represas knew it had a long-term advantage in this regard. Every delay it could cause to the project through its long-haul campaign of symbolic communication, the more viable alternative energy solutions for Chile became.

## 6.7 Conclusion

From 2008 to 2009 and into early 2010, the mediatized discourse surrounding HidroAysén, then, underwent several moments of evolution. Around the first critical

---

<sup>60</sup> ‘No’ (meaning ‘no’, ‘not’ and ‘non’ in Spanish) does not appear in the concept map as it is one of the Spanish ‘stopwords’. Stopwords are words like ‘and’ in English with low semantic content (meaning). In content analysis with Leximancer, these are removed from the text data using a predefined stopwords list specific to each language.

discourse moment in the debate, the submission of the EIS, HidroAysén was reported in technical terms, and the bureaucratic processes leading to its approval were emphasised. As shown here, discourse around HidroAysén rapidly changed by mid-to-late 2009 so that it came to be described in media coverage increasingly as a “political project”. New concepts in the discourse then came in quick succession. With HidroAysén’s first foray into a national-scale communications effort came the key symbolic concepts that the project was “clean, renewable and Chilean”. This last claim – the project’s “native-ness” – was echoed in much of media coverage in the corpus here. The protest group’s insistence that this was a “foreign” project was able to get some media attention, however, and this fed into notions of neo-colonialism and distrust for business, and ultimately inequality, that already existed in Chile. At the same time, key media now labelled the *protest movement* as foreign, and this notion would become a symbolic attribute that the anti-dams side would retain throughout the debate. Finally, climate change entered the debate. As demonstrated above, the corpus media seem to have aligned mostly with the pro-dams frame on climate change – though some aspects of the anti-dams argument do seem to have been able to access the media to a lesser degree.

In May 2010, though, there came a significant, decisive change in the ongoing discursive sparring. HidroAysén’s shareholders appointed a new CEO after a surprise ousting of Hernán Salazar. The new HidroAysén chief, Daniel Fernández, came to the megaproject from the top post at TVN, Chile’s national broadcaster. A key objective of Fernández’ appointment was quickly labelled in *La Tercera* as being “communicational” and to find a solution to “key challenges” that the project was facing “in relation to the community” (Marticorena, *La Tercera* 02/04/2010). In truth, public opinion on HidroAysén had barely shifted in the timeframe outlined in this chapter. In November 2008, a survey by Adimark had found 51% support for the project nationally, and by October 2009, an IPSOS national opinion survey found 50.6% of respondents objected to HidroAysén. However, a few months after the arrival of Daniel Fernández, and the start of an aggressive new public relations campaign, these figures would change significantly – and not to the advantage of the project developers.

## Chapter 7: HidroAysén reacts

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines discourse on HidroAysén in key Chilean media during the most polemical months of the project. This period extends from mid-2010 when the megaproject came under new leadership, through mid-2011 when it was initially approved, until late 2011 as nationwide anti-dams protests unfolded. This phase begins with an aggressive new program of reactive communications by the project developer. I argue that in engaging in this new phase of symbolic communication, HidroAysén now attempted to influence public opinion by gaining symbolic power (Thompson 2005), or as Bourdieu puts it, engaging in “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 2004). I also examine in this chapter (and the one that follows) the discursive representation of the protest movement against HidroAysén, because favourable media representation of protest organisations Alexander (2006) tells us, is crucial in successful protests. In addition, I investigate in this chapter the kinds of “strategic interventions” (Lester 2010a) that the anti-dams protest campaign was able to make against the megaproject’s attempts at wielding symbolic power. This chapter and the final research chapter Chapter 8, continue to address the research question concerning mediatized discourse in the HidroAysén debate 2008-2014. They also respond to the research question concerning HidroAysén’s becoming emblematic, that is, constructed with different layers of symbolic attributes, which made it more than a conflict over the environment.

In this chapter, I continue to analyse both with close reading and more “distant” text analysis, media coverage in the corpus assembled for this study. I additionally examine further key advertising outputs from the developing company, and likewise communications material from the protest movement. I also discuss how social media platforms first came to be widely used in the mediatized debate over HidroAysén, especially from around 2010. I argue that the advent of “mass self-communication” (Castells 2007) in Chile *did* offer opportunities for alternative discourse on HidroAysén to develop, but that attracting the attention of mainstream media, and therefore reaching elite decision-makers, was still the goal of social media use. I demonstrate in this chapter that social media content was able occasionally to enter mainstream media

discourse. This kind of “switching” between networks, as conceptualised by Arsenault & Castells (2008) and Castells (2009), and adapted by Hutchins and Lester (2015) to the context of environmental conflicts, is therefore also examined in the context of the HidroAysén debate here.

In period covered in this chapter, the HidroAysén debate became increasingly polarised. The discursive positions of the two opposing sides were now seemingly irreversibly entrenched, so that each had a corresponding set of symbolic meanings associated with it. This is a period, then, when opposing sides become emblematic of two fundamentally opposing worldviews. Of interest here is how – and how much – both sides and their worldviews were represented in the corpus media, and how this may have changed over time. There is some evidence to indicate that the anti-dams movement was now at last able to have its voices and its arguments heard more comprehensively in media discourse than it had earlier. I therefore examine in this chapter which position seems most to have influenced the course of the mediatized debate in this period, and in framing the debate after its own arguments in the public sphere, may have had some influence over the real-world outcomes in the case of this megaproject. The greatest communicational advantage, I argue in this chapter, however, seems not to have been created by the anti-dams movement itself, but was rather *ceded* to it by the communication strategy of its opponents.

## **7.2 Social media, trust, protest and the HidroAysén debate**

Social media use in Chile increased exponentially from 2008, when the Spanish language version of the social media platform first appeared. There were 107,000 Facebook users in Chile in February of 2008, and over 4 million users by February 2009. These figures made Chile the second-highest ranking Latin American country for social media uptake by 2009 (Baeza Yates 2009). In the wake of the Chilean earthquakes of 2010, social media use became more widespread with a rise both in Facebook use (peaking at 81% of the total population) and Twitter (at 22%) immediately following the earthquake, as new social media users found the platforms a means of communication in the post-quake chaos. Facebook remained the key social media



platform with usage in the HidroAysén timeframe averaging around 70% and Twitter usage around 8% (StatCounter 2018) of the population.

Importantly for this study, in 2010, social media use seems not only to have risen, but the nature of its contents seems also to have *changed*. I interviewed the chief social media strategist for Patagonia sin Represas, Pablo Hubner, in 2013 (18/10/2013). Hubner explained that prior to 2010, social media in Chile had been used primarily for *social* contact. But after the February 2010 earthquake:

...there was a lot of anxiety to know what was going on. Social networks, in one way or another, became a powerful alternative way to find out information...find what had happened to one's family and friends, with people that hadn't yet been able to make contact in any other way. Or to get information from regions from which there hadn't yet been any official information reported.

Hubner also said of the weeks and months of earthquake recovery in mid-2010:

.....suddenly there was this collaborative interest...another meaning for using social media...You see people had the feeling that with all the establishment and the institutions that existed, somehow this was not working as it should. And this gave a feeling of credibility of participation and collaboration to people who were using social media....When this happened, many of us who were journalists decided to get into the world of social media to try to see how this might be used in many other ways.

This new use of social media networks for informational purposes, and their growing credibility, Hubner explained, had an impact on mainstream media, and also important implications for social movements like Patagonia sin Represas:

It wasn't that [the media] had lost relevance, it was simply that they now had to adapt to this new reality of the digital world that sometimes had more credibility than the establishment. It broke the paradigm of the direct, single message of conventional media. In the social networks, there was citizen participation in debates...a feeling of citizen scrutiny of political parties, of the conventional media, and these all had to adapt to the new reality. Campaigns like Patagonia sin Represas could have a greater role in this landscape, because the [conventional] media had always been ignoring us. Now because of our prominence in social media networks, the media were obliged to put this theme on their agendas...So in terms of the campaign, the social networks opened a new space for the debate.

(Hubner, interviewed 18/10/2013)



The anti-dams protest movement had taken advantage of digital opportunities early on, first with an extensive website and blog from 2007, and then with the use of social media in its communications. Patagonia sin Represas had been using Facebook since mid-2008, and Twitter since April 2009. HidroAysén was not so quick to engage in social media use. It never had a Facebook page, and began to use Twitter only in 2011. Director of Communications María Irene Soto commented in interview 23/20/13 that:

The shareholders were always against it. They felt that if we used Facebook or Twitter, it would mean that we were showing we felt we had to respond to Patagonia sin Represas and all its claims on social media. And they were afraid to lose control of information in this debate. So we held back. Finally our agency [Burston-Marsteller] was able to convince the directors that we should have a social media presence. So we were able to start using Twitter, at least.

(Soto, interviewed 23/20/13)

Current (2018) figures for social media engagement with followers suggest that the anti-dams side was much more active and had a much larger following than the megaproject had for its social media presence. On Facebook, Patagonia sin Represas has 179,313 likes and 169,924 followers, on Twitter it has posted 28,400 times and has 95,000 followers. HidroAysén had 9970 tweets and a following of 8,298 people until its last post in 2014. Both sides in the debate now used social media as a motivating and organising platform. Along with dissemination of their own discourse, with their own frames, and at low cost, social media's *motivating* capabilities were also vital, particularly for the anti-dams campaign.

Valenzuela et al. (2015) have researched the connection between social media use and participation in the student and environmental protests that erupted in Chile with such vehemence in 2011. They conclude that in the Chilean context, as in other national contexts (notably the Arab Spring protests of that year) social media use to discuss and share issue-related protest material amongst young people (18-29 years old) was positively correlated with participating in street protests – in this case the mass protests against HidroAysén in 2011. This finding underscores the mobilising potential that social media can exert. In comparison with online social network use to share

information about an issue, consumption of news via traditional media showed a low association with mobilisation to protest in Valenzuela et al.'s study. Importantly, this study also shows that precisely these young people (18-29 years olds) were the *least* likely population segment to exercise political participation by voting<sup>61</sup>, and that the rejection of political activity by this segment was because of lack of trust in institutions. Research has long shown that mistrust triggers extra-institutional forms of political participation, and when such mistrust is paired with the perception of having a capacity to influence public policy decisions, unconventional participation – like street protests – becomes more likely (Gamson 1968, Johnson et al. 2010, Mannarini et al. 2008).

The key point here in relation to HidroAysén, is that Chileans' already had bountiful mistrust in the institutions of their neoliberal system. They mistrusted elites and authority because of persistent inequality. They mistrusted foreign companies operating in Chile for profit because of their experiences of environmental degradation for little economic gain. And now especially, they also mistrusted authorities because of perceived inaction post-2010 earthquake. Now that a new online space had become available for information and debate, (if not entirely an alternative public sphere, as acknowledged in Chapter 2) this was a place where solidarity could be fostered, mistrust of authority amplified and people could be motivated and organised to participate in highly visible protest actions. Creating and maintaining a strong, active social media presence was therefore essential for Patagonia sin Represas. If HidroAysén had been able to dominate mainstream print media discourse on the project, as discussed in the previous chapter, the company (precisely one of the institutions for which many Chileans felt mistrust) was at a communicational disadvantage in the networks of mass self-communication. In this phase of the HidroAysén debate, then, Patagonia sin Represas seems to have been able to use social media networks to motivate and mobilise, and in doing so, to gain visibility in the traditional media networks also – as further discussed below. Perhaps partly because it was largely unable to respond effectively to growing claims against it in peer-produced media,

---

<sup>61</sup> According to Valenzuela et al. (p 152) between 1988 to 2009, the levels of electoral participation of youth between 18 and 29 years old diminished from 35 to 9 per cent.

HidroAysén embarked in late 2010 on a new, strident advertising campaign in the mainstream media.

### 7.3 HidroAysén's "campaign of terror"

As noted at the end of Chapter 6, May 2010 marked the "signing" (Mladinic, *La Tercera* 09/04/2010) of Daniel Fernández as the new head of HidroAysén. The civil engineer had successfully led several government corporations, and was a PPD (Partido por la Democracia, the centre-left Party for Democracy, part of the Concertación coalition) militant. Observers of HidroAysén understood immediately what Fernández' arrival signified:

The arrival of Daniel Fernández to the post of executive vicepresident of HidroAysén marks the end of a technical phase where the company could not overcome obstacles that presented themselves, and a strategic turn to the more political and communicational...This new "signing" by the Endesa-Colbún consortium demonstrates that the communication channels between the worlds of business and of politics are much more subtle than they are evident, but despite this, no less real or effective.

(Mladinic, *La Tercera* 09/04/2010)

The writer also noted that although the PPD seemed to have signalled its rejection of the project (through the 2008 comments of the then-environment minister Ana Lya Uriarte), "this situation did not seem to inconvenience Fernández ideologically."

Interviewed for this study in Santiago in 2013 (19/12/2013), Fernández explained: "the shareholders of the company called on me three years ago...May 2010. They wanted to relaunch the project with a different structure, different leadership." Fernández said he believed "monumental errors" had been made in the communication of the megaproject. "I don't think the shareholders fully understood the level of conflict that had been generated, and I think that they underestimated the campaign against the project."

Fernández now harnessed in earnest the services of companies like PR giant Burson-Marsteller which had already been working with the megaproject since 2007 (and

which specialises in crisis communication)<sup>62</sup>. With ad agency 180 Degrees, the company created a large new campaign of newspaper, radio, television, billboard and online ads which focused on energy scarcity and the consequences for Chile if it did not expand its energy portfolio. The TV advertisement, like the online ad below, presented the idea that: “If Chile does not duplicate its energy [capacity] from today, in 10 years, it will only half function. No one source of energy alone is sufficient.” It used the anchorage “A favour de la corriente” – “In favour of the current”. “Corriente” in Spanish means a water or electricity ‘current’, and ‘of the current time’ as in English, but it also means ‘popular’ and, of particular interest here, ‘usual’ or ‘normal’, perhaps referring to the fact that hydroelectricity was seen as a conventional energy source, unlike *unconventional* ERNCs.



Figure 28: One of HidroAysén’s web-based advertisements from the 2010 campaign.

The idea that “Chile would only half function” was also now depicted in radio and television ads on national broadcasters from late November 2010, in the lead-up to the deadline for the end of the dams’ environmental approvals process. These illustrated a near-future energy crisis in Chile. One television ad divided the screen in half to show the lights going out in an operating theatre when a pizza deliverer rings a doorbell.

<sup>62</sup> In a 2009 newspaper advertisement, Patagonia sin Represas had pointed out that Burson-Marsteller specialised in “both raising and cleaning the corporate image of companies, and also harming the image of adversaries of their clients”. In 1979 it represented Babcock & Wilson, owner of the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor, following the nuclear accident there. In 1984 it was advisor to Union Carbide Corporation to clean its image following the death of 2000 people in the Bhopal Disaster. And in 2007, it represented US company Blackwater that had been accused of assassinating Iraqi civilians (Patagonia sin Represas 2009). In another ad, Patagonia sin Represas pointed out Burson-Marsteller’s work with the Argentine dictatorship between 1976 and 1983 to create a campaign against human rights organisations (Patagonia sin Represas 2010).

Another depicted a soccer stadium plunged into darkness when a woman begins to blow dry her hair. The ads were accompanied by a voiceover that stated “If Chile does not double its energy [capacity] in the next 10 years, it will only half function...”.




Figure 29: (Double click to play). The voiceover is: “(Doorbell rings. Electricity cut – lights go out). Hello. Your pizza. No, you’ve got the wrong number. Oh, sorry...(Doorbell rings. Electricity cut – lights go out). If Chile does not duplicate its energy [capacity] from today, in 10 years, it will only half function. No one source of energy alone is sufficient. In favour of the current. HidroAysén, Chile with energy. (Can be viewed at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPcPyUjLLkE>)




Figure 30: (Double click to play) The second ad in the campaign that became known as HidroAysén’s “campaign of terror”.  
(Can be viewed at: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2dGxVq\\_3j8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2dGxVq_3j8))

Soon after the ads began to be played on channels including TVN and Channel 13, there was a strong reaction in social media networks. The term “campaign of terror” quickly emerged to describe the advertising campaign for the megaproject. This has particular

historical resonance in Chile, in relation to the fear campaign run by Pinochet prior to the 1988 yes/no plebiscite that ended his dictatorship. The campaign for the 'Yes' vote (to keep Pinochet in power) is often referred to in Chile as "the campaign of terror" (González 2006). The term "campaign of terror" to describe the HidroAysén ads first emerged on Twitter. Director of Radio Santa María in Coyhaique tweeted:

"HidroAysén's ads show a trace of the "Yes" campaign, campaign of terror."



Then, Rodrigo Miranda, head of Chile's College of Journalists tweeted: "I think that HidroAysén made an error in calculation. Campaign of terror doesn't lead anywhere. Remember the 'yes' campaign":



Asked about this tweet in interview in 2013 (16/12/2013), Miranda described his memories of Pinochet's 'Yes' campaign, that he'd seen as a teenager:

The 'Yes' campaign showed all sorts of terrifying things: that there would be food shortages, unemployment. And I remembered this clearly when they showed a person drying her hair with a hairdryer and the electricity cuts out because there's no HidroAysén....It was too extreme.

"Campaign of terror" quickly became a social media meme and then also made its way into mainstream media discourse. Some of the tweets that followed included one from journalist Francisco Aravena who wrote: "HidroAysén's advertising spots are an insult. Even campaigns of terror should have some limit."



Political scientist and activist Diego Benavente wrote: “Campaign of terror by #hidroaysen, symbolic violence. And the strange thing is that the first channel I see it on is #tvn.” This was referring to the fact that the ad appeared on the national broadcaster TVN (as well as other channels).



And actor Jaime Mondría wrote: “#Hidroaysen is applying a campaign of terror to convince me of something on which I already have an opinion formed #patagoniasinrepresas.”



And if Patagonia sin Represas had been accused of lying in relation to the image of power lines in front of the Torres del Paine, HidroAysén was now accused of the same. A tweet by @ginniasa said: “HidroAysén and campaign of terror to convince that we will be in the dark. LIE, just good business for them, which we Chileans will pay for.”



Ginniasa @ginniasa · 28 Nov 2010

Hidroaysén y campaña del terror para convencer que nos quedamos a oscuras. MENTIRA, solo buen negocio para ellos que pagaremos los chilenos

Translate Tweet



4



By December 2010, #campanadelterror had become a Twitter hashtag, with which hundreds of tweets parodied the HidroAysén campaign, listing all the absurd things that might happen in Chile if the megaproject was not approved (“planes will fall out of the sky”, “we’ll swap light bulbs for candles”, “we’ll only be able to buy one of a pair of shoes”). On a semiotic level, the “campaign of terror” ads present signs that are in polar opposition, with the screen divided into two sections one black, one white (the dark, colourless future a signifier of Chile left “in the dark” without HidroAysén, versus the bright, colourful future of a Chile *with* the project). This (false) dichotomy is again reminiscent of McGaurr and Lester’s (2009) “complementary problems” concept, where there is a black and white, mutually exclusive divide between “competing risks”. However, the company’s “HidroAysén or disaster” paradigm was now called into question as the “campaign of terror” notion became part of wider media discourse.

In December 2010, *El Mostrador* (21/12/2010) wrote of the “aggressive style” of Daniel Fernández, using the phrase “campaign of terror” to describe the new advertising push. There was also an exchange of letters to the editor about the campaign in *La Tercera*. One letter wrote of a “dirty campaign of discrediting opponents and of energy terror, that insults Chileans’ intelligence” (Sandoval, *La Tercera* 21/01/2011). *El Mercurio* published a Letter to the Editor by Douglas Tompkins which read:

I can’t remember a private initiative of such dimensions, trying to convince the public of the benefits of an investment project, and this is a clear indicator of the project’s inability to persuade and to sustain itself on its own merits. But what seems worrying to me is not so much the breadth of their campaign, but rather its threats, that is, if this project isn’t completed, Chile will be left in the dark, or only half functioning, as the slogan says.

(Tompkins, *La Tercera* 11/12/2010)

Matías Asún, head of Greenpeace Chile was also published in a letter in *La Tercera*, in which he stated that:



We are told that if Chile does not produce more energy, it simply won't be able to complete the development challenges that it has set itself, and that the "lights will go out", suggesting that, apart from this project, there are no other alternatives...It's incredible that the government does not make any pronouncement in the face of this campaign of terror that HidroAysén has taken up.

(Asún, *La Tercera* 16/12/2010)

*El Mostrador* also noted that the government seemed to be largely complicit in the "terror" messages that HidroAysén was conveying. It wrote: "In the last few months, we have been witness to how the government has joined with enthusiasm the terror campaign conducted by big business in the electric sector" generating "serious doubts in relation to its independence, in respect to big business, both domestic and foreign." (Liberona, *El Mostrador* 20/03/2011). Even after the project's approval in 2011, the media were still talking of a "campaign of terror". For example, even in the more conservative *El Mercurio*, a journalist used the expression in an interview with Energy and Mining minister Laurence Golborne, questioning him about HidroAysén's "campaign of terror" (Pardo, *El Mercurio* 14/05/2011).

Now aware that "campaign of terror" had become a meme that had moved beyond its social media beginnings into mainstream media discourse, Patagonia sin Represas quickly created its own response. Its arguments against HidroAysén's publicity campaign first appeared on Facebook and were then published in news outlets including *El Mostrador* and *La Tercera*. Costs of advertising and the requirement to edit its advertising messages meant that by this time, Patagonia sin Represas could no longer advertise in *El Mercurio*. All three corpus newspapers also published ads from HidroAysén's new campaign – which was itself, not without controversy, especially in *El Mostrador* (Markari, *El Mostrador* 22/12/2010). Patagonia sin Represas' new advertising material depicted Daniel Fernández as Pinocchio and wrote: "HidroAysén's campaign of terror is a desperate answer in the face of great public opposition to a bad project..."


patagonia sin represas



patagonia sin represas

Home
About
Photos
Notes
Events
Videos
Posts
Community
Info and ads

 Like
 Follow
 Share
...



patagonia sin represas
17 December 2010 ·

La [campaña del terror](#) de HidroAysén es una respuesta desesperada ante la gran oposición ciudadana a un mal proyecto y peor estudio de impacto ambiental.

( comparte esto con tus contactos)

<http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl/.../inserto-campana-del-te...>



# HIDROAYSÉN Y SU CAMPAÑA DEL TERROR

La Campaña del terror de HidroAysén es una respuesta desesperada ante la gran oposición ciudadana a un mal proyecto y peor Estudio de Impacto Ambiental.

**• Lavado de Cerebro.** Si el proyecto HidroAysén fuese bueno para Chile, se sustentaría en sus méritos, sin embargo ha debido contratar a agencias conocidas por defender lo indefendible, tales como Burson y Marsteller y Tirois Asociados, entre otras. Con su asesoría, las eléctricas están embudadas en una campaña del terror y en una embestida de tráfico de influencias, lobby y compra de conciencias sin precedentes, que degradan el tejido social y la gobernabilidad del país.

**• El prontuario de Burson-Marsteller.** Burson-Marsteller (B-M) es una de las gigantes de las relaciones públicas a nivel mundial, especializada tanto en limpiar la imagen corporativa de empresas controvertidas, como en perjudicar la de sus detractores. Algunos medios han señalado que B-M ha sido reiteradamente cuestionada por su participación en campañas vinculadas a violaciones de derechos humanos, delitos ecológicos, e incluso otros tipos de acciones criminales. Entre 1976 y 1983, por encargo de la dictadura militar de Argentina, B-M organizó la campaña contra las organizaciones de derechos humanos. En 1979 representó a Babcock & Wilcox, propietaria del reactor nuclear Three Mile Island luego de su falla, el segundo accidente atómico más grave de la historia. En 1984 asumió a Union Carbide Corporation para limpiar su imagen después de la muerte de 2.000 personas debido a la fuga masiva de gas venenoso en su planta de Bhopal, India. El 2007 representó a la empresa neozelandesa Blackwater acusada del asesinato de civiles iraquíes.

**• Campaña del Terror** Ningún país inteligente y democrático, consciente de la situación socio-ambiental, con institucionalidades y legislaciones serias en los sectores de energía y medio ambiente, autorizaría hoy un proyecto como el que trata de vendernos HidroAysén. La iniciativa publicitaria recientemente estrenada por la empresa, y ya repudiada por el público vía medios de prensa y redes sociales, es tan trágica como engañosa. Es una campaña del terror que amenaza a la ciudadanía con una inminente escasez de energía que no es tal.

**• Chantaje Corporativo**  
La campaña publicitaria de HidroAysén constituye un chantaje inaceptable para la ciudadanía y el gobierno, pues amenaza dejar el país a oscuras SI Y SOLO SI su proyecto no se materializa. Esta amenaza proviene de la mayor generadora del mercado eléctrico chileno, es claramente una demostración de su poder monopolístico, que busca imponer sus intereses corporativos por sobre el bien común. Los ciudadanos nos preguntamos cómo es posible que el Estado abdique de su responsabilidad de la seguridad energética de todo un país a los intereses comerciales de una empresa.

**• Desarrollo energético intensivo e Ineficiente.**  
El sector eléctrico privado ha promovido la idea de que la tasa del crecimiento de la demanda debiera ser un 1% superior a la del PIB. Ahora las cosas han cambiado significativamente. La economía se ha desacelerado y ronda en torno al 3,5%, la demanda eléctrica se estancó desde 2007, y, hemos descubierto que es imperativo, posible y deseable desacoplar el crecimiento del PIB del crecimiento de la demanda energética. ¿Cómo? Por medio de la eficiencia, el ahorro y la conservación de la energía, así como de un manejo más profundo de la demanda, es decir, transitando a modelos de desarrollo significativamente menos energo-intensivos. Más encima, dado que en Chile el negocio eléctrico es tan lucrativo estamos con una sobreoferta de proyectos energéticos de todo tipo.

**• Subestimando a los chilenos y chilenas.** Si no se construye HidroAysén no solo no se apaga la luz, al contrario, se abre el mercado para que se desplieguen emprendimientos renovables. Afortunadamente, a los chilenos y chilenas estas burdas artimañas de HidroAysén no nos infunden terror, sino rechazo, disgusto, y algo de risa... La encuesta IPSOS, de noviembre pasado, entrega un contundente 57,8% de rechazo a HidroAysén a nivel nacional. La

"creo que HidroAysén tuvo error de cálculo... campaña del terror no conduce a nada... recuerden la campaña del Si",  
Rodrigo Miranda,  
Secretario General del

Figure 31: Patagonia sin Represas Facebook post, showing their “Campaign of Terror” advertisement.

233

It wrote of HidroAysén's new publicity campaign:

the company's most recent publicity initiative, which has been repudiated by the public in the print media and in social media networks, both engenders terror and is misleading. This is a campaign of terror that threatens the public with an imminent energy scarcity, which doesn't exist.

It added:

HidroAysén's publicity campaign constitutes unacceptable bribery of the public and the government. It threatens that the country will be left in the dark, if, and only if, its project does not materialise. This threat, coming from the largest energy utility in the Chilean market, is clearly a demonstration of its monopolistic power, which seeks to impose its corporate interests above the common good.

(Patagonia sin Represas 17/12/2010)

HidroAysén's new campaign, and Patagonia sin Represas' response, were topical and polemical enough to warrant a feature in *El Mercurio* (17/12/2010) in which strategic communications experts opined on the communicational sparring. The article noted: "the two sides are in a defensive dynamic, which doesn't lead to rapprochement. On both sides, their attacks are exaggerated. In this sense, neither can advance in any way."

It also said:

When running campaigns in which either fictitious or probable scenarios are depicted – which both sides have done – it is very important to be able to substantiate them with solid facts. If not, one runs the risk of one's campaign becoming a fear campaign, and this is never well received.

Speaking of the 2010/2011 campaign in interview, Daniel Fernández said:

Today I am a critic of our campaign. I believe that we also committed errors. Because what the campaign intended to show was that if we don't make decisions today, in the future Chile will barely function...We made this kind of play on the idea that electricity is one single thing, and that its different parts are connected, so that if someone uses electricity here...it goes out there. It was a bit of a play on this idea, the campaign. No one could believe this was real. The idea was a bit in jest. But I think that we were wrong on this point. People didn't take it in jest...They took it very seriously. And in this sense, I think we got it wrong...

(Fernández, interviewed 19/12/2013)

By early 2011, then, the anti-dams campaign seems to have scored an important communicational victory. Not only were national media evaluating its campaign side by side with the megaproject's, but the discourse anti-dams supporters were using in social networks was now appearing in mainstream media. It seemed that Patagonia sin Represas activists and citizens who supported their campaign had been able to activate "switching points" (Arsenault & Castells 2008; Castells 2009; Hutchins & Lester 2015) between activism in the social networks and journalism in the mainstream media, despite the fact that, as indicated in discussion up to this point, mainstream media, especially *La Tercera* and *El Mercurio*, usually took a pro-HidroAysén stance.

During this period, the *quantity* of coverage of the protest campaign also began to rise. In Chapter 6, I showed how the three corpus media outlets published quite different proportions of content orientated towards the megaproject, versus content on protest against the project. Megaproject-orientated content was dominant in both conservative newspapers in the corpus, while in *El Mostrador*, pro-dam content dominated slightly. If the same articles are evaluated in terms of change over time for each year over the corpus timeframe, it is clear that mentions of Patagonia sin Represas begin to increase, proportional to mentions of HidroAysén, in 2010, as shown below.




Figure 32: Comparison of coverage of key search terms across the whole corpus, 2008-2014, showing change in coverage over time.

I drilled down further into the data for 2010, and noted that the most prominent rise in mentions of the protest movement was right at the end of 2010, around the time of the “campaign of terror” (the protest movement was mentioned 41 times between January and September 2010, but 35 times from October to December across the whole corpus).

If the first instance in which Patagonia sin Represas had achieved symbolic power in the megaproject debate had been when it controversially depicted power lines running in front of the (in actuality, distant) Torres del Paine, now, around the “campaign of terror” the protest movement again arguably exercised symbolic power. As Thompson (2005, p. 50) tell us, symbolic power is “the capacity to intervene in the course of events and influence the actions of others by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms”. The anti-dams symbolic construct that HidroAysén’s new, reactive communications campaign was a “campaign of terror” prompted much discourse on the dams, from both sides of the debate, and may have allowed coverage of the protest movement to become more prominent in the media corpus. Seemingly as a result of negative public discourse, the “terror” campaign was withdrawn by HidroAysén early, and only ran for eight weeks, from the end of November 2010 to February 2011.

Change in public opinion around this time seems to indicate that the “campaign of terror” and the discourse surrounding it, were having the *opposite* of the campaign’s desired effect – a tendency that is known in social psychology as a “boomerang effect”<sup>63</sup>. Various polling services had been monitoring public opinion on HidroAysén closely since the project began. As noted in Chapter 5, the earliest polls in 2007 had reported 36% of Chileans were against the dams. If in the intervening years, public assessments of HidroAysén had not changed greatly, negativity towards the megaproject *had* now increased. While an October 2009 Ipsos survey showed 50.6% of respondents objected to HidroAysén (Ipsos 2009), an Ipsos survey at the end of November 2010 found that 57.8% of those questioned were against the dams (Ipsos 2010). By April of the following year, 61.8% (Ipsos 2011) opposed the megaproject. In the following months, there

---

<sup>63</sup> The term was first used by psychologists Hovland, Janis & Kelly (1953) to refer to a reaction by an audience that is *opposite* to the intended response of a persuasive message. The effect has been studied particularly in public responses to health messages that engender fear to attempt to change behaviour (Cho & Salmon 2007).

would be further change of public opinion – increasingly against the megaproject.

#### **7.4 Discrediting the opposition, polarising the debate**

Daniel Fernández commented in interview for this study that HidroAysén had made a “monumental error” when it failed to confront Patagonia sin Represas on the image of the Torres del Paine crossed by power lines. He also said:

I think this was a turning point, because in that moment, the shareholders should have come out, should have brought a charge of misleading advertising before the Media Ethics Committee, and should have unmasked this unethical act. They didn't do that. They let it go and go and go.

(Fernández, interviewed 19/12/2013)

Following this experience, it was clear that Fernández, HidroAysén, and its owners, would not now let the anti-dams movement get away with any communicational advantage they may have gained over the “campaign of terror.” The months immediately before the polemical approval of HidroAysén in May 2011, then, were a time in which it seemed the developing company, and in some cases, government voices, focused on discrediting the opposition to the megaproject. This is a time in which the mediatized debate seems to have become more polarised than ever.

The dams developers' own commentary now became scathing about the project's “detractores” (detractors) or “opositores” (opponents). *La Tercera* interviewed Ignacio Antonázas, the head of Endesa España in Latin America in December 2010. In this long feature piece, Antonázas was quoted as saying that:

There are a few groups with a strong backing of overseas entities, which do not understand the true energy situation in the country, and which have taken on the task of confusing public opinion communicationally.

Antonázas also referred to Patagonia sin Represas' campaign as “deceiving, treacherous.” (Viancos, *La Tercera* 5/12/2010). Fernández also pointed out in an editorial in *El Mercurio* that his project “was working for the social and economic

development of the Aysén region” while those in opposition to the project, like Tompkins, sought to “convert Chilean Patagonia into a place of contemplation and privilege, not for the wellbeing of its inhabitants” (Fernández, *El Mercurio* 16/12/2010).

There was then an acrimonious exchange of Letters to the Editor in *La Tercera*, in which Fernández called the anti-dams campaign a group that, “financed by sources unknown and with objectives unknown, dedicates itself to transmitting myths and falsehoods” (Fernández, *La Tercera* 30/12/2010).<sup>64</sup> The newspaper also published Douglas Tompkins’ equally acerbic reply, in which he accused Fernández of “resorting to rhetorical pirouettes to justify a lucrative project”, and for “discrediting with absurd statements anyone who stood in his way”. He also accused Fernández of being committed to a vision of “developmentalism to the death, which has submitted our civilisation to a global environmental crisis” (Tompkins, *La Tercera* 01/04/2011). The anti-dams senator for Aysén, Antonio Horvath, was also published in this exchange in *La Tercera*, writing that Fernández’ campaign “seeks disgracefully, and wrongly to polarise the community.” (Horvath, *La Tercera* 09/01/2011). And, still in letters to *La Tercera*, Fernández continued to criticise the anti-dams opposition, writing that:

NGOs in opposition to the project, financed from overseas, and under a mantle of conservationism, lay down a vision of a Patagonia almost without inhabitants, designed only for contemplation and for the benefit of a privileged few.

(Fernández, *La Tercera* 14/01/2011)

If Tompkins had accused the megaproject’s developers of “developmentalism to the death”, right-wing commentator and HidroAysén supporter Carlos Martínez now accused the anti-dams opposition of “ecólatra”. Though difficult to translate into English, this neologism can be rendered as “excessive veneration of all things ‘green’”, or more colloquially “tree hugging”. Martínez also stated in his Letter to the Editor in this exchange that: “criticism of the dams is, for better or for worse, an ideological position” (Martínez, *La Tercera* 2011/01/08).

---

<sup>64</sup> The idea that the Patagonia sin Represas campaign was “financed by sources unknown” is erroneous. *El Mercurio* had just published an article (clearly critical of the anti-dams position) which examined Patagonia sin Represas’ funding sources by bringing together information which was already publically available (*El Mercurio* 8/11/2010).

Interviewed in *El Mostrador* (09/05/2011) just before the project's approval, Fernández cited again "these organised groups, that receive finance from overseas, [which] have been trying for more than three years to put obstacles in way of the project, to paralyse it." Government voices and media coverage then seemed to follow suit. In an interview in *La Tercera* in the days before the EIS decision, Energy Minister Laurence Golborne spoke of "quite extreme groups" that "defend their visions to the death" (*La Tercera* 04/05/2011). Media now depicted these polarised positions on HidroAysén as a "battle" (Bellolio, *El Mostrador* 20/06/2011; *El Mercurio* 21/03/2011) or a "struggle", (Zannotti, *El Mercurio* 05/06/2011) or both (López, *El Mostrador* 06/06/2011; *El Mercurio* 17/12/2010; Zannotti, *El Mercurio* 04/03/2011). *El Mercurio* (28/06/2011) even reported the communicational conflict as "a mediatized struggle" in which both sides were producing "propaganda".

Also, at this time, the media seems often to use the word "conflictivo" in Spanish, which can be translated as "conflict-generating", for example, in several articles in *La Tercera* right on the eve of the project's approval (03/05/2011; Yaikin, *La Tercera* 03/05/2011). The anti-dams movement were now also called "eco-terrorists" (*La Tercera* 11/05/2011a), and just before the dams received environmental approval, there was discourse on how the debate had become polarised, for example, *El Mercurio* reported "voices for and against Endesa and Colbún's megaproject have polarised in the last few weeks" (Herrera & Olivares, *El Mercurio* 05/05/2011). A day later, *El Mercurio* again reported on the "polarised situation" in respect of the megaproject and opposition to it (05/06/2011). This, then, was the situation in terms of media discourse on the project on the eve of the deadline for the vote on HidroAysén by the regional Comisión de Evaluación Ambiental (CEA-Environmental Assessment Committee)<sup>65</sup> in Coyhaique.

## **7.5 HidroAysén is approved**

On the ground in Aysén, tensions were also mounting. Ten days before the approval/rejection deadline, *El Mercurio* reported a fire bomb attack at the home of HidroAysén's head of staff in the project area (04/09/2011). In Coyhaique, signs appeared in the town centre showing photographs of the personnel responsible for

---

<sup>65</sup> The assessing authority had changed from Corema to the CEA due to a restructuring of environment authorities in 2010.



ruling on the project's EIS, together with their contact details and home addresses, and bearing appeal to the committee not to "sell out Patagonia". Two weeks before the decision, the local head of the CEA resigned: *La Tercera* cited "personal reasons, in the context of pressure by environmental groups over the vote on HidroAysén" (Álvarez Parra, *La Tercera* 27/02/2011). The regional head of government, Pilar Cuevas, who would vote with the committee, reportedly received anonymous telephone death threats, and *La Tercera* reported three days before the vote that police special forces had been mobilised in Coyhaique in anticipation of protest (06/05/2011).

On the other hand, government voices in Santiago were clearly calling for the project's approval. The day before the vote, the Interior Minister was reported as saying: "It would be good for the country if it were approved" and this was reported in all three corpus media (*La Tercera*, 09/05/2011a; *El Mostrador* 09/05/2011a; *El Mercurio*, 09/05/2011). *El Mercurio* additionally quoted the minister as saying: "if it had been approved a decade ago, it would have allowed us to be less polluted, and to have much cheaper energy costs." Condemnation of the minister's declaration was swift. All the corpus media also quoted the words of Socialist Party Lower House representative, Alfonso de Uresti, *La Tercera* as follows:

This seems to me a very serious intervention by the Minister of the Interior, Rodrigo Hinzpeter, who is very clearly exercising improper pressure on the decision-making of those that have the responsibility to decide the project's future.

Uresti also said that, as the moment of the environmental decision approached, "pressures of all types have increased" and that, with comments such as Hinzpeter's, the government was "creating a suit made to measure for the electrical companies that wish to install this megaproject in the region" (*La Tercera*, 09/05/2011b). Christian Democrat Party deputy Patricio Vallespín was quoted in *La Tercera*, calling the situation "shameful" and saying that: "the instruction by the Minister of the Interior was like [the instruction of] a country estate boss, and then his regional functionaries just fulfil it" (*La Tercera*, 10/05/2011a).

On 10 May 2011, in a vote of 11 in favour and one abstention, the CEA in Coyhaique approved the megaproject, granting it a Resolución de Calificación Ambiental (RCA – an

Environmental Qualification Resolution). The project's only remaining approval hurdle was for it to be ticked off by the Committee of Ministers on the Environment, which was considered a formality<sup>66</sup>. So newsworthy was the decision that *El Mercurio* published a minute-by-minute account of the proceedings of the meeting and voting (09/05/2011). Public reaction to the outcome was swift. There were street demonstrations that day in Coyhaique, Santiago, Osorno and Concepción as well as in other cities. In Santiago, 7000 people answered a social media call to demonstrate, including several opposition parliamentarians and the head of the Senate, Guido Girardi. The police-authorised protests were met with tear gas and water canon: 68 people were arrested. Parliamentarian Vallespín who took part in the march, was quoted in *El Mercurio* as saying: "the police intervened with a great deal of force, without justification" (*El Mercurio* 10/05/2011), an act that was soon ruled illegal (*La Tercera* 11/05/11a). In Coyhaique, street protests continued for a week, followed by school sit-ins in protest at the project's approval.

This unrest was simply a prelude for almost two months of anti-dams protest – and intense mediatized debate. After the *New York Times* (Barrionuevo, *New York Times* 05/08/2011) compared this period of intense protest with the Arab Spring, the period of roughly May-August 2011 became known as The Chilean Winter (Villalobos-Ruminott 2012, Valenzuela et al. 2015). Following the initial spontaneous anti-dams protests, Patagonia sin Represas organised demonstrations at least weekly, throughout May and into June, both in the capital and across the country, many attracting 15,000 – 20,000 marchers. The protest on Fri 13<sup>th</sup> May was reported to have attracted 80,000<sup>67</sup> people (Mendoza, *El Mostrador*, 21/05/11). Another large protest was scheduled for May 21<sup>st</sup>, the day President Piñera was due to deliver his State of the Nation address to the Chilean parliament.

---

<sup>66</sup> A RCA was valid for 5 years. The EIS process for the transmission line would also have to be completed in this time. In actuality, the series of legal actions, investigations, and the resolution of comments and questions related to the RCA (both from the company's side, and from opponents) repeatedly delayed the Committee of Ministers' vote. Though this should have taken place within 30 days after the RCA was granted in 2011, the Committee did not make any resolution until January 2014, in the last days of Piñera's government. That ruling was invalidated by the new Committee of Ministers once Bachelet took power in March 2014.

<sup>67</sup> Newspapers' figures on the numbers of protesters at each march varied: *El Mercurio* tended to opt for lower figures, *El Mostrador*, higher ones. One ex-employee of HidroAysén (a former chief of operations in Aysén who wished to remain anonymous) reported in interview for this study (21/05/2013) that he had spoken with police special forces after the largest march and they had confirmed some 200,000 people were present, a figure not reported in the media at the time.



Blog de la campaña



CONSEJO  
DE DEFENSA  
DE LA PATAGONIA  
CHILENA

## Eventos este Sábado 21 de Mayo

Por Campaña Patagonia Sin Represas 19 de Mayo del 2011

Este sábado, 21 de mayo, nos juntamos una vez más a lo largo de todo Chile para manifestar lo justo: Patagonia sin Represas.

CIUDAD	HORA	LUGAR
ARICA	11:00	Parque Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (Juan Noé entre Baquedano y Patricio Lynch).
ANTOFAGASTA	10:00	Frente a Intendencia
COPIAPÓ	10:00	Frente al Gobierno Regional
TIERRA AMARILLA		
TOCOPILLA	12:00	Plaza de Condell
LA SERENA	10:00	"Caminata por la vida " Avenida de Aguirre con Balmaceda
SANTIAGO	11:00	San Pablo con Neptuno (Metro San Pablo)
MELIPILLA	11:00	Plaza de Armas
VALPARAÍSO	10:00	Plaza Victoria
RANCAGUA	11:00	Plazas Los Héroes
CURICÓ	15:30	Plaza de Armas.
TALCA	12:00	Plaza Victoria (2 Sur con 8 Oriente)
CONCEPCIÓN	12:00	Plaza España
TEMUCO	11:00	Plaza Teodoro Wickel
OSORNO	11:30	Plaza de Armas
PUCÓN	11:00	Frente a la municipalidad
VALDIVIA	12:00	Simón Bolívar (frente al Coliseo)
PUERTO MONTT	15:00	Vagonart (costado Museo JP II)
PUERTO AYSÉN	11:00	Plaza de Armas
PUERTO AYSÉN	17:00	Plaza Mahuen
COYHAIQUE	10:00	En Parque Las Lumas En Sede El Mirador
CHILE CHICO	11:00	Plaza de la Ciudadanía de Chile Chico
COCHRANE	15:00	Plaza de Armas
PUERTO NATALES	12:00	Av. Bulnes con Ramirez
PUNTA ARENAS	11:00	Plaza de Armas

Lecturas: 82339    Comentarios: 128    | [Comentar Este Post](#) 

Déjanos tu comentario o nota

Tu Nombre:

E-mail: (No se publicará)

Comentarios:

(Los comentarios serán moderados)

[Enviar comentario](#)

Compartir

 Reenviar esto a un amigo(a)

 Compartir en Facebook

 Compartir en Twitter

 Suscribirse a este blog

### Últimos Post

12 de Octubre del 2011  
**Documental 'Patagonia Se Levanta' en el Festival Internacional de Cine de Valdivia**

2 de Septiembre del 2011  
**Alegatos judiciales contra HidroAysén, este martes 6 de septiembre**

19 de Mayo del 2011  
**Prepara tus carteles y pancartas de Patagonia sin Represas**

10 de Mayo del 2011  
**Carta al presidente Piñera del Prof. Dr. h. c. Manfred Max-Neef**

Figure 33: List showing protest locations in 24 cities across Chile for 21 May 2011. The header reads: “This Saturday, 21 May, we will get together once more along the whole length of Chile to demonstrate for what is just: Patagonia sin Represas.”

Patagonia sin Represas/the CDP organised marches in 24 cities throughout Chile for that day. This Patagonia sin Represas blog page recorded over 82,000 views, while the organisation’s Facebook and Twitter presences ran a contest for the best slogans under which to march, or provided advice on preparing placards. The evening before the 21 May march, there were also protests in Concepción, Valparaíso, Viña del Mar, Chillán, Valdivia and Osorno, and 40,000 people were reported in an anti-dams protest in central Santiago. On 21 May, as Piñera made his State of the Nation speech in Santiago,

opposition parliamentarians unfurled an anti-dams banner in Congress bearing the words: “Patagonia without Dams: No to HidroAysén”. Later that day, 60,000 people again marched in the streets of Santiago. These were the biggest demonstrations the country had seen since its return to democracy.

The transnational nature of the protest became more palpable when *El Mercurio* (20/05/2011) reported that demonstrations against the megaproject had been also conducted on 20 May in Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Marseille, Paris, Valencia, Toledo, Barcelona, Madrid, La Rioja, Hamburg, Rome, Buenos Aires, Lima, La Paz, Rio de Janeiro, London, Montreal, Vancouver and Melbourne. That the anti-HidroAysén protest was supported by transnational environmental and media networks also became clear when the *New York Times* dedicated an editorial to HidroAysén, in which it beseeched Chile to “keep Patagonia wild” and criticised the project as “potentially disastrous” (*The New York Times* 11/05/2011). This editorial was reported in all three corpus media, and was notably criticized by Mining and Energy Minister Laurence Golborne in an interview in *El Mercurio* (25/05/2011) in which he characterised the intervention as hypocritical, pointing out that only 3% of energy in the US was from renewable sources<sup>68</sup>.

As noted here and in Chapter 3, the Chilean Winter was also a time of frequent mass-protests, sit-ins and hunger strikes by university and secondary school students, in protest at the quality of public school education, and the cost of private university education. The students’ protest was directed in part towards business elites that they accused of profiteering from education. It must have seemed in the Chilean Winter of 2011, particularly in the capital, that barely a day went by without new reports of protest and shutdowns of streets in the city centre. The student cause: fundamentally a protest against persistent inequality and lack of tangible action by government to show

---

<sup>68</sup> There had also been an editorial in the *New York Times* (01/04/2008) in which it said that HidroAysén would “damage one of the wildest and most beautiful places on earth” and that “building large-scale hydroelectric dams is an old-world way of obtaining energy”. It continued: “It is too late in the environmental life of this planet to accept such ecologically destructive energy solutions or the model of unfettered growth they are meant to fuel”. This editorial was roundly criticised in the Chilean media as being “tutelage from the exterior” (*El Mercurio*, 04/05/2008). The newspaper stated that “the necessities of our country, of the region, is a theme exclusively for Chileans.” This comment from the *New York Times* certainly played into criticisms about the anti-dams movement being composed of “foreigners” and “elites”.

that students' voices were being heard, could easily be conflated with the cause of protesting HidroAysén. In fact, it seems that, with many schools and universities closed, many that attended the student protests *also* took part in the anti-dams protests. The sentiments and demands of each seemed to become intermingled, so that even in reporting the protests, the media began to report them as *one* set of protests (*La Tercera*, 20/10/2011). This point is important because the student protests and the anti-dams marches certainly did have aspects in common: chief among them, as discussed, the sense that Chileans were being taken advantage of for profiteering by social and economic elites, and that the neoliberal model of Chile's post-dictatorship development must now change. As discussed in Chapter 3, social unfairness and inequality seem to have been the roots of both protests, and in the Chilean Winter of 2011, this feeling now seems to have become strongly associated with HidroAysén, both in the social media networks, and to some degree in the traditional media. This post from Patagonia sin Represas' Facebook page during the Chilean Winter protests shows, for example, how the issue of inequality was highlighted by the anti-dams movement, alongside environmental concerns. Here, the wealth of the Matte family, owners of Colbún, is emphasised.



Figure 34: The post links to an article by Radio Bío Bío, which is titled: "Researcher analyses inequality in Chile: "the country's wealth is concentrated among 4 families." The quote above this reads: "among them, the Matte brothers, one of the HidroAysén partners, with \$10,4 billion."

However, the media in the corpus compiled for this study appear to have reported the approval of and the protests against HidroAysén very differently. The next section examines discourse in the avalanche of media coverage surrounding HidroAysén's approval and shows how the themes of HidroAysén and inequality clearly now travelled together in some media reporting on the megaproject – while other media seemed to take a more pro-institutional, anti-protester stance.

## **7.6 Media report HidroAysén's approval**

While this study does not seek to analyse broadcast media coverage of the dams debate, the ubiquity of coverage of the megaproject across *all* media in the days leading up to and the weeks immediately after the vote should be acknowledged. The protests against HidroAysén were a staple of nightly news for weeks, but in short news segments, there was little room for analysis of the reasons behind the protests. Some broadcasters did take a more in-depth look. For example, the night before the EIS vote HidroAysén's Daniel Fernández was interviewed on the project by prominent journalist Fernando Paulsen on the popular current affairs program *Última Mirada* (Last Look) on Chilevisión. A week after the project was approved, Fernández engaged in a heated televised debate with environmentalist, former presidential candidate and head of the NGO Chile Sustentable (Sustainable Chile) Sara Larraín, on the high-impact political program *Tolerancia Cero* (Zero Tolerance) also on Chilevisión. The debate was reported in *La Tercera* as being "intense": Fernández accused the anti-dams position of being "intolerable" and "violent" (16/05/2011). Prominent radio journalist Tomás Mosciatti, a host on national Radio Bío Bío, also spoke frequently on HidroAysén on both radio and television around this time, consistently from an anti-dams standpoint. For example, he was interviewed by CNN Chile (a broadcaster which tended to cover more anti-dams viewpoints) on the eve of the EIS vote, and recounted the "reasons to reject HidroAysén" (CNN Chile 8/05/2011). He stated "who do you believe? I don't believe the authorities."

The differences between media reporting in the three corpus media outlets in the ten days prior to, and the two months after the approval are starkly evident. In the following, I analyse discourse in all three corpus media outlets output over this period

separately, at first with a close reading to identify instances where their discursive positions are clear. Then, using Leximancer's textual analysis, I compare discourse across the three media.

### 7.6.1 *El Mercurio*

*El Mercurio* published much coverage of the protests: there were 28 articles on the protests in the month following the approval: none undertook any in-depth analysis of the anti-dams arguments. The anti-HidroAysén marches and the student marches had both seen violent incidents, perpetrated by 'encapuchados' who attended most protests in Chile between 2011-2013, covering their heads and faces before perpetrating violent acts. Thought to be young people, some anarchists, the *encapuchados* were not aligned with any cause in particular. Their key objective seemed to be violence, particularly against the police.<sup>69</sup> *El Mercurio* typically reported violent incidents at the anti-dams marches, the number of people arrested and police officers injured, with little space dedicated to analysing the reasons behind the protests. Though most Chileans were aware of the phenomenon of the *encapuchados*, and understood that these were not typical anti-dams protestors, *El Mercurio's* (22/05/2011) coverage seemed adamant on holding the "environmentalists" (as it typically called them) to account for the violence. The newspaper reported President Piñera as saying:

I ask those that convene these marches to take responsibility, because when these marches end in violence, the organisers also have a quota of responsibility.

*El Mercurio* (21/05/2011) also reported a Santiago Police chief as saying:

We were promised a peaceful march and we ended up with 22 police injured, two seriously, and with damage to public and private property...We believe there are people [here] that are trying to impose their ideas though violence.

---

<sup>69</sup> The BBC's Latin American service covered the issue of the *encapuchados* (Long 29/05/2013) concluding that due to *encapuchado* violence at protests, media coverage tended to concentrate on such incidents. As a result, the BBC said: "the issues concerned – the environment, gender equality, indigenous rights and above all, education – are often overlooked. Instead, the coverage centres on police tactics and public order." This can certainly be said of *El Mercurio's* coverage of the protests, in concordance with Gitlin (1980) and Murdock (1981).

For these people institutionality [meaning the environmental approvals process] is not sufficient.

*El Mercurio's* coverage tended to prioritise government sources that spoke in defence of the project, and the bureaucratic processes it had passed through. The day after the project was approved, for example, the newspaper quoted the Minister for the Environment, María Ignacia Benítez, as saying: "everything is in accordance with environmental legislation...everything conforms to the applicable environmental rules. It's by far the most evaluated project [ever]" (*El Mercurio* 10/05/2011b). The newspaper also quoted the Minister of Energy and Mining, Laurence Golborne, who defended the project and the country's "institutional processes", saying that: "The country needs energy that is clean, cheap and secure. Any project that complies with environmental regulations is a good project for Chile" (*El Mercurio* 11/05/2011). *El Mercurio* wrote that the Secretary General of the Presidency, Cristián Larroulet also "defended the megaproject and stated that thanks to its approval, 'the Chilean electricity grid will be much less polluting'" (14/05/2011). The newspaper quoted former President Ricardo Lagos as saying HidroAysén was "necessary, because Chile needs more energy" (*El Mercurio* 15/05/2011) and Golborne echoed this sentiment, also saying the project was "necessary". He said: "it's not about whether we want or don't want a power station. It's about what options we have to generate cheap energy and achieve development" (*El Mercurio* 16/05/2011). *El Mercurio* (11/05/2011) also quoted Piñera as saying, (with discourse reminiscent of HidroAysén's) that:

If we don't take decisions today, we are condemning our country to a power blackout towards the end of the decade...Sometimes governments have to make difficult decisions, but avoiding or delaying making decisions isn't the way we understand serious and responsible public service.

*El Mercurio's* coverage also included critiques by government actors of the project's opponents, for example, it reported Golborne as saying: "The citizenry is empowered, but it is not well informed". The newspaper also noted that Piñera "criticised those that 'believe that by opposing everything, and every type of energy, they are doing something for their country'". Of these protesters, the president said: "I want them to know that they are profoundly wrong" (*El Mercurio* 11/05/2011a).



During this time, HidroAysén seemed to remain largely quiet. There were just four articles in *El Mercurio* (13/05/2011; 15/05/2011; 26/05/2011; 02/06/2011) during the two months after the approval that included any source from HidroAysén (always Fernández) and all of these seemed to be in relation to technical aspects of the project and processes related to it: that is, there was no public declaration on behalf of the company about the protests, public opinion, or the company's likely future course of action. This apparent retreat from communication on behalf of the company is discussed in detail in Chapter 8. One feature piece, published in *El Mercurio* (Ibarra, *El Mercurio* 29/05/2011) is of particular interest in relation to communication from HidroAysén's shareholders, though. It refers to "damage control" in the face of the protests by the Matte group (Colbún's owners). The article said:

Both Colbún and Endesa are experiencing a 'tense calm' in these days of protest. Although they expected protest, they have been surprised by their size.

A member of the Matte family is quoted here as saying that "the prestige of the Matte family is suffering"... "What to do now? 'Wait out the storm, what else?'". Importantly, the unnamed executive from the Matte group also added a comment acknowledging that HidroAysén had now come to represent more than a debate about dams in Patagonia. He said "in the protests there is an element of discontent with the government...and others protest for emotional reasons."

In addition to the kind of discourse noted above, most telling about *El Mercurio's* stance in the megaproject debate is perhaps the following editorial from two days after the EIS approval where the publication sums up its position on the dams. *El Mercurio* stated that, despite all the claims of the protest movement against the project, the administrative process of environmental approvals was sound:

The environmental impact assessments have norms established in institutional processes that the country has set itself. These have the objective of guaranteeing measures to mitigate the impact of said projects, in order that they comply with established standards.

It continued, seemingly stating its rationale for its support of the project:

In this case, the government did not hide its interest in bringing the project to fruition...because it considered that in the current energy scenario in Chile, it was a priority to have clean and renewable energy, to lower future energy costs, and allow [Chile] to advance towards achieving developed country status, during this decade. Ultimately, this meant taking the difficult decision to prioritise, in this stage of the country's development, the provision of clean and cheap energy over keeping the Patagonian forests untouched.

(*El Mercurio* 11/05/2011b)

### 7.6.2 *La Tercera*

*La Tercera* produced the most extensive amount of coverage over this period (purely in terms of the number of pieces published) surpassing the coverage of *El Mercurio*, which had produced more coverage on the dams debate throughout its whole trajectory. For example, on the day after the EIS approval, 10 May 2011 alone, *La Tercera* published 22 HidroAysén-related articles. Like *El Mercurio*, *La Tercera* too reported extensively on violence and arrests at anti-dams marches. However, this newspaper's coverage was subtly different to *El Mercurio*'s. For example, *La Tercera*'s first article about the protests dealt with abuses by police, Chile's *Carabineros*, at the planned march, calling their actions "unacceptable" and "excessive", and saying that the protesters were expressing themselves "legitimately" (*La Tercera* 10/05/2011b). In another article on the protests, *La Tercera* quoted environmentalist Sara Larraín saying that she had witnessed "an abusive situation by the authorities, because there had been a planned march, with the route defined by the authorities, but the *Carabineros* impeded it" (*La Tercera* 10/05/2011c). *La Tercera* continued with coverage that seemed to sympathise with the protesters, for example, it quoted the President of the Committee on Human Rights of Chile's lower house, Sergio Ojeda, as saying: "we want to know where orders for such violent, brutal and unheard-of repression come from" (Yaikin, *La Tercera* 11/05/11b).

*La Tercera* also reported many of the same government voices as *El Mercurio* in defence of the project and the corresponding approvals process – including Piñera and Mining and Energy Minister Golborne. Environment Minister Benítez was interviewed just after the vote and was quoted as saying:

I am very satisfied with the whole process...Chileans can be clear, and proud of the fact that we have an efficient and committed environmental institutionality.

(*La Tercera* 09/05/2011c)

In discourse reminiscent of the definition of Murray Li's (2011) "rendering technical", in another *La Tercera* article, the minister was said to have:

emphasized the technical work there had been behind the approval of the megaproject, saying that from the "environmental point of view, there has been perhaps the longest ever approval process...[carried out] to a very high and demanding standard with more than 200 professionals working in a technical way, who gave their responses....This separates things of a technical nature from those of a political nature."

(*La Tercera* 10/05/11d)

In the days after the approval, *La Tercera* also interviewed the head of the National Energy Commission in support of the megaproject, who said that the contribution of HidroAysén to the energy grid would "stabilise prices" and help "avoid blackouts" (10/05/2011).

Despite these evidently pro-project institutional voices, *La Tercera* also reported *opposition* for the project from those in government, significantly more than *El Mercurio*. For example, *La Tercera* quoted anti-dams Aysén senator, Antonio Horvath, in several articles. Horvath was quoted as saying that approving HidroAysén was "a 'blunder' for the government" and that, given the controversies around the EIS process, "environmental institutionality" had been "assaulted" (*La Tercera* 11/05/2011b). The newspaper also followed the declarations of the head of Chile's Senate, Guido Girardi, against the project. In one article, Girardi was quoted as saying:

The entity who decides what will occur in relation to energy is no longer the President of the Republic, but rather commercial organisations. Today, the president is proposing more coal, more megadams, and this is a strategic error. It's being hostage to corporate interests.

(*La Tercera* 11/05/2011b)

Likewise, *La Tercera* printed a statement by lower house deputy Vallespín and the heads of two environmental NGOs involved in Patagonia sin Represas that “environmental institutionality” was being “manipulated”. Environmentalist Sara Larraín was quoted as saying that the president had:

“again deceived public opinion, signalling that if HidroAysén was not built, that the country would enter into an absolute energy crisis.” In addition, she said that the government had benefitted “its personal friends” with the approval of initiatives like HidroAysén.

(*La Tercera* 12/05/2011)

The newspaper also now began to use the word “irregularidades” (‘irregularities’, also translated as ‘anomalies’, ‘malfeasance’ or ‘wrongdoing’) – this in reference to the brewing legal cases against the conduct of the EIS process. The newspaper had rarely used the term in relation to HidroAysén before 2011, but in the two months after the project was approved, the word was used 12 times.

Statements like those above (just a few examples of many such instances) printed in a newspaper that is conservative and pro-business orientated are notable, especially as *La Tercera* had previously been quite strongly supportive of the megaproject. I interviewed the newspaper’s deputy editor, Felipe Contreras (16/07/2013) for this study, and he reported that there was indeed some shift in the newspaper’s editorial position on the dams around the time of the Chilean Winter protests, as the case of HidroAysén became more emblematic: as he put it, “an emblem, an icon of the neoliberal market model”. He said:

In Chile – and we are talking about a country where for 20 years the media was kept under control by the dictatorship – I believe often the position of the media is not to generate conflict. And in this sense, the media, and this newspaper in particular, try to put forward the different positions that exist in relation to the megaproject. A group of large corporations, that come and present a project and its benefits...and on the other hand...the people who are opposed to HidroAysén and we have given space in the newspaper to the arguments of those who think that HidroAysén is not the best solution to the energy problem.

He also said:

I would say that until 2011 there had not been a great deal of difference between us and *El Mercurio*. These two newspapers have declared themselves in favour of the free market economy, and identify with the right or the centre-right.

But he added that:

In its opinion pages, the newspaper has shown itself inclined towards HidroAysén...However, I'd emphasize that although in the beginning we were careful to cover both sides, later, as we saw the extent of the opposition to the project, we lowered the decibels of our exposure of HidroAysén a great deal.

In response to public opinion on the dams, then, the newspaper had both lowered the “decibels” of its coverage of the megaproject, and as the dams came to represent a world view that was rejected by many Chileans, the newspaper seems to have increased its coverage of the *opposite* view – as is evident from the close reading above, and the text analysis work that follows below. The way the HidroAysén case played out, then, seems to have had an effect on the position of at least one of the country's influential conservative news outlets.

### 7.6.3 *El Mostrador*

Like *La Tercera*, *El Mostrador* also produced a great spike in coverage around the time of the dams' approval (see Figure 13 in Chapter 6). As a smaller news institution, this online news outlet had consistently produced less coverage overall than the other two corpus media. Now, the number of megaproject-related articles in *El Mostrador* easily surpassed the number in *El Mercurio*.

On the day of the approval, *El Mostrador* wrote that there was “no surprise” that the project had been approved, and laid out the hurdles that it still had to pass through to become reality (05/09/2011b). It also began to report the anti-dams marches and legal appeals as ways to “delay” or “put a break on” the project given that the government “had come out in support” of it (10/05/2011a).

Like *La Tercera*, *El Mostrador* emphasized police violence against protesters, rather than attributing violence to the protesters themselves, as *El Mercurio* did. Like *La Tercera*, *El Mostrador* quoted Ojeda, saying that “the repressive attitude of the police was absolutely unfounded” (10/05/2011b). Later when suspension of approvals for the

marches was threatened, Ojeda was again quoted as saying that the marches were “legitimate” and could “not be prohibited” (23/05/2011). Of note is also the fact that *El Mostrador* reported different figures for the number of people at protests to the other two corpus papers, for example, it reported that 90-100,000 people had attended a march on 27 May, while the other newspapers had reported this figure as 40,000, and police said that only 15,000 people attended (28/05/2011a). As figures are almost always lower in conservative *El Mercurio*, and higher in *El Mostrador*, and given the admission of a Santiago police chief mentioned in footnote 67 in this chapter, it seems likely that number of protesters quoted has an ideological bias.

In terms of reporting government or institutional voices, *El Mostrador* also quoted Horvath, the anti-dams senator for Aysén, saying that the country’s “environmental institutionality” had been “assaulted” (09/05/2011c). *El Mostrador* also used the same quote from Girardi as *La Tercera* did, cited in the section above – a statement highly critical of the government stance on the dams (*El Mostrador*, 11/05/2011).

However, true to its pluralist position, the newspaper also quoted pro-dams, anti-protester voices and attitudes. For example, it quoted Golborne just as *El Mercurio* did, saying that “The citizenry is empowered, but it is not well informed” (13/05/2011). It also published pieces by commentators who pointed out “contradictions in the environmental cause” (28/05/2011b) and asked where the “green fury” had been when all of the coal burning power stations of the previous 20 years had been constructed (Hödar, *El Mostrador* 26/05/2011). There was a feature article by engineer José Maldifassi (Maldifassi, *El Mostrador* 22/05/2011) whose stance unequivocally underscored the benefits HidroAysén would have for the country in terms of jobs, energy and the development of new technologies. And a vehement piece by right wing Renovación Nacional party militant, Renato Gazmuri railed against the anti-dams protest of a “very good project”, calling it “extreme environmentalism” (Gazmuri, *El Mostrador* 24/05/2011). *El Mostrador*, then, clearly published arguments from actors on both sides of the debate.

Perhaps the most important aspect of discourse in *El Mostrador* at this time was the notion of citizen discontent at inequality and wealth concentration, and the association of HidroAysén with elites that appeared often in the media outlet’s coverage of the

dams. The newspaper also discussed HidroAysén in relation to Chile's democracy and its deficiencies, that the HidroAysén case had highlighted, and the model of growth that the country had followed, with its roots in the dictatorship. *El Mostrador* made clear now that the debate over HidroAysén was much more than an environmental one. For example, commentator Teresa Marinovic wrote:

The wound that has been opened is not to do with energy, but rather society...HidroAysén has just been an excuse to talk about the wealth concentration which keeps Chile at the very bottom of the OECD and keeps Chileans expressing a profound social discontent...this is a fight between the business class and the "proletariat" not between those that have an environmental conscience and those who don't.

(Marinovic, *El Mostrador* 18/05/2011)

And sociologist Marcelo Mendoza added:

HidroAysén...represents much more than the construction of dams in Patagonia. Somehow, it symbolises the disgust of the majority precisely for this fantasy of unbridled "growth" and the abstraction known as "the market"...

The small group of elites that incestuously moves from business to politics, or doesn't even move between the two, has forgotten about ordinary people. Gross inequality in incomes...has formed a society that is antidemocratic...

He added:

This rebellion symbolises the stellar distance which exists between power and the interests of the business-political class, and ordinary people.

(Mendoza, *El Mostrador* 21/05/2011)

In relation to growth, equality and HidroAysén, Director of pollster Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporanea (Centre for the Study of Contemporary Reality), Carlos Huneeus wrote in *El Mostrador* that when the dictatorship ended, growth had been defined as:

"growth with equity", but then this transformed into "growth at all costs", without taking into account "scandalous inequalities". But alleviating poverty has not led to more social or economic justice...Many people are now less concerned with obtaining material goods, as they have them, but instead with things that are immaterial, "postmaterialist"...The authorities should take seriously the importance of the environmental demands of the majority, and

fit the country's strategy for growth to these. The protests against HidroAysén are much more significant for this country than just a question of energy.

(Huneeus, *El Mostrador* 20/05/2011)

The same commentator wrote in a subsequent article exploring the cause of the protests against the megaproject that "the concentration of wealth" was a chief cause of the "citizens' discontent", so that:

although people live better than before, it's insufficient, because a small minority has benefitted much more than the majority. The perception of inequality in society is overwhelming.

(Huneeus, *El Mostrador* 07/06/2011)

In addition, the case of HidroAysén was discussed in *El Mostrador* as indicative of the state of Chile's democracy. Commentator José Aylwin, Co-director of the Observatorio Ciudadano (Citizens' Observatory) wrote that the project:

...makes clear the multiple limitations of the ability of Chilean institutional ability to guarantee citizens' basic rights, to protect the environment, and ultimately to legitimise a political system that can be defined as a democracy.

He also said that systems put in place under the dictatorship had permitted the case of HidroAysén to unfold as it had:

HidroAysén would not be possible without the institutional processes created by the dictatorship, which despite reforms, continue to exist without being greatly modified; depriving citizens of any power in the face of these kinds of projects.

(Aylwin, *El Mostrador* 17/05/2011)

Discourse over the root causes of discontent over HidroAysén was therefore quite explicit in *El Mostrador*, and this set the media outlet's coverage of the megaproject case fundamentally apart from that of *El Mercurio's* and *La Tercera's*. But this discourse on inequality in relation to the project was also *new* – and it came to be associated with the project from this time. This coincides with Chilton's (1987) concept of critical discourse moments as moments when discourse can change. It appears that in *El Mostrador*, and even in conservative publication *La Tercera*, there was indeed a change in discourse. HidroAysén's approval, then, certainly became a "moment of inflection" (Mendoza, *El*





Figure 35: Leximancer concept map for *El Mercurio*, 1 May-15 July 2011

In the concept map for *El Mercurio*, it is clear that the key theme is the ‘proyecto’ (project) which is now associated with the concepts, ‘autoridades’ (authorities), ‘aprobación’ (approval) and also words that relate to the approvals process, like Evaluación Ambiental (environmental evaluation), decision (decision) and tramitación (procedure/processing/paperwork). There are also some concepts that relate to the conflict around the project – for example ‘rechazo’ (rejection), ‘polémico’ (polemic) and críticas (criticisms). The next theme in order of importance is ‘país’ (country): related to this theme are the concepts ‘construcción’ (construction), ‘represas’ (dams), ‘megaproyecto’ (megaproject) and energético (energy as adjective).

Under the theme ‘Personas’ (people), of interest is the apparent emphasis in *El Mercurio* on violence and protest in relation to ‘people’: the terms ‘manifestaciones’ (protests), ‘violencia’ (violence), ‘disturbios’ (disturbances), ‘desórdenes’ (disorder) and even ‘gases’ (gasses) which relates to tear gas used against protesters at the marches. The ‘marchas’ (marches) also have enough significance in the corpus for *El Mercurio* that Leximancer treats them as a theme of themselves. Under this theme ‘enfrentamientos’ (confrontations) and ‘Carabineros’ (police) – referring to the violent confrontations with police which were carried out, it seemed, by *encapuchados*. The concept ‘gobierno’ (government) is closely associated with ‘institucionalidad’ (institutionality): *El Mercurio* certainly emphasised the validity of the institutional processes of government, clearly the reason this connection is made here. More peripheral are the themes ‘energía’/ ‘energética’ (energy as noun and adjective) for ‘desarrollo’ (development): *El Mercurio* was clearly still purveying a message of energy for development. Of note is that *El Mercurio* associates the word ‘apagón’ (blackout) with energy development, and it used this word in relationship to the argument for HidroAysén, with this newspaper arguing that the country faced blackouts in the absence of the megaproject. It is quite clear, then, from this “distant reading” that *El Mercurio*’s discourse was pro-project and anti-demonstrator, with little apparent exploration of the reasons behind the protests and the public’s rejection of the HidroAysén megaproject.

Leximancer’s concept map for *La Tercera*’s coverage over this period looks quite different. The key theme here is the project HidroAysén. Of interest is that

‘ambientalistas’ (environmentalists) and ‘rechazo’ (rejection) are some of the concepts most closely associated with HidroAysén in the *La Tercera* corpus articles. Also closely associated with HidroAysén itself are ‘investigación’ (investigation, referring to the investigation into the approval that was called for by opposition parliamentarians). Under the theme ‘ministros’ (ministers – this relating to the Committee of Ministers who would have the final say on the project) importantly, ‘irregularidades’ (irregularities) appears as a concept, this in relation to the charges of irregularities (also translated as ‘anomalies’, ‘malfeasance’ or ‘wrongdoing’) within the project that *La Tercera* reported on. This concept does not appear at all in the graphic for *El Mercurio*’s coverage.




Figure 36: *La Tercera*'s coverage 1 May-15 July 2011

The anti-megaproject protests were reported prominently enough to be depicted as a theme of *La Tercera's* coverage. However, protests are also shown closely related to

HidroAysén itself: the concepts 'marcha' (march) and 'manifestaciones' (protest). Of interest is that the concept 'marcha' (march) in *La Tercera* is closely connected to the concept 'pacífica' (peaceful), in contrast with *El Mercurio's* coverage which emphasises the violence. Under the theme 'Carabineros' (police), it seems police are associated with 'agresión' (aggression) and 'violencia' (violence) which is certainly how a close reading of the corpus shows that *La Tercera* reported police response to the anti-dam protests. The fact that the concepts 'cuidanía' (citizens or citizenry) and 'democracia' (democracy) appear at all demonstrates something of the difference in *La Tercera's* discourse from that of *El Mercurio's*. Also of interest is that, under the theme 'Chile' *La Tercera* uses the concepts 'energía' (energy) and 'renovables' (renewables). As discussed previously, 'renewable' energy in Chile is ERNCs (not large hydro) which means in *La Tercera's* discourse, ERNCs are prominent. They are not a concept identified in *El Mercurio's* coverage at all.

Finally, of interest in relation to *La Tercera* is that there is recognition of occurrences/processes in Santiago, versus on a *national* level: the themes of Santiago/Patagonia are directly linked. Under the theme 'nacional' (national) appear the concepts 'movimiento' (movement) and 'organizaciones' (organisations). Leximancer allows the user to drill down into the line locations of words, and I did this for the concepts 'organisations' and 'movement'. A close reading of the line locations where these words appear in *La Tercera's* discourse do show that the movement against HidroAysén appeared to be discussed as a national issue, protested nationally – not just as an issue for the region, or one decided in Santiago alone.




Figure 37: *El Mostrador* coverage 1 May-15 July 2011

Most notable in Leximancer's concept map for coverage of this critical discourse moment in *El Mostrador* is the finding that 'personas' (people) is the key theme, rather than in the case of the other two media outlets, 'project' and 'HidroAysén'; this reflecting the more human-orientated coverage in this media outlet, as opposed to the business/project orientated coverage of *El Mercurio*, at least. The theme 'personas' is directly connected to HidroAysén, and key concepts under 'personas' are 'protestas', 'manifestaciones' and 'marchas' (protests, demonstrations, marches). The marches seem to have been reported as 'pacífica' (peaceful). On the other hand, 'Carabineros' (police) is closely associated with 'violencia' (violence). Of interest also, is the fact that 'proyecto' (project) and 'política' (politics) make up the next two leading themes. *El Mostrador*, it seems, reported the project – which here also had 'irregularidades' (irregularities, see also other translations above), 'impactos' (impacts) and 'críticas'

(critics) – as a *political project*. Under the theme ‘politics’, however, key concepts are ‘cambio’ (change), ‘jóvenes’ (young people), and other concepts seemingly not present in the other two publications: ‘futuro’ (future), ‘verdad’ (truth) and ‘naturaleza’ (nature). ‘Educación’ (education) also appears here: making it clear that *El Mostrador* did indeed align its coverage of the dams issue with the protests of young people about education. Interestingly, ‘gobierno’ (government), ‘cuidadanía’ (citizens, citizenry) and ‘conflictos’ (conflicts) appear closely linked, reflecting the way that *El Mostrador* seems to have framed people’s discontent with government. Other concepts discovered in the text analysis add to this understanding. For example, under the theme ‘Chile’ ‘indignación’ (outrage) appears, and under the theme ‘sociales’ (social as adjective) the concepts ‘profundo, malestar, descontento’ (deep, unrest/upset, discontent) are also mapped, suggesting deep social discontent. The concepts ‘redes’ and ‘sociales’ (social networks/social media) and also appear close together: *El Mostrador* analysed how the anti-dams and education movement operated and organised through social media.

Perhaps of most interest here is the theme ‘crecimiento’ (growth), showing that discourse in *El Mostrador* was concerned with Chile’s model of growth and, most closely linked to this theme ‘desigualdades’ inequalities. There seems to be a binary opposition drawn here between ‘empresas’ (companies) and the ‘mayoría’ (majority), and the issue of ‘pobreza’ (poverty) is also present. *El Mostrador*, then, discussed the difficulties of growth, poverty and inequality – which neither of the other two corpus media outlets did. There is even some hint that the discontent over education and dams was reported as a class issue in *El Mostrador*: the theme ‘clase’ (class) is closely co-located here with the word ‘revolución’ (revolution). *El Mostrador* then, clearly reported the HidroAysén debate as much more than an environmental conflict, going to the very root of citizen discontent over both education and the dams, and analysing the vehement rejection of the dams as an artefact of the prevailing social landscape.

Overall, then, it is clear that the three corpus media took quite different positions at this time on HidroAysén. While *El Mercurio*’s approach was “business as usual”, *La Tercera* made a departure now for the first time from its rival conservative outlet’s position, in the words of its Deputy Editor “lowering the decibels” of its support for the megaproject, and increasing its exploration of alternative views of the Patagonia dams situation. *El Mostrador* now explicitly attributed the roots of discontent over the dams

to the social inequality that the project had become emblematic of. The May 2011 approval of the dams was therefore a turning point in the discourse on the megaproject. HidroAysén found itself with less media support, and the opposition to the project with more mainstream media coverage of its positions, during the conflict-filled Chilean Winter of 2011.

## 7.7 Conclusion

As Alexander (2006, p. 233-234) tells us, in “power conflicts” such as the symbolic conflict between Patagonia sin Represas and HidroAysén, “representation is critical”. The protest campaign had fought since 2007 to influence media representation of the HidroAysén megaproject, to sway public opinion, and to influence government decision-making on the megaproject. Now, in the conflict and chaos that surrounded the project’s approval, it seemed that anti-dams voice had finally been able to make some degree of “strategic intervention” (Lester 2010a) in discourse on the megaproject. Social media “switching” (Arsenault & Castells 2008, Castells 2009) with mainstream media was one avenue for this. Street protests against the dams also now generated vast mainstream media attention for months during 2011, and protest becoming active in one public arena – that of the streets – produced discourse in other public arenas (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988), the media arena and the political one. These are also sites Lester & Hutchins’ (2015) identify as switching points in the enactment of mediatized environmental conflicts. Aided by the negative public reaction to HidroAysén’s “campaign of terror”, and by an angry citizenry for which the megaproject was just one aspect of a wider discontent, the anti-dams campaign seems to have succeeded in shaping public discourse more now than at any other time in the debate timeframe. Cottle tells us that media themselves can become actors in mediatized conflicts while “disseminating images or ideas about them” (2006 p. 9). While we see in this period that the conservative position of *El Mercurio* had not greatly changed, discourse on the dams in *La Tercera* and in *El Mostrador* does seem to have altered, making both media outlets influential actors in the dams debate in this period.

Following HidroAysén’s approval, public opinion on the project was more negative than ever. In May 2011, polling found 74% of Chileans disapproved of the megaproject: 87% of those who defined themselves as politically left-leaning, as well as 59% of those who

regarded themselves as politically of the right. Disapproval of the project rose to 81% amongst all 18-34 year-olds. However, perhaps most indicative of Chileans' sense of distrust in government was the fact that, asked whether they believed that the dams would be built anyway, 72% of Chileans said they believed that they would (according to a Centro de Estudios *La Tercera* poll, reported in *El Mostrador* 15/05/2011). Now that HidroAysén had become (as Contreras put it) "an emblem, an icon of the neoliberal market model", there seemed little way the project could shift this discursive representation. The next chapter outlines some of the ways the beleaguered megaproject appeared to try to do that.



## Chapter 8: Invisible once again

### 8.1 Introduction

This last research chapter traces the attempted withdrawal from national mediatized discourse by the developing company, in the wake of the protests of May/June 2011. Now that HidroAysén had become a symbolic construct, associated with layers of meaning, many of which were negative for the megaproject, the project's management opted out of national public discourse as far as possible for a second time. It seems the decision to go "low-profile" again was also part of the company's crisis communication strategy. In this final phase of communication analysed here, the company again attempted to achieve relative invisibility on a national level, and instead to concentrate its communication efforts in the communities close to the dams. In Chapter 5, I argued that in the Chilean context, a megaproject developer such as HidroAysén could opt not to conduct national-level communications and stay "low-profile" (Fernández, interviewed 19/12/2013) because in this particular national setting (up to that moment, at least) negotiations with key government decision makers and cultivation of relations with communities in the project zone had been more crucial to a project's success than conducting national-level strategic communications.

I show in this chapter, however, that the furore over HidroAysén in 2011 seems to have marked a turning point in the previously accepted way of negotiating projects such as this one. HidroAysén's owners may have hoped for continuing lines of communication with government, so that behind-the-scenes negotiations could continue out of the public eye: "invisibility" with the kind of "strategic utility" that Lester and Hutchins (2012b) have identified in sensitive environmental debates, so that talks can unfold "free of media interference" (2012a, p. 22). However, evidence analysed in this chapter indicates that, as the tide of national public opinion turned against HidroAysén and all that it symbolised, the willingness of government to hear HidroAysén's arguments, and to make conditions suitable for the advancement of the project, seems to have waned. So although in 2011 when it withdrew from national communications, the megaproject may still have expected, and may indeed have exercised, some "invisible" negotiating capacity, by 2013, this was clearly not the case.

HidroAysén and Patagonia sin Represas had now been waging communicational sparring over the megaproject for five years. In the period analysed in this chapter, however, it is difficult for Patagonia sin Represas to engage with HidroAysén in the media, simply because the megaproject sought to be *out of* the national media as far as possible. Local communications are therefore addressed in this chapter, and I ask what HidroAysén's deliberate withdrawal from national-level discourse means for our understanding of the communication of megaprojects that are of national significance. I also discuss here the ways in which the anti-dams campaign endeavoured to keep HidroAysén on media agendas – including through events, making the megaproject a key election issue, and through public interest environmental litigation (McGrath 2008) against the project.

In examining this final phase in the communication of this lengthy discursive battle, this chapter completes this study's survey of mediatized discourse in the HidroAysén debate 2008-2014, as set out in the research questions. In addition, I expand on my response to the research question concerning this debate becoming emblematic, exploring here how the anti-dams movement *also* became emblematic to some degree, through its opponents' discursive construction. Although the bulk of media discourse on the megaproject ends shortly after the Committee of Ministers withdrew environmental approvals and rejected the project in June 2014, discussion of HidroAysén in the media did not stop there. In the last section of this chapter, therefore, I show how HidroAysén remained a feature of media discourse right up until the end of 2017 when the company was dissolved. I argue here, and in this study's conclusion, that even after the project had ended, HidroAysén had taken a seemingly permanent position in ongoing discourse over energy and development, as a symbol for the kind of development Chile rejected when it rejected HidroAysén.

## **8.2 Retreat to the region: HidroAysén ends national-scale communications**

HidroAysén itself had been largely silent in terms of its own strategic communications since it had received the green light of environmental approval. The day after the project was approved, it had issued just one media release, praising the country's "rigorous environmental institutionality" and again presenting the project as "clean,

renewable and Chilean” and as being “for the country’s development” (HidroAysén 10/05/2011). In the month after the approval, there had been a few interviews with Fernández in all three corpus media, and also as discussed above, in the broadcast media. Other than granting these interviews, HidroAysén appeared to make little response to the furore that its approval had garnered. As discussed in the previous chapter, the company appeared to believe it could do little in this “damage control” mode other than “wait out the storm.” (Ibarra, *El Mercurio* 29/05/2011) There was seemingly little attempt at crisis communications in terms of media relations strategies, or in terms of stakeholder communications on a national level.


Then, a month after the approval, HidroAysén began a new advertising campaign in the main regional newspaper in Aysén, apparently directly in response to the mass protests, particularly in the capital. In June 2011, the company published the first of its full-page advertisements in *El Diario de Aysén* (The Newspaper of Aysén), based in Coyhaique, and distributed throughout the region. The advertisement read:

Do you think that the people of Santiago care about health in the Aysén region? At HidroAysén, our commitment is with you, who lives in the region. In terms of health, the HidroAysén project is contemplating setting up a Medical Centre, the equipping of the Cochrane Hospital, and the modernisation of the health posts at Caleta Tortel and Villa O’Higgins. Our commitment is to you. HidroAysén. Chile with energy.



Figure 38: Example of HidroAysén's 2011 advertising campaign in the Aysén region

Similar ads run in regional publications asked: "Do you think that in Santiago there are problems with transport connectivity?...HidroAysén contemplates construction, repair or improvement of 237 kilometres of roads..." Another ad posed the question: "Do you think that in Santiago there is a lack of educational opportunities or establishments?" – and then listed the benefits that the company said it would bring to the region in terms of education. These claims were backed up on the company's Twitter page:



This tweet reads: “#hidroaysen will bring equipment to Cochrane Hospital and to the [health] posts at Caleta Tortel and Villa O’Higgins.” And also:



Here, the company substantiates its claims of improvements in the field of education. It says “Our scholarship plan for the Lord Cochrane College is considering 25 scholarships annually for a period of 10 years from the start of the project’s construction.”

HidroAysén had seemingly identified an important point of difference for communicating the project in the region, versus in the capital. The company’s Communications and Community Relations director Maria Irene Soto noted in interview that people in Aysén ask:

‘Why do they have to tell us from Santiago how we should live?’...People say: ‘why in Santiago are they marching and protesting against the project if they don’t even know where Patagonia is. If they don’t know where Cochrane is. If they don’t live like we do here?’ To get from one place to another here, people drive six or seven hours on dirt roads. Sometimes they don’t have access to a doctor. In Santiago, if you get sick, you go to the doctor. Here, you don’t. There, everything is easily accessible. Here, people feel passed over. They feel somehow that they have not been thought of for many years...They feel isolated and they feel discriminated against. The project allows them to see that perhaps they can win something with this. They think: ‘at least at last now we are being seen.’

(Soto, interviewed 14/11/2013)

The campaign was immediately criticised by commentators in the national media, who characterised the discursive opposition of Santiago with the region in the ads as retribution by HidroAysén for the protests in Santiago. *La Tercera* quoted Luis Mariano Rendón, head of one of the Patagonia sin Represas NGOs, Acción Ecológica, as saying

that: “this is a highly unscrupulous campaign that is trying to divide Chileans”. He said the campaign intended to “attack people from Santiago and set them against the inhabitants of Aysén” and was trying to make the project “seem like the solution to all the region’s problems.” He also said that the campaign seemed “particularly odious if one takes into account that we are talking about a company that that is foreign majority controlled”. (Yaikin, *La Tercera* 15/06/2011).

This short-lived campaign (it ran only June-August 2011) demarcated an important shift in HidroAysén’s communications. This seemed to be informed by the fact that the project was now more opposed in the capital and other parts of Chile than it was on the ground in Aysén: in May 2011 74% were against HidroAysén nationally (*El Mostrador* 15/05/2011) while 60% opposed it in Aysén, and 66% said they would vote against the project in a plebiscite (López, *El Mercurio* 14/05/2011). Now seemingly unable to make any communicational headway against the tide of protest across the country, the developing company prioritised its communication efforts in the region. In interview for this study, HidroAysén head Fernández explained the strategy for communications after mid-2011 as follows:

Low profile, let’s call it...Not just because of the protests, but because of the feeling that the company wasn’t the one that needed to be communicating...In the surveys that we did, we didn’t have sufficient credibility. People said “no, we don’t believe the company”.

Fernández added that public opinion on a local level was more valuable to the company than that on a national level. From this point on, this therefore meant for the company being:

...more low profile at a national level, and we concentrated on relations with the local community, that is, in the region. Relations with the community, conversations, generation of confidence, horizontality.

(Fernández, interviewed 19/12/2013)

HidroAysén’s communications in the region now meant, until mid-2014, the publication of a tabloid-like newspaper four times a year, the continuation of the company’s radio programs “Conversemos con HidroAysén” (discussed in Chapter 5) and an open-door policy in regional offices where people could come and learn about the project. Between 2012 and 2014, the company also ran a program of house-to-house visits several times a



year. These were door-knocks in the towns and villages of the region. Two HidroAysén personnel visited each house, and if welcomed in, sat down for a conversation with the inhabitants. Quotes from project supporters were often posted on the company's Twitter page.



Figure 39: A Twitter post showing a HidroAysén home visit. The text reads: “Door-to-door. Marisol Vera isn’t in favour of, or against, she believes that the project will bring better work.”

Importantly, these visits also involved, from 2013, showing a 5-minute video on the dams with an energetic, documentary-like voiceover. Soto reported that previously, the company had been loath to depict the dam walls.

This was also a lesson for us. We had never dared to show a real image. But then we said ‘let’s make real images, show it just like it is, with real videos, just like they are’. And when people see these, they change their perception.

(Soto, interviewed 14/11/2013)

The “real images” were an animated video of dam walls neatly appearing without any machinery and ice-blue reservoirs quickly filling: an undoubtedly much-sanitised version of the messy 10-year process of dam building.

Part of the communications strategy at these home visits was also to give a DVD recording of a Discovery Channel documentary that had been made about the Patagonia dams project, and released on the user-pay Discovery Channel with several showings in

November 2012. The documentary, *Desafíos Futuros: HidroAysén* (*Future Challenges: HidroAysén*) had been much criticised by the anti-dams movement which had called it an “infomercial” (Leal, *Radio Bío Bío* 25/11/2012). There had been an uproar in the social networks about the documentary as soon as it screened, for example:



Fig 38: Writer and political commentator Patricio Herman wrote: “Unfortunate, not to say shameful, the public relations support that Discovery Channel Latin America is giving HidroAysén.” Environmental governance specialist Sam Leiva wrote: [now] “Discovery Channel defending #hidroaysen: because they haven’t been able to convince us with their terror campaigns, now [they try to convince us] with reporting.” And Sebastián Soto wrote: “Image washing of the highest order. Documentary about HidroAysén on Discovery Channel.”

The 44-minute documentary, which is still available as a HidroAysén video on Vimeo (Discovery Channel 2012) is certainly favourable towards HidroAysén and seems to echo many of the company’s key messages about the dams, without any alternative viewpoints. Though it is not clear on what basis the documentary was made (whether as a paid commercial arrangement between HidroAysén and the film makers or otherwise) it seems that HidroAysén subsequently acquired the rights to distribute this documentary. When I was conducting interviews with the company, I was given a copy. In the homes and guesthouses in which I stayed when interviewing in the Aysén region in 2013, I also observed copies of the documentary. When I asked where people had



obtained this the answer was always that it had been given to them by HidroAysén.<sup>70</sup> These two powerful audiovisual outputs therefore seemed also to be key parts of the strategy to convince the region to accept the megaproject.

At the time that HidroAysén had retreated from national communications, it was also investing in community acceptance in the region by providing a range of programs that it considered corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. As discussed in Chapter 5, some of these initiatives had already been banned by the regional representative Comptroller General in 2010, on grounds of conflict of interests while the project was in the approvals process. However, some initiatives, including those the megaproject developer cited in its advertising campaign discussed above, were still active. The controversial program of competitive grants for private projects in the region continued until 2012, and the HidroAysén scholarships program continued past this date so that the scholarship holders could complete their studies.

Interviewed in Coyhaique 2013, Soto explained the company's change in communications from late 2011/early 2012, and the ongoing CSR effort, as follows:

We changed our way of doing things completely. We opted to stop communicating on a national level. And now when we are working here, we don't go in and tell people: 'it's like this.' Instead, we go and say, 'you know, we've made some errors, we were wrong about this, we were wrong in doing that.' ...First we were wrong in not listening to you. We were wrong to bring in the competitive grants, because you, who got the money were happy, but your neighbour, who didn't, was angry. We made mistakes, perhaps, in the distribution of the scholarships, because some people benefitted and others didn't. What we should have done was we should have worked with local organisations, built the social fabric, been able to co-construct the project. We've changed now from: 'this is the project, see if you can understand it, and if you like it, good, and if not, let me explain it to you', to: 'let's talk', let's build this together. How does this seem to you? How do you feel about this? What's happening for you?

(Soto, interviewed 14/11/2013)

---

<sup>70</sup>CDP Executive secretary and Patagonia sin Represas representative Patricio Rodrigo wrote on behalf of the campaign organisations to Discovery Channel, calling the documentary a "publicity report that was favourable to an initiative that had been highly questioned both nationally and internationally" (Rodrigo 26/11/2012). In this letter, Rodrigo suggested that a documentary from the anti-dams campaign viewpoint be broadcast by Discovery Channel. The anti-dams documentary *Patagonia se Levanta/Patagonia Rising* was indeed broadcast by Discovery Channel four times in September 2013.

This seeming attempt at a corporate apologia as an aspect of the company's crisis communication appeared to be an effort to retrieve and build reputation in the region in the wake of the local and national protests. As Coombs et al. (2010) tell us, "crisis communication can be used to reduce the level of negative emotions experienced by stakeholders" (p.338), and corporate apologia, as an aspect of crisis communication, is a rhetoric of self-defence that corporations can employ, if considered sufficiently credible, to restore reputation.

From HidroAysén's viewpoint, this "retreat" to the dam-building region, a change in communications strategy, and some degree of continuing CSR initiatives seemingly *did* bear fruit. Soto reported in interview in 2013 that, according to the company's own surveys, support for the project in some parts of the potentially-affected region was "up around 70%". However, she also reported that by this date, in the region *overall*, support was "almost even, around 41.7 in favour, and 41.6 against" the project. Of interest is that surveys *not* conducted by HidroAysén found quite different levels of support in some areas. For example, Bernardo López, the mayor of Caleta Tortel, the settlement at the mouth of the River Baker, reported in an interview for this study (28/10/2013) that a survey conducted in his municipality (in 2013) recorded 68% against the project, some 20% pro-project and some 9% undecided.

HidroAysén's communicational retreat to the Aysén region, and its "low profile" period directly after the project's approval can be understood as an attempt to become invisible once again – or at least visible only in the region of Aysén which, as discussed in Chapter 5, meant communicating with just 0.5% of the country's population. Lester and Hutchins (2012b) have asked "why some actors choose not to be seen" and under what conditions it is "possible to remain unseen" (p. 850) in the context of an Australian forestry conflict. In Chile, as noted above, this megaproject developer's attempts to exit the national media spotlight from mid-2011 seem to have been informed by the notion that more could be achieved through persuading those sectors that really mattered to the project's development: populations on the ground in Aysén and decision-makers in the capital. As discussed in Chapter 5, HidroAysén's ex-PR account executive at Burson-Marsteller (interviewed 16/12/2013) had spoken of a "strong lobby" on the part of the company's shareholders "directly to the source of power", and the senator for Aysén Antonio Horvath (interviewed 26/11/2013) had mentioned "subterranean negotiations", secret

negotiations between the megaproject developers and decision makers. It was also clear that, as discussed in Chapter 5, due to the nature of social structures in Chile, those at the helm of HidroAysén had had direct access to government decision makers for much of the trajectory of the project.

However, the potential for this kind of influence depended on the prevailing political landscape, the election cycle, and certainly from the point of view of decision-makers, on public opinion. Though Piñera's government had been largely supportive of the project, opposition voices were not, and with majority public opinion now against the megaproject, there was clearly political capital to be lost in maintaining overt support of it. Piñera's popularity had already fallen dramatically in the wake of the HidroAysén approval, from 63% in October 2010 to 36% by May 2011 (Canales, *La Tercera* 02/06/2011). It was evident that by late 2013, as the company still waited for the final decision of the Committee of Ministers, with a change of government predicted, there was little political will to take responsibility for decision-making on the project right at the end of Piñera's term. Government support for the project was in now in doubt. Asked in late 2013 if lobbying of decision-makers in the capital remained active on the part of the megaproject, the company's ex-account executive at Burson-Marsteller commented:

I don't think so. I'm really out of this now, but I don't think there's much, I don't think there's much. That is, HidroAysén used to have direct lines of information to the Committee of Ministers. Now, they don't even have any idea when they're going to meet.

(Burson-Marsteller account executive, interviewed 16/12/2013)

It was clear, then, that between late 2011 and 2013 as the megaproject's influence in the corridors of power may have been waning, and national media coverage was not deemed useful for the project, the only key communications avenue that remained was the one on the ground in Aysén. As the Burson-Marsteller executive said, in explaining the company's communicational retreat to the region:

What couldn't happen, if people were against the project on a national level, was to lose the region. If we had the region against us, the project wouldn't be viable. I mean, close the curtains and we go.

However, the fact that HidroAysén withdrew from national communications post-protests in 2011, did not mean the company remained invisible on a national level: it

was not entirely possible for it “to remain unseen” (Lester & Hutchins 2012b, p. 850). As shown in Chapter 6, there were several external events, some created by Patagonia sin Represas, in which the megaproject was made more visible in the national media. In addition, the project developers continued to use the company’s website and Twitter to broadcast the benefits of the project, on Twitter, often cycling repeatedly through the same affirmations about the benefits of the project, often with images of Aysén locals and quoting their reasons for supporting the project. Daniel Fernández also continued to “present the benefits of the project” (*El Mercurio* 01/08/2011) to select, elite audiences, particularly in the capital.

What is important here is that the developing company of the largest infrastructure project in Chile’s history was declining, once again, to communicate its project on a national level. Its communication efforts now sought to bypass national media and evade national public opinion. That HidroAysén intended to maintain low profile in the latter part of the megaproject debate signifies a rejection of traditional media as a key sphere for information and debate. This new kind of “invisibility” in favour of targeted conversations with limited stakeholder groups has obvious implications for public debate on an issue of national significance. Avoiding a media presence is clearly an effective way to evade scrutiny, but it is also a way to attempt to *exclude* groups that would rather engage their opponents publically through mediatized debate. If only one side is present in the media, there can be little effective debate. Likewise, if the more powerful partner in mediatized sparring – the partner which has always attracted more media attention, as HidroAysén did – withdraws from mediatized visibility, then the issue at stake seems more likely to drop off media agendas. Apart from moments in which Patagonia sin Represas was able to attract media attention to HidroAysén between late 2011 and 2014, and apart from events in the course of the dams’ development which were newsworthy for a period, this was precisely what now occurred in the mediatized debate over this megaproject.

### **8.3 Keeping HidroAysén visible**

The task for Patagonia sin Represas after the outrage surrounding the approval and the protests of 2011, then, was to keep the megaproject in the news. Between late 2011 and 2014 when the project was finally rejected, there were several events – some related to

legal proceedings in which the project had become involved, some spontaneous news events, some publicity events created by the anti-dams campaign – that garnered media coverage.

In the year after the 2011 approval alone the project was subject to 15 separate legal actions and was briefly “paralysed” (Moya, *El Mercurio* 20/06/2011) by a ruling of the Court of Appeals in the southern city of Puerto Montt in a case brought by Horvath, Girardi and the anti-dams campaign. By the middle of 2012, some appeals had been dismissed in favour of HidroAysén, but others remained active. The megaproject was also now under investigation by a committee of the Lower House for possible “irregularities” in its approvals process. As well as its intent to “delay” and “overturn” the project, according to environmentalist Juan Pablo Orrego, this public interest environmental litigation (McGrath 2008) was one of Patagonia sin Represas’ publicity strategies. Orrego said:

We made sure to get all possible media attention out of each round in the courts, whether we were successful or not. As long as it stayed in the courts, HidroAysén also stayed in the news.

(Orrego, interviewed 12/06/2013)

Reporting on the project *did* increase when announcements on the legal actions’ outcomes were made. Reports on the legal actions made up so much of the media discourse from late 2011 that legal terms fill the corpus: “investigations” “legal proceedings”, “appeals”, “judicial rulings” “remedies of protection” and “constitutional protection lawsuits” are regularly associated in media discourse with the dams. In April 2012, the Supreme Court rejected a key case brought against the megaproject by anti-dams politicians and activists. This event was widely reported. Alejandro Navarro, vicepresident of the Senate was quoted in *La Tercera* (04/04/2012) as saying: “HidroAysén has won the battle, but not the war”. *El Mercurio*, however editorialised in an article headlined “Green light for HidroAysén” that “the decision of the Supreme Court is positive for the country” (*El Mercurio* 07/04/2012). A series of legal appeals continued right up until 2017, periodically gaining media visibility.

In February and March 2012, protests erupted in Aysén. Blockades of roads and bridges brought the region to a halt and onto the national news again. The Aysén Uprising was

not specifically about the dams project, though Patagonia sin Represas was one of the 24 organisations represented in the protests. People in Aysén were calling for attention to their plight of being isolated and ignored, suffering high prices of food and fuel, with few work and educational opportunities, poor transport connectivity, all the while being managed from distant Santiago, where projects like HidroAysén, which would have such significant impact on the region, were negotiated. The protests had the support of 80% of *Ayseninos* (as people from this part of Chile are known). One of a list of demands that that the protestors had was for binding regional plebiscites on megaprojects like HidroAysén, for greater regional control over planning, and for Santiago to cede control over resources, like fish and water, to the region. The protests made Aysén visible nationally (McAllister 2012) and though they were dealt with brutally by 3000 troops shipped to the region (six people lost eyes to police bullets), they must have served as a warning both to government and to the megaproject's developers about the kind of protest that was possible in Aysén if the megaproject were to be forced on the region.

During 2012 and 2013, the anti-dams movement also organised various events in Santiago to keep HidroAysén visible. To commemorate International Earth Day on 22 April 2012, the campaign organised a music event in the centre of Santiago, which it titled, seemingly in response to the media's heralding of a "green light" for the project, "Luz Roja a HidroAysén" (Red Light for HidroAysén).



Figure 40: One of Patagonia sin Represas' tweets about the 22 April event.

Some of Chile's best known musicians donated their time, and the event, which *La Tercera* noted went ahead "peacefully" (*La Tercera* 22/04/2012), was widely covered in the broadcast media, including in a special report by CNN Chile. In December of 2012, anti-dams organisations followed the same format and held a concert it called: "Juntos Desenchufemos HidroAysén" (Together Let's Unplug HidroAysén). This was another

happening which seemed to be both organised and discussed after the event on social media, more than in traditional media:



Figure 41: Facebook post and YouTube link for “Juntos Desenchufemos HidroAysén”.

Though the event was reported in the corpus media, the articles mainly discussed the musicians who would be playing and offered little analysis surrounding the anti-dams protest, though *El Mercurio* (09/12/2012) did note that the event was intended to highlight anti-megaproject positions in advance of the Committee of Ministers’ vote on the project, now expected in January 2013.

Patagonia sin Represas’ most successful initiative in this period in terms of public visibility and political adhesion was a campaign it called “Vota sin Represas” (Vote without Dams) which was launched in a televised event at the National Congress in July 2013 in the run up to presidential elections in 2013/14. Its aim was to make HidroAysén a key election issue as it had been in the 2009/10 election. Vota sin Represas asked candidates running for election at any level of government to declare their position on the dams, and to make a signed commitment to work towards a Patagonia free of dam megaprojects. This publicity strategy included social media content, letter box drops, advertisements in print media and posters on public transport routes. Though the Vota sin Represas initiative is not named frequently in the corpus media, apart from some publicity surrounding its launch (for example, *El Mercurio* 09/06/2013) the dams certainly became a crucial issue in the election from this time. Vota sin Represas’ social

media sites were active, with over 9000 followers on Facebook, nearly 4000 on Twitter, and Vota sin Represas videos on YouTube. On Twitter, Vota sin Represas kept a rolling tally of candidates who declared their positions on the dams:



Figure 42: A tweet showing Senator Horvath’s “reaffirmation” of his commitment to a Patagonia without Dams, and a Vota sin Represas’ tally of presidential candidates who had declared themselves “without dams”.

On Facebook also, Vota sin Represas urged Chileans to vote for candidates that had declared their opposition to dam projects for Patagonia:





Figure 43: “There are thousands of us who want a Patagonia Without Dams. In these elections, vote for the candidates who commit to a Patagonia free of...”

It seemed that the public pressure for candidates to declare a position on the dams had indeed borne fruit for the anti-dams movement, when in a debate on TVN in late-2013, leading candidate Bachelet stated in relation to the megaproject: “I don’t think it is viable. I am not in favour of it” – a move interpreted in all the corpus media, as *La Tercera* put it, “increasing the difficulty” for the project (*La Tercera* 26/11/2013).

#### **8.4 “Uncertainty threatens the project”**

During this period, there was one other key news event that kept HidroAysén visible. Since early 2011, Piñera’s government had been promising legislation on a “Carretera Eléctrica” (“Electricity Highway”), a publically financed project to connect all Chile’s electricity grids<sup>71</sup>. For HidroAysén, this would have meant a 900km reduction in the length of its proposed transmission line, with consequent savings. By mid-2012, however, this project had not advanced, or been defined with any clarity by the Piñera government. Also, the Committee of Ministers charged with giving HidroAysén final approval, which had initially had 30 days from May 2011 to make its ruling, had still not delivered an outcome, partly due to ongoing litigation (see Chapter 7, footnote 66).

At the end of May 2012, Colbún delivered a bombshell. The company declared that it would be withdrawing from and suspending indefinitely its participation in the EIS process for HidroAysén’s 2300km transmission line because of lack of a clear energy policy in Chile. Fernández had foreshadowed the decision in a speech at a Reuters forum in the capital. *El Mercurio* (29/05/2012) reported him as criticizing both “legal action to delay and stop projects”, and also government actions that had engendered “uncertainty” on the project. He said that potential investors were reluctant to invest in such an atmosphere. The following day, a Colbún media release, quoted in *El Mercurio* (30/05/2012) read:

---

<sup>71</sup> Some of those opposing HidroAysén called the project the “Carretera Hidroeléctrica”, arguing that it would be an initiative made to measure for HidroAysén and other hydroelectric dams intending to export their energy from Patagonia: effectively a government subsidy of private energy projects (Cuadra 2013).

While there is no energy policy with national consensus to define the energy matrix that the country requires, Colbún considers that the conditions for developing energy projects of this magnitude and complexity do not exist.

The announcement seemed to constitute an indefinite suspension of HidroAysén. There was a flurry of media coverage, evident in the corpus media. *El Mercurio* (01/06/2012) described the news as a “violent upset”. *El Mostrador* characterised this as a protest against perceived government inaction to facilitate the project, saying that this was “an act of pressurising the government”, that “the Mattes are banging their fists on the table” (*El Mostrador* 31/05/2012). Another article in *El Mostrador* (01/06/2012) said that metaphorically: “the Matte family felt it had no other option than to go out on the street and burn tyres”. *El Mostrador* (02/06/2012) also reported that this was an “ultimatum” by the Mattes to force the government’s hand, and reported Horvath as saying that there was “something akin to bribery” in this move (30/08/2012). *La Tercera* likewise reported the move as the company exerting pressure on the government. It quoted parliamentarian Alfonso de Uresti as saying: “this is a signal of pressure on the executive so that it finally makes a determination in favour of the project” (*La Tercera* 31/05/2012). Piñera blamed both the environmental movement and developing companies themselves for the situation, but promised action from government. *El Mercurio* (Concha & Tapia, *El Mercurio* 2/06/2012) quoted him saying that:

Various energy projects are being confronted with a ferocious opposition by environmentalists and other groups that try to impede their construction, while the companies complain that they still don’t have clear rules to move forward with their investments...The state must establish mechanisms to expedite both generation and transmission projects so that that they don’t have obstacles put in their way by bureaucracy or legal actions...

In its editorials around this time, *El Mercurio* reiterated its support for the project and criticisms of the anti-dams movement, calling it a “serious blunder” for the Chilean economy “that must be resolved immediately” (*El Mercurio* 3/06/2012). It said:

Since the project began, the HidroAysén project (with 2750MW of power and with the possibility of bringing the country an enormous amount of energy for its development, by means of five dams that would flood in total 5900 hectares which would correspond to 0,00054 of the area of Aysén, 108,494 km<sup>2</sup>, – waters which if not used for generation of electricity are lost into the sea – and a continuous current transmission line, with just one cable and not like the transmission towers that we see in the central part of the country) the merciless attacks by “progressives”, “greens”, “environmentalists” and

“foreigners” have intensified. These fail to recognise that if this project is not built, we will have to recourse urgently to options that are more polluting, and that energy will get more expensive.

Of Colbún’s position *El Mercurio* said:

Hopefully this decision will not be final, and that the problems that affect hydro and thermoelectric projects will be resolved, because there is always the danger that the investor, who sees himself harassed and denigrated by “environmentalists” “greens” “progressives” and other “foreigners”, will decide not to invest in the country...

(*El Mercurio* 04/06/2012)

From this point, discourse in the corpus media in relation to the megaproject is filled with the word “incertidumbre” (uncertainty). Between 2008 and April 2012, the word is mentioned in 12 articles in the corpus media. After April 2012, until the final decision on the project was made in 2014, 49 articles used the word at least once. The word “indefinición” (lack of clarity, or vagueness) in relation to government policy on energy also appears in the discourse from 2012. Also, after the decision by Colbún in May 2012, the word “inviable” (unviable) is frequently used. For example, Horvath is quoted in *El Mercurio* in May 2012 as saying “HidroAysén is increasingly unviable” (*El Mercurio* 30/05/2012) and *La Tercera* quoted Greenpeace head, Asún, as saying that Colbún’s withdrawal was a sign that the project was “not only finished, but completely unviable” (*La Tercera* 30/05/2012). The word “unviable” appears 18 times in the corpus media before April 2012, but 39 times between that date and the end of the corpus in 2014. It seems HidroAysén was therefore surrounded by uncertainty, lack of government support and an increasing discourse on its unviability, from mid-2012. By early 2013, the megaproject had been withdrawn from Endesa’s portfolio of projects in Chile, however, the company continued to work on the technical and legal aspects of the project, on attracting investors, and of course, on relations with communities on the ground.

## 8.5 Patagonia sin Tompkins

During the time that HidroAysén was working, “low-profile” in the region to generate more local approval for the project, there seemed to be a new initiative afoot: to demonise Douglas Tompkins. As a key funder and communications mastermind of

Patagonia sin Represas, Tompkins had long been a thorn in the side of the company. The company had never spared its words in its public criticism of the environmentalist, nor he of the company. From HidroAysén's point of view, the American owner of vast tracts of Patagonia was the chief obstacle to the megaproject's progress. Conservative media had largely concurred with this position. For example, amongst many other negative assessments of Tompkins in the corpus media for this study, *El Mercurio* had published a scathing op-ed in late 2011 (by the director of a right-libertarian American think tank) in which it accused Tompkins of "green neoimperialism":

Developing countries continue to be vulnerable to imperialism, now based in ideologies like environmentalism. The green "missionaries" of these ideologies propose to save the world from environmental degradation...Convinced of their moral superiority, these green imperialists use their persuasive rhetoric and indirect methods to paralyse economic development...An example: Douglas Tompkins. Tompkins is a typical "green" missionary, a very rich gringo who made his fortune with his companies, Esprit, and The North Face...They dress up the rich of the world with ecological elegance, and then they invest part of the profits in suppressing the economic hopes of the poor...The Tompkins of this world are arrogant...It is immoral and absurd to try to make Chile and other countries into museums of ecology, where man is seen as an intruder. But this seems to be the objective of many "greens". The new heavy cross of the poor is a cross that is coloured green.

(Smith, *El Mercurio* 24/11/2011)

Tompkins had previously been described in *El Mercurio* (by local parliamentarian René Alinco) as "a gringo invader" (11/05/2011c) and Fernández, as noted in the previous chapter, had accused Tompkins of trying to turn Patagonia into a place of "contemplation and privilege" (*El Mercurio* 16/12/2010).

Tompkins was certainly a controversial figure in Patagonia. As discussed in Chapter 5, Tompkins had bought hundreds of thousands of hectares of Chile for conservation since the 1980s. His Parque Pumalín stretched from the Argentine border to the fjords on the Pacific Ocean at one point, and there had been some difficult negotiations about building road access for the Carretera Austral – the only road connecting Aysén with the rest of Chile – through Pumalín. Some local people around his Estancia Chacabuco, further south, complained that he had bought up their land which had been used for grazing and

animal breeding, and populated it with native animals<sup>72</sup>. This position against Tompkins was underscored when in August 2013, a new organisation appeared in the Aysén region, calling itself “La Voz de la Patagonia” (The Voice of Patagonia).



Figure 44: Voice of Patagonia. Welcome to the Twiter (sic) of the social movement, “Voice of Patagonia” from Cochrane, and formed by people who live in Captain Prat Province.

La Voz de la Patagonia clearly aimed to build on the controversy around Tompkins. A few days after the organisation was launched, during the lead up to the election that would effectively decide HidroAysén’s future, *La Tercera* published a letter to the editor by the organisation’s leader, Carlos Olivares. In relation to the Carretera Austral it said:

Tompkins can lead the life he wants, but the people of Aysén can’t. He doesn’t suffer from isolation...he can just catch a helicopter; for Patagonians, the endless wait, isolation and the sensation of abandonment and inequality. In Patagonia we think that now it’s time to change this.

(Olivares, *La Tercera* 07/09/2013)

It soon became clear that the La Voz de la Patagonia’s key objectives were to promote hydroelectricity and to discredit Tompkins, as it did abundantly on its Twitter and Facebook pages – where it had 687 ‘Friends’ and 265 (Twitter) followers (as of October 2018). It also printed a bumper sticker saying “Patagonia without Tompkins”, which I observed in late 2013 appearing frequently, especially around Cochrane where the organisation was based.

---

<sup>72</sup> In 2018, 405,000 hectares of conservation lands were donated to the Chilean state as Tompkins had promised, to be national parks in perpetuity (BBC 30/01/18). This is thought to be the largest land donation in history by a private owner to a state.



Figure 45: “Patagonia without Tompkins” bumper sticker.



Figure 46: Voice of Patagonia poster: “Hidroelectricity, development for Aysén, Contribution to Chile, with respect we can [do this].”

Like HidroAysén, the organisation also carried out house-to-house visits in some parts of Aysén, and it also had a weekly radio show (“in which we torpedoed Tompkins a lot...attacked him a lot”, Olivares explained). When I interviewed Olivares in Cochrane for this study, he spoke much about the sentiments of some of the organisation’s local members who felt they had been “displaced” from their lands by Tompkins. He was incensed about “foreigners” buying land in Patagonia. However, he also revealed some disturbing beliefs about Tompkins’ motives: “This *compadre* wants to invade Patagonia. Because Tompkins has a façade of environmentalism, but his objectives...don’t forget also, that Tompkins is a Jew...” When asked what significance this had, Olivares answered:

Don’t forget that the Jews have a Promised Land...and it is speculated that this could be Patagonia....Tompkins is buying...In Argentina he has 1 million hectares and in Chile 400,000. His motive is to create an independent state within the two nations...And in the hypothetical situation that there is a nuclear war, who do you think would come to the Chacabuco Valley? Tompkins and all his donors....the Rockefellers...do you know who Rockefeller is? So you see, the motive of Tompkins is not environmentalism, it’s real estate...or setting up a state inside a state.

(Olivares, interviewed 16/10/18)

He also added that: “Tompkins has transformed himself into a regional cause...and the primary obstacle for development.” La Voz de La Patagonia’s Facebook page makes liberal use of terms such as “extremist”, “fundamentalist” “usurper” “criminal” and “Zionist” to describe Tompkins<sup>73</sup>. It also began to make use of culture-jamming hybrid images on Facebook, echoing those in the anti-dams ads, to denote the malign influence Voz de la Patagonia felt Tompkins to be:




Figure 47: Composite image of Tompkins from Voz de la Patagonia’s Facebook account. The text calls him a “pseudo-environmentalist”.

It also discusses the so-called “Plan Andinia”, an anti-semitic conspiracy theory that originated in Argentina in the 1970s concerning the establishment of a Jewish state in Chile and Argentina, and has been used by the far right in both countries (Bohoslavsky 2008).

---

<sup>73</sup> Tompkins, who was not Jewish, was little perturbed by these attacks. Asked about La Voz de La Patagonia in interview, he said: “Well, you always have some nutcases out there, OK? You just have to know that beforehand. You have to be comfortable with that. You just let it play out. You have to have some self-confidence about that.”

But there existed another theory in relation to La Voz de la Patagonia at the time I was interviewing for this study in Aysén in 2013. Several interviewees, including the mayor of Caleta Tortel, Bernardo López, said that La Voz de la Patagonia was a lobby organisation created by HidroAysén. López, the most adamant on this, said:

It's not that it *could* be...it's a fact. They, HidroAysén, established this organisation, they finance this organisation...just like Patagonia sin Represas...they finance this organisation, and the people that work on this campaign have received jobs and benefits from HidroAysén.

(López, interviewed 28/10/2013)

If this is correct, it constitutes an important, and to most observers, hidden part of HidroAysén's communicational *modus operandi* at the time when it had retreated from a national debate. This study does not offer any proof of the Voz de la Patagonia/HidroAysén connection, or evaluate this claim's veracity, but what is significant here is that there clearly existed some significant anti-Tompkins, anti-foreigner sentiment in Aysén, and opportunities were clearly seized to amplify this, to spread disinformation<sup>74</sup>, and to connect Tompkins and the megaproject as visibly as possible in the region. Aspects of this clearly seemed to be a manifestation of the kind of fake news that can proliferate in the echo chambers of the internet (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017; McNair 2017). What is also significant here is that any opposition to the project was being aligned with elitism and "rich nation environmentalism" (Nixon 2011, p. 2) in the anti-Tompkins discourse. Patagonia sin Tompkins was therefore a means of strengthening the representational connection with some of the things that the anti-dams campaign had already inadvertently become symbolic of: elitism, foreignness, hindering development, and extending the control of "afuerinos" (outsiders) in deciding the future of Patagonia.

## 8.6 "The slow death of HidroAysén"<sup>75</sup>

In December 2013, Michele Bachelet won a second presidential term, defeating Sebastián Piñera. It became clear in January 2014 that the outgoing government would

---

<sup>74</sup> Fernández himself had been quoted in *El Mostrador* as saying that the anti-dams campaign had spread "false myths" (Urquieta, *El Mostrador* 4/10/2010) so La Voz de la Patagonia may have been a kind of communicational retribution in kind.

<sup>75</sup>(López, *El Mostrador* 20/03/14)



not be delivering the Committee of Ministers' verdict on the project, and that this would now be the key task for the start of Bachelet's second presidency. Sworn in in March 2014, Bachelet appointed economist Máximo Pacheco as energy minister. Interviewed in *El Mostrador*, Pacheco immediately presented a more conciliatory tone on Chile's energy future. He was quoted as saying: "there are all sorts of new things happening in the world in terms of energy that one has to pay close attention to", and as emphasising the necessity for energy projects "to listen to communities and to public opinion" and to "look after the environment" (*El Mostrador* 24/01/2014). Less than a week after Bachelet was sworn in, her government announced that she had convened a new Committee of Ministers to resolve the HidroAysén issue. The Committee's first act was to invalidate the resolution brought by its counterpart committee under Piñera's government, which had called for a new EIS addendum from the company on aspects that had been lacking in the EIS responses since 2008 (*El Mercurio* 19/05/2014). Now the remaining questions and complaints related to the EIS would be assessed as a final version: the company would have no right of reply by adding further studies, though it would still have a 30-day right of appeal in the Environmental Tribunals (*El Mostrador* 19/03/2014).

In the lead up to the meeting, Environment Minister Pablo Badenier met with Patagonia sin Represas representatives, and anti-dams parliamentarians Urresti and Girardi. *El Mercurio* quoted environmentalist Patricio Rodrigo as saying after the meeting that the project "would soon no longer be a national issue" (*El Mercurio* 20/05/2014). The day before the Committee's meeting, Badenier also met Voz de la Patagonia representatives, including Olivares, to appeal for the megaproject's future. *El Mercurio* quoted their expressions of support for the megaproject – though, interestingly, it also reported that they denied their trip to the capital had been funded by the developing company (*El Mercurio* 09/04/2014). Shortly before the meeting, Douglas Tompkins was also interviewed in *La Tercera* making the announcement that his Parque Pumalín would be donated to the Chilean government, on condition it became a national park. In the interview, he said of HidroAysén: "it seems to be a dead project" (*La Tercera* 20/04/2014). The night before the committee's meeting, candlelight vigils were held by the anti-dams movement.

The Committee of Ministers (of Environment, Energy, Mining, Agriculture, Economy and Health) convened on 10 June 2014, and after three hours of deliberations, unanimously rejected the project, cancelling the RCA granted in 2011. The resolution was made on technical aspects of the EIS – that the project had not complied with environmental law in three key aspects. The much-anticipated decision was widely covered in the media. The following day, *La Tercera* published a piece by Energy Minister Pacheco in which he wrote of taking decisions only “with the necessary social legitimacy”.

We now need to undertake some collective learning. New projects will be required to be conducted well right from the beginning...with an early engagement of the communities, listening to legitimate questions about the impact of projects on the life of families and their environments...The resolution of the Committee of Ministers is symbolic. It closes a cycle of controversy for Aysén and also for the national discussion on energy. I have underscored the necessity to “dehidroaysén-ise” the debate over our energy future, because it is not reasonable that the country stakes its future gambling on just one project in the long term.

(Pacheco, *La Tercera* 11/06/2014)

However, *La Tercera* also published an editorial in which it lamented “the long chain of errors and lapses in judgement that had ended in prolonged vacillation” and the “discrediting of institutional processes” (*La Tercera* 11/06/2014). An editorial in *El Mercurio* immediately following the decision stated that “the reasons cited by the Committee of Ministers are not convincing”. It noted “the political factor” and said “it’s impossible not to see the colour of this decision”. It said of the megaproject:

Its rejection, rather than being due to a determined environmental impact, seems to have deferred to a popular veto by organised groups that have dominated the voice of the citizenry.

However, the same editorial also acknowledged: “the complacency of the shareholding companies in terms of the necessary communication of the project” as one of the reasons for the project’s failure (*El Mercurio* 12/06/2014). *El Mostrador* published an interview with Piñera’s environment minister Benítez, underscoring the political nature of the decision:

The whole discussion of the motives for rejecting the project is just pure fabrication. Bachelet said in the presidential campaign that it was inviable, so it is in fact the chronicle of a death foretold.

The article continued:

Bachelet knew that approving the project was politically unapproachable – if she had taken a decision different from the one that has been adopted, the costs would have been incalculable...The government has ceded to the “demand of the streets”.

(Cárcamo, *El Mercurio* 11/06/2014)

*El Mostrador*, however, also made a deeper analysis of the situation in an editorial. It said:

HidroAysén’s administrative certification process had too many challenges. These came not only from the size of the environmental impacts that were insufficiently addressed by the project, but also from the climate of citizen protest that surrounded it, originating in the perception that there was an illegitimate pairing between politics and business which infringed people’s rights...

It added:

The perception that the judicialisation of environmental questions is the product only of an anti-development social activism is a simplistic vision of the problem...The fundamental issue here is the real sustainability of projects, without hidden environmental liabilities. It is also an issue of a good government ecology, and strict compliance with the law. The cancellation of HidroAysén is a positive signal.

(*El Mostrador* 13/06/2014a)

The response from the anti-dams movement to the Committee’s ruling was exultant. Anti-dams actors characterised the decision as a citizens’ victory over the political and economic system that had supported the megaproject. *El Mostrador* quoted Greenpeace Chile’s head, Matías Asún as saying:

This is a citizens’ triumph for the thousands of people who came out onto the streets to demonstrate their opposition to the project. The death of HidroAysén is a victory of an empowered civil society which raised its voice for over 10 years, and finally managed to bury the project.

(*El Mostrador* 13/06/2014b)

*El Mostrador* also characterised the event as a victory for social movements, and for democracy. It said, “Patagonia sin Represas has achieved a historic triumph” ...adding:

Here, as in the education debate, we have for a long time been victims of the use and abuse of a way of understanding reality based on the fallacy of the market, which also adulates the technical and underestimates the value of dialogue.

(Sáez, *El Mostrador* 15/06/2014)

In the social networks, the decision was celebrated with a new hashtag:

#chaohidroaysen (Goodbye HidroAysén)



Figure 48: Patagonia sin Represas tweet, saying: “We did it. We won! Long live Chile! #goodbyehidroaysen”

The company, however, remained quiet, apart from a brief four-line media release in which it would “wait for formal notification” of the Committee’s decision, and “define the course of action to continue” (HidroAysén 11/06/2014).

## 8.7 After HidroAysén

HidroAysén did continue with appeals and litigation against the Committee’s decision, between 2014 and October 2017. Appeals were heard the Environmental Tribunals of Valdivia and Santiago, as well as in the Supreme Court. In January 2015, HidroAysén was denied additional water rights by the DGA, a move that *El Mercurio* reported as “putting the tombstone” on the case of HidroAysén (22/01/2015). Later that month, Endesa confirmed that it was pulling out of HidroAysén (and one of its planned coal burning power stations, Punta Alcalde), saying that it was working on new projects that “used the best technology available and which are more friendly to the environment and to society” (*El Mercurio* 29/01/2015). However, even in early 2016, Colbún was still

reaffirming its interest in completing the project. Its general manager was reported in *El Mercurio* as saying that: “HidroAysén will definitely be built, but perhaps in a different way from the project as it was originally conceived” (07/01/2016).

Just a few months later, though, the discursive representation of the megaproject – and the practical likelihood of it being built – seem to have changed entirely. The price of photovoltaic power had fallen 75% in the seven years to 2017 (Vargas, *El Mercurio* 20/04/2017) and Chile, with its near-cloudless skies in the arid north, can now produce the cheapest solar power in the world at US\$29.10 per megawatt hour. Energy from coal fired power stations now costs over twice as much (Puiu 11/10/2018). In 2017, *El Mercurio* reported as front-page news that by 2024, ERNCs (primarily solar energy) would be supplying 58% of the energy that HidroAysén would have generated, and quoted the president of Enel in Chile, Herman Chadwick, as saying that it would now be “a monumental error to invest in ‘traditional’ power generation projects in Chile” (*El Mercurio* 26/04/2017). *El Mercurio* also interviewed general manager of energy consultants Energética, María Isabel González, on the changed energy landscape. She said:

A few years ago, when HidroAysén was stopped, there was talk of “energy blackouts” in Chile. But scenarios change. The “blackout” idea, which wasn’t a good way to promote a project, did have some logic, because Chile needed energy to keep growing...There has [now] been a major unexpected change in the industry....HidroAysén seemed the best option that this country had three years ago. Today other options fit the current scenario better.

(Vargas, *El Mercurio* 20/04/2017)

The now outgoing government of Bachelet was quick to take credit for Chile’s response to the changed energy landscape. *El Mercurio* quoted Minister of Energy, Andrés Rebolledo as saying that: “we have proven that it is possible to implement energy in a different way” (*El Mercurio* 17/11/2017a) and Environment Minister Marcelo Mena was quoted saying that: “since we closed the door on HidroAysén, investment in energy has doubled, ERNCs have increased five-fold and prices have fallen 75%” (*El Mercurio* 05/11/2017a).

During 2017, HidroAysén was still fighting legal battles against the 2014 ruling of the Committee of Ministers. However, in October 2017, Santiago’s environmental tribunal

rejected the company's appeals. By early November, *El Mercurio* was reporting that Endesa and Colbún planned to return water rights that they held in relation to HidroAysén to the government, given that non-use of non-consumptive water rights in Chile attracted annual payments to government (*El Mercurio* 05/11/2017b). An extraordinary meeting of shareholders was called for 22 December 2017, which *El Mercurio* reported as being for conducting a vote on the "dissolution and liquidation of the company" and the return of water rights (*El Mercurio* 17/11/2017b). *La Tercera* reported a Colbún spokesperson as saying that the project "is not feasible in economic terms, in the context of the current situation in the electricity market". The company also said that it would only develop projects that were "accepted by communities and stakeholders in the areas where these projects are developed" (*La Tercera* 17/11/2017). In a marked change from its usual position on HidroAysén, *El Mercurio* also published an editorial on the day that the company was dissolved, saying that:

In practical terms, the suspension of HidroAysén has been beneficial for the country, because it opened the possibility to further develop ERNCs, which have experienced a spectacular growth, especially wind and solar, with a reduction in tariffs...

It also published an article about the anti-dams campaign in which the end of HidroAysén was described as "a citizens' achievement", and in which Patagonia sin Represas activists were quoted, saying:

Patagonia sin Represas has been the most important socio-environmental cause in Chile's recent history. It has strongly influenced public policy in relation to water, social participation, and of course, energy...it's something to be happy about, proud of, and grateful for, that the work of so many has achieved what seemed impossible on so many fronts. Now is the time to celebrate.

(*El Mercurio* 18/12/2017)

A week after the megaproject developing company was finally dissolved, Patagonia sin Represas posted this image of some of its key activists on its Facebook page, with the following accompanying message:

On 10 June of 2014, the Committee of Ministers ruled unanimously to revoke HidroAysén's Environmental Qualification Resolution (RCA), granted in May 2011. The ministers' vote was followed by the whole country. This is how *El*

*Mostrador* reported the news <https://goo.gl/WsHBC5> This photo captures the very moment in which the result of the vote was made known. #WEWON #THANK YOU #PATAGONIA SIN REPRESAS



Figure 49: Facebook post by Patagonia sin Represas to mark the end of HidroAysén.

## 8.8 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed media discourse in the final phase of the HidroAysén debate, when the megaproject attempted a withdrawal from the media once again, in favour of a “low profile” stance on a national level, and close work with the communities on the ground. The anti-dams movement was now tasked once again with keeping the megaproject visible. It did so by organising cultural and political events which were also “image events” (DeLuca 2006), and which were intended to be shared across “wild public screens” (Brunner & DeLuca 2016). Such events indeed made more impact in the social media networks than in legacy media. But Patagonia sin Represas now also had to contend with some of the negative qualities it had become emblematic of, through extended negative discourse in conservative media, and now through a new anti-Tompkins, pro-dams lobby organisation. This lobby now employed some of the same media tactics as the anti-dams movement itself, notably in the use of culture-jamming images. It also seems to have used a strategy of online mis-information, which recent scholarship indicates is a new practice, and tactic, to arise out of the user-produced

media landscape (for example, McNair 2017) . If the prevailing energy landscape had not changed, as it did, in a way that made HidroAysén inviable, HidroAysén might have benefitted more from this attempt at reducing the anti-dams movement's credibility.

Perhaps of most interest in the media coverage of HidroAysén right at the end of the HidroAysén debate is the apparent concession of *El Mercurio*, which had always supported the megaproject so adamantly, that the demise of HidroAysén had been positive for the country. It seems extraordinary that *El Mercurio* – previously always so staunchly critical of the anti-dams movement – would allow space for commentary on the fact that it had been demonstrated possible to “implement energy in a different way”, and which called the defeat of HidroAysén something to be “proud of” and “celebrate”. This apparent change in stance at this moment on the issue of HidroAysén perhaps best reflects the profound change that the debate over the megaproject wrought in Chile between 2007 and 2017. The final chapter, and conclusion to this thesis, turns to a discussion of the effects on Chile of the HidroAysén debate, and outlines some of the lessons that can be learned from the mediatized case of this emblematic megaproject.



## Chapter 9: Conclusion

### 9.1 Introduction

My aim in this thesis has been to delineate the discursive characteristics of the 11-year mediatized debate over a hydroelectric megaproject planned for Chilean Patagonia, with particular attention to media discourse from 2008-2014. The study was conceived in response to the notion that megaprojects inherently depend on *representation* (Flyvbjerg, Rothengatter & Bruzelius 2003; Flyvbjerg 2005) and often “misrepresentation” (Kain 1990) or “strategic deception” (Flyvbjerg, Garbuio & Lovallo 2009) to be approved and built. In early research for this study, it was clear that the HidroAysén megaproject had symbolic dimensions, so I resolved to examine the way symbolism formed around HidroAysén, to better understand what I perceived to be the particular capacity of megaprojects like this one to become symbolic. Though the literature on megaproject management has begun to recognise the symbolic dimensions of such projects (Klein & Aubry 2017; Lopez Rego, Reis Irigaray & Lago Chaves 2017; Syn & Ramaprasad 2018; van Marrewijk 2017) few studies have recognised the media as a crucial site for the discursive representation and symbolic construction of large infrastructure projects (Fischhendler et al. 2015; Waisbord & Peruzzotti 2009, 2013a), and no studies have traced mediatized discourse over the whole trajectory of a megaproject, to learn more about how such projects play out in the media. Though a handful of studies on various facets of the HidroAysén case exist (Latta 2010, 2011; Cuadra 2013; Merino & Bello 2014; Romero 2014; Schaeffer 2015), none examine mediatized discourse in detail, or over the whole project trajectory. Given that both the scale of megaprojects and the rate of their development is increasing (Flyvbjerg 2014, 2017) a study that addresses these gaps in the research on megaprojects is both necessary and timely. This case study of the “paradigmatic” (Flyvbjerg 2011) case of HidroAysén has aimed to address these silences, and enable a better understanding of the communication and mediatized contestation (Wolfsfeld 1997; Cottle 2006) of megaprojects.

This thesis has therefore asked how the HidroAysén debate was articulated in key Chilean media over the period 2008-2014, and has addressed this with detailed thick

description and analysis of the mediatized discourse surrounding the megaproject in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. I have also asked why, and when, the developing company sought invisibility, showing that the company sought to keep the megaproject as low profile as possible both from the time the project was established, and then again after it was widely contested with a series of vehement street protests. I additionally asked how the protest campaign made HidroAysén visible, and in examining the ways in which this occurred, I have shown how HidroAysén came to represent much more than an environmental conflict over a megaproject. I asked, too, how HidroAysén became emblematic and I have shown that the layered composite of symbolic meanings that became attached to the project (which I summarise below) made HidroAysén an emblem. In sections 9.3, and particularly 9.4 below, I address the final research question, by outlining some of the lessons that can be drawn from the emblematic case of HidroAysén about the communication of conflicts over megaprojects.

Theoretically, this thesis has drawn on some aspects of a media political economy paradigm, acknowledging that while the earlier radical (Herman & Chomsky 1988) “manufacturing consent” model is largely inappropriate in a deeply mediatized (Hepp & Couldry 2018) world, more recent scholarship on media political economy (Hardy 2014, 2017) is certainly relevant where “elite closure” (Núñez & Miranda 2011; Torche 2005) means that the interests of media owners and of business are particularly closely related. I have used Castells’ (2007) theories on mass self-communication and the network society (Castells 1996c, 2000, 2004a, 2007, 2008, 2009) to explain the advent of digital media in Chile. I also draw on aspects of Cottle’s (2006) “media contest” model – where elite agendas are contestable, and the media can be a forum for diverse voices – to conceptualise the lengthy mediatized sparring over HidroAysén. I draw too on parts of a “media culture” (Kellner 1995, 2003) paradigm, particularly for semiotic enquiry into some of the image-based texts (DeLuca 2006; DeLuca & Peebles 2002; DeLuca, Lawson & Sun 2012) I analyse in this thesis. I have additionally been interested in risk, especially in Beck’s (2009b) “relations of definition” of risk, where holding greater power of risk definition may eventually confer greater influence over real-world outcomes in debates around megaprojects. Castells’ (2009) grand theory of “communication power” also fundamentally underpins this study, and, following Arsenault and Castells (2008), Castells (2009, 2012) and latterly, Lester and Hutchins

(2015), I have identified some of the “switching points” that were activated in the HidroAysén debate in order to achieve communication power. Theories on mediatized *visibility* (Thompson 2005) and its inverse, strategic invisibility (Lester & Hutchins 2012; Thompson, J 1995, 2000, 2005, 2011) have also been drawn on in this thesis. Finally, the formation of symbolic power (Bourdieu 1977, 1991, 1998) and the power of symbolic discourse to construct reality (Bourdieu 1991, Couldry 2000, 2003) also underpin my arguments on HidroAysén’s becoming a symbolic construct, and eventually, becoming emblematic.

This study has used a multifaced, mainly constructivist, methodology to examine strategic communication by the megaproject developer, as well as by protest against the project. I have analysed both with macro and micro lenses, using thick description (Geertz 1973) and Leximancer’s computer assisted text analysis (Smith 2000a; 2000b; 2003; Smith & Humphreys 2006) to examine the discourse across a large mainstream media corpus, and in social media networks. I have also analysed some examples of the image-based and audiovisual material that proliferated during the HidroAysén debate. I have additionally triangulated mainstream media and social media content with material collected in the 38 interviews I conducted with key actors in the debate. Using insights from all these sources, I have shown how a series of symbolic meanings accumulated in the discursive sparring over the megaproject, so that over time, it came to represent very much more than a conflict over dams.

The discussion here on HidroAysén contributes fine empirical detail to the literature on globalisation and mediatization (Couldry & Hepp 2018, Hepp 2013) in relation to Latin America particularly (Waisbord 2013b, 2013d), in the context of the enactment of struggles over extractivism and megaprojects (Waisbord 2013a). It also contributes a new empirical illustration to the broader literature on mediatization, and the enactment of mediatized environmental conflicts (Hutchins & Lester 2015). The detailed survey of the mediatized activism around HidroAysén here also contributes to work on media and activism both in a Latin American context (Coryat 2015; Valenzuela, Arriagada & Scherman 2012; Valenzuela, Scherman, & Arriagada 2015), and more generally (Boutyline & Willer 2017; Cammaerts 2012, 2013, 2015; Downing 2008; Rucht 2013).

With its focus on the communicational and the symbolic in relation to megaprojects, this

study also contributes to the literature on megaprojects – specifically, to the conceptualisation of megaprojects as symbols (Klein & Aubry 2017; Lopez Rego, Reis Irigaray & Lago Chaves 2017; Syn & Ramaprasad 2018; van Marrewijk 2017). The study proposes two new concepts in relation to mediatization and megaprojects, describing a process of “becoming emblematic” (see summary in section 9.2 below) and arguing for a new concept of the “communicational sublime” to be added to Flyvbjerg’s four megaproject sublimines (see section 9.4 below). Finally, by conducting cross-language research, this study aims to further cosmopolitanism in communications studies, as Waisbord (2016) prescribes.

In this conclusion to this thesis, I first summarise the constructed symbolic meanings which made HidroAysén emblematic, then progress to a discussion of the significance of the HidroAysén debate for Chile. I also discuss some lessons that can be derived from studying the discursive construction of HidroAysén. Finally, I make suggestions for further research in this field.

## **9.2 Becoming emblematic**

Could an engineering project constituting five dams on distant southern rivers and a corresponding power line, become synonymous with social tensions bred by unequal development, incomplete democratisation, an intransigent social hierarchy, and the fraught dichotomy of the local versus the global? I have shown here that incrementally, over the course of an 11-year conflict, these things are indeed what HidroAysén came to represent. I consider HidroAysén’s construction to have been partially intentional on the part of the anti-dams social movement and the megaproject developers, part product of the prevailing social context, and partly the *unintentional* result of the project developers’ organisational culture and communications strategies. HidroAysén’s construction also crucially depended on its framing in key agenda-setting media – these with their own ideological positions, often dependent on media ownership structures – and also on journalistic and PR practices, some of which were particular to the Chilean context. The megaproject’s construction was also a product of macro-sociological space

shrinking (Bauman 1998; O'Brien 1992) tendencies that brought transnational companies to develop a project in the remote southern reaches of Chile, while at the same time allowing local protest against the project to be nationally visible, and even enter the transnational arena of cosmopolitan environmental concern.

The table below shows the dominant discursive representations that became attached to HidroAysén over time between 2006 and 2017, and serves to summarise the different layers of symbolic meaning of the megaproject, none of which necessarily obscured the previous layer (except, perhaps, the first meaning, which was largely lost over time). I define here the period in which the megaproject first came to be associated with each symbolic meaning, and show where possible, where the origins of each meaning lie:

Period	Symbolic meaning	Symbol's origin
2007	Innovative engineering project, nation-building project, progress towards development	HidroAysén, corpus media
2007	Destruction of environment, of Chile's heritage	Patagonia sin Represas
2007-2014	Project to benefit elites	Patagonia sin Represas
2008	Technical and bureaucratic behemoth	HidroAysén, media
Late 2009-early 2010	Political project	Corpus media
2009-2010	Foreign-ness, neo-imperialism	Patagonia sin Represas, corpus media
2009	Clean energy for development, necessary to combat climate change, better than ERNCs	HidroAysén, corpus media
Late 2010-early 2011	"energy terror"	Patagonia sin Represas, social media, corpus media
2011	Inequality, incomplete democracy, elite profiteering, the neoliberal status quo, a wrong mode of development	Patagonia sin Represas, <i>El Mostrador</i> , to some extent <i>La Tercera</i>
2012-14	Irregularities, malfeasance	Corpus media, Patagonia sin Represas
2014	Lost opportunity	<i>El Mercurio</i>
2014-2017	Citizens' victory, return to democracy, important learning opportunity, opportunity for change, chance to move to ERNCs	Corpus media, social media, Patagonia sin Represas

Figure 50: Table showing cumulative symbolic meanings of HidroAysén, which made the project emblematic.

It is clear, then, that over time, the megaproject became layered with meanings, so that it became a *composite* of symbols. If we understand symbols here, to recap Geertz (1973 p. 91) as “tangible formulations of notions” and “concrete embodiments of ideas, attitudes, judgements”, then HidroAysén did indeed become an embodiment of different ideas, attitudes, and judgements. As I have argued, the roots of many of these did not necessarily lie within the megaproject itself, or indeed in environmental conflict specifically. What HidroAysén became emblematic of, over time, as this thesis demonstrates, was a wider, more deep-seated discontent. In this way, the HidroAysén debate became a mediatized contest of two opposing worldviews, in which the megaproject represented the maintenance of elite closure by Chile’s post-dictatorship neoliberal mode of development, and the anti-dams movement represented postmaterialist values, democratisation and challenge to social unfairness. Chile’s very model of development was being contested here. As HidroAysén’s Daniel Fernández put it, in hindsight: “It is a conflict between paradigms which are reactive to each other” and a “clash of ways of thinking”. He continued:

The world of business has a way of thinking that is rational, cartesian, scientific, structured, interested in development, and economic growth....and society has benefitted from these. But a moment has come in which people want different things. So a reactive paradigm has emerged, and this is one of equality, cooperation, solidarity, consensus, and also environmental protections. One opposes the other.

(Fernández, interviewed 19/12/2013)

Or, as Douglas Tompkins put it:

This isn’t just a campaign to stop a dam. This is a campaign that comes from a worldview of stable state economics versus the economics of endless growth. The worldviews of the myth of progress and growth forever...which is undermining the very process which makes life itself possible. We are working from two opposite poles.

(Tompkins, interviewed 05/12/2013)

In Chile, by the end of the HidroAysén debate, it seems that, despite the odds against this, the anti-dams side's worldview triumphed. That the megaproject became emblematic of all this worldview opposed made it vehemently contested, and finally, politically untouchable. Over time, because of the cost of delays to the project, and ultimately, change in the energy market, HidroAysén also became economically unviable.<sup>76</sup> However, HidroAysén did not fail only on its fiscal bottom line. This research suggests that in the absence of the anti-dams movement's channelling and amplification of the pre-existing discontent with Chile's post-dictatorship mode of development, and without the communicational ability to *couple* this discontent to HidroAysén; the building of the megaproject would (by 2018) already have been well advanced. Like Ralco, it would have been a *fait accompli*. Aysén, in Chilean Patagonia, with its unique, precious landscapes, its close-knit small communities and its strong regional identity, would have been irrevocably changed. Instead, HidroAysén changed Chile.

### 9.3 “Chile cambió”

The HidroAysén case was set just on the cusp of a time when the neoliberal model of development was being questioned. During the HidroAysén debate, the rise in post-materialist values that drove environmental concern also coincided with a surge in internet access and social media use in Chile. This was a landscape in which social discontent could now for the first time be widely communicated. As HidroAysén's communications chief pointed out in retrospect in an interview for this study, “Chile cambió” – Chile changed (Soto, interviewed 14/11/2013). In this changed Chile, activists could not only make a powerful multinational company's proposed megaproject visible, they also sometimes obtained the power of risk definition (Beck 2009b) in relation to the project. And they could occasionally operate the “switches” (Arsenault & Castells 2008; Castells 2009, 2012) which gave them “communication power” (Castells 2009).

---

<sup>76</sup> As discussed through this thesis, Patagonia sin Represas *also* came to represent some constructed meanings: defence of natural and social heritage from outside interests, rejection of neoliberalism, democratisation; but paradoxically, at the same time, elitism, foreign-ness, dictation of Patagonia's future by outsiders.

The effects of the demise of the megaproject on the country have been profound. In terms of energy development, the huge growth in ERNCs in Chile after HidroAysén meant that the country has become what the *New York Times* has described as “a global leader in countering climate change” (10/03/2018). Without HidroAysén, Chile is moving towards a more diverse, less centralised, more “democratic” and lower carbon model of energy generation<sup>77</sup>. This change may not have been as complete had the energy from HidroAysén been available. Also, because the power line for HidroAysén was never built, other dam projects for Patagonia which had planned to share that line to export their energy have found it harder to justify their business cases. When HidroAysén fell, other socio-environmentally damaging, foreign-owned dam projects in Patagonia fell also<sup>78</sup>.

In terms of environmental attitudes and protections, Chile has been shown to have become increasingly environmentally concerned during the HidroAysén timeframe (Franzen & Vogl 2013). This heightened concern seems to have been in response to the many, very tangible, assaults on Chile’s environment by its mode of development, and by many planned and protested megaprojects, of which HidroAysén was the most visible. The anti-dams movement’s critique, and broader public questioning of the country’s institutional processes in relation to the environment (which effectively revealed the politically contestable nature of supposedly objective, bureaucratic processes) has also resulted in change. Underway in 2018, a reform of EIS rules will mandate meaningful early stakeholder participation, including allowing potentially-affected communities to work with project developers on the terms and scope of projects (Ibarra Maldonado, *El Mercurio* 3/06/2018). And barely two months after the end of HidroAysén, in January 2018, Chile officially designated as a vast network of national parks the 405,000 hectares of Patagonian land that Douglas Tompkins had donated to the state. Much of this land would have been crossed by the dams’ transmission line, but is now protected by the state in perpetuity.

---

<sup>77</sup> It should be borne in mind that hydroelectricity is not necessarily a “low-carbon” energy form, despite dams developers’ claims to the contrary. See discussion in Chapter 6.

<sup>78</sup> For example, the Río Cuervo Project, involving two large dams, planned by Australian/Swiss consortium Energía Austral. The project folded in August 2017.



During the HidroAysén debate, Chile's democracy had also been deepened. HidroAysén represented a challenge to the neoliberal consensus, and other legacies of the dictatorship<sup>79</sup>, including depoliticisation. I argue that HidroAysén acted as an impulse to re-politicisation: for Cuadra (2013) a “radical expression of a democratizing citizenry” (p. 1170). The HidroAysén case therefore supports Anselm and Haikola's recent (2018) contention that issues related to the environment may serve to “politicize a political area that has previously been depoliticized”, this in contradiction to earlier contentions that environmental politics in the postpolitical era may *diminish* the potential for political antagonism (Swyngedouw 2010, 2011a, 2013a 2013b, 2014a). As Beck put it: “*history is back*” (2015, p. 77). The HidroAysén case can also be regarded as an empirical example of Beck's “emancipatory catastrophism”, in which the “bads” of modernisation can allow for “social catharsis” and ultimately better social and environmental justice, if actors in struggles of this nature are able to “connect things which had not been thought of as being connected” (p. 80), as the sparring actors connected a megaproject with inequality in the debate over HidroAysén.

Additionally, running parallel to the discourse on the dams, and intensifying from 2011 when the dams became so strongly contested, there had been much public discussion of the need for a new constitution in Chile<sup>80</sup>. This call had occasionally been heard in Patagonia sin Represas' discourse on HidroAysén, and was mentioned by several interviewees for this study. As one of her last acts before leaving office in March 2018, Michelle Bachelet initiated a legislative project to create a new constitution with better human rights and social provisions, which she described as promoting “dignity, liberty, equality, solidarity, and respect of fundamental rights” with the aim of “creating the necessary conditions for holistic and sustainable development” (*Caras* 6/03/2018). Though it is not clear how this last initiative will proceed under the current government of Piñera<sup>81</sup>, it appears, in summary, that many of the anti-dams' insurgents' claims have

---

<sup>79</sup> Some scholars (Fukuyama 1992; Mouffe 2000; Rancière 1998; Swyngedouw 2011; Žižek 1999) argue that depoliticisation is now a global phenomenon in the era of postpolitics, in which a hegemonically imposed consensus on principles such as (neo)liberalism, capitalism and free movement of capital have displaced conflict and antagonism, even in environmental politics.

<sup>80</sup> Chile's current constitution dates from 1980 when it was written under Pinochet's dictatorship.

<sup>81</sup> In the 2017 Chilean presidential elections, Chile paradoxically swung back to the right, with the re-election of Sebastián Piñera, reflecting a wider Latin American move towards the right, in countries including Argentina, Paraguay, and most recently Brazil. This election saw only 48.5% (*BBC* 18/12/2017) voter turnout, perhaps a marker of low trust in political institutions in Chile. Piñera is pro-business, and

now been reinforced by their realisation in law, thus turning environmental protest into institutional change, or, as Anselm puts it, “transforming the temporary energy of inaugural political events into the enduring success of the political” (Anselm & Haikola 2018 p. 583).<sup>82</sup> These things can be seen as HidroAysén’s lasting legacy for Chile.

#### **9.4 Lessons from the case of HidroAysén**

HidroAysén was a victory. It represented a win for those who seek environmental justice, affirming the “value of life, of all forms of life, against the interests of wealth, power and technology” (Castells 2004b p. 190), and for those that observe an “ethical duty” (Cox 2007) in communication on the environment. It was a win also for civil society over existing hegemonic structures. However, for those who seek environmental and social justice, this is no time for celebration. As discussed, the rate of megaproject development is increasing, projects themselves are becoming larger and more environmentally and socially damaging, and they are correspondingly more contested. In Latin America alone, in terms of dam megaprojects alone, hundreds of projects, many much larger than HidroAysén, are currently being planned and built. Immediate, irrevocable damage to ecosystems aside, many of these will be net emitters of greenhouse gasses for decades, despite the construct of hydroelectricity being “clean”. In response, social justice movements have formed in defence of territory and natural resources. Because of these kinds of projects, and protests against them, as Murphy (2017) tells us, “Latin America has resurfaced as a site of intense debate and important critical thought regarding the politics of the earth” (Murphy 2017, p. 154). The controversy over HidroAysén can be considered part of this “eco-territorial shift” (Svampa 2012) of contestation in Latin America, in response to the varied forms of extractivism spawned by the particular mode of neoliberal development on this continent.

---

has promised to reduce obstacles to investment, but he has also shown himself to be open to environmental positions, for example, in 2010, when he effectively cancelled the planned Barrancones coal-burning power plant near the Punta de Choros marine reserve.

<sup>82</sup> Theorists like Swyngedouw suggest that in order to effect an opening up of political procedures as discussed here, contested issues *need* to achieve the kind of symbolic meaning that HidroAysén did. See Swyngedouw (2011b & 2014a).

Not all megaprojects will be stopped by protest – but most megaprojects can likely be better managed. Having a better understanding of the sociological phenomenon of megaprojects is therefore essential for those who protest megaprojects, as well indeed, for project developers themselves. The long-lived case of HidroAysén, a megaproject that never materialised, is a rich empirical source for the formulation of such insights. In answer to this thesis' final research question, then, I offer some practical lessons from the emblematic case of HidroAysén about the communication of conflicts over megaprojects.

Subject as they are to the “megaprojects paradox” (Flyvbjerg 2013 pp. 1-10) of over-promising and under-delivering, megaprojects inherently rely on favourable communicational construction in order to be approved and built. Flyvbjerg has told us that if it were revealed, such lack of transparency and “deliberate misrepresentation” would typically “not be defensible in liberal democracies” (2014, p. 18) but it seems in Chile at the start of the HidroAysén case, historical antecedents meant that this *was* the expected way of doing business. HidroAysén's shareholders had not entirely considered the emerging new social and communications environment, or if they had, they resolved despite this to take a business-as-usual, clientelistic (García 2015; Hallin & Papathanassopoulos 2002) approach. It is clear that, in the changed social landscape and the translocal media landscape of which Chile is now part, that approach is no longer effective. Projects cannot be imposed on citizens, nor can they be kept “low profile”, or invisible, in a deeply mediatized world. Standards of consultation and communication that would be applied by multinational corporations in a developed country context need to be applied likewise to projects in countries of the Global South.

<sup>83</sup> This first lesson seems an elementary one, but it should be borne in mind in considering the communication of other Latin American megaprojects, which may share comparable political and media landscapes, and business environments.

---

<sup>83</sup> This as a *communicational* dimension of the kind of double standards frequently seen in extractive industry projects by multinational companies from developed countries in the Global South. Due to weak environmental regulations and poor enforcement of laws, foreign companies are able to develop extractive projects in Latin America using environmentally damaging practices that are banned in their own countries.

For megaproject planners, it is clear that communication strategies that rely on reactive communication and scare campaigns do not generate social license, even in environments where these previously might have been routine. On the contrary, the largest increase in public rejection of HidroAysén coincided with the company's "campaign of terror" strategy. Aggressive, reactive communication clearly heightens public rejection. This trend has been observed in the science communications literature in relation to climate change, for example, where it has been shown that "fear is generally an ineffective tool for attracting people's attention to climate change" (O'Neil & Nicholson-Cole 2009, p. 355). In HidroAysén's case, its fear campaign ceded to the anti-dams movement its greatest communicational advantage. Likewise, CSR initiatives and CSR communication by megaproject developers need to be treated with care. If not received as genuine, as distinct from being a strategy to smooth the path of a project, CSR initiatives can *decrease* public acceptance of a project.

The more visible, contested and emblematic HidroAysén became, the more the debate around the megaproject became highly polarised and politicised. It seems clear from the HidroAysén case that polarisation makes for intransigent positions on opposing sides of a struggle, which may never be able to be reconciled. Given that more megaprojects *are* being built, and will continue to be built, the need for *negotiation* over such projects may ultimately deliver better outcomes for communities and environments. However, becoming emblematic in the way that HidroAysén did may preclude negotiation: indeed, interviewees for this study reported that representatives from the opposing sides never met. The kind of "peace talks" that Lester & Hutchins (2012b) describe in a protracted environmental conflict in Australia may therefore not be possible. In this way, if becoming emblematic does not halt a project, it may indeed result in a project going ahead with *less* negotiation, less social license and less concession to socio-environmental concerns – particularly if the protest movement is represented negatively in the media. Given the precedents for extractivism (Waisbord 2013a) and megaproject development in Latin America, this may be particularly so in a Latin American context.

In addition, the potential for the conflict over an *emblematic* project to obscure concerns around other projects is real. As discussed, for example, several other large

hydroelectric dams were being planned in precious natural environments in Chilean Patagonia at the same time as HidroAysén. Only HidroAysén became emblematic. Though ultimately these projects also became unviable, and failed when HidroAysén failed, they were certainly proceeding with planning ‘under the radar’ for the whole time that HidroAysén was being debated. In fact, in Argentine Patagonia, on the opposite side of the Andes, the larger (in terms of flooded area) Condor Cliff-La Barrancosa dam complex was approved and began to be built in the HidroAysén timeframe, with much of the same official discourse around the need for dams, and much less protest. When one conflict becomes emblematic but obscures other similar and concurrent environmental issues, this poses difficult ethical questions about how the environment movement chooses, in the face of multiple assaults on the environment, which landscapes and ecosystems should be “saved”. This is an aspect of the mediatized enactment of environmental conflict (Hutchins & Lester 2015) that deserves further investigation.

Another lesson from the case of HidroAysén appear to be that for protest, being able to communicate *first*, and across digital platforms, on a contested issue seems to confer concerted advantage. Patagonia sin Represas was able to communicate its definition of risk (Beck 2009) surrounding HidroAysén before the project developer had even presented its project locally. Having a strong social media presence also gave the protest movement an advantage in the communicational sparring over the project. HidroAysén’s reluctance to engage early and fully in a kind of communication in which its stakeholders could “speak back” because of initial fear of negative publicity, cost it an important arena for debate on the project.

Patagonia sin Represas’ use of image-based strategic communication on “public screens” (DeLuca & Peebles 2002; DeLuca, Lawson & Sun 2012), showing gorgeous natural landscapes, and later, culture-jamming composite images, was also significant. As the campaign’s art director Douglas Tompkins explained, the Patagonia sin Represas “brand” had to be instantly recognisable. The campaign’s composite landscape and power line images, especially the image of the Torres del Paine which became so infamous, were powerful. They came to stand in metonymically for the project, and for the national heritage it would destroy, even without naming the megaproject.

HidroAysén was unable to counter the anti-dams campaign with image use: there are no memorable “pro-HidroAysén” images. Image-making and meaning creation through the cumulative, intertextual use of images therefore also serves as an important site for the communication of a protest campaign – one in which the environment movement may always have an advantage. As DeLuca tells us, such “image politics” are now a crucial part of the rhetoric of environmental activism (DeLuca 2012). This study confirms that they remain the environmental movement’s key advantage, and offer important political opportunities in a mediatized age.

It seems above all, though, that the protest campaign’s greatest advantage, and the greatest disadvantage for HidroAysén, lay in the prevailing social conditions in Chile at the time when HidroAysén was being planned. Patagonia sin Represas understood Chileans’ indignation at the neoliberal system and elite closure, and it was able to couple its anti-dams narrative to the strong current of pre-existing social discontent on these issues. As Waisbord and Peruzotti (2009) and Waisbord (2013a) have shown in relation to the *asamblea* movement in Argentina, and Beck now proposes in relation to emancipatory catastrophism (2015), the ability to transform what at first seemed like an environmental issue into a strong political challenge from civil society relies on being able to make such a discursive connection. Ultimately, as Waisbord and Peruzotti also show, such coupling of environmental imperatives with political demands means projects like these become political. In the case of HidroAysén, becoming a “political project” meant ultimately becoming politically *untouchable*, and finally, unviable. For protesters this is the most desirable outcome; for megaproject developers, a situation to be avoided at all costs. But both are ultimately discursively constructed positions.

As a final lesson from the case of HidroAysén, then, we might turn again to the megaproject literature, particularly to Flyvbjerg and his four “megaproject sublimes” (2012, 2014, 2017). As noted (see Chapter 1, footnote 5), what Flyvbjerg has conceptualised as the political, technological, economic, and aesthetic “sublimes” together help harness the conviction of megaproject developers, funders, government decision-makers, the media and the public to accept, support, and even be in awe of, megaprojects. These sublimes, now a prominent concept in scholarship on megaprojects, are considered an important driver of the scale and frequency of

megaprojects. As a result of the research presented here, I suggest that a fifth sublime, a *communicational* sublime, be added to the theorisation on megaprojects. Clearly, a communicational sublime would mean very different things from the protest versus the project developer's position. In the best scenario, this would be a place for the negotiation of social license, for a shared construction of the parameters of a project. Less positively, the concept of a communicational sublime might also be a recognition, and a warning, about the tendencies of megaproject developers towards communicating the superlatives of their projects, at the expense of sufficiently communicating risk (Flyvbjerg 2005, 2014). Noting a communicational sublime as a driver of decision-making on megaprojects could serve as a cautionary mechanism for those who plan, fund and support megaprojects. Such stakeholders might ask whether "facts" on a megaproject's benefits are indeed facts, or instead products of an obfuscating communicational sublime. A communicational sublime might also be considered as a site of contestation of megaprojects by stakeholders, a location where the "communication power" of less powerful actors can sometimes triumph over the powerful in a mediatized world. Finally, a communicational sublime would be a recognition that megaprojects today stand or fall on their communication, and are therefore, ultimately, contestable.

## **9.5 Suggestions for future research**

The mediatized construction of megaprojects in the developing world as a means of "generating consent" (Latta 2010), as well as for *contesting* such projects, has not yet been adequately studied. Given the megaproject boom, there is currently vast scope for collecting empirical data around new megaprojects and their mediatized communication, to examine the conditions under which some become contested, symbolic and emblematic, and the ways others evade protest and are quietly completed.

The discursive construction of HidroAysén and other hydroelectric megaprojects in particular as a "clean" form of energy in the face of climate change (when they can indeed be significant greenhouse gas emitters) also warrants further research attention. This is particularly so where, as initially in the case of HidroAysén, such constructions

serve to displace other smaller-scale, less environmentally damaging, renewable energy forms from consideration.

Finally, mediatized conflicts over megaprojects like the HidroAysén case also warrant further research attention for their political dimension. Cross-national research on how the communication of conflicts over such projects may transform them into “untouchable” political projects would be fruitful, as would testing of Beck’s (2015) emancipatory catastrophism thesis in relation to megaprojects. Studying megaproject conflicts in a variety of national, and transnational, contexts may also reveal whether such conflicts do indeed serve to repoliticise societies that have previously been depoliticised. If this were the case, it would support Alselm and Haikola’s (2018) contention that environmental conflicts, and perhaps even conflicts over megaprojects in particular, can lead a return to the political in an increasingly postpolitical world.



## Appendix

### Timeline of the case of HidroAysén

**1940s:** The Chilean government and Endesa carried out the first explorations in Aysén with the intention of mapping and quantifying the extent of hydroelectric resources in the region.

**1970s:** New studies were undertaken in the region and a study was published in December 1975 of possible hydroelectric development of the River Baker. In 1976, a study of the hydroelectric potential of the River Pascua was published.

**1998:** Both studies were updated with new fieldwork. The Rivers Baker and Pascua were deemed to have hydroelectric potential of 2800MW which could be developed with a series of hydroelectric dams and generation plants.

**2004:** Endesa Chile began initial studies for the environmental baseline study, which would become the HidroAysén project's Environmental Impact Study. Endesa announces studies will continue until 2008.

**2006: January:** The Aysén Life Reserve Citizen's Coalition established in Coyhaique.

*April:* Groups opposing hydroelectric projects in Patagonia established their citizens' education campaign.

*4 September 2006:* Endesa (51%) and Colbún (49%) established Centrales Hidroelectricas de Aysén S. A., a company to be known as HidroAysén. The executive director was Hernán Salazar.

**2007: March:** The Council for the Defence of Patagonia was founded, and began its campaign, Patagonia sin Represas.

*May:* 36% of respondents to an opinion survey said that they were against the dams.

*August:* The HidroAysén project was changed from four to five dams, but due to improved engineering at the dam walls, the planned area of the dams was reduced from 9,300 to 5910 hectares.

*October:* HidroAysén was examined in the Tribunal de la Defensa de Libre Competencia (Chilean Competition Tribunal) because of fears of a monopoly in Chile's energy sector. The project passed this tribunal, but with certain restrictions, including having to find outside partners for involvement in the project's transmission line.

**2008: August:** HidroAysén submitted its environmental impact study to Corema in Coyhaique.

*November:* A survey by Adimark revealed that 51% of respondents supported the construction of dams in Aysén.

**2009: February:** Endesa (a mainly Spanish-owned transnational company which owned

the once national Chilean energy entity) was taken over by Enel (Italy). Enel bought out Acciona (Spain) and Endesa (Spain) to take control of 92% of Endesa.

*July:* Legal appeal by lawyers for the CDP against HidroAysén's admissibility to the environmental approval process rejected by Chile's Supreme Court.

*September:* A referendum held in the community of Caleta Tortel at the mouth of the River Baker showed that 78% of voters objected to the HidroAysén project.

*October:* An IPSOS national opinion survey showed that 50.6% of respondents objected to the construction of dams in Aysén.

**2009/2010:** Two rounds of presidential elections (*December/January*). The main candidates (conservative-right Sebastian Piñera and centre-left Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle) vocally supported the project.

*January 2010:* Piñera was elected president, the first time since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship that a candidate of the right was elected in Chile.

**2010:** *May:* Daniel Fernández became the new CEO of HidroAysén, and began a new more aggressive communication strategy.

*October:* Environmental institutions in Chile were overhauled. Conama was replaced by the Ministry for the Environment, regional and national Environmental Assessment Services and dedicated Environmental Tribunals. The Servicio de Evaluación Ambiental (SEA, Environmental Assessment Service) in Coyhaique would now be responsible for assessing HidroAysén's EIS.

*November:* HidroAysén begins television advertising campaign, which would become known as the 'Campaign of Terror'.

*End November:* 57.8% of respondents to an IPSOS survey said that they were against dam construction in Aysén.

**2011:** *April:* 61.8 % of respondents in an IPSOS survey were against dam construction in Aysén.

*9 May:* The SEA in Coyhaique approved HidroAysén in an 11-1 vote despite the reviewing authorities citing outstanding flaws and omission of critical data. Environmental qualification permits were granted to the megaproject. Local protests in Coyhaique and large street demonstrations in Santiago immediately follow the ruling.

*May/June:* Massive street protests against HidroAysén in Santiago and other cities around Chile intermittently for six weeks after the approval. The largest of these was thought to number 100,000 people in the streets of Santiago. Conservative media emphasise disorderly behavior, despite the protests being mainly peaceful. There are 67 arrests at one protest on 13 May.

*15 May:* *La Tercera* published the results of its own survey which showed 74% of those questioned in Santiago rejected the building of the HidroAysén project. Another study, conducted by the Fundación Aysén Futuro and reported in *La Tercera* on 14 May

showed that in a hypothetical plebiscite in Aysén, 66% of people would reject the project, and 34% would approve it.

*September:* A national survey by the Universidad Diego Portales reported that 66% of respondents were against the HidroAysén project, and 72% were in agreement with the protests against the project.

*October:* The Court of Appeal rejected appeals of the anti-dams movement against the project. As a last administrative hurdle for HidroAysén, a Committee of Ministers from the Piñera government was established to review the megaproject. The committee's timeline for reporting its findings (and giving the project the final "green light") was to be the end of 2012.

*December:* The developing company HidroAysén revealed the planned route for the southern section of its 2300km power line, necessitating the building of up to 1700 transmission towers. HidroAysén was negotiating with Canadian company Transelec.

**2012: 4 April:** In a divided sentence, the Supreme Court of Chile rejected CDP's appeals against HidroAysén.

*9 April:* Pedro Pierry, one of the judges who had voted in favour of HidroAysén in the 2011 ruling is revealed in the media to have a large amount of shares in Endesa.

*12 April:* Chile's House of Representatives approved a report by the Commission for Human Rights which had been set up to review the approval of the megaproject. This report stated that the project should not have been approved on human rights, environmental and legal grounds.

*22 April:* Patagonia sin Represas stages a free concert in Santiago: *Luz Roja a HidroAysén* (Red light for HidroAysén) as a strategy to keep HidroAysén in the news. Musicians donate their time and speak out against the megaproject.

*May:* Colbún, 49% owner of HidroAysén, announced that it had indefinitely suspended the process to seek environmental permissions for the transmission line for the HidroAysén project. It cited lack of political agreement on energy development policy in Chile as grounds for its decision. This move is regarded as posturing to put political pressure on the government.

*August:* With a bill presented to the senate, Piñera announced the start of the building of a Carretera Eléctrica (an 'Electricity Highway') which would connect the electric grid around Santiago (the Sistema Interconectado Central or SIC) with the Sistema Interconectado del Norte Grande (SING). This would mean that any power from HidroAysén that was fed into the SIC could then allow additional energy to be used in the SING, which mainly used power for mining. HidroAysén could therefore be associated with power for mining. The same bill would also subsidise the construction of an 'Electricity Highway' to the south – effectively amounting to government subsidy of HidroAysén's transmission line.

*December:* Patagonia sin Represas staged another concert in Santiago, which it called: *Juntos Desenchufemos HidroAysén* (Together let's unplug HidroAysén).

**2013:** The final decision of the Committee of Ministers reviewing HidroAysén was expected all year. With presidential and lower/upper house elections this year, it was not clear whether the committee would report its findings under Piñera's administration, or whether the politically unpalatable decision would be passed on to the next administration. The decision did not come in 2013.

*July-November:* HidroAysén became a key election issue. The CPD/Patagonia sin Represas established Vota sin Represas (Vote Without Dams) a campaign to encourage election candidates to sign a declaration stating their intention to protect Patagonia from large-scale energy infrastructure projects like HidroAysén. Seven out of nine presidential candidates signed, with the exception of (centre-left) Michelle Bachelet and (conservative-right) Evelyn Matthei. Some 75 lower house and candidates and six Senate candidates also signed to Vote Without Dams.

*November:* Before the second round runoff between Bachelet and Matthei, Bachelet stated that she would not support HidroAysén if elected. First round of elections held on 17 November.

*15 December:* Second round of elections. Bachelet won the presidency.

**2014:** Bachelet appointed a new Minister of Energy, Máximo Pacheco. Pacheco foreshadowed an overhaul of energy policy in Chile, suggesting change to the role of the state and the participation of citizens in defining Chile's energy future.

*10 June:* The Committee of Ministers considering the HidroAysén approval rejected the project and its licences were revoked. HidroAysén declared its intention to continue working on the project.

**2014-2017:** HidroAysén brought a series of legal appeals against the decision of Committee of Ministers.

**2015:** HidroAysén's appeal for new water rights to re-initiate the project, but was rejected by the Direccion General de Aguas (DGA), the General Water Authority.

**2017:** *April:* Other renewable energy sources (solar/wind) now generated 58% of the power that HidroAysén would have produced by 2022.

*15 May:* Santiago's Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the CDP/Patagonia sin Represas which had brought a case against HidroAysén for failure to use its water rights (as stipulated by law).

*1 November:* Santiago's Environmental Tribunal made a final rejection of the series of appeals by HidroAysén against decision of Committee of Ministers.

*5 November:* Enel and Colbún announced their intention to return the water rights from the Rivers Baker and Pascua to the state.

*17 November:* In an extraordinary meeting of HidroAysén shareholders, dissolution and liquidation of the company is voted on and approved.

## List of interviewees

Rene Alinco, parliamentary representative for Aysén 2006-2014

Matías Asun, Director of Greenpeace, Chile

Carlos Briso, Technical Manager, HidroAysén

Rodrigo Castillo, Executive Director, Asociación de Empresas Eléctricas

Felipe Contreras, deputy editor, *La Tercera*

Lucio Cuenco, engineer and director of NGO Observatorio Latinoamericano de Conflictos Ambientales

Obispo Luis Infanti de la Mora, Bishop of Aysén

José Miguel de Pulgada, Editor, *El Diario de Aysén*

Nikolas Espinoza, former HidroAysén employee, public engagement in the Environmental Management Plan for the transmission line

Daniel Fernández, CEO, HidroAysén 2010-2014

Andrés Gillmore, sociologist, spokesman for Costa Carrera, an association of tourist operators in the Rio Baker catchment

María Paz Hargreaves, tourism operator, Caleta Tortel

Peter Hartmann, activist, Aysén Reserva de Vida/Patagonia sin Represas

Eduardo Hidalgo, Rodolfo Aedo, Xaviera Carvajal  
representatives of Chonke, an environmental and socio-cultural group in Aysén

Antonio Horvath, Senator for Aysén

Pablo Hubner, journalist and social media strategist, Patagonia sin Represas

Sara Larraín, Director, Chile Sustentable

Flavia Liberona, Director, Terram

Bernardo López, Mayor of Caleta Tortel

Carlos Martínez, independent political strategist

Marcelo Mena, Director, Centre for Sustainability, Andrés Bello University, Environment Minister, second Bachelet presidency

Rodrigo Miranda, journalist, Director of the Chilean College of Journalists

Carolina Morgado, Head of Communications, Fundación Tompkins, Parque Pumalín and Patagonia sin Represas

Carlos Olivares, President, Voz de la Patagonia social movement

Juan Pablo Orrego, Director, Ecosistemas. Chile's most well-known environmentalist

Roberto Reyes, Local Community Engagement, HidroAysén

Patricio Rodrigo, Executive Director, Corporación Chile Ambiente

Hugh Rudnick, energy analyst, Universidad Católica de Chile

Hernán Salazar, CEO, HidroAysén 2006-2010

Patricio Segura, journalist/activist, Patagonia sin Represas

María Irene Soto, Director of Communications, HidroAysén

Jorge Taboada, Manager, Administration and Development, HidroAysén.

Douglas Tompkins, conservationist, philanthropist, media strategist and funder of Patagonia sin Represas campaign

Claudia Torres, Aysén radio host and parliamentary candidate for Aysén (2013)

Ana Lya Uriarte, Environment Minister during first Bachelet presidency

Mitzi Urtubia, journalist/PR writer, Ecosistemas and Patagonia sin Represas

Former PR account executive for HidroAysén, Burson-Marsteller (anonymous)

Former HidroAysén stakeholder participation manager in Aysén (anonymous)

## References

- ABC 2009, viewed 25 August 2012,  
<http://www.abc.net.au/science/moon/earthrise.htm>.
- Abramson, P 2011, 'Critiques and counter-critiques of the postmaterialism thesis: Thirty-four years of debate', Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California at Irvine, viewed 12/12/18 <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3f72v9q4>
- Adam, B, Beck, U & Van Loon, J 2000, *The risk society and beyond: critical issues for social theory*, Sage Publications Ltd, London.
- Adorno, T & Horkheimer, M 1944/1972, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Verso, London.
- Alexander, J 2006, *The Civil Sphere*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Alexanyan, K, Barash, V, Etling, B, Faris, R, Gasser, U, Kelly, J, Palfrey, J & Roberts, H 2012, 'Exploring Russian Cyberspace: Digitally-Mediated Collective Action and the Networked Public Sphere', The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University.
- Allcott H & Gentzkow, M 2017, 'Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 211-236.
- Allern, S 2002, 'Journalistic and commercial news values: News organizations as patrons of an institution and market actors', *Nordicom Review*, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 137-152.
- Altshuler, A & Luberoff, D 2004, 'Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment', The Brookings Institution and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Washington D.C.
- Alvarez, S, Dagnino, E & Escobar, A 2018, *Cultures of politics/politics of cultures: revisioning Latin American social movements*, Routledge, London.
- Amgaben, G 2002, What is a paradigm?, 10/10/16, video,  
<http://www.egs.edu/faculty/amgaben/amgaben-what-is-a-paradigm-2002.html%3>
- Anderson, A 1993, 'Source-Media Relations: The Production of the Environmental Agenda', in A Hansen (ed.), *The Mass Media and Environmental Issues*, Leicester University Press, Leicester, pp. 51-68.
- Anderson, A 1997, *Media, culture and the environment*, Routledge, London.
- Anderson, A 2009, 'Media, Politics and Climate Change: Towards a New Research Agenda', *Sociology Compass*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 166-182.
- Anderson, C 2006, *The long tail: Why the future of business is selling less of more*, Hyperion, New York.

Angus, I, 2000, *Primal scenes of communication: Communication, consumerism, and social movements*, State University of New York Press, Albany.

Ansar, A, Flyvbjerg, B, Budzier, A & Lunn, D 2014, 'Should we build more large dams? The actual costs of hydropower megaproject development', *Energy Policy*, vol. 69, pp. 43-56.

Anselm, J & Haikola, S 2018, 'Depoliticization, Repoliticization, and Environmental Concerns: Swedish Mining Politics as an Instance of Environmental Politicization', *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies*, vol. 7 no. 2, pp. 561-596.

Anthonissen, P (ed.) 2008, *Crisis Communication: Practical PR Strategies for Reputation Management and Company Survival*, Kogan Page, London.

Aouragh, M & Alexander, A 2011, 'The Egyptian Experience: Sense and Nonsense of the Internet Revolution', *International Journal of Communication*, vol. 5, no. Feature, pp. 1344-1358.

Araujo, T & van der Meer, T 2018, 'News values on social media: Exploring what drives peaks in user activity about organizations on Twitter', *Journalism*, p. 1-19.

Archibald, D 2011, 'Photography, the Police and Protest: Images of the G20, London 2009', in S Cottle & L Lester (eds), *Transnational Protests and the Media*, Peter Lang, New York, pp. 129-142.

Arellano, S 2008, 'The old and the new reform of chile's power industries', *Centre of Applied Economics working paper*, pp. 1-28.

Aronoff, C 1975, 'Credibility of public relations for journalists', *Public Relations Review*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 45-56.

Arpan, L & Roskos-Ewoldsen, D 2005, 'Stealing thunder: Analysis of the effects of proactive disclosure of crisis information', *Public Relations Review*, vol. 31, pp. 425-433.

Arribas-Ayllon, M & Walkerdine, V 2011, 'Foucauldian Discourse Analysis', in C Willig & W Stainton-Rogers (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods in Psychology*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, pp. 91-108.

Atkinson, A 2015, *Inequality*, Harvard University Press, Harvard.

Arsenault, A & Castells, M 2008, 'The Structure and Dynamics of Global Multi-Media Business Networks', *International Journal of Communication*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 708-748.

Arvidsson, A & Colleoni, E 2012, 'Value in informational capitalism and on the Internet' *The Information Society*, vol. 28, no. 3 pp. 135-50.



- Ayre, J 2014, 'Chile Now (Arguably) World's Top Renewable Energy Market', Clean Technica, <<http://cleantechnica.com/2014/10/11/chile-now-arguably-worlds-top-renewable-energy-market/%3E>.
- Baeza Yates, R 2009, '2008: El Año en que Facebook Conquistó Chile', viewed 01/09/18, <http://www.baeza.cl/inf/FacebookChile.pdf>
- Bagdikian, B 1980, 'Conglomeration, Concentration, and the Media', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 59-64.
- Bagdikian, B 1983, *The Media Monopoly*, Beacon Press, Boston.
- Bagdikian, B 1987, *The Media Monopoly*, Beacon Press, Boston.
- Bagdikian B 2000, *The Media Monopoly*, 6th edition, Beacon, Boston.
- Bagdikian B 2004, *The New Media Monopoly* (7th edition), Beacon Press, Boston, MA.
- Baker, C 2006, *Media concentration and democracy: Why ownership matters*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Bakker, P 2014, 'Mr. Gates Returns', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 596-606.
- Baldasty, GJ 1992, *The commercialization of news in the nineteenth century*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison.
- Bank, W 2016, 'World Bank Internet Users as percentage of the population'.
- Barnhurst, KG & Nerone, J 2001, *The form of news: A history*, Guilford Press, London.
- Barrionuevo, A 05/08/2011, 'With Kiss-Ins and Dances, Young Chileans Push for Reform', *New York Times*, viewed 01/05/18, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/world/americas/05chile.html>
- Barthes, R 1972, *Mythologies*, Hill and Wang, New York.
- Barthes, R 1973/1975, *The pleasure of the text*, Hill & Wang, New York.
- Bassnett, S 2005, *Translation Studies*, Routledge, London.
- Bassnett, S 2014, *Translation*, Routledge, New York.
- Bauer, C 1998, *Against the Current: Privatization, Water Markets, and the State in Chile*, Kluwer, Boston.
- Bauer, C 2004, *Siren Song: Chilean Water Law as a Model for International Reform*, RFF Press, Washington DC, RFF Press, Washington DC.

Bauer, C 2009, 'Dams and markets: rivers and electric power in Chile', *Natural Resources Journal*, vol. 49, no. 3-4, p. 583.

Bauman, Z 1998, 'Time and Class: New Dimensions of Stratification', *Sociologisk Rapportserie*, vol. 7, pp. 1-18.

BBC News, 06/08/18, Hydropower dams: What's behind the global boom, viewed 11/11/18, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45019893>

BBC, 18/12/18, Chile election: Conservative Piñera elected president, viewed 21/11/18, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-42388019>

BBC, 30/01/2018, 'Chile creates national parks from donated land', <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-42868690>

Beasley, R & Danesi, M 2002, *Persuasive Signs: The Semiotics of Advertising*, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin.

Beck, U 1992, *Risk society: towards a new modernity*, vol. 17, Sage Publications Ltd.

Beck, U 1995, *Ecological politics in an age of risk*, Polity, Cambridge.

Beck, U 1997, *The Reinvention of Politics*, Polity, Cambridge.

Beck, U 1999, *World Risk Society*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

Beck, U 2000, 'Foreword', in S Allan, B Adam & C Carter (eds), *Environmental Risks and the Media*, Routledge, London, pp. xii-xiv.

Beck, U 2006, *The Cosmopolitan Vision*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

Beck, U 2009, *The World at Risk*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

Beck, U 2009a, 'Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision', *Constellations*, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 3-22.

Beck, U 2011, 'Cosmopolitanism as Imagined Communities of Global Risk', *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 55, no. 10, pp. 1346-1361.

Beck, U 2015, 'Emancipatory catastrophism: What does it mean to climate change and risk society?' *Current Sociology*, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 75-88.

Beck, U, Giddens, A & Lash, S 1994, *Reflexive modernization: politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order*, Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge.

Beckett, C & Mansell, R 2008, 'Crossing boundaries: new media and networked journalism', *Communication, Culture and Critique*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 92-104.

Beeferman, D, Berger, A & Lafferty, J 1997, 'A model of lexical attraction and repulsion', in P Cohen & W Wahlster (eds), 35th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics and Eighth Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Madrid, pp. 373-380.

Bell, A 1991, 'News Values', in *The language of news media*, Blackwell, Cambridge, MA., pp. 155-160.

Bell, D 1973, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, Basic Books, New York.

Bell, D 1978, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, Heinemen, London.

Belz, A, Talbott, A & Starck, K 1989, 'Using role theory to study cross perceptions of journalists and public relations practitioners', in J Grunig (ed.), *Public relations research annual*, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, vol. 1, pp. 125-139.

Benedikter, R & Siepmann, K 2013, 'Meet the Mattes', Foreign Affairs, viewed 24/03/16, <https://http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/chile/2013-06-12/meet-mattes%3E>.

Benkler, Y 2006, *The wealth of networks: How social production transforms markets and freedom*, Yale University Press, Newhaven.

Benkler Y, Faris, R & Roberts, H 2018, *Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Bennett, L 1990, 'Towards a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 103-125.

Benton, T & Craib, I 2001, *Philosophy of social science: The philosophical foundations of social thought*, Palgrave, Basingstoke.

Berelson, B 1952, *Content analysis in communication research*, Free Press, New York.

Berganza-Conde, M, Oller-Alonso, M & Meier, K 2010, 'Journalistic roles and objectivity in Spanish and Swiss journalism. An applied model of analysis of journalism culture', *Revista Latina de Comunicación Social*, vol. 65, pp. 488-502.

Berger, A 2000, *Ads Fads, and Consumer Culture: Advertising's Impact on American Character and Society*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham.

Berman, J & Witzner, D 1997, 'Technology and Democracy', *Social Research*, vol. 64, no. 3, p. 1313.

Bernays, E 1923, *Crystallizing Public Relations*, Boni and Liveright, New York.

Bice, S 2014 'What gives you a social licence: an exploration of the social licence to operate in the Australian Mining Industry', *Resources*, no. 3, pp. 62-80.

Birbili, M 2000, 'Translating from one language to another', *Social Research Update*, no. 31, viewed 12/10/16, <<http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU31.html%3E>.

Blumler, J & Gurevitch, M 1995, *The Crisis of Public Communication*, Routledge, London.

Blumler, J & Gurevitch, M 2001, 'The New Media and Our Political Communication Discontents: Democratizing Cyberspace', *Information, Communication & Society*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 1-13.

Boggs, C 2001, *The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere*, Guildford Press, New York.

Bohoslavsky, E 2008, Contra la Patagonia Judía, La familia Eichmann y los nacionalistas Argentinos y Chilenos frente al plan Andina (de 1960 a nuestros días), *Cuadernos Judaicos*, vol. 25, pp. 218-223.

Bosworth, B, Dornbusch, R & Labán, R 1994, *The Chilean economy: policy lessons and challenges*, Brookings Institution, Washington DC.

Bourdieu, P 1977, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Bourdieu, P 1979, *Distinction*, Routledge, London.

Bourdieu, P 1991, *Language and symbolic power*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

Bourdieu, P 1993, *The Field of Cultural Production*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

Bourdieu, P 1998, *On Television and Journalism*, Pluto, London.

Bourdieu, P 2004, 'Gender and symbolic violence', in N Scheper-Hughes & P Bourgois (eds), *Violence in war and peace*, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 339-343.

Boutilier, R 2014 'Concepts and emerging ideas: frequently asked questions about the social licence to operate', *Impact Assess. Proj. Apprais.* no. 32, pp. 263-272.

Boutyline, A & Willer, R 2017, 'The social structure of political echo chambers: Variation in ideological homophily in online networks,' *Political Psychology*, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 551-569.

Bowers, A 2011, 'Protest and Public Relations: A New Era for Non-institutional Sources?', in S Cottle & L Lester (eds), *Transnational Protests and the Media*, Peter Lang, New York, pp. 113-128.

Boykoff, J & Boykoff, M 2007, 'Climate change and journalistic norms: A case-study of US mass-media coverage', *Geoforum*, vol. 38, no. 6, pp. 1190-1204.

Boykoff, M & Boykoff, J 2004, 'Balance as bias: global warming and the US prestige press', *Global Environmental Change*, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 125-136.

Boykoff, M & Rajan, R 2007, *Signals and Noise*.

Boykoff, M 2007, 'Flogging a dead norm? Newspaper coverage of anthropogenic climate change in the United States and United Kingdom from 2003 to 2006', *Area*, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 470-481.

Boykoff, M 2008, 'Lost in translation? United States television news coverage of anthropogenic climate change 1995-2004', *Climatic Change*, vol. 86, no. 1-2, pp. 1-11.

Boykoff, M 2013, 'Public enemy no. 1? Understanding media representations of outlier views on climate change', *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 57, no. 6, pp.796-817.

Boykoff, M 2016, 'Fight semantic drift!? Mass media coverage of anthropogenic climate change,' *Contentious Geographies*, pp. 61-80, Routledge, London.

Boykoff, M, Maldonado, C & Nacu-Schmidt, A 2018, 'US Television Coverage of Climate Change or Global Warming 2000-2018-October 2018' *Media and Climate Change Observatory Data Sets*. 75, [https://scholar.colorado.edu/mecco\\_data/75](https://scholar.colorado.edu/mecco_data/75)

Bradley, K. & Hedrén, J (eds.) 2014, *Green utopianism: perspectives, politics and micro-practices*, Vol. 2, Routledge, London.

Branston, G & Stafford, R 2006, *The media student's book*, Routledge, New York.

Brants, K 1998, 'Who's afraid of infotainment?' *European Journal of Communication*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 315-335.

Brender, V 2003, 'The Media and the Neoliberal Transition in Chile: Democratic Promise Unfulfilled', *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 39-68.

Brender, V 2010, 'Economic transformations in Chile: the formation of the Chicago Boys', *The American Economist*, vol. 55, no. 1, pp.111-122.

Bresnahan, R 2002, 'Radio and the democratic Movement in Chile 1973-1990: Independent and Grass Roots Voices During the Pinochet Dictatorship.', *Journal of Radio Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 161-181.

Brewer, J 2000, *Ethnography*, Open University Press, Buckingham.

Breuer, A & Groshek, J 2014, 'Online media and offline empowerment in post-rebellion Tunisia: An analysis of Internet use during democratic transition', *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, vol. 11, no. 1 pp. 25-44.

Broersma, M & Graham T 2013, 'Twitter as a news source: how Dutch and British newspapers used tweets in their news coverage, 2007–2011', *Journalism Practice*, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 446–464.

Brownill, S 2013, 'Just Add Water: Waterfront regeneration as a global phenomenon', in M Leary & J Carthy (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Urban Regeneration*, Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 266-287.

Brunner, E, & DeLuca, K 2016, 'The argumentative force of image networks: Greenpeace's panmediated global detox campaign', *Argumentation and Advocacy*, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 281-299.

Bruns, A 2005, *Gatewatching: Collaborative Online News Production*, Peter Lang, New York.

Bruns, A 2006, 'Towards produsage: Futures for user-led content production', in F Sudweeks, H Hrachovec & C Ess (eds), *Cultural Attitudes towards Communication and Technology 2006*, Tartu, Estonia, pp. 275-284.

Bryman, A 1998, *Quantity and quality in social research*, Unwin Hyman, London.

Buchanan, M 2002, *Small World: Uncovering Nature's Hidden Networks*, Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, New York.

Budds, J 2004, 'Power, Nature and Neoliberalism: the Political Ecology of Water in Chile', *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, vol. 25, pp. 322-342.

Buechler, S. 2011, *Understanding Social Movements*, Routledge, New York.

Burgess, R 1984, *In the Field: an Introduction to Field Research*, Allen and Unwin London.

Burt, R 1980, 'Models of Network Structure', *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 6, pp. 79-141.

Butler, D 1995, *The Trouble with Reporting Northern Ireland*, Avebury, Aldershot.

Cacciatore, M, Scheufele, D & Iyengar, S 2016, 'The End of Framing as we Know it ... and the Future of Media Effects', *Mass Communication and Society*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 7-23.

Cairncross, F 1997, *The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Will Change our lives*, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.

Calabrese, A 2004, 'The promise of civil society: a global movement for communication rights', *Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies*, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 317-329.

Cameron, G, Sallot, L & Curtin, P 1997, 'Public relations and the production of news: A critical review and a theoretical framework', in B Burleson (ed.), *Communication Yearbook*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, vol. 20, pp. 111-155.

Cammaerts, B 2012, 'Protest Logics and the Mediation Opportunity Structure', *European Journal of Communication*, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 117-34.

Cammaerts, B 2013, 'The Mediation of Insurrectionary Symbolic Damage: The 2010 UK Student Protests', *International Journal of Press/Politics*, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 525-48.

Cammaerts, B 2015, 'Movement media as technologies of self-mediation', in C Atton (ed.), *The Routledge Companion to Alternative and Community Media*, Routledge, London, pp. 445-456.

Campbell, D & Stanley, J 1966, *Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research*, Rand-McNally, Chicago.

Campbell, D 1975, 'Degrees of freedom and the case study', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 178-191.

Campo V, M 2008, *El Poder de los Medios en España*, Ediciones UOC, Barcelona.

Canal 13, 28/11/2007, Cabalgata en Aysén, protesta por proyectos hidroeléctricas. *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism*, vol. 24 no. 1, pp. 9-18.

Caras 6/03/18, La nueva Constitución de Michelle Bachelet, viewed 12/11/18, <http://www.caras.cl/politica/la-nueva-constitucion-de-michelle-bachelet/>

Carey, J 1989, *Communication as culture: essays on media and society*, Unwyn-Hyman, Boston.

Carlson, M 2015, 'When news sites go native: Redefining the advertising-editorial divide in response to native advertising', *Journalism*, vol. 16, no. 7, pp. 849-865.

Carmona Ulloa, E 2002, *Los Dueños de Chile*, Ediciones La Huella, Santiago.

Carmona, E 1997, *Morir es la noticia: los periodistas relatan la historia de sus compañeros asesinados y o desaparecidos*, Ernesto Carmona Santiago de Chile.

Carroll, W & Hackett, R 2006, 'Democratic Media Activism Through the Lens of Social Movement Theory', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 83-104.

Carruthers, D & Rodriguez, P 2009, 'Mapuche Protest, Environmental Conflict and Social Movement Linkage in Chile', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 743-760.

Carson, A 2014, 'The political economy of the print media and the decline of corporate investigative journalism in Australia', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 49, no. 2 pp.726-742.

Carson, R 1962, *Silent Spring*, Ballantine Books.

Carvalho, A 2005, 'Representing the politics of the greenhouse effect', *Critical Discourse Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1-29.

Carvalho, A 2007 Ideological cultures and media discourse on scientific knowledge: Re-reading the news on climate change, *Public Understanding of Science*, vol. 16, pp. 223-243.

Carvalho, A 2008, 'Media(ted) discourse and society', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 161-177.

Cascio, J 2005, 'The rise of the participatory panopticon', viewed 5 March 2013, <<http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/002651.html>>.

CASEN 2013, Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, viewed 12/07/2015, <http://www.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/resultados-encuesta-casen-2013/%3E>.

CASEN 2015, Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, Region de Aysén 2015, viewed 21/10/18, <http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/indicadores/docs/region/Aysen.pdf>

Castells, M, 2000, 'Materials for an exploratory theory of the network society', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 51, no. 1. pp. 5-24.

Castells, M & Ince, M 2003, *Conversations with Manuel Castells*, Polity, Cambridge.

Castells, M & Tubella, I 2005, 'The transformation of the social structure of the network society: Social uses of the Internet in Catalonia', in M Castells (ed.), *The Network Society: A cross-cultural perspective*, Edward Elgar, Malden, MA.

Castells, M 1996a, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, vol. I, Blackwell Publishing, Massachusetts.

Castells, M 1996b, 'The Net and the Self: Working Notes for a Critical Theory of the Informational Society', *Critique of Anthropology*, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 9-38.

Castells, M 1996c, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Castells, M 2004a, *The Network Society: A Cross-cultural Perspective*, Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA.

Castells, M 2004b, *The power of identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*, 2nd Edition edn, Wiley-Blackwell.

Castells, M 2007, 'Communication, power and counter-power in the network society', *International Journal of Communication*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 238-266.

Castells, M 2008, 'The new public sphere: Global civil society, communication networks, and global governance', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616, no. 1, pp. 78-93.

Castells, M 2009, *Communication Power*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.



- Castells, M 2012, *Networks of Outrage and Hope*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Castillo, A 2009, *Journalism in the Chilean Transition to Democracy. The Lost Decade 1990-2000*, VDM Verlag Dr Müller, Saarbrücken.
- Catellani, A 2011, 'Environmentalists NGOs and the construction of the culprit: semiotic analysis', *Journal of Communication Management*, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 280-297.
- CCTP 2013, 'Chile necesita una gran reforma energética, Comité Editorial Comisión Ciudadana-Técnico-Parlamentaria para la Política y la Matriz Eléctrica'.
- Centre, PR 2014, 'Emerging Nations Embrace Internet, Mobile Technology', viewed 15/07/16.
- Chadwick, A 2013, *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Chile Sustentable 2012, 'La Urgencia de un Plan Nacional de Acción Eficiencia Energética para Chile, Chile Sustentable', viewed 12/09/16.  
<http://www.chilesustentable.net/la-necesidad-y-urgencia-de-un-plan-nacional-de-accion-de-eficiencia-energetica-para-chile/%3E>.
- Chile Sustentable 2013, 'Chile necesita una gran reforma energética, Propuestas de la Comisión Cuidadana Técnico-parlamentaria para la transición hacia un desarrollo eléctrico limpio, seguro, sustentable y justo', Chile Sustentable, Santiago.
- Cuenta Pública 2010, Contraloría Regional de Aysén del General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, Santiago, viewed 21/07/16, <<http://www.contraloria.cl/%3E>.
- Chile: Ciudades, Pueblos, Aldeas y Caseríos 2005, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Santiago de Chile, viewed 01/11/16,  
 <[http://www.ine.cl/canales/usuarios/cedoc\\_online/censos/pdf/censo\\_2002\\_publicado\\_junio\\_2005.pdf%3E](http://www.ine.cl/canales/usuarios/cedoc_online/censos/pdf/censo_2002_publicado_junio_2005.pdf%3E).
- Chilton, P 1987, 'Metaphor, Euphemism and the Militarization of Language', *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 7-19.
- Chinn, M & Fairlie, R 2004, 'The Determinants of the Global Digital Divide: A Cross-Country Analysis of Computer and Internet Penetration', Economic Growth Centre, University of Yale, Yale, viewed 18/1/13,  
[http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth\\_pdf/cdp881.pdf](http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp881.pdf).
- Cho, H, and Salmon, C 2007, 'Unintended effects of health communication campaigns', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 57 no.2, pp. 293-317.
- Chouliaraki, L 2008, 'The symbolic power of transnational media: Managing the visibility of suffering', *Global Media and Communication*, vol. 4, no. 3, pp.329-351.

Chouliaraki, L & Fairclough, N 1999, *Discourse in Late Modernity: rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

CIA 2000, 'CIA Activities in Chile', Central Intelligence Agency, viewed 12/09/16 <https://http://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/%3E>.

CNE 2015, Estadísticas Electricidad, Comisión Nacional de Energía, viewed 25/02/16 2016, <<http://www.cne.cl/estadisticas/electricidad/%3E>.

CNTV 2005, Encuesta Nacional de Television, Consejo Nacional de Television (CNTV - National Council for Television), Santiago, viewed 15/07/16, <[http://www.cntv.cl/cntv/site/artic/20151209/asocfile/20151209124713/v\\_encuesta\\_nacional\\_de\\_televisi\\_n.pdf%3E](http://www.cntv.cl/cntv/site/artic/20151209/asocfile/20151209124713/v_encuesta_nacional_de_televisi_n.pdf%3E).

CNTV 2011, Encuesta Nacional de Television, Consejo Nacional de Television (CNTV - National Council for Television), viewed 17/07/16, <[http://www.cntv.cl/cntv/site/artic/20151209/asocfile/20151209124713/7\\_entv\\_2011.pdf%3E](http://www.cntv.cl/cntv/site/artic/20151209/asocfile/20151209124713/7_entv_2011.pdf%3E).

Cohen, B 1963, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Cohen, J, Tsfati, Y & Sheafer, T 2008, 'The Influence of Presumed Media Influence in Politics Do Politicians' Perceptions of Media Power Matter?', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 72, no. 2, pp. 331-344.

Collier, S & Sater, W 1999, *A History of Chile 1808-1994*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Collier, S 1967, *Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence, 1808-1833*, Cambridge University Press Cambridge

Contemporary Issues in an Emerging Field', in N Denzin & Y Lincoln (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, pp. 285-300.

Conway, M 2006, 'The subjective precision of computers: A methodological comparison with human coding in content analysis', *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, vol. 83, no. 1, pp. 186-200.

Coombs, T, Frandsen, F, Holladay, S and Johansen, W 2010, 'Why a concern for apologia and crisis communication?', *Corporate Communications: An International Journal*, vol. 15 no. 4, pp. 337-349

Cordano, M, Welcomer, S, Scherer, RF, Pradenas, L and Parada, V 2011, 'A cross-cultural assessment of three theories of pro-environmental behavior: A comparison between business students of Chile and the United States', *Environment and Behavior*, vol. 43, no. 5, pp. 634-657.

Corner, J 2003, 'The model in question: a response to Klaehn on Herman and Chomsky', *European Journal of Communication*, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 367-375.

Corrales, O & Sandoval, J 2003, *Concentración del Mercado de los Medios, Pluralismo y Libertad de Expresión*, Universidad de Chile, Santiago.

Coryat, D 2015, 'Extractive politics, media power, and new waves of resistance against oil drilling in the Ecuadorian Amazon: The case of Yasunidos', *International Journal of Communication*, vol. 9, no. 20 pp. 3741-3760.

Cottle, S & Lester, L 2011, *Transnational Protests and the Media*, Peter Lang, New York.

Cottle, S & Rai, M 2006, 'Between Display and Deliberation: Analyzing TV news as communicative architecture', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 28, no. 2 pp. 163-189.

Communicative Architecture', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 163-189.

Cottle, S 1998, 'Ulrich Beck, "Risk Society" and the Media: A catastrophic view?', *European Journal of Communication*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 5-32.

Cottle, S 2000, 'TV news, lay voices, and the visualisation of environmental risks', in S Allan, B Adam & C Carter (eds), *Environmental Risks and the Media*, Routledge, London, pp. 29-44.

Cottle, S 2002, 'TV Agora and Agoraphobia Post September 11', in B Zelizer & S Allan (eds), *Journalism After September 11*, Routledge, London.

Cottle, S 2003, *News, Public Relations and Power*, Sage, London.

Cottle, S 2004, *The Racist Murder of Stephen Lawrence: Media Performance and Public Transformation*, Praeger, Westport, CT.

Cottle, S 2006, *Mediatized conflict*, Open University Press, Maidenhead.

Cottle, S 2008, 'Reporting demonstrations: the changing media politics of Dissent', *Media, Culture and Society*, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 853-72.

Cottle, S 2011a, 'Media and the Arab uprisings 2011: Research notes', *Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism*, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 647-659.

Cottle, S 2011b, 'Cell phones, camels and the global call for democracy', in J Mair & R Keeble (eds.), *Mirage in the Desert? Reporting the Arab Spring*, Arima Publishing, Bury St Edmunds, pp. 196-210.

Cottle S 2013, 'Environmental conflict in a global, media age: Beyond dualisms', in L Lester & Hutchins B (eds.), *Environmental Conflicts and the Media*, Peter Lang, New York, pp. 19-33.

Couldry, N 2000, *The Place of Media Power: Pilgrims and Witnesses of the Media Age*, Routledge, London.

- Couldry, N 2003, 'Media meta-capital: extending the range of Bourdieu's field theory', *Theory and Society*, vol. 32, pp. 653-677.
- Couldry, N 2014, *Mediatized Worlds: Culture and Society in a Media Age*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Couldry, N 2003, 'Media, Symbolic Power and the Limits of Bourdieu's Field Theory', MEDIA@ LSE Electronic Working Papers, London.
- Couldry N & Hepp A, 2018, *The mediated construction of reality*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Cox, R 2007, 'Nature's "Crisis Disciplines": Does Environmental Communication Have an Ethical Duty?', *Environmental Communication*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 5-20.
- Coxon, A 2005, 'Integrating qualitative and quantitative data: what does the user need', *Qualitative Social Research*, vol. 6, no. 2, viewed 01/09/16, < <http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/2-05/05-2-40-e.htm> - lit.>.
- Craig, RL 2004, 'Business, advertising, and the social control of news', *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 233-252.
- Cresswell, J 2010, 'Mapping the developing landscape of mixed methods research', in A Tashakkori & C Teddlie (eds), *SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research*, SAGE, London, pp. 45-68.
- Cresswell, J 2011, 'Controversies in Mixed Methods Research', in N Denzin & Y Lincoln (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, pp. 269-283.
- Cronin, M 2003, *Translation and Globalization*, Routledge, New York.
- Cuadra X 2013, 'Las trayectorias de la movilización contra hidroaysén. El malestar es sobre lo político, la propuesta es democratizadora', *Anuari del Conflicte Social*, 2012, pp. 1155-1176.
- Cuidadano, E 2005, 'El Ciudadano - Quiénes Somos', viewed 15/07/16, <<http://www.elciudadano.cl/quienes-somos/>>.
- Curran, J & Park, M 2000, *De-Westernising Media Studies*, Routledge, London.
- Curran, J & Seaton, J 1997, *Power Without Responsibility*, Routledge, London.
- Curran, J 1977, 'Capitalism and control of the press, 1800-1975', *Mass Communication and Society*, pp. 195-230.
- Curran, J 1990, 'The new revisionism in mass communication research: a reappraisal', *European Journal of Communication*, vol. 5, no. 2/3, pp. 135-164.
- Curran, J 1991, 'Rethinking the media as public sphere', in P Dahlgren & C Spark (eds), *Communication and Citizenship*, Routledge, London, pp. 27-57.

- Curran, J 2000, 'Rethinking Media and Democracy', in J Curran & M Gurevitch (eds), *Mass Media and Society*, Arnold, London, pp. 120-154.
- Curran, J, Ecclestone, J, Oakley, G & Richardson, A (eds) 1986, *Bending Reality - The State of the Media*, Pluto Press, London.
- Dahl, R 1989, *Democracy and its Critics*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Dahlberg, L 2007, 'Rethinking the fragmentation of the cyberpublic: from consensus to contestation', *New Media & Society*, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 827-847.
- Dahlberg, L 2007, 'The Internet, deliberative democracy and power: Radicalizing the public sphere', *International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 47-64.
- Dahlberg, L 2011, 'Reconstructing digital democracy: an outline of four 'positions'', *New Media Society*, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 855-872.
- Dahlgren, P 1995, *Television and the Public Sphere*, Sage, London.
- Dahlgren, P 2005, 'The Internet, public spheres, and political communication: Dispersion and deliberation', *Political Communication*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 147-162.
- Dahlgren, P (ed.) 2009, *Media and political engagement: Citizens, communication and democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Dake, K 1991, 'Orienting dispositions in the perception of risk - an analysis of contemporary worldviews and cultural biases', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 61-82.
- Dake, K 1992, 'Myths of Nature: Culture and the Social Construction of Risk', *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 21-37.
- Danesi, M & Perron, P 2000, *Analyzing Cultures*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington.
- Davies, N 2008, *Flat Earth News: An Award-winning Reporter Exposes Falsehood, Distortion and Propaganda in the Global Media*, Vintage, London.
- Davis, A 2000a, 'Public relations, business news and the reproduction of corporate elite power', *Journalism*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 282-304.
- Davis, A 2000b, 'Public relations, news production and changing patterns of source access in the British National Media', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 22, no. 29, pp. 39-59.
- Davis, A 2002, *Public Relations Democracy: Politics, Public Relations and the Mass Media in Britain*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Davis, A 2007, *The Mediation of Power: a Critical Introduction*, Routledge, London.

Davis, A 2009, 'Journalist-Source Relations, Mediated Reflexivity and the Politics of Politics', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 206-219.

De la Torre, A, Fajnzylber, P and Nash, J 2009, 'Desarrollo con menos carbono: respuestas latinoamericanas al desafío del cambio climático', World Bank, Washington, viewed 15/08/18,  
<https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/import/downloads/desarrolloconmenoscarbono.pdf>

Deacon, D & Golding, P 1994, *Taxation and Representation: the Media, Political Communication and the Poll Tax*, John Libbey, London.

Dean, J, Anderson, J & Lovink, G 2006, *Reformatting Politics: Information Society and Global Civil Society*, Routledge, New York.

Délano, B 1990, *Las relaciones públicas en Chile: Fundamentos prácticos y teóricos*, Universitaria, Santiago.

della Porta, D & Tarrow, S (eds) 2005, *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford.

DeLuca, K 1999, *Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism*, The Guilford Press, New York.

DeLuca, K, Lawson, S & Sun, Y 2012, 'Occupy Wall Street on the Public Screens of Social Media: The Many Framings of the Birth of a Protest Movement', *Communication, Culture & Critique*, no. 5, pp. 483-509.

DeLuca, K & Peeples, J 2002, 'From public sphere to public screen: Democracy, activism, and the "violence" of Seattle', *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, no. 79, pp. 125-151.

DeLuca, K, Sun, Y & Peeples, J 2011, 'Wild public screens and image events from Seattle to China: Using social media to broadcast activism beyond the confines of Democracy', In S. Cottle & L. Lester (Eds.), *Transnational Protests and the Media* (pp. 143-158) Peter Lang, New York.

Denscombe, M 2008, 'Communities of Practice A Research Paradigm for the Mixed Methods Approach', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 270-283.

Denzin, N 1970, *The Research Act in Sociology*, Aldine, Chicago.

Denzin, N 1978, *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*, McGraw-Hill, New York.

Desta, I 2010, 'CSR in Developing Countries', in M Pohl & N Tolhurst (eds), *Responsible Business: How to Manage a CSR Strategy Successfully*, Wiley, Chichester, pp. 265-279.

Dewey, J 1920/2008, 'Reconstruction in philosophy', in J Boydston & R Ross (eds), *The middle works of John Dewey, 1899-1924*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, pp. 77-202.

Dewey, J 1922/2008, 'Human nature and conduct', in J Boydston & G Murphy (eds), *The middle works of John Dewey 1899-1924*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, pp. 1-227.

Dewey, J 1925/2008, 'The public and its problems', in J Boydston & J Gouinlock (eds), *The later works of John Dewey 1925-1953*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, pp. 235-372.

Diamond, E 1996, 'Thanks Steve, we needed that', *Columbia Journalism Review*, vol. 34, no. March/April, pp. 30-32.

Diamond, J 1996, 'The Roots of Radicalism', *The New York Review of Books*, 14/11/96, pp. 4-6.

Dimitriou, H 2005, 'Globalization, Mega Transport Projects and the Making of Mega Places', paper presented to Annual Meeting of Transportation Research Board, Washington D.C., 11 January 2005.

Dimitriou, H 2009, 'Globalization, Mega transport projects and Private Finance', paper presented to Volvo Research and Educational Foundation Future of Urban Transport Conference, Volvo Research and Educational Foundation, University College London, April 2009.

Discovery Channel, 2012, *Desafios Futuros: HidroAysén*, viewed 07/10/18, <https://vimeo.com/63904694>

Dobers, P & Halme, M 2009, 'Corporate Social Responsibility and Developing Countries', *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 237-249.

Domke, D, Shah, D & Wackman, D 1998, 'Media priming effects: Accessibility, association, and activation', *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 51-74.

Donmoyer, R 2000, 'Generalizability and the Single-Case Study', in R Gomm, M Hammersley & P Foster (eds), *Case Study Method*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks.

Doorley, J & Garcia, H 2010, *Reputation Management: The Key to Successful Public Relations and Corporate Communication*, Routledge, New York.

Dotson, D, Jacobson, S, Kaid, L & Carlton, J 2012, 'Media Coverage of Climate Change in Chile: A Content Analysis of Conservative and Liberal Newspapers', *Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 64-81.

Douglas, M, & Wildavsky, A. B. 1982, *Risk and Culture: An essay on the selection of technical and environmental dangers*, University of California Press, Berkley.

Douglass, M 2005, 'Globalization, Mega-projects and the Environment: Urban Form and Water in Jakarta', paper presented to International Dialogic Conference on Global Cities: Water, Infrastructure and Environment, The UCLA Globalization Research Center, 16-19 May 2005.

Downing, J 2008, 'Social Movement Theories and Alternative Media: An Evaluation and Critique', *Communication, Culture and Critique*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 40-50.

Downs, A 1972, 'Up and Down with Ecology-the Issue-Attention Cycle', *Public Interest*, vol. 28, Summer.

Doyle, J 2016, *Mediating Climate Change*, Routledge, London.

Dryzek, J 2005, *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Duran, G & Kremerman, M 2011, 'La responsabilidad de las 4 mil familias que tienen secuestrado al país', viewed 12/09/16, <http://www.fundacionsol.cl/2011/11/la-responsabilidad-de-las-4-mil-familias-que-tienen-secuestrado-al-pais/%3E>.

Dyer, R 1993, *The matter of images: Essays on Representations*, Routledge London and New York.

Eckstein, H 1975, 'Case study and theory in political science', in F Greenstein & N Polsby (eds), *Handbook of Political Science*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, vol. 7, pp. 79-137.

Eco, U 1976, *A Theory of Semiotics*, Indiana Univerity Press, Bloomington.

Eco, U 2001, *Experiences in Translation*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

Eder, K (trans.) 1996, The social construction of nature: A sociology of ecological enlightenment, *Theory, Culture & Society*, Sage, Thousand Oaks.

*El Divisadero*, 13/4/2010, 'CDP denuncia que Enersis encubre lobby corporativo para viabilizar HidroAysén con donación', viewed 02/11/16, [www.eldivisadero.cl/noticias//task=show&id=22648](http://www.eldivisadero.cl/noticias//task=show&id=22648)

*El Mostrador* 2006, 'Carta ética fundacional', *El Mostrador*, viewed 12/07/16, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/carta-etica-fundacional/%3E>.

Elliot, P 1986, 'Intellectuals, "the Information Society" and the Disappearance of the Public Sphere', in R Collins, J Curran, N Garnham, P Scannell, P Schlesinger & C Sparks (eds), *Media, Culture and Society: A Critical Reader*, Sage, London, pp. 247-263.



Ellis, C & Bochner, A 2000, 'Autoethnography, personal narrative, reflexivity: Researcher as subject', in N Denzin & Y Lincoln (eds), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, pp. 733-768.

Elmasry, M & el-Nawawy, M 2017, 'Do Black Lives Matter?' *Journalism Practice*, vol. 11, no. 7, pp. 857-875

Enel 2010, Annual Report, viewed 28/03/16, [https://http://www.enel.com/en-gb/Documents/FinancialReports/report2010/Annual\\_Report\\_2010\\_V2.pdf%3E](https://http://www.enel.com/en-gb/Documents/FinancialReports/report2010/Annual_Report_2010_V2.pdf%3E).

Enersis 2015, Endesa Chile, Enersis Américas, viewed 15/03/16 2016, <http://www.enersis.cl/en/conocenos/filiales/generacion/Pages/endesachile.aspx%3E>.

Entman, R 1993, 'Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 51-58.

Entman, R 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago University Press, Chicago.

Entman, R 2007, 'Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 163-173.

Entman, R and Rojecki, A 1993, 'Freezing Out the Public: Elite and Media Framing of the U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement', *Journal of Political Communication*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 153-173.

Ericson, R, Baranek, P & Chan, J 1989, *Negotiating Control: A Study of News Sources*, Open University Press, Milton Keynes.

Erjavec, K 2004, 'Beyond advertising and journalism: Hybrid promotional news discourse', *Discourse & Society*, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 553-578.

Erkul, E & Kes-Erkul, A 2009, 'Web 2.0 in the process of e-participation: The case of organizing for America and the Obama Administration', National Centre for Digital Government, University of Massachusetts, Working Paper No. 09-001.

Escobar, L 2010, *Hacia un crecimiento inclusivo: propuestas de política económica*, Chile Veintiuno, Santiago.

Espinoza, C 2009, '100 millones de dólares perderá sector hidroeléctrico por cambio climático', *La Nación*, viewed 10/03/16, <<http://www.lanacion.cl/100-millones-de-dolares-perdera-sector-hidroelectrico-por-cambio-climatico/noticias/2009-11-20/205450.html%3E>.

Estrada, D, 2007, 'Ambiente Chile: Caballería rebelde contra represas', IPS Agencia de Noticias, viewed 14/08/13, <<http://www.ipsnoticias.net/2007/11/ambiente-chile-caballeria-rebelde-contra-represas/%3E>.

*Estrategía* 2002, 'Nuevo retraso en Ralco pondría en peligro abastecimiento', *Estrategía*, 6/05/2002.

*Estrategía* 2003, 'Defensa de Ralco', 5/06/03.

Ewen, S 1996, *PR!: a social history of spin*, Basic Books, New York.

Eyzaguirre, P 1993, *Manual de Relaciones Públicas*, Los Andes, Santiago.

Fairclough, N 1995, *Media Discourse*, Edward Arnold, London.

Fairclough, N 1998, 'Political Discourse in the Media: an analytical framework', in A Bell & P Garrett (eds), *Approaches to Media Discourse*, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 142-162.

Fairclough, N 2003, *Analysing Discourse: textual analysis for social research*, Routledge, London.

Fairfield, T & Jorratt, M 2015, 'Top income shares, business profits and effective tax rates in contemporary Chile', *Review of Income and Wealth*, vol. 134, no. 333, pp. 155-172.

Fearnside P 1997, 'Greenhouse-gas emissions from Amazonian hydroelectric reservoirs: the example of Brazil's Tucuruí Dam as compared to fossil fuel alternatives', *Environmental Conservation*, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 64-75.

Fearnside, P 2004, 'Greenhouse gas emissions from hydroelectric dams: controversies provide a springboard for rethinking a supposedly 'clean' energy source. An editorial comment,' *Climatic Change*, vol. 66, no. 1-2, pp. 1-8.

Fearnside, P 2015, 'Tropical hydropower in the clean development mechanism: Brazil's Santo Antônio Dam as an example of the need for change,' *Climatic Change*, vol. 131, no. 4, pp. 575-589.

Fenton, N & Barassi, V 2011, 'Alternative Media and Social Networking Sites: The Politics of Individuation and Political Participation', *The Communication Review*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 179-196

Fernández, C 22/04/2012, 'Acto en rechazo a HidroAysén', CNN Chile  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ImKu8-KBzTwChile>.

Ferrari, M 2000, 'A influência dos valores organizacionais na determinação prática das Relações Públicas em organizações do Brasil e do Chile', Doctoral thesis, University of Sao Paulo.

Ferrari, M 2009, 'Public Relations in Chile: Searching for Identity Amid Imported Models', in K Sriramesh & D Vercic (eds), *The Global Public Relations Handbook*, Routledge, New York, pp. 749-766.

Fielding, N 2012, 'Triangulation and Mixed Methods Designs: Data Integration with New Research Technologies', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 124-136.

Fischhendler, I, Cohen-Blankshtain, G, Shuali, Y and Boykoff, M, 2015, 'Communicating mega-projects in the face of uncertainties: Israeli mass media treatment of the Dead Sea Water Canal', *Public Understanding of Science*, vol. 24, no. 7, pp. 794-810.

Fishman, M 1980, *Manufacturing the News*, University of Texas Press, Austin.

Flanagan, C 1992, 'Relaciones Públicas: concepto, evolución y practica actual en Chile', Doctorate thesis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

Flew, T & McElhinney, S 2002, 'Globalization and the Structure of New Media Industries', in L Lievrouw & S Livingstone (eds), *Handbook of New Media: Social Shaping and Consequences of ICTs*, Sage, London, pp. 304-319.

Flew, T 2008, *New Media: an Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Floch, J 2001, *Semiotics, Marketing and Communication. Beneath the Signs, the Strategies*, Palgrave, Basingstoke.

Flyvbjerg, B (ed.) 2017, *The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Flyvbjerg, B 2001, *Making social science matter: Why social enquiry fails and how it can succeed again*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Flyvbjerg, B 2005, 'Machiavellian Megaprojects', *Antipode*, vol. Volume 37, no. 1, pp. 18-22.

Flyvbjerg, B 2006, 'Five Misunderstandings About Case Study Research', *Qualitative Enquiry*, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 219-245.

Flyvbjerg, B 2011, 'Case Study', in N Denzin & Y Lincoln (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, pp. 301-316.

Flyvbjerg, B 2012, 'Why mass media matter and how to work with them: phronesis and megaprojects', in B Flyvbjerg, T Landman & S Scram (eds), *Real Social Science: Applied Phronesis*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 95-121.

Flyvbjerg, B 2014, 'What You Should Know about Megaprojects and Why: An Overview', *Project Management Journal*, vol. 45, no. 2, April-May, pp. 6-19.

Flyvbjerg, B, Garbuio, M & Lovallo, D 2009, 'Delusion and Deception in Large Infrastructure Projects: Two Models for Explaining and Preventing Executive Disaster', *California Management Review*, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 170-193.

Flyvbjerg, B, Rothengatter, W & Bruzelius, N 2003, *Megaprojects and risk: an anatomy of ambition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Fominaya, C 2014, *Social movements and globalization: How protests, occupations and uprisings are changing the world*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Fontaine, P 9/05/2003, 'Derechos de agua, hidroelectricidad, y Ralco', *El Diario*.

Foucault, M 1965, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, Pantheon Books, New York.

Foucault, M 1972, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Pantheon, New York.

Foucault, M 1977, *Discipline and Punish*, Pantheon, New York.

Foucault, M 1980, 'Two Lectures', in C Gordon (ed.), *Power/Knowledge - Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, Pantheon, New York.

Foucault, M 1982, 'The subject and power', in H Dreyfus & P Rainbow (eds), *Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 208-226.

Fowler, R 1991, *Language in the News: discourse and ideology in the press*, Routledge, London.

Fox, E & Waisbord, S (eds) 2002, *Latin Politics, Global Media*, University of Texas Press, Austin, TX.

Franzen, A, and Vogl, D 2013, 'Two decades of measuring environmental attitudes: A comparative analysis of 33 countries', *Global Environmental Change*, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 1001-1008.

Fraser, N 2007, 'Transnationalizing the public sphere: On the legitimacy and efficacy of public opinion in a post-Westphalian world', *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 7-30.

Freedom House 2012, *Freedom of the Press Chile*, Freedom House, Washington DC, viewed 15/07/16, <<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2012/chile>>.

Freedom House 2015, *Freedom of the Press: Chile*, Freedom House, Washington DC, viewed 12/07/16, <<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/chile>>.

Freedom House 2018, *Freedom in the World 2018*, Freedom House, Washington DC, viewed 20/10/18, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/chile>

Freeman, C 1982, *The Economics of Industrial Innovation*, Frances Pinter, London.

Fuchs, C 2010, 'Labor in informational capitalism and on the Internet', *The Information Society*, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 179-96.

Fukuyama, F 1992, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Avon Books, New York.

Galtung, J & Ruge, MH 1965, 'The Structure of Foreign News The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 64-90.

Gamson, W & Modigliani, A 1987, 'The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action', *Research in Political Sociology*, vol. 3, pp. 137-177.

Gamson, W & Wolfsfeld, G 1993, 'Movements and Media as Interacting Systems', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 528, no. 1, pp. 114-125.

Gamson, W 1968, *Power and Discontent*, Dorsey, Homewood.

Gandy, O 2002, 'Social Shaping and Consequences of ICTs', in L Lievrouw & S Livingstone (eds), *Handbook of New Media*, Sage, London, pp. 448-460.

Gans, H 1980, *Deciding what's news: a study of the CBS evening news, NBC nightly news, Newsweek and Time*, Constable, London.

Garabí-Panambi, Company website, viewed 12/11/18,  
<http://garabipanambi.com.ar/index.html>

Garcia-Chevesich, P, Alvarado, S, Neary, D, Valdes, R, Valdes, J, Aguirre, J, Mena, M, Pizarro, R, Jofré, P, Vera, M & Olivares, C 2014, 'Respiratory disease and particulate air pollution in Santiago Chile: Contribution of erosion particles from fine sediments', *Environmental Pollution*, vol. 187, pp. 202-205.

García, C 2015, 'PR, clientelism and economics: a comparison of southern Europe and Latin America', *Journal of Communication Management*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 133-149.

García, C 2015, 'PR, clientelism and economics: a comparison of southern Europe and Latin America', *Journal of Communication Management*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 133-149.

Gates, B, Myrvhold, N & Rinearson, P 1995, *The Road Ahead*, Wheeler, Rockland.

Gauntlett, D 2005, *Moving Experiences: Media Effects and Beyond*, 2nd Edition John Libbey, London.

Geertz, C 1973, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, Basic Books, New York.

Geertz, C 1988, *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author*, Polity, Cambridge.

Geertz, C 1993, *Local Knowledge: further essays in interpretive anthropology*, Fontana, London.

Geertz, C 1995, *After the fact: Two countries, four decades, one anthropologist*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

- Gellert, P & Lynch, D 2003, 'Mega-projects as displacements', *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 55, no. 175, pp. 15-25.
- George, A & Bennett, A 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, MIT Press, Cambridge
- Gerbaudo, P 2018, 'Social media and populism: an elective affinity?', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 745-753.
- Gerring, J 2006, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Ghannam, J 2011, 'Social Media and the Arab World: Leading up to the Uprisings of 2011', Center for International Media Assistance, National Endowment for Democracy, Washington.
- Giddens, A 1990, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Giddens, A 1991, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and society in the Late Modern Age*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Giddens, A 1994, *Beyond Left and Right*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Giddens, A 1999, 'Risk and Responsibility', *The Modern Law Review*, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 1-10.
- Giddings, L 2006, 'Mixed-methods research: positivism dressed in drag?' *Journal of Research in Nursing*, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 195-203.
- Gilboa, E, Jumbert, M, Miklian, J, and Robinson, P, 2016, 'Moving media and conflict studies beyond the CNN effect', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 654-672.
- Gillham, B 2000, *Case Study Research Methods*, Continuum, London.
- Gimmler, A 2001, 'Deliberative Democracy, the Public Sphere and the Internet', *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 21-39.
- Ginsburg, F 2006, 'Ethnography and American Studies', *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 487-495.
- Gitlin, T 1980, *The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making & unmaking of the new left*, University of California Press, Berkley.
- Gitlin, T 1998, 'Public Sphere or Public Spherecules', in T Liebes & J Curran (eds), *Media, Ritual and Identity*, Routledge, London, pp. 168-174.
- Glasser, TL 1988, 'Objectivity precludes responsibility', in RE Heibert & C Reuss (eds), *Impact of Mass Media: Current Issues*, Longman, New York, pp. 44-51.

Gobierno de Chile 2011, 'Presidente Piñera lanzó agenda 'Chile País Desarrollado' que contempla 50 iniciativas para generar 'más oportunidades y mejores empleos'', viewed 16/06/15, <http://www.gobiernodechile.cl/destacados/2010/11/08/presidente-pinera-lanzo-agenda-chile-pais-desarrollado-que-contempla-50-iniciativa.htm%3E>

Godoy, S 2016, 'Media Ownership and Concentration in Chile', in E Noam & IMC Collaboration (eds), *Who Owns the World's Media? Media Concentration and Ownership around the World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 641-673.

Godoy, S & Gronemeyer, M 2012, Mapping Digital Media: Chile, The Open Society Foundations, Santiago, viewed 12/06/17, <https://http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-chile-20121122.pdf%3E>.

Golan, G 2006, 'Inter-media agenda setting and global news coverage: Assessing the influence of the New York Times on three network television evening news programs', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 323-334.

Goldberg, C 2007, 'Reflections on Jeffrey C. Alexander's the Civil Sphere', *The Sociological Quarterly*, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 629-639.

Goldberg, G 2010, 'Rethinking the public/virtual sphere: the problem with participation', *New Media & Society*, vol. 13, no. 5.

Golding, P & Murdock, G 1997a, *The political economy of the media*, vol. 2, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

Golding, P & Murdock, G 1997b, *The political economy of the media*, vol. 1, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

Goldman, R & Papson, S 1996, *Sign Wars: The Cluttered Landscape of Advertising*, The Guilford Press, New York.

González, C 2006, 'El peso de la memoria en los inicios de la transición a la democracia en Chile (1987-1988)', *Historia*, Vol. 2, no. 39, pp. 431-475

Gonzales, G 2004, 'Ralco Dam – the Dark Story Behind the Biggest Source of Light', viewed 1/11/16, < <http://www.ipsnews.net/2004/09/rights-chile-ralco-dam-the-dark-story-behind-the-biggest-source-of-light/%3E>.

González-Rodríguez, G 2008a, 'Restoration of Democracy and the Subsequent Concentration of Media Ownership', in J Lugo-Ocando (ed.), *The Media in Latin America*, Open University Press, Maidenhead, pp. 61-77.

González-Rodríguez, G 2008b, 'Restoration of Democracy and the Subsequent Concentration of Media Ownership', in J Lugo-Ocando (ed.), *National Medias*, Open University Press, Maidenhead, pp. 61-77.

- González, G 2005, 'Chile: La revista Rocinante cierra sus puertas', *Alterinfos América Latina*, viewed 14/07/16, <<http://www.alterinfos.org/spip.php?article62%3E>.
- Goodman, D & Preston, J 2012, How the Kony Video Went Viral, 31/1, *New York Times*, New York, <<http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/how-the-kony-video-went-viral/>>.
- Gorard, S & Taylor, C 2004, *Combining Methods in Educational and Social Research*, Open University Press, Maidenhead.
- Greene, J 2007, *Mixed Methods in Social Enquiry*, John Wiley, San Francisco.
- Greenslade, R 04/10/12, 'More PRs and Fewer Journalists Threatens Democracy', *The Guardian Online*, viewed 08/12/18, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2012/oct/04/marketingandpr-pressandpublishing>
- Greer, J & Bruno, K 1996, *Greenwash: The reality behind corporate environmentalism Malaysia*, Penang.
- Grewal, D 2008, *Network Power: The Social Dynamics of Globalization*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
- Gronemeyer, M and Porath, W 2017, Tendencias de la posición editorial en diarios de referencia en Chile. El arte de dosificar la crítica frente a la actuación de los actores políticos, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 177-202.
- Groshek, J & Koc-Michalska, K 2017, 'Helping populism win? Social media use, filter bubbles, and support for populist presidential candidates in the 2016 US election campaign', *Information, Communication & Society*, vol. 20, no. 9, pp. 1389-1407.
- Grunig, J & Hunt, T 1984, *Managing Public Relations*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, NY.
- Guatam, A, Haubold, I, Pacey, V, Papirnik, D, Premjee, M, Schlumpf, P, Berry, R, & Tolley, G 2018, 'Brazil's Belo Monte: A Cost-Benefit Analysis', policy paper, viewed 12/11/18, <http://franke.uchicago.edu/bigproblems/BPRO29000-2014/Team09-EnergyPolicyPaperBeloMonte.pdf>:
- Guba, E & Lincoln, Y 1994, 'Competing paradigms in qualitative research', in N Denzin & Y Lincoln (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, pp. 105-117.
- Guzman, A 2015, 'Evolution of News Frames During the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: Critical Discourse Analysis of Fox News's and CNN's Framing of Protesters, Mubarak, and the Muslim Brotherhood', *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, vol. 93, no.1, pp. 80-98.



Habermas, J 1989 [1962], *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois society*, trans. Thomas Burger, vol. 85, Polity Press, Cambridge.

Habermas, J 2006, 'Political Communication in media society: does democracy still enjoy an epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical research', *Communication Theory*, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 411-426.

Hajer, M & Versteeg, W 2005, 'A decade of discourse analysis of environmental politics: Achievements, challenges, perspectives', *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 175-184.

Hajer, M, 1995, *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Hall, S (ed.) 1997, *Representation: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices*, The Open University/Sage, London.

Hall, S 1974/1980, 'Coding and encoding in the television discourse ', in S Hall (ed.), *Culture, Media, Language*, Hutchison, London, pp. 197-208.

Hall, S 1982, 'The Rediscovery of Ideology: Return of the Repressed in Media Studies', in M Gurevitch, T Bennett, J Curran & J Woollacott (eds), *Culture, Society, Media*, Methuen, London.

Hall, S, Critcher, C, Jefferson, T, Clarke, J & Roberts, B 1978, 'Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state, and law and order', in *The Social Production of News*, Macmillan, London, pp. 53-77.

Hall, S, Roman, R, Cuevas, F, Sánchez, P, 2009, *¿Se Necesitan represas en la Patagonia? Un análisis del futuro energético chileno*, Ocho Libros, Santiago.

Hallahan, K, Holtzhausen, D, van Ruler, B, Vercic, D & Sriramesh, K 2007, 'Defining strategic communication', *International Journal of Strategic Communication*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 3-35.

Hallin, D & Mancini, P 2004, *Comparing Media Systems: three models of media and politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Hallin, D & Mancini, P 2013, *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Hallin, D & Papathanassopoulos, S 2002, 'Political clientelism and the media: Southern Europe and Latin America in comparative perspective', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 175-195.

Hallin, D 1986, *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

- Hallin, D 1994, *We Keep America on Top of the World - Television Journalism and the Public Sphere*, Routledge, London.
- Halloran, J, Elliott, P & Murdock, G 1970, *Demonstrations and Communication: A Case Study*, Penguin, London.
- Hammersley, M 1996, 'The relationship between qualitative and quantitative research: paradigm loyalty versus methodological eclecticism', in J Richardson (ed.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods for Psychology and the Social Sciences*, BPS Books, Leicester, pp. 159-174.
- Hannigan, A 2006, *Environmental Sociology*, Routledge, London.
- Hansen, A & Machin, D 2008, 'Visually branding the environment: climate change as a marketing opportunity', *Discourse Studies*, vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 777-794.
- Hansen, A & Machin, D 2013, *Media and Communication Research Methods: An Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Hansen, A 1991, 'The Media and the social construction of the environment', *Media, Culture & Society*, no. 13, pp. 443-458.
- Hansen, A (ed.) 1993, 'Greenpeace and Press Coverage of Environmental Issues', in A Hansen, *The Mass Media and Environmental Issues*, Leicester University Press, Leicester, pp. 150-178.
- Hansen, A 2010, *Environment, media and communication*, Routledge, London.
- Hänska Ahy, M 2016, 'Networked communication and the Arab Spring: Linking broadcast and social media', *New Media & Society*, vol. 18, no. 1 pp. 99-116.
- Harcup, T & O'Neill, D 2001, 'What is news? Galtung and Ruge revisited', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 261-280.
- Hardy, J 2014, *Critical political economy of the media: An introduction*, Routledge, London.
- Hardy, J 2017, 'Money, (Co)Production and Power', *Digital Journalism*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 1-25.
- Harris, A 1995, 'Absolutely a Semiotic: Visual and Linguistic Manipulation in Print Advertising', in C Spinks & J Deely (eds), *Semiotics*, Peter Lang, New York, pp. 78-102.
- Harvey, D 2007, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Hayes, D & Guardino, M 2010, 'Whose Views Made the News? Media Coverage and the March to War in Iraq', *Political Communication*, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 59-87.

- Held, D, McGrew, A, Goldblatt, D & Perraton, J 1999, *Global transformations: Politics, economics, and culture*, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
- Henley R, 09/12/2018, 'Paris on lockdown for gilets jaunes protests – as it happened', *The Guardian*, viewed 10/12/2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2018/dec/08/paris-on-lockdown-amid-ongoing-gilet-jaunes-protests-live-updates>
- Henry, H 2009, 'Re-thinking Apollo: envisioning environmentalism in space', *The Sociological Review*, vol. 57, pp. 190-203.
- Hepp, A 2013, *Cultures of Mediatization*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Hepp, A & Krotz, F 2014 'Mediatized worlds: Understanding everyday mediatization', in *Mediatized Worlds: Culture and Society in a Media Age*, A Hepp & F Krotz (eds.), p. 1-15, Palgrave, London.
- Herman, E & Chomsky, N 1988, *Manufacturing consent: The political Economy of the Mass Media*, Pantheon, New York.
- Herman, E & McChesney, R 2000, 'The global media', in H David & AG McGrew (eds), *The global transformations reader: an introduction to the globalization debate*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Herman, E & McChesney, R 2001, *Global media: The new missionaries of global capitalism*, Continuum, London.
- Hermida A, Lewis S & Zamith R 2014, 'Sourcing the Arab Spring: a case study of Andy Carvin's sources on Twitter during the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions,' *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 479-499.
- Hesmondhalgh, D 2007, *The Cultural Industries*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
- Hetherington, A 1985, *News, newspapers and television*, Geoforum, Macmillan, London.
- HidroAysén 2008-2009, *Boletines Informativos Regionales*.
- HidroAysén 2008, HidroAysén Informa.
- HidroAysén 2009, television advertisement, viewed 12/12/18 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HhSqKZeF74g>
- HidroAysén 2009, television advertisement, viewed 12/12/18 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXTV\\_gmVOPk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXTV_gmVOPk)
- HidroAysén 2010, television advertisement, viewed 12/12/18 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPcpyUjlLkE>

- HidroAysén 2010, television advertisement, viewed 12/12/18  
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2dGxVq\\_3j8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2dGxVq_3j8)
- HidroAysén 2011, company website, viewed 12/11/18, <http://www.hidroaysen.cl/>
- HidroAysén 2014, viewed 03/15/13, <<http://www.hidroaysen.cl/comunicados-de-prensa/page/1/%3E>
- HidroAysén Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, 2008, viewed 16/05/18,  
<http://infofirma.sea.gob.cl/DocumentosSEA/MostrarDocumento?docId=e8/03/92eae0642bbba32b4c1a28aeec61da6e66d>
- HidroAysén, 10/05/2011, Comunicado de Prensa, viewed on 12/06/2015,  
<http://http://www.hidroaysen.cl/?p=6022>
- HidroAysén, 11/06/2014, Declaración Pública, viewed 12/07/18,  
<http://www.hidroaysen.cl/?p=1937>
- Hilgartner, S, and Bosk, C, 1988, 'The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, No. 1, pp. 53-78.
- Hirschman, A & Rothschild, M 1973, 'The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 544-566.
- Hjarvard, S 2013, *The Mediatization of Culture and Society*, Routledge, London.
- Holmes, C 2006, 'Mixed (up) methods, methodology and interpretive frameworks', paper presented to Mixed Methods Conference Cambridge.
- Holmes, G 2011, 'Conservation's friends in high places: Neoliberalism, networks and the transnational conservation elite', *Global Environmental Politics*, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 1-21.
- Holsti, O 1969, *Content analysis for the social sciences and humanities*, Addison-Wesley, Reading.
- Hovland, C, Janis, I & Kelly, H 1953, *Communication and persuasion: Psychological studies of opinion change*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Howard, P 2010, *The Digital Origins of Dictatorships and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- HRW 1998, 'Limits of Tolerance: Freedom of Expression and the Public Debate in Chile', viewed 12/06/16, <https://http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/chile/index.htm> - TopOfPage.
- Hudson, R 1994, *Chile: A Country Study*, Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Washington.

Hurtado, E 2012, 'Bribery and laundering charges reveal accreditation mess', University World News, no. 251, viewed 2/05/16,  
<http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20121206064955774%3E>.

Hurtado, M 1989, *Historia de la TV en Chile (1958-1973)*, Ediciones Documentas-CENECA, Santiago.

Hutchins, B & Lester, L 2011, 'Politics, Power and Online Protest in an Age of Environmental Conflict', in S Cottle & L Lester (eds.), *Transnational Protests and the Media*, Peter Lang, New York.

Hutchins, B & Lester, L 2015, 'Theorizing the enactment of mediatized environmental conflict,' *International Communication Gazette*, vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 337-358.

IEA 2012, Oil and Gas Security, Emergency Response of IEA countries.

IEA 2015, Non conventional renewable energy law (20.257), 15/01/15 edn, International Energy Agency, 29/02/16,  
<http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/chile/name-24577-en.php%3E>.

Industries', in M.Gurevitch, T Bennett, J Curran & J Woollacott (eds), *Culture, Society and the Media*, Methuen, London.

Infanti de la Mora, L 2007, 'Amor y Sabiduría ', in J Orrego & P Rodrigo (eds), *Patagonia ¡Sin Represas!*, Ocho Libros, Santiago, p. 13.

Informe de la Comisión Investigadora Sobre el Funcionamiento de la Educación Superior, 2011, Cámara de Diputados, Santiago, viewed 14/04/16,  
<[https://http://www.camara.cl/trabajamos/comision\\_ficha.aspx?prmID=706%3E](https://http://www.camara.cl/trabajamos/comision_ficha.aspx?prmID=706%3E).

Inglehart, R 1977, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Inglehart, R, 1997, *Modernisation and Postmodernisation: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Inglehart, R, et al., 2002, 'World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys', 1999-2001, ICPSR version, Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor.

International Rivers, 'Quantity over quality: HidroAysén fails again, viewed 12/07/18,  
<https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/quantity-over-quality-hidroays%C3%A9n-fails-again-1725>

International Telecommunications Union 2017, ICT Facts and Figures 2017, viewed 18/11/18,  
<https://www.itu.int/en/ITU/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2017.pdf>

IPCC 2007, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Intergovernmental panel on

Climate Change, viewed 25/02/16, [https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4\\_syr\\_full\\_report.pdf](https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf)

Ipsos 2009, Posición frente a la construcción de Centrales Hidroeléctricas, viewed 12/09/15, [https://www.ipsos.com/es-cl/posicion-frente-a-la-construccion-de-centrales-hidroelectricas/2009\\_677599](https://www.ipsos.com/es-cl/posicion-frente-a-la-construccion-de-centrales-hidroelectricas/2009_677599)

Ipsos 2010, Posición frente a la construcción de Centrales Hidroeléctricas en Aysén, viewed 12/09/15, [https://www.ipsos.com/es-cl/posicion-frente-a-la-construccion-de-centrales-hidroelectricas-en-aysen/2010\\_887325](https://www.ipsos.com/es-cl/posicion-frente-a-la-construccion-de-centrales-hidroelectricas-en-aysen/2010_887325)

Ipsos 2011, Posición frente a la construcción de Centrales Hidroeléctricas HidroAysén, viewed 12/09/15, [https://www.ipsos.com/es-cl/posicion-frente-a-la-construccion-de-centrales-hidroelectricas-hidroaysen/2011\\_667542](https://www.ipsos.com/es-cl/posicion-frente-a-la-construccion-de-centrales-hidroelectricas-hidroaysen/2011_667542)

IWS 2016, 'Internet World Stats - Chile', viewed 12/09/2016, <<http://www.internetworldstats.com/sa/cl.htm%3E>.

Iyengar, S & Hahn, K 2009, 'Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 19-39.

Iyengar, S 1990, 'The accessibility bias in politics: Television news and public opinion', *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1-15.

Iyengar, S 1994, *Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues*, University of Chicago Press.

Jakubowics, K 2003, 'Media in Transition: The Case of Poland', in M Price, B Rozumilowicz & SG Verhulst (eds), *Media Reform: Democratizing the Media, Democratizing the State*, Routledge, London, pp. 203-231.

Jarroud, M 2014, 'Natural Gas - Both Crisis and Solution in Chile', *TierraAmérica, Environment and Development*, viewed 25/01/16, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/natural-gas-crisis-solution-chile/%3E>.

Jarroud, M 2015, 'Unifying Transmission from North to South means Cheaper Energy in Chile', *TierraAmérica, Environment and Development*, viewed 23/01/16, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2015/05/unifying-transmission-from-north-to-south-means-cheaper-energy-in-chile/%3E>.

Jebril, N, Stetka, V & Loveless, M 2013, 'Media and Democratisation: What is Known about the Role of the Mass Media in Transitions to Democracy', Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford.

Jenkins, H 2006, *Convergence culture: Where old and new media collide*, New York University Press, New York.

Jenkins, H, Puroshotma, R, Clinton, K, Weigel, M & Robison, A 2006, 'Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education for the 21st Century', MacArthur

Foundation, viewed 15/1/13,  
[http://henryjenkins.org/2006/10/confronting\\_the\\_challenges\\_of.html](http://henryjenkins.org/2006/10/confronting_the_challenges_of.html).

Johnson, L & Onwuegbuzie, A 2004, 'Mixed Methods Research: A research paradigm whose time has come', *Educational Researcher*, vol. 33, pp. 14-26.

Johnson, R, Onwuegbuzie, A & Turner, L 2007, 'Toward a Definition of Mixed Methods Research', *Mixed Methods Research*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 112-133.

Johnson, T, Kaye, B & Kim, D 2010, 'Creating a Web of Trust and Change: Testing the Gamson Hypothesis on Politically Interested Internet Users', *Atlantic Journal of Communication*, vol. 18, pp. 259-279.

Johnston, B & Garcia-Downing, C 2004, 'Hydroelectric Development on the Bío-Bío River Chile: Anthropology and Human Rights Advocacy', in M Blaser, H Feit & G McRae (eds) *In the way of Development: Indigenous Peoples, Life Projects and Globalization*, Zed Books, London, pp. 211-234.

Juris, J 2011, 'Mediating and Embodying Transnational Protest: Internal and External Effects of Mass Global Justice Actions', in S Cottle & L Lester (eds), *Transnational Protests and the Media*, New York, Peter Lang, pp. 98-112.

Kain, J 1990, 'Deception in Dallas: Strategic Misrepresentation in Rail Transit Promotion and Evaluation', *Journal of the American Planning Association*, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 186-196.

Kaltwasser, C 2007, 'Chile: transición pactada y débil autodeterminación colectiva de la sociedad', *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 343-372.

Kaplan, A 1964, *The Conduct of Enquiry*, Chandler, San Francisco.

Katz, E 1996, 'And deliver us from segmentation', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 546, pp. 22-33.

Kawata, J 2006, *Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism*, Ashgate, Burlington.

Keen, A 2007, *The Cult of the Amateur: How today's Internet is Killing our Culture and Assaulting our Economy*, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London.

Kellner, D 1995, *Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics Between the Modern and the Postmodern*, Routledge, London.

Kellner, D 2003, *Media Spectacle*, Routledge, London.

Kellner, D 2004, 'The Media and the Crises of Democracy in the Age of Bush-2', *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 29-58.

Kellner, D, 2014, 'Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy', in D Boros & J Glass (eds.) *Re-imagining public space*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 19-43

- Kelly, T 2010, 'Is the Internet the Secret to Happiness?', *Time Magazine*, 14 May 2010, viewed 19/02/13, <http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1989244,00.html>.
- Khagram, S 2004, *Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
- Kim, K 1996, *Caged in Our Own Signs: A Book about Semiotics*, Ablex, Norwood.
- Kiyoshi, K, Lakhsmanan, T & Anderson, W 2006, *Structural changes in Transportation and Communication in the Knowledge Society*, Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA.
- Klaehn, J 2002, 'A critical review and assessment of Herman and Chomsky's "propaganda model"', *European Journal of Communication*, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 147-182.
- Klein, G & Aubry, M, 2017, 'From the Editors: Introducing the Special Issue on Megaprojects – "Symbolic and Sublime"', *Project Management Journal*, vol. 48, no. 6, pp. 3-4
- Klinenberg, E 2005, 'Convergence: news production in a digital age', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 597, pp. 48-64.
- Kornbluh, P 2003, *The Pinochet File. A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*, The New Press New York.
- Krippendorff, K 2004, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*, Sage, Thousand Oaks.
- Krotz, F & Hepp, A 2011, 'A concretization of mediatization: How 'mediatization works' and why mediatized worlds are a helpful concept for empirical mediatization research', *Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 137-152.
- Kurasawa, F 2004, 'A cosmopolitanism from below: Alternative globalization and the creation of a solidarity without bounds', *Archives of European Sociology*, vol. 45, no. 2 pp. 233-255.
- Kurasawa, F 2007, *The Work of Global Justice: Human Rights as Practices*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Kurtz, M 2013, *Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective: Social Foundations of Institutional Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Kvale, S 1996, *Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing*, SAGE, London.
- Lakoff, G 2004, *Don't think of an elephant! Know your values and frame the debate*, Chelsea Green, White River Junction.



Lan, L & Meng, Y, 2016, 'A Comparative Study of Discourse and Ideological Representations of Protesters in International Online News during 2014 Occupy Central', *Intercultural Communication Studies*, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 82-98.

Lash, S & Urry, J 1994, *Economies of Signs and Space*, Sage Publications, London.

Latta, A & Williams, K 2011, *Chilean Patagonia in the Balance: Dams, Mines and the Canadian Connection*, The Council of Canadians, Ottawa,  
<http://canadians.org/content/report-chilean-patagonia-balance-dams-mines-and-canadian-connection%3E>.

Latta, A 2007, 'Citizenship and the Politics of Nature: The Case of Chile's Alto Biobío', *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 229-246.

Latta, A 2010, 'Generating Consent: Mega-Hydro and the post Neoliberal Corporation. The case of HidroAysén ', paper presented to International Conference: "The tension between environmental and social justice in Latin America: the case of water management", Sao Paulo.

Latta, A 2011, 'Los desastres planificados: megaproyectos y trauma socio-ambiental, el caso de HidroAysén' *Sociedad Hoy*, vol. 20, 1st quarter, pp. 111-129.

Law, J 2004, *After Method: Mess in Social Science Research*, Routledge, Abingdon.

Leadbeater, C 2009, *We-Think*, Profile Books, London.

Leal, C 25/11/2012, 'Indignación en redes sociales tras programa favorable a HidroAysén de Discovery Channel', *Radio Bío Bío*, viewed 1/10/18,  
<https://www.biobiochile.cl/noticias/2012/11/25/indignacion-en-redes-sociales-tras-programa-favorable-a-hidroaysen-de-discovery-channel.shtml>

Lecheler, S & Kruikemeier, S 2016, 'Re-evaluating journalistic routines in a digital age: A review of research on the use of online sources', *New Media & Society*, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 156-171

Lefsrud, L, & Meyer, R 2012, 'Science or science fiction? Professionals' discursive construction of climate change', *Organizational Studies*, vol. 33, no. 11, pp. 1477-1506.

Lehmann-Wilzig, S & Cohen-Avigdor, N 2004, 'The natural life cycle of the new media evolution', *New Media and Society*, vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 707-730.

Lester, L & Hutchins, B 2006, 'Environmental protest and tap-dancing with the media in the information age', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 433-451.

Lester, L & Hutchins, B 2012a, 'The power of the unseen: environmental conflict, the media and invisibility', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 34, no. 7, pp. 847-863.

Lester, L & Hutchins, B 2012b, 'Journalism, the environment and the new media politics of invisibility', *Australian Journalism Review*, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 19 - 31.

Lester, L & Hutchins, B 2013, *Environmental Conflict and the Media*, Peter Lang, New York.

Lester, L 2006, 'Journalism, Reflexivity and the Natural State', *Australian Journal of Communication*, vol. 33, no. 2, 3, pp. 75-88.

Lester, L 2007, *Giving Ground: Media and Environmental Conflict in Tasmania*, Quintus, Hobart.

Lester, L 2010a, 'Big tree, small news: Media access, symbolic power and strategic intervention', *Journalism*, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 589-606.

Lester, L 2010b, *Media and environment: Conflict, politics and the news*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

Lester, L 2016, 'Media and social licence: on being publicly useful in the Tasmanian forests conflict', *Forestry: An International Journal of Forest Research*, vol. 89, no. 3 pp. 542-551.

Levy, M & Windahl, S 1984, 'Audience activity and gratifications: A conceptual clarification and exploration', *Communication Research*, vol. 11, pp. 51-78.

Lewis, S, Zamith, R & Hermida, A 2013, 'Content Analysis in an Era of Big Data: A Hybrid Approach to Computational and Manual Methods', *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 34-52.

Lewis, SC & Reese, SD 2009, 'What is the war on terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists', *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, vol. 86, no. 1, pp. 85-102.

Lichtenberg, J 1993, 'In defense of objectivity', in J Curran & M Gurevitch (eds), *Mass Media and Society*, Edward Arnold, London, pp. 216-231.

Lincoln, Y, Lynham, S & Guba, E 2011, 'Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions and Emerging Confluences, Revisited', in N Denzin & Y Lincoln (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, pp. 97-128.

Lippmann, W 1922 (1997) *Public Opinion*, Transaction Pub, New Brunswick.

Livingstone, S & Lunt, P 1994, *Talk on Television*, Routledge, London.

Lohrey, A 2002, 'Groundswell: The Rise of the Greens', *Quarterly Essay*, no. 8.

Londoño, E 2018, 'In Chile, a Billionaire Takes the Reins from a Socialist, Again', *The New York Times*, viewed 12/10/2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/world/americas/chile-president-pinera-bachelet.html>

- Long, G 2015, 'Arrest, Torture, Exile: Journalism Under Military Rule in Chile', *Journalism is not a Crime*, viewed 12/06/16, <https://journalismisnotacrime.com/en/news/110/>.
- Long, G 29/05/13, 'Quiénes son los encapuchados de las protestas en Chile?', *BBC Latin America*, [https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2013/05/130524\\_chile\\_protestas\\_encapuchados\\_estudiantes\\_jp](https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2013/05/130524_chile_protestas_encapuchados_estudiantes_jp)
- Lopez Rego, M, Reis Irigaray, H, & Lago Chaves, R 2017, 'Symbolic Megaprojects: Historical Evidence of a Forgotten Dimension', *Project Management Journal*, vol. 48, no. 6, pp. 17–28.
- López, R, Figueroa, E & Gutiérrez, P 2013, 'La parte del León': Nuevas estimaciones de la participación de los súper ricos en el ingreso de Chile, Universidad de Chile, Facultad Economía y Negocios, Santiago, viewed 15/4/16, <http://www.econ.uchile.cl/uploads/publicacion/306018fadb3ac79952bf1395a555a90a86633790.pdf%3E>.
- Lostarnau, C, Oyarzún, J, Maturana, H, Soto, G, Señoret, M, Soto, M, Rötting, T, Amezaga, J and Oyarzún 2011, 'Stakeholder participation within the public environmental system in Chile: Major gaps between theory and practice', *Journal of Environmental Management*, vol. 92, pp. 2470-2478
- Lovink, G 2007, *Zero Comments: Blogging and Critical Internet Culture*, Routledge, London.
- Lovink, G 2011, *Networks without a Cause: a Critique of Social Media*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Lundby, K (ed.) 2009, *Mediatization*, Peter Lang, New York.
- Lynn, T & Williams, S 2018, "'Have a Quiet, Orderly, Polite Revolution": Framing Political Protest and Protecting the Status Quo', *Critical Sociology*, vol. 44, no. 4-5 pp. 733–751.
- MacDonald, M 2002, *Review of Large Public Procurement in the UK*, HM Treasury, London.
- Macnaughton, P & Urry, J 1998, *Contested Natures*, Sage, London.
- Maeck, A, DelSontro, T, McGinnis, D, Fischer, H, Flury, S, Schmidt, M, Fietzek, P & Lorke, A 2013, 'Sediment trapping by dams creates methane emission hot spots', *Environmental Science & Technology*, vol. 47, no. 15, pp. 8130-8137.
- Mannarini, T, Legittimo, M, Talò, C 2008, 'Determinants of Social and Political Participation among Youth: A Preliminary Study', *Psicología Política* 36, pp. 95-117.

Mansell, R 2002, *Inside the Communication Revolution: Evolving Patterns of Social and Technical Interaction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Maoz, Z 2002, 'Case study methodology in international studies: from storytelling to hypothesis testing', in F Harvey & M Brecher (eds), *Evaluating Methodology in International Studies*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 161-186.

Martín-Barbero, J 2006, 'A Latin American Perspective on Communication/Cultural Mediation', *Global Media and Communication*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 279-297.

Markoff, J 2006, *What the Doormouse Said: How the sixties counterculture shaped the personal computer industry*, Penguin, New York.

MaRS 2015, Market Information Report: Chile, MaRS Cleantech, Toronto,  
[https://http://www.marsdd.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/MAR-CHILE\\_REPORT\\_FINAL.pdf](https://http://www.marsdd.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/MAR-CHILE_REPORT_FINAL.pdf)%3E.

Mason, J 2002, 'Qualitative interviews: Asking, Listening and Interpreting', in T May (ed.), *Qualitative Research in Action*, Sage London.

Mason, J 2007, *Qualitative Researching*, Sage, London.

Masterton, M 2005, 'Asian journalists seek values worth preserving', *Asia Pacific Media Educator*, vol. 1, no. 16, p. 6.

Mastrini, G & Becerra, M 2011, 'Structure, Concentration and Changes of the Media System in the Southern Cone of Latin America', *Comunicar*, vol. 36, no. XVIII, pp. 51-59.

Matamala, D 2015, 'Poderoso caballero. El pe\$ó del dinero en la política chilena', Universidad Diego Portales/Calalonia, Santiago.

Matamoras, P 2011, '¿Qué diantres es el "monitoreo"?', viewed 1/10/16,  
<http://www.matamoras.cl/2011/06/24/%C2%BFque-diantres-es-el-%E2%80%9Cmonitoreo%E2%80%9D/%3E>.

Matthews, J 2015, 'Chile's mines set hot pace on renewables — Australia take note', *Australian Mining*, viewed 29/02/16,  
<http://www.australianmining.com.au/features/chile-s-mines-set-hot-pace-on-renewables-austr-1%3E>

Mauersberger, C, 2016, *Advocacy Coalitions and Democratizing Media Reforms in Latin America: Whose Voice Gets on the Air?* Springer, Heidelberg.

Mayring, P 2007, 'Introduction: Arguments for Mixed Methodology', in P Mayring, G Huber, L Gurtler & M Kiegelmann (eds), *Mixed Methodology in Psychological Research*, Sense Publishers, Rotterdam, pp. 1-4.

McAdam, D, Tarrow, S & Tilly, C 2001, *Dynamics of Contention*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

McAllister, C 2012, 'Where the Roads Don't Reach: Community Radio in the Aysén Uprising', *NACLA Report on the Americas*, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 21-24.

McChesney, R & Schiller, D 2003, *The political economy of international communications: Foundations for the emerging global debate about media ownership and regulation*, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

McChesney, R 1997, *Corporate Media and the Threat to Democracy*, Seven Stories Press, New York.

McChesney, R 1999, *Rich media, poor democracy: Communication politics in dubious times*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana.

McChesney, R 2003, 'Corporate media, global capitalism', in S Cottle (ed.), *Media Organisation and Production*, Sage, London, pp. 27-39.

McChesney, R 2004, *The Problem of the Media: US Communication Politics in the Twenty-first Century*, Monthly Review Press, New York.

McChesney, R 2007, *Communication Revolution: Critical Junctures and the Future of Media*, New Press, New York.

McChesney, R 2008, 'The Political Economy of Media: Enduring Issues, Emerging Dilemmas', *Monthly Review Press*, New York.

McChesney, R 2013, *Digital disconnect: How capitalism is turning the Internet against democracy*, The New Press, New York.

McCoombs, M & Ghanem, S 2001, 'The convergence of agenda setting and framing', in SD Reese, O Gandy & A Grant (eds), *Framing public life: Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world*, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, pp. 67-81.

McCoombs, M & Shaw, D 1972, 'The agenda-setting function of mass media', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 176-187.

McCoombs, M & Shaw, D 2006, 'The evolution of agenda-setting research: Twenty-five years in the marketplace of ideas', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 58-67.

McCombs, M, Shaw, D, & Weaver, D 2014, 'New Directions in Agenda-Setting Theory and Research', *Mass Communication and Society*, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 781-802.

McCully, P 1996, *Silenced rivers: the Ecology and Politics of Large Dams*, Zed Books, London.

McCurdy, P 2012, 'Social movements, protest and mainstream media', *Sociology Compass*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp 244-255.

McGaurr, L & Lester, L 2009, 'Complementary Problems, Competing Risks: Climate Change, Nuclear Energy and The Australian,' in T Boyce & J Lewis (eds), *Climate Change and the Media*, Peter Lang, New York, pp. 174-185.

McGrath, C 2008, 'Flying foxes, dams and whales: Using federal environmental laws in the public interest', *EPLJ*, vol. 25, pp. 324-358.

McKee, A 2005, *The Public Sphere: An Introduction*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

McLeod, D & Hertog, J 1992, 'The manufacture of public opinion by reporters: informal cues for public perceptions of protest groups', *Discourse and Society*, vol. 3, pp. 259-275.

McLeod, D & Hertog, J 1999, 'Social control and the mass media's role in the regulation of protest groups: The communicative acts perspective', in D Demers & K Viswanath (eds), *Mass media, social control, and social change: A macrosocial perspective*, Iowa State University Press, Ames, pp. 305-330.

McLuhan, M 1962, *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The making of Typographic Man*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

McManus J, 1994, *Market-Driven Journalism: Let the Citizen Beware?* Sage, Thousand Oaks.

McNair, B 1995, *An Introduction to Political Communication*, Routledge, London.

McNair, B 2006, *Cultural Chaos: Journalism, News and Power in a Globalised World*, Routledge, London.

McNair, B 2017, *Fake News*, Routledge, London.

McQuail, D 1992, *Media Performance and the Public Interest*, Sage, London.

McQuail, D 2000, *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory* (4th ed.), Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.

McWilliams, A, Siegel, D & Wright, P 2006, 'Corporate social responsibility: strategic implications', *Journal of Management Studies*, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 1-18.

Mellado, C & Barría, S 2012, 'Development of professional roles in the practice of public relations in Chile', *Public Relations Review*, vol. 38, no. 2012, pp. 446-453.

Mellado, C & Hanusch, F 2011, 'Comparing professional identities, attitudes, and views in public communication: a study of Chilean journalists and public relations practitioners', *Public Relations Review*, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 384-339.

Mellado, C, Moreira, S, Lagos, C & Hernández, M 2012, 'Comparing journalism cultures in Latin America : The case of Chile, Brazil and Mexico', *International Communication Gazette*, vol. 74, no. 60, pp. 60-77.

Mellado, C, Salinas, P, Del Valle, C & González, G 2010a, 'A comparative study in four regions: Labor market and profile of the Chilean journalist', *Cuadernos de Información*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 45-64.

Mellado, C, Salinas, P, Del Valle, C & González, G 2010b, 'Encuesta de Periodistas de Prensa', Medios de Comunicación.

Meraz, S 2009, 'Is There an Elite Hold? Traditional Media to Social Media Agenda Setting Influence in Blog Networks', *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 682-707.

Meraz, S 2011, 'Using time series analysis to measure intermedia agenda-setting influence in traditional media and political blog networks', *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, vol. 88, no. 1, pp. 176-194.

Mercopress 2010, 'Four Chilean families concentrate 47% of assets in Santiago's stock exchange', viewed 05/04/16, <<http://en.mercopress.com/2010/08/14/four-chilean-families-concentrate-47-of-assets-in-santiago-s-stock-exchange%3E>.

Mercopress 2016, 'Magellanes Region in south Chile could hold a treasure of unconventional tight gas ', viewed 5/02/16, <http://en.mercopress.com/2016/02/04/magallanes-region-in-south-chile-could-hold-a-treasure-of-unconventional-tight-gas%3E>.

Merino, M & Bello, M 2014, Discourse Coalitions in the Controversy around the HydroAysen Project in the Patagonia Region of Chile, *International Journal of Social Science Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 1-13.

Merrin, W 2009, 'Media studies 2.0: Upgrading and open-sourcing the discipline', *Interactions: Studies in Communication and Culture*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 17-34.

Metzgar, E & Maruggi, A 2009, 'Social media and the 2008 U.S. presidential election', *Society for New Communications Research Publisher*, San José.

Meyer, P 2009, *The Vanishing Newspaper: Saving Journalism in the Digital Age*, University of Missouri Press, Colombia.

Meyer, T & Hinchman, L 2002, Media democracy: how the media colonize politics, Polity, Cambridge.

Millas, H 2007, *La Sagrada Familia: La Historia Secreta de las Diez Familias más poderosas de Chile*, Planeta, Santiago.

Miller, D & Williams, K 1993, 'Negotiating HIV/AIDS Information: Agendas, Media Strategies and the News', in E J. (ed.), *Getting the Message*, Routledge, London.

Miller, D 1994, Don't Mention the War: Northern Ireland, *Propaganda and the Media*, Pluto Press, London.

- Miller, J 1987, *The ethics of reading*, Colombia University Press, New York.
- Ministerio de Agrucultura, 2014, Parque Nacional Torres del Paine 2014, viewed 12/12/16, <<http://www.parquetorresdelpaine.cl/es/quienes-somos>>.
- Ministerio de Energía 2016, Ministerio de Energía, viewed 18/01/16 2016, [http://antiguo.minenergia.cl/minwww/opencms/14\\_portal\\_informacion/la\\_energia/el\\_electricidad.html%3E](http://antiguo.minenergia.cl/minwww/opencms/14_portal_informacion/la_energia/el_electricidad.html%3E).
- Mladinic, H 2010, '¿Conversemos con HidroAysén?', *Patagonia sin Represas*, viewed 05/08/16, [http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl/final/noticia.php?id\\_noticia=1089%3E](http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl/final/noticia.php?id_noticia=1089%3E).
- Mobarec, P & Spiniak, D 2001, *Revista Hoy: 1.108 Ediciones con Historia*, Ediciones Copyright, Santiago.
- Moffat, K, Lacey, J, Zhang, A & Leipold, S 2015, 'The social licence to operate: a critical review', *Forestry: An International Journal of Forest Research*, vol. 89, no. 5 pp. 477-488.
- Moloney, K 2006, *Rethinking PR: PR Propaganda and Democracy*, Routledge, London.
- Moloney, K, Jackson, D & McQueen, D 2013, 'News Journalism and Public Relations: A Dangerous Relationship', in S. Allan & Fowler-Watt, K, *Journalism: New Challenges Centre for Journalism and Communication Research*, Bournemouth University, Bournemouth, pp. 259-281
- Molotch, H 1979, 'Media and Movements', in M Zald & J McCarthy (eds), *The Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilisation, Social Control and Tactics*, Winthrop, Cambridge, MA.
- Mönckeberg, M 2001, *El saqueo de los grupos económicos al estado chileno*, Ediciones B, Santiago.
- Mönckeberg, M 2011, *Los magnates de la prensa*, Debate, Santiago.
- Monge, P & Contractor, M 2003, *Theories of Communication Networks*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Moretti, F 2013, *Distant Reading*, Verso Books, London.
- Morgan, D 2014a, 'Pragmatism as a Paradigm for Social Research', *Qualitative Inquiry*, vol. 20, no. 8, pp. 1045-1053.
- Morgan, D 2014b, 'Pragmatism as a Paradigm for Social Research', *Qualitative Enquiry*, vol. 20, no. 8, pp. 1045-1053.
- Morozov, E 2009, 'Iran: Downside to the "Twitter Revolution"', *Dissent*, pp. 10-14.



- Morozov, E 2011, *The Net Delusion: The dark side of Internet freedom*, Public Affairs, New York.
- Morse, J & Niehaus, L 2009, *Mixed Method Design: Principles and Procedures*, Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek.
- Mosciatti, T, 08/05/2011, CNN Chile, viewed 20/08/2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=siZ6HaL19-4>
- Mosco, V 1996, *The Political Economy of Communication*, Sage, London.
- Mouffe, C 2006, *On the Political*, Routledge, London.
- Moya, V, Zúñiga, V 2008, Información insuficiente para la evaluación ambiental, El Mercurio, viewed 02/04/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={f0084bb0-7fc6-492c-88ca-5918247aaa0e}>
- Muck, P 2012, 'Chile: National Adaptation Plans to Climate Change', National Climate Change Office at the Chilean Ministry of Environment (CONAMA).
- Mullen, A 2010, 'Twenty years on: the second-order prediction of the Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 673-690.
- Murdock, G 1981, 'Political Deviance: The Press Representation of a Militant Mass Demonstration', in S Cohen & J Young (eds), *The Manufacture of News: Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media*, Constable, London.
- Murdock, G 2005, 'Large Corporations and the Control of the Communications Industries', *Culture, Society and the Media*, pp. 123-156.
- Murdock, G, Petts, J & Horlick-Jones, T 2003 'After amplification: rethinking the role of the media in risk communication', in Pidgeon N, Kasperson, R & Slovic P (eds.), *The Social Amplification of Risk*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 156-178.
- Murphy, P, 2017, *The Media Commons: Globalization and Environmental Discourses*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana.
- Murray Li, T 2011 Rendering Society Technical: Government Through Community and the Ethnographic Turn at the World Bank in Indonesia, in David Mosse ed. *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*, Berghahn, Oxford, pp. 57-80.
- Murray, C, Robinson, P, Goddard, P & Parry, P 2011, '"Not in Our Name": British Press, the Anti-war Movement and the Iraq Crisis 2002-2009', in S Cottle & L Lester (eds), *Transnational Protests and the Media*, Peter Lang, New York, pp. 59-73.
- Mythen, G 2007, 'Reappraising the Risk Society Vision: Telescopic Sight or Myopic Vision?', *Current Sociology*, vol. 55, no. 6, pp. 793-813.

Nasirov, S & Silva, C 2014, 'Diversification of Chilean Energy Matrix: Recent Developments and Challenges', *International Association for Energy Economics*, vol. Fourth Quarter pp. 27-31.

Nelson, M 2013, 'Viewpoint - Fifty years of hydroelectric development in Chile: A history of unlearned lessons ', *Water Alternatives*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 195-206.

Neumann, J 1996, *Lights, Camera, War: Is media technology driving international politics?*, St. Martin's Press, New York.

Neuman, W, Guggenheim, L, Jang, S, & Be, S 2014, 'The dynamics of public attention: Agenda setting theory meets big data', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 64, pp. 1936-214.

*New York Times* 11/05/2011, Editorial: Keep Patagonia Wild.

Nielsen, L 2011, 'Classifications of Countries Based on Their Level of Development: How it is Done and How it Could be Done', International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=24628.0%3E>.

Nixon, R 2011, *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor*, Harvard University Press, Harvard.

Noam, E 2016, *Who owns the world's media? Media concentration and ownership around the world*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Núñez, X & Miranda, L 2011, 'Intergenerational income and educational mobility in urban Chile', *Estudios de Economía*, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 195-221.

Nuovo, V 2011, 'Locke's Theology 1694-1704', Christianity, Antiquity and Enlightenment, *International Archives of the History of Ideas*, vol. 203, pp. 21-51.

O'Brien, R 1992, *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography*, Chatham House/Pinter, London.

O'Neil, P 2013, 'Introduction: Media Reform and Democratization in Eastern Europe', in P O'Neil (ed.), *Post Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe*, Routledge, London, pp. 1-6.

O'Neill, S & Boykoff, M 2011, 'The role of new media in engaging the public with climate change', in L. Whitmarsh, S. O'Neill & I. Lorenzoni (eds.), *Engaging the public with climate change: behaviour change and communication*, Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 233-251.

O'Neill, D & Harcup, T 2009, 'News values and selectivity', in K Wahl-Jorgensen & T Hanitzsch (eds.), *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*, International Communication Association Handbook Series, Routledge, New York, pp. 161-174.

O'Neill, S & Nicholson-Cole, S 2009, "'Fear Wont' Do It": Promoting Positive Engagement With Climate Change Through Visual and Iconic Representations', *Science Communications*, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 355-379.

O'Shaughnessy, M & Stadler, J 2002, *Media and Society: an Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

O'Sullivan, T, Hartley, J, Saunders, D, & Fiske, J 1983, 'News values', in *Key Concepts in Communication*, Methuen, New York, pp. 153-155.

O'Sullivan, J 2012, 'Challenging values: the "good" journalist online', in E Siaperas & A Veglis (eds), *The Handbook of Global Online Journalism*, Wiley, Chichester.

OBHE 2015, 'Chile: Is it the end of the road for for-profit post secondary education?', viewed 19/06/16,  
[http://www.obhe.ac.uk/what\\_we\\_do/news\\_articles\\_reports/news\\_analysis/na\\_2015/news\\_analysis\\_ga3\\_19jun15%3E](http://www.obhe.ac.uk/what_we_do/news_articles_reports/news_analysis/na_2015/news_analysis_ga3_19jun15%3E).

OECD 2010, 'Middle class in Latin America economically vulnerable', Latin American Economic Outlook 2010,  
<http://www.oecd.org/chile/middleclassinlatinamericaeconomicallyvulnerable.htm%3E>.

OECD 2013, Chile: Inventory of Estimated Budgetary support and Tax Expenditures for Fossil Fuels, OECD, viewed 5/02/16, <http://www.oecd.org/site/tadffss/CHL.pdf%3E>.

OECD 2014a, Chile's Supreme Audit Institution: Enhancing Strategic Agility and Public Trust, OECD, [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/chile-s-supreme-audit-institution\\_9789264207561-en%3E](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/chile-s-supreme-audit-institution_9789264207561-en%3E).

OECD 2014b, Society at a Glance 2014 Highlights: Chile, OECD Social Indicators, OECD, viewed 13/04/16, <http://www.oecd.org/social/societyataglance.htm%3E>.

OECD 2015a, Chile Economic Forecast Summary (November 2015), 11/15 edn, 1/02/16, <http://www.oecd.org/economy/chile-economic-forecast-summary.htm%3E>.

OECD 2015b, OECD Better Life Index, OECD, viewed 25/01/16,  
<http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/chile/%3E>.

OECD 2015c, OECD Economic Surveys, Chile: 2015, OECD, Paris,  
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco\\_surveys-chl-2015-en%3E](http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-chl-2015-en%3E).

Oravec, C, 1984, 'Conservationism v. Preservationism: The Public Interest in the Hetch Hetchy controversy' (1908-1913), *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, vol. 70, no.4, pp.444-458

Orrego, J 2013, 'Fundamentos para la Campaña Patagonia Sin Represas'.

- Pan, Z & Kosickim G 2005, 'Framing and understanding of citizenship', in S. Dunwoody, L. Becker, G. Kosicki, & D. McLeod (eds.), *The evolution of key mass communication concepts: Honoring Jack M. McLeod*, Hampton, Cresskill, pp. 165–204.
- Papacharissi, Z 2002, 'The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as a Public Sphere', *New Media & Society*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 9-27.
- Parisi, F & Yáñez, G 2000, 'The deal of the century in Chile Endesa España's takeover of Enersis', *International Review of Financial Analysis*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 103-116.
- Parsons, R and Moffat, K 2014, 'Constructing the meaning of social license,' *Soc. Epistemol.* no. 28, pp. 340–363.
- Patagonia sin Represas 2009, newspaper advertisement, 'El Lobby Feroz'.
- Patagonia sin Represas 2009, television advertisement, viewed 12/12/18, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTpYL59KWuY>
- Patagonia sin Represas 2010 (17/12/2010) 'HidroAysén y su campaña del terror'
- Patagonia sin Represas 2010, Patagonia sin Repreas: Una campaña de educación publica.
- Patagonia sin Represas, 03/03/2009, 'Se ve muy mal cuando una Multinacional Irrumpe en un Territorio como lo está haciendo Endesa en la Patagonia?', viewed 12/07/18, [http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl/final/noticia.php?id\\_noticia=554](http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl/final/noticia.php?id_noticia=554))
- Patterson, TE 2000, 'Doing well and doing good: How soft news and critical journalism are shrinking the news audience and weakening democracy-and what news outlets can do about it', Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
- Pavlich, G 2012, 'Paradigmatic cases', in A Mills, G Durepos & E Wiebe (eds), *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, pp. 645-647.
- Peña, C 2008, 'Los archivos secretos de Ricardo Claro y sus actuaciones en las sombras', CIPER (Centro de Investigación Periodística), viewed 15/07/16, <http://ciperchile.cl/2008/12/31/los-archivos-secretos-de-ricardo-claro-y-sus-actuaciones-en-las-sombras/%3E>.
- Periodistas y Comunicadores Chile, Encuesta Prensa, viewed 15/07/16, [http://www.periodistasycomunicadoresdechile.cl/descargas/ Encuesta\\_prensa.pdf](http://www.periodistasycomunicadoresdechile.cl/descargas/ Encuesta_prensa.pdf).
- Persily, N 2017, 'The 2016 US Election: Can democracy survive the internet?', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 63-76.
- Peston, R 06/06/2014, 'Robert Peston's Speech Warns of Threat to Journalism from Native Ads', *The Guardian Online*, viewed 12/08/18

<http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jun/06/robert-peston-threat-journalism-native-ads-charles-wheeler-lecture-full-text>

Petersen, K 2010, 'Revisiting Downs' Issue-Attention Cycle: International Terrorism and U.S. Public Opinion', *Journal of Strategic Security*, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 1-16.

Pettenger, M, (ed.) 2007, *The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses*, Routledge, Abingdon.

Philo, G 1995, *Glasgow Media Group Reader, Vol 2: Industry, Economy, War and Politics, Media, Culture & Society*, Routledge, London.

Pimm, S 2010, "'Pleistocene Park' emerges from Patagonia's rescued grasslands', [nationalgeographic.com](http://nationalgeographic.com), viewed 5/12/16,  
[http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2010/01/23/patagonia\\_grasslands\\_park/%3E](http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2010/01/23/patagonia_grasslands_park/%3E)

Pino, P, Iglesias, V, Garreaud, R, Cortés, S, Canals, M, Folch, W, Burgos, S, Levy, K, Naeher, L & Steenland, K 2015, 'Chile Confronts its Environmental Health Future After 25 Years of Accelerated Growth', *Annals of Global Health*, vol. 81, no. 3, pp. 354-367.

Poderopedia 2014, ¿Quiénes son los grandes grupos controladores de medios en Chile?, Poderopedia, Santiago, viewed 20/07/16,  
<http://apps.poderopedia.org/mapademedios/analisis/4/%3E>.

Poderopedia 2015, Poderopedia: Personas. Eduardo Morel, viewed 12/11/16,  
[http://www.poderopedia.org/cl/personas/Eduardo\\_Morel.%3E](http://www.poderopedia.org/cl/personas/Eduardo_Morel.%3E).

Pope, S & Wæraas, A 2016, 'CSR-washing is rare: A conceptual framework, literature review, and critique', *Journal of Business Ethics*, vol. 137, no. 1, pp.173-193.

Power, M, Haynes, A & Devereux, E 2016, 'Reasonable People vs. The Sinister Fringe', *Critical Discourse Studies*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 261-277.

Priemus, H 2010, 'Mega-projects: Dealing with pitfalls', *European Planning Studies*, vol. 18, no. 7, pp. 1023-1039.

Protest, D & McCombs, M (eds.) 2016, *Agenda setting: Readings on Media, Public Opinion, and Policymaking*, Routledge, London.

Pybus, C & Flanagan, R 1990, *The Rest of the World is Watching*, Pan MacMillan, Sydney.

Pym, A 2014, *Exploring Translation Theories*, Routledge, New York.

Rahimi, B 2011, 'The Agonistic Social Media: Cyberspace in the Formation of Dissent and Consolidation of State Power in Postelection Iran', *The Communication Review*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 158-178.

Rahnema, M & Bawtree, V 1997, *The Post-Development Reader*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

- Rancière, J 1998, *Disagreement*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis
- Rane, H & Salem, S 2012, 'Social media, social movements and the diffusion of ideas in the Arab uprisings,' *Journal of International Communication*, vol. 18, no. 1 pp. 97-111.
- Reese, S 2001, Framing public life, S. Reese, O. Gandy, & A. Grant (Eds.), in *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and our Understanding of the Social World*, Laurence Earlbaum Associates, Mahwah, pp. 241-280.
- Reinhardt, F & Schon, H 2013, 'Colbún and the future of Chile's Power', Harvard Business School case studies, vol. 9, no. 713, pp. 1-20, [http://heep.hks.harvard.edu/files/heep/files/day\\_1\\_sess\\_3\\_colbun\\_for\\_reinhardt.pdf?m=1427131560%3E](http://heep.hks.harvard.edu/files/heep/files/day_1_sess_3_colbun_for_reinhardt.pdf?m=1427131560%3E).
- Renn, O 1992, 'Risk communication: towards a rational discourse with the public', *Journal of Hazardous Materials*, vol. 29, pp. 465-519.
- Requejo-Alemán, J & Lugo-Ocando, J 2014, 'Assessing the Sustainability of Latin American Investigative Non-profit Journalism', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 522-532.
- Rice, R (ed.) 2008, *Media Ownership, Research and Regulation*, Hampton Press, Cresskill, NJ.
- Riffe, D, Lacy, S & Fico, F 2014, *Analyzing Media Messages: Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research*, Routledge, New York.
- Robertson, A 2010, *Mediated Cosmopolitanism*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Robinson, P 2001, 'Theorising the Influence of Media of World Politics: Models of Influence on Foreign Policy ', *European Journal of Communication*, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 523-544.
- Robinson, P 2002, *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*, Routledge, London.
- Rockwell, R & Janus, N 2001, 'Stifling Dissent: the fallout from a Mexican media invasion of Central America', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 497-512.
- Rodrigo, P & Orrego, J (eds.) 2007, *Patagonia Chilena ¡Sin Represas!*, Ocho Libros Editores, Santiago de Chile.
- Rodrigo, P, 26/11/2012, Letter to Discovery Channel Latin America, viewed 12/10/18, [https://issuu.com/psegura/docs/carta\\_a\\_discovery\\_channel](https://issuu.com/psegura/docs/carta_a_discovery_channel)
- Rogers, H 2015, 'The Impact of Lower Gas and Oil Prices on Global Gas and LNG Markets', vol. 99, viewed 29/02/16, <https://http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/NG-99.pdf%3E>.

Rojecki, A 2002, 'Modernism, State Sovereignty and Dissent: Media and the New Post-Cold War Movements ', *Critical Studies in Media and Communication*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 152-171.

Romero, H 2014, Ecología política y represas: elementos para el análisis del Proyecto HidroAysén en la Patagonia chilena, *Revista de Geografía Norte Grande*, no. 57.

Rosie, M & Gorringer, H 2009, What a Difference a Death Makes: Protest, Policing and the Press at the G20, 21 February 2013, <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/14/5/4.html>.

RSF 2008, Annual Report: Freedom of the Press Worldwide in 2008, Reporters without Borders, Paris, viewed 18/07/16, [https://http://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/fileadmin/rte/docs/2008/ROG-Jahresbericht\\_2008.pdf](https://http://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/fileadmin/rte/docs/2008/ROG-Jahresbericht_2008.pdf).

RSF 2011, 'Citizen activism challenges protected media oligopoly', Reporters Without Borders, viewed 14/07/16, <https://rsf.org/en/news/citizen-activism-challenges-protected-media-oligopoly>

Rucht, D 2004, 'The Quadruple "A": Media Strategies of Protest Movements Since the 1960s', in W van de Donk, B Loader, P Nixon & D Rucht (eds.), *Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements*, Routledge, London, pp. 29–58

Rucht, D 2013, 'Protest Movements and their Media Usages', in Bart Cammaerts, A Matoni & P McCurdy (eds.), *Mediation and Protest Movements*, Intellect, Bristol, pp. 249-68

Rudnick, H, Barroso, L, Mocarquer, S & Bezerra, B 2008, 'A delicate balance in South America ', *Institute of Eletrical and Electronics Engineers Power and Energy Magazine*, August 2008.

Rwabizambuga, A 2007, 'Negotiating Corporate Social Responsibility Policies and Practices in Developing Countries: An Examination of the Experiences from the Nigerian Oil Sector', *Business and Society Review*, vol. 112, no. 3, pp. 407-430.

Salter, L 2005, 'The communicative structures of journalism and public relations', *Journalism*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 90–106.

Sandelowski, M, Voils, C & Knafl, G 2009, 'On Quantitizing ', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 208-222

Sapelli, C 2011, '¿Chile más equitativo?', Una mirada distinta a la distribución del ingreso, la movilidad social y la pobreza en Chile, CIP - Pontifica Universidad Católica de Chile. [http://economia.uc.cl/docs/sapelli\\_10\\_07\\_2011.pdf%3E](http://economia.uc.cl/docs/sapelli_10_07_2011.pdf%3E).

Sasaki, F 2017, 'Does Internet use provide a deeper sense of political empowerment to the Less Educated?', *Information, Communication & Society*, vol. 20, no. 10 pp. 1445-1463.

Sassen, S 2004, 'Electronic markets and activist networks: The weight of social logics in digital formations', in *Digital Formations: New Architectures for Global Order*, R. Latham and S. Sassen (eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Saussure, F 1966, *Course in General Linguistics*, McGraw-Hill, New York.

Savigny, H 2002, 'Public Opinion, Political Communication and the Internet', *Politics*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 1-8.

Schäfer, M & Schlichting, I 2014, 'Media representations of climate change: A meta-analysis of the research field', *Environmental Communication*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 142-160.

Scheufele, D & Tewksbury, D 2007, 'Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 9-20.

Scheufele, D 1999, 'Framing as a theory of media effects', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 103-122.

Scheufele, D 2000, 'Agenda-setting, priming, and framing revisited: another look at cognitive effects of political communication', *Mass Communication & Society*, no. 3, pp. 297-316.

Schlesinger, P 1978, *Putting "reality" together: BBC News*, Constable, London.

Schlesinger, P 1990, 'Rethinking the sociology of journalism: Source strategies and the limits of media-centrism', in M Ferguson (ed.), *Public communication: The new imperatives*, Sage, London pp. 61-83.

Schlesinger, P & Tumber, H 1994, *Reporting Crime: The Media Politics of Criminal Justice*, Clarendon, Oxford.

Schudson, M 2001, 'The objectivity norm in American journalism', *Journalism*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 149-170.

Schudson, M 2003, *The Sociology of News*, Norton, New York.

Schumpeter, J 1947, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Harper & Brothers, New York.

Segerberg, A & Bennett, W 2011, 'Social Media and the Organization of Collective Action: Using Twitter to Explore the Ecologies of Two Climate Change Protests', *The Communication Review*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 197-215.

Sepulveda, O 1996, 'Jaime Bauza, Gerente General de Endesa: el país necesita el proyecto Ralco', *Caras*, vol. 220, pp. 68-69.

Shabecoff, P 1988, "'Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate'", *New York Times*, 24 June, <<http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/us/global-warming-has-begun-expert-tells-senate.html> Retrieved 24 August 2012>.



Shaw, M 2005, *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq*, Polity, Cambridge.

Shin, J & Cameron, G 2004, 'Conflict measurements: Analysis of simultaneous inclusion in roles, values, independence, attitudes, and dyadic adjustment', *Public Relations Review*, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 401-410.

Shirky, C 2011, 'The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere and Political Change', *Foreign Affairs*, no. January/February 2011, pp. 1-12.

Shoemaker, P 1984, 'Media treatment of deviant political groups', *Journalism Quarterly*, vol. 61, pp. 66-75.

Sigismondi, P 2016, 'Babel and Globalization: Translating in the 21st Century', *International Journal of Communication*, no. 10, pp. 860-867.

Simon, A 2001, 'A unified method for analyzing media framing', in R Hart & D Shaw (eds), *Communication in U.S. Elections: New Agendas*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, pp. 75-89.

Smith, A & Humphreys, M 2006, 'Evaluation of unsupervised semantic mapping of natural language with Leximancer concept mapping', *Behavior Research Methods*, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 262-279.

Smith, A 2000a, 'Machine learning of well-defined thesaurus concepts', in A Tan & P Yu (eds), *International Workshop on Text and Web Mining*, Melbourne, pp. 72-79.

Smith, A 2000b, 'Machine mapping of document collections: The Leximancer system', in *Fifth Australasian Document Computing Symposium*, Sunshine Coast.

Smith, A 2003, 'Automatic extraction of semantic networks from text using Leximancer', paper presented to Human Language Technology Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Edmonton.

Söderlund, J, Sankaran, S & Biesenthal, C 2017, 'The Past and Present of Megaprojects' *Project Management Journal*, vol. 48, no. 6, pp. 5-16

Soley, L & Craig, R 1992, 'Advertising pressures on newspapers: A survey', *Journal of Advertising*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 1-10.

Solimano, A & Pollack, M 2006, *La Mesa Coja: prosperidad y desigualdad en el Chile democrático*, CIGLOB, Santiago.

Solimano, A 2011, *Prosperity without Equality: the Chilean experience after the Pinochet Regime*, International Centre for Globalization and Development, Santiago.

Solimano, A 2014, *Economic Elites, Crises and Democracy: Alternatives beyond Neoliberal Capitalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

- Spanish Oxford Living Dictionaries,  
<https://es.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/visibilizar>
- Sparks, C 2000, *Tabloid tales: Global Debates over Media Standards*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham.
- Spohr, D 2017, 'Fake news and ideological polarization: Filter bubbles and selective exposure on social media', *Business Information Review*, vol. 34, no. 3, pp.150-160.
- Squires, A 2009, 'Methodological challenges in cross-language qualitative research: A research review', *International Journal of Nursing Studies*, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 277-287.
- Stake, R 1995, *The Art of Case Study Research*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks.
- Stake, R 2000, 'Case studies', in N Denzin & Y Lincoln (eds), *SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, pp. 435-454.
- Stake, R 2005, 'Qualitative case studies', in N Denzin & Y Lincoln (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, pp. 433-466.
- Stake, R 2008, 'Qualitative Case Studies', in N Denzin & Y Lincoln (eds), *Strategies of Qualitative Enquiry Third Edition*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, pp. 119-150.
- Statcounter Chile, Social Media Statistics for Chile 2010, viewed 02/09/18,  
<http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/chile/2010>
- Statistica 2017, Social media share Chile, viewed 12/09/18,  
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/449867/chile-share-social/>
- Stats, IW 2014, Internet World Stats usage and population statistics - Chile, Internet World Stats, viewed 20/07/16, <http://www.internetworldstats.com/sa/cl.htm%3E>.
- Stegall, S & Sanders, K 1986, 'Coorientation of PR practitioners and news personnel in education news', *Journalism Quarterly*, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 341-347.
- Stevenson, N 2002, *Understanding Media Cultures*, Sage, London.
- Stiegler, B 2009 'Teleologies of the snail: The errant self-wired to a WiMax network', *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 26, no. 2-3, pp. 33-45.
- Stober, R 2004, 'What media evolution is: a theoretical approach to the history of new media', *European Journal of Communication*, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 483-505.
- Street, J 2011, *Mass Media, Politics & Democracy*, Palgrave MacMillan, London.
- Strega, S 2005, 'The view from the poststructural margins: Epistemology and methodology reconsidered', in L Brown & S Strega (eds), *Research as Resistance*, Canadian Scholars' Press, Toronto, pp. 199-234.

Strömbäck, J & Esser, F 2014, 'Introduction', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 15, no. 3 pp. 243–255.

Strömbäck J, Karlsson M & Hopmann D 2012, 'Determinants of news content', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 13, no. 5–6, pp. 718–728.

Stubbs, M 1996, *Text and corpus analysis: Computer-assisted studies of language and culture*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Sunkel, G & Geoffroy, E 2001, *Economic Concentration of the Media*, Lom Editions, Santiago.

Sunstein, C 2001, *Republic.com*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Sunstein, C 2009, *Going to extremes: How like minds unite and divide*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Sunstein, C 2018, *# Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Svampa, M 2012, 'Consenso de los commodities, giro ecoterritorial y pensamiento crítico en América Latina,' *OSAL* no. 32, pp.15–38.

Swyngedouw, E 2010, 'Trouble with nature: Ecology as the new opium for the masses', *The Ashgate Research Companion to Planning Theory: Conceptual Challenges for Spatial Planning*, J Hllier & P Healey (eds.), Ashgate, Abingdon, p. 299–318.

Swyngedouw, E 2011a, 'Interrogating post-democratization: Reclaiming egalitarian political spaces', *Political Geography*, vol. 30, pp. 370–380.

Swyngedouw, E 2011b, 'Depoliticized environments: The end of Nature, climate change and the post-political condition', *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements*, vol. 69, pp. 253–274.

Swyngedouw, E 2013a, 'Apocalypse now! Fear and doomsday pleasures', *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, vol. 24, no. 1, pp.9–18.

Swyngedouw, E 2013b, 'The non-political politics of climate change', *ACME*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1–8.

Swyngedouw, E 2014a, 'Where is the political? Insurgent mobilisations and the incipient "return of the political"', *Space and Polity*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp.122–136.

Swyngedouw, E 2014b, 'Anthropocenic politicization: From the politics of the environment to politicizing environments, in K Bradley & J Hedrén, J (eds.), *Green utopianism: perspectives, politics and micro-practices*, vol. 2, Routledge, London, pp. 35–49.

- Syn, T & Ramaprasad, A 'Megaprojects–symbolic and sublime: an ontological review', *International Journal of Managing Projects in Business* (Forthcoming 2018)
- Tafur, V 2011, 'Water Law, Mining and Hydro-energy Conflicts in South America: Tales from the Andes and Patagonia', *International Journal of Rural Law and Policy*, vol. 2011 Special Edition, Water Law: Through the Lens of Conflict, pp. 1-11.
- Tang, L & Yang, P 2011, 'Symbolic power and the internet: The power of a 'horse'', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 33, no. 5, pp.675-691.
- Tapscott, D & Williams, A 2006, *Wikinomics*, Penguin, London.
- Teddlie, C & Tashakkori, A 2011, 'Mixed Methods Research', *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, pp. 285-300.
- Teichroeb, R 1990, 'Canadian Blessing for Chinese Dam Called "Prostitution"', *Winnipeg Free Press*, 20 September 1990, p. 9.
- Temple, B & Young, A 2004, 'Qualitative research and translation dilemmas', *Qualitative Research*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 161-178.
- Temple, B 1997, 'Watch your tongue: issues in translation and cross-cultural research', *Sociology*, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 607-618.
- The Economist*, 2010, 'Sweet to Tweet: Twitter makes politicians seem more accessible', viewed 21/07/16, <http://www.economist.com/node/16056612%3E>.
- The Guardian*, 27/05/2015, Peru planning to dam Amazon's main source and displace 1000s, viewed 12/10/18, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/andes-to-the-amazon/2015/may/26/peru-amazon-main-source-dams-displacements>
- Thompson, E 1991, *The Making of the English Working Class*, Penguin, London.
- Thompson, E 1993, *Customs in the Common*, Penguin, London.
- Thompson, J 1995, *The Media and Modernity: a social theory of the media*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Thompson, J 2000, *Political Scandal: power and visibility in the media age*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Thompson, J 2004, 'Editor's Introduction', in J Thompson (ed.), *Language and Symbolic Power*, Polity, Cambridge, pp. 1-31.
- Thompson, J 2005, 'The new visibility', *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 31-51.
- Thompson, J 2011, 'Shifting boundaries of public and private life', *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 49-70.

- Thussu, D 2000, *International Communication*, Edward Arnold, London.
- Thussu, D 2006, *Media on the Move: Global Flow and Contra-flow*, Routledge, London.
- Thussu, D 2007, *News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment*, Sage, London.
- Thussu, D 2009, *Internationalizing Media Studies*, Sage, London.
- Tilly, C 2005, *Popular Contention in Great Britain 1758-1834*, Paradigm, Boulder, CO.
- Tironi, E & Sunkel, G 2000, 'The Modernization of Communications: The Media in the Transition to Democracy in Chile', in R Gunther & A Mughan (eds), *Democracy and the media: a comparative perspective*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Tokar, B 1999, *Earth for Sale: reclaiming ecology in the age of corporate greenwash*, South End Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Tokman, M 2010, 'Nuclear Electricity in Chile: How Far, How Close', paper presented to International Atomic Energy Agency Conference on Topical Issues on Infrastructure Development: Managing the Development of National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, Vienna, 10/02/10.
- Tompkins Conservation, 2015, viewed 10/12/16, [http://www.tompkinsconservation.org/about\\_kris\\_and\\_doug\\_tompkins.htm%3E](http://www.tompkinsconservation.org/about_kris_and_doug_tompkins.htm%3E)
- Topper, K 2002, 'Not So Trifling Nuances: Pierre Bourdieu, Symbolic Violence, and the Perversions of Democracy', *Constellations*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 30-56.
- Torche, F 2005, 'Unequal but fluid: Social mobility in Chile in a comparative perspective', *Americal Sociological Review*, vol. 70, no. 3, pp. 422-450.
- Torche, F 2009, *Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Intergenerational Transmission of Inequality in Latin America* UNDP, New York.
- Torrance, R 1998, *Encompassing Nature: a sourcebook, Nature and Culture from Ancient Times to the Modern World*, Counterpoint, Washington DC.
- Touraine, A 1973, *Production de la société*, Seuil, Paris.
- Transelec 2018, viewed 20/10/18, <http://www.transelec.cl/who-we-are/?lang=en>
- Trumbo, C 1995, 'Longitudinal Modeling of Public Issues: An Application of the Agenda-Setting Process to the Issue of Global Warming', *Journalism and Communication Monographs*, vol. 152, no. 2.
- Tuchman, G 1972, 'Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen's Notions of Objectivity', *American Journal of Sociology*, no. 77, pp. 660-679.

- Tulloch, J 1993, 'Policing the Public Sphere - The British Machinery of News Management', *Media, Culture and Society*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 363-384.
- Tumber, H & Webster, F 2006, *Journalists Under Fire: Information War and Journalistic Practices*, Sage, London.
- Tunstall, J 1971, *Journalists at work: Specialist correspondents: Their news organizations, news sources, and competitor-colleagues*, Constable, London.
- Turner, G 1996, *British Cultural Studies*, Routledge, London.
- Ukpere, W & Slabbert, A 2009, 'A relationship between current globalisation, unemployment, inequality and poverty', *International Journal of Social Economics*, vol. 36, no. 1/2, pp. 37-46.
- Uldam, J & Askanius, T 2013, 'Calling for confrontational action in online social media: video activism as auto-communication,' in B Cammaerts, P McCurdy & A Mattoni (eds.), *Mediation and Protest Movements*, Intellect Books, Bristol, pp. 159-178.
- Ulloa Galindo, C 2014, 'Genealogía de la concentración económica de los medios de comunicación en Chile: un análisis desde la historia social y la comunicación', *Perspectivas de la Comunicación*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 96-106.
- UNDP 2015, 'Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development', *United Nations Human Development Reports*, viewed 05/04/16, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/CHL%3E>.
- Union, I 2012, viewed 17/1/13 2013, <<http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/>
- Urry, J 2003, *Global Complexity*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Valdes, J 2008, *Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School of Economics in Chile*, University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge.
- Valenzuela, S 2013, 'Unpacking the Use of Social Media for Protest Behavior: The Roles of Information, Opinion Expression and Activism', *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 17, no. 10, pp. 1-23.
- Valenzuela, S, Arriagada, A & Scherman, A 2012, 'The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior: The Case of Chile', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 299-314.
- Valenzuela, S, Scherman, A, and Arriagada, A 2015, 'Student and Environmental Protests in Chile: The Role of Social Media', *Politics*, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 151-171.
- van Dijck, J 2013, *The culture of connectivity: A critical history of social media*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

van Dijk, J 1999, 'The One-Dimensional Network Society of Manuel Castells', *New Media & Society*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 127-138.

van Dijk, J 2012, *The Network Society*, 3rd Edition, Sage, London.

van Dijk, T 1988a, *News Analysis: case studies of international and national news in the press*, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale.

van Dijk, T 1988b, *News as Discourse*, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale.

van Dijk, T 1991, *Racism and the Press*, Routledge, London.

van Maanen, J 1995, 'An end to innocence: The ethnography of ethnography', in J van Maanen (ed.), *Representation in Ethnography*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks.

van Marrewijk, A, 'The Multivocality of Symbols: A Longitudinal Study of the Symbolic Dimensions of the High-Speed Train Megaproject (1995–2015)', *Project Management Journal*, vol. 48, no. 6, pp. 47–59.

Vara, A 2015, 'A South American approach to metamorphosis as a horizon of equality: Focusing on controversies over lithium', *Current Sociology*, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 100-104.

Venegas, G 2007, 'Cambio climático llevará a modificar fuentes de energía', *Enconomía y Negocios*, viewed 16/03/16,  
<http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=16551%3E>.

Villalobos-Ruminott, S 2012, 'The Chilean Winter', *Radical Philosophy*, no. 171, pp. 11-15.

Vogt, P 2008, 'Quantitative versus qualitative is a distraction: Variations on a theme by Brewer & Hunter (2006)', *Methodological Innovations Online*, vol. 3, pp. 1-10.

Volkmer, I 2003, 'The global network society and the global public sphere', *Development*, pp. 9-16.

Vorderer, P, Klimmt, C, Rieger, D, Baumann, E, Hefner, D, Knop, K, Krömer, N, Mata, J von Pape, T, Quandt, T, Reich, S, Reinecke, L, Trepte, S, Sonnentag, S & Wessler H 2015, 'Der mediatisierte Lebenswandel: Permanently online, permanently connected', *Publizistik* vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 259–276.

Vorrath, S 2015, 'Why Chile could aim for 100% renewable – and what Australia can learn from it', *Renew Economy*, <<http://reneweconomy.com.au/2015/why-chile-could-aim-for-100-renewable-and-what-australia-can-learn-from-it-59818%3E>.

Wachs, M 1989, 'When Planners Lie with Numbers', *Journal of the American Planning Association*, vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 476-479.

Waisbord, S & Peruzzotti, E 2009, 'The environmental story that wasn't: advocacy, journalism and the asamblea movement in Argentina', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 691-709.

Waisbord, S 2000, *Watchdog journalism in South America: News, Accountability and Democracy*, Columbia University Press, New York.

Waisbord, S 2010, 'Latin America', in P Norris (ed.), *Public Sentinel: News Media and Governance Reform*, World Bank, New York, pp. 305-328.

Waisbord, S 2013a, 'Contesting Extractivism: Media and environmental citizenship in Latin America', in L. Lester & B. Hutchins (eds.), *Media and Environmental Conflict*, Peter Lang, New York, pp. 105-124.

Waisbord, S 2013b, 'A Metatheory of Mediatization and Globalization?', *Journal of Multicultural Discourses*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 182-189.

Waisbord, S 2013c, *Reinventing professionalism: News and journalism in global perspective*, Polity, Cambridge.

Waisbord, S 2013d 'Media Policies and the Blindspots of Media Globalization', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 35, no. 1 pp. 132-138.

Waisbord, S 2014, 'United and fragmented: Communication and media studies in Latin America', *Journal of Latin American Communication Research*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 55-77.

Waisbord, S 2016, 'Communication Studies Without Frontiers? Translation and Cosmopolitanism across Academic Cultures', *International Journal of Communication*, vol. 10, pp. 868-886.

Wang, G (ed.) 2011, *De-westernizing communication research: Altering questions and changing frameworks*, Routledge, New York.

Warner, M 1970, 'Decision-making in network television news', in *Media sociology: A reader*, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, pp. 158-167.

Watts, J & Franklin, J 2013, 'Chile finds its voice in The Clinic satirical magazine', *The Guardian*, viewed 15/07/16,  
<https://http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/13/chile-the-clinic-satirical-magazine%3E>.

Webster, J & Ksiazek, T 2012, 'The Dynamics of Audience Fragmentation: Public Attention in an Age of Digital Media', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 39-56.

Wendelin M, Engelmann I & Neubarth J 2017, 'User rankings and journalistic news selection', *Journalism Studies*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp.135-153.

Wehrli, B 2011, 'Climate science: Renewable but not carbon-free', *Nature Geoscience*, vol. 4, no. 9, pp 585-599.



- Weiss, A 2015, 'The digital and social media journalist: A comparative analysis of journalists in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru', *International Communication Gazette*, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 74-101.
- White, J, Drew, S & Hay, T 2009, 'Ethnography Versus Case Study, Positioning Research and Researchers', *Qualitative Research Journal*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 18-27.
- Whitworth, A & Cheatham, C 1988, 'Appraisal Manipulation: Appraisal of the Yonki Dam hydroelectric project', *Project Appraisal*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 13-20.
- Willis, J 2007, *Foundations of qualitative research: interpretive and critical approaches*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks.
- WIP 2015, The World Internet Project (WIP) International Report - Sixth Edition, WIP Chile and USC Annenberg School Center for the Digital Future, viewed 20/07/16, <https://http://www.iis.se/docs/2015-World-Internet-Report.pdf%3E>.
- Wodak, R & Chilton, P 2005, *A New Agenda for Critical Discourse Analysis: theory, methodology and interdisciplinarity*, John Benjamins, Amsterdam.
- Wodak, R & Meyer, M 2009, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, SAGE, London.
- Wodak, R 1996, *Disorders of Discourse*, Longman, London.
- Wolfsfeld, G 1997, *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Wolfsfeld, G 2004, *Media and the Path to Peace*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Wolfsfeld, G 2011, *Making Sense of Media and Politics: Five Principles in Political Communication*, Routledge, New York.
- Wolfsfeld, G, Segev, E, Sheaffer, T 2013, 'Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First', *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 115-137.
- Wolfsfeld, G 2018, 'The role of the media in violent conflicts in the digital age: Israeli and Palestinian leaders' perceptions', *Media, War & Conflict*, vol. 11, no. 1 pp. 107-124.
- World Bank 2014, Efectos Distributivos de la Reforma Tributaria de 2014, Banco Mundial América Latina y el Caribe, viewed 22/04/16, <[http://www.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/EstudioBancoMundial\\_ReformaTributaria.pdf%3E](http://www.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/EstudioBancoMundial_ReformaTributaria.pdf%3E)
- World Bank 2015, viewed 23/01/16 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG%3E>.
- World Bank 2015a, GDP at market prices, World Bank, 8/04/15, <[http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?page=6&order=wbapi\\_data\\_value\\_1981\\_wbapi\\_data\\_value\\_wbapi\\_data\\_value-first&sort=asc%3E](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?page=6&order=wbapi_data_value_1981_wbapi_data_value_wbapi_data_value-first&sort=asc%3E)

- World Bank 2015b, GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$), World Bank, 08/04/16, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD%3E>.
- World Bank 2015c, GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2011 PPP \$ per kg of oil equivalent) 2015 edn, World Bank, 29/02/16, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.GDP.PUSE.KO.PP.KD%3E>.
- World Bank 2016, GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$) World Bank, [http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?order=wbapi\\_data\\_value\\_2014+wbapi\\_data\\_value+wbapi\\_data\\_value-last&sort=desc%3E](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc%3E).
- Xian, H 2008, 'Lost in translation? Language, culture and the roles of translator in cross-cultural management research', *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal*, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 231-245.
- Yanchar, S & Williams, D 2006, 'Reconsidering the compatibility thesis and eclecticism: Five proposed guidelines for method use', *Educational Researcher*, vol. 35, no. 9, pp. 3-12.
- Yin, R 2003, *Case study research: Design and Methods (third edition)*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks.
- Yin, R 2014, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, SAGE, London.
- Zahler Torres, A 2011, '¿En qué país vivimos los chilenos?', viewed 12/04/16, <http://ciperchile.cl/2011/06/06/%C2%BFen-que-pais-vivimos-los-chilenos/%3E>.
- Zajc, M 2015, 'The Social Media Dispositive and Monetization of User-Generated Content', *The Information Society*, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 61-67.
- Zannotti, M, 05/06/2011, 'HidroAysén: Escenario post aprobación', El Mercurio, viewed 04/09/18, <https://www.guoteca.com/energia-y-sustentabilidad/hidroaysen-escenario-post-aprobacion/>
- Zannotti, M, 2011, 04/03/2011, 'HidroAysén, el proyecto más conflictivo', El Mercurio, viewed 07/09/18, [www.guoteca.com/energia-y-sustentabilidad/hidroaysen-el-proyecto-mas-conflictivo/](http://www.guoteca.com/energia-y-sustentabilidad/hidroaysen-el-proyecto-mas-conflictivo/)
- Zarfl, C, Lumsdon, A, Berlekamp, J, Tydecks, L & Tockner, K 2015, 'A global boom in hydropower dam construction', *Aquatic Sciences*, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 161-170.
- Zhou, Y & Moy, P 2007, 'Parsing framing processes: The interplay between online public opinion and media coverage', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 79-98
- Žižek, S 1999a, 'Carl Schmitt in the age of post-politics', in Mouffe, C, (ed.) *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, Verso, London, pp. 18-37.

## Corpus media references

(In date order)

### El Mercurio

*El Mercurio* 20/03/03, 'Obstáculos a central Ralco', p. 3.

Riveros, J 07/10/2006, 'Este proyecto se va a hacer teniendo todas las aprobaciones en la mano', viewed 1/11/16, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id=>

Merinches, J 15/10/2006, 'Primer cara a cara de empresa HidroAysén con la comunidad', *El Mercurio*, viewed 02/11/16, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id=%7B76521a14-495b-43e9-851d-c05f53c30419%3E>.

*El Mercurio* 10/03/2007, 'Experto nuclear: Chile debe decidir entre esta energía o central en río Baker', viewed 21/08/18, <http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2007/03/10/248631/experto-nuclear-chile-debe-decidir-entre-esta-energia-o-central-en-rio-baker.html>

Ostornol, J 25/04/2007, 'Endesa y Colbún se la juegan por Aysén', *El Mercurio*, viewed 01/10/16, <http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=25641%3E>.

Aránguiz, D 07/02/2008, 'Pérez Yoma se declara partidario de las centrales hidroeléctricas en Aysén', *El Mercurio*, viewed 22/11/16, <http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=41701%3E>.

Bustamante Rocha, D 14/02/2008, 'Apoyo a HidroAysén: "Es una operación política que no veíamos desde el escándalo Ralco"', *El Mercurio*, viewed 12/11/16, <http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=42022%3E>

*El Mercurio* 04/05/2008, 'HidroAysén responde: "No necesitamos tutelaje del exterior"', viewed 12/07/16, <http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=46517>

*El Mercurio* 24/07/2008, 'Energía: HidroAysén prevé 14 meses de trámite para sus centrales', viewed 02/05/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={30071007-cffc-4acf-87fa2a7234f35e4f}>

*El Mercurio* 30/08/2008, 'Las 3 toneladas de papel que mandó al sur HidroAysén', viewed 08/04/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={76730938-7897-48ad-8a12-94ab49cab44a}>

*El Mercurio* 19/09/2008, 'Evaluación de impacto ambiental' viewed 20/06/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={30017702-cffc-3acd-77da3f7443f45e4f}>

Molina, P 12/10/2008, 'Se nos debe permitir responder las dudas', *El Mercurio*, viewed 12/06/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id=%7b3e75edf6-25ae-49c1-8aea-e9447005580a%7d>}

Derosas, R 18/10/2008, 'Es inaceptable que autoridades que no tienen la información correcta opinen en forma precoz', *El Mercurio*, viewed 18/08/10, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={b1318019-b504-4f1d-afc1-5a6625fefe44}>}

Mateo, R 19/10/2008, 'Es inaceptable que autoridades que no tienen la información correcta opinen en forma precoz', *El Mercurio*, viewed 12/06/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={8132af4b-3317-441a-8078-2ee155f1bd50}>}

Bustamante, D, and Moya, V 20/11/2008, 'Decisión sobre HidroAysén se realizará en plena recta final de la carrera presidencial', *El Mercurio*, viewed 05/07/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={b570dd53-1b64-4fb7-ba23-7b8b974411d9}>}

*El Mercurio* 04/01/2009, 'La riqueza energética de Chile', viewed 01/08/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={2e3d867a-e342-4bab-ac71-207fc2a9fde8}>}

*El Mercurio* 02/03/09, 'Lo que espera Endesa de su nuevo dueño italiano', *El Mercurio*, viewed 20/08/18, [http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl/final/noticia.php?id\\_noticia=551](http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl/final/noticia.php?id_noticia=551)}

Bustamante Rocha, D, Orellana, G 16/04/2009, 'HidroAysén tiene que ser un proyecto país... aceptado y autorizado por todos', viewed 09/07/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={7ad1ebf8-92f7-44f7-b8c9-ff4f7d48001a}>}

Bustamante Rocha, D 25/04/2009, 'La postura de Frei y Piñera sobre HidroAysén y la energía proveniente de la Patagonia', *El Mercurio*, viewed 12/08/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={0cf69079-db27-4123-acd6-6d5fa3f30fa3}>.

*El Mercurio* 23/06/2009, 'Diversificación energética', viewed 23/07/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={ec4bb32e-2cf6-4578-874e-d9d6068d8c15}>}

*El Mercurio* 20/08/2009, 'HidroAysén aplaza trámite y decisión sobre el proyecto queda para el próximo Gobierno', viewed 20/08/2018, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={097fe024-6b9b-4777-baae-ba6150e51577}>}

*El Mercurio* 23/08/2009, 'HidroAysén: plazos y nuevos escenarios', viewed 20/08/2018, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={a745154b-2493-4752-9efa-5a5e23d12ba0}>}

*El Mercurio* 30/10/2009, 'Trámites ambientales de HidroAysén', viewed 19/07/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={85f5db7d-4313-409e-9bfe-7d05996a852a}>

*El Mercurio* 14/04/2010, 'Ex presidente de Endesa: Chile no puede darse el lujo de no realizar HidroAysén', viewed 10/06/2018, <http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2010/04/15/476213/ex-presidente-de-endesa-chile-no-puede-darse-el-lujo-de-no-realizar-hidroaysen.html>.

*El Mercurio* 02/05/2010, 'Con cupo de accionistas minoritarios, obispo Infanti busca frenar HidroAysén en junta de Enel en Italia', viewed 20/08/18, <http://impresa.elmercurio.com/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?dt=2010-05-02&PaginaId=1&bodyid=2>

Esturillo, J 21/08/2010, 'Daniel Fernández delinea la nueva estrategia de HidroAysén', *El Mercurio*, p. 1.

*El Mercurio* 8/11/2010, 'Más de US\$6,5 millones han recibido las organizaciones que se oponen a HidroAysén', viewed 12/08/18, <http://www.revistaei.cl/2010/11/08/mas-de-us-65-millones-han-recibido-las-organizaciones-que-se-oponen-a-hidroaysen/#>)

Tompkins, D 11/12/2010, Campaña de HidroAysén, *El Mercurio*, viewed 02/07/18, <http://impresa.elmercurio.com/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?dt=2010-12-11&PaginaId=2&bodyid=1>

*El Mercurio* 12/12/2010, 'Blog: HidroAysén', *El Mercurio*, viewed 16/11/16, [http://buscador.emol.com/vermas/El\\_Mercurio/Noticias\\_El\\_Mercurio/2010-12-12/46328/Blog%3A\\_HidroAys%C3%A9n/%3E](http://buscador.emol.com/vermas/El_Mercurio/Noticias_El_Mercurio/2010-12-12/46328/Blog%3A_HidroAys%C3%A9n/%3E)

Fernández, D 15/12/2010, 'HidroAysén', *El Mercurio*, viewed 12/12/16, <Available at: <https://http://www.veoverde.com/2010/12/chile-polemica-entre-douglas-tompkins-y-daniel-fernandez-por-hidroaysen/>

Fernández, D 16/12/2010, 'Editorial: HidroAysén', *El Mercurio*

*El Mercurio* 17/12/2010, 'HidroAysén y Patagonia sin Represas pasan a la ofensiva y optan por mensajes más directos', viewed 16/07/18, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={b6b9a7ea-4553-4bd3-881b-924946ef7eb2}>

Drysdale, S 16/02/2011, 'Los Pehuenches después de Ralco', *El Mercurio*, viewed 01/11/16, <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id=%7Bcd0bdd9d-9861-47ad-b3d2-4677daa60c9a%3E>

*El Mercurio* 21/03/2011, 'Daniel Fernández renueva equipo para lograr aprobación de HidroAysén', 21/03/2011, viewed 21/09/18, <http://www.revistaei.cl/2011/03/21/daniel-fernandez-renueva-equipo-para-lograr-aprobacion-de-hidroaysen/>

Herrera, M & Olivares, N 05/05/2011, 'Intendenta se reúne con ministros políticos para analizar situación de HidroAysén', viewed 15/09/18,  
<http://diario.elmercurio.com/2011/05/05/nacional/politica/noticias/24FB9C4C-B2C0-44E5-B9AC-112DF5D6E46E.htm?id={24FB9C4C-B2C0-44E5-B9AC-112DF5D6E46E>

*El Mercurio* 09/05/2011, "'Para el país sería bueno que se apruebe" el proyecto HidroAysén', viewed 20/08/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2011/05/09/480519/hinzpeter-para-el-pais-seria-bueno-que-se-apruebe-el-proyecto-hidroaysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 09/05/2011, 'Minuto a minuto (finalizado): Comisión Ambiental aprobó proyecto HidroAysén', viewed 16/09/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2011/05/09/480572/minuto-a-minuto-finalizado-comision-ambiental-aprobo-proyecto-hidroaysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 10/05/2011a, 'La Moneda alista escenario del comité de ministros tras aprobación de HidroAysén', viewed 02/09/18,  
<http://www.revistaei.cl/2011/05/10/la-moneda-alista-escenario-del-comite-de-ministros-tras-aprobacion-de-hidroaysen/>

*El Mercurio* 10/05/2011b, 'Ministra Benítez por HidroAysén: "Está todo de acuerdo a las legislaciones ambientales"', viewed 07/08/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2011/05/10/480686/ministra-benitez-por-hidroaysen-esta-todo-de-acuerdo-a-las-legislaciones-ambientales.html>

*El Mercurio* 11/05/2011a, 'Piñera e HidroAysén: "Los que se oponen a todo están profundamente equivocados"', viewed 16/07/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/11/480918/pinera-e-hidroaysen-los-que-se-oponen-a-todo-estan-profundamente-equivocados.html>

*El Mercurio* 11/05/2011b, 'La difícil discusión política de HidroAysén', Editorial.

*El Mercurio* 11/05/2011c, 'René Alinco: Navarro no conoce Aysén y es amigo de un gringo invasor', viewed 07/10/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/11/480917/rene-alinco-navarro-no-conoce-aysen-y-es-amigo-de-un-gringo-invasor.html>

*El Mercurio* 12/05/11, 'Fernández y aprobación de HidroAysén: "No estamos conformes con la resolución"', viewed 14/08/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2011/05/12/481135/fernandez-y-aprobacion-de-hidroaysen-no-estamos-conformes-con-la-resolucion.html>

*El Mercurio* 13/05/11, 'Daniel Fernández prevé rápida aprobación del tendido eléctrico de HidroAysén', viewed 06/08/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2011/05/13/481414/daniel-fernandez-preve-rapida-aprobacion-del-tendido-electrico-de-hidroaysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 14/05/11, 'Gracias a HidroAysén la matriz energética será mucho menos

contaminante', viewed 12/08/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/14/481570/larroulet-gracias-a-hidroaysen-la-matriz-energetica-sera-mucho-menos-contaminante.html>

López, J 14/05/2011, 'Encuesta revela que el 60% de los aiseninos se opone a centrales hidroeléctricas', *El Mercurio*, viewed 01/10/2018,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/14/481545/encuesta-revela-que-el-60-de-los-aisenininos-se-opone-a-centrales-hidroelectricas.html>

Pardo, G 14/05/2011, 'Entrevista al biministro Laurence Golborne: "Si se hubiese querido detener el proyecto de HidroAysén en años anteriores se habría podido, y no se hizo"', *El Mercurio*, viewed 16/07/18,  
<http://diario.elmercurio.com/2011/05/15/reportajes/reportajes/noticias/26BC3D49-7226-4B00-BD9B-B63D8C84FC5A.htm?id=%7b26BC3D49-7226-4B00-BD9B-B63D8C84FC5A%7d>

*El Mercurio* 15/05/11, 'Ex Presidente Lagos señaló que el proyecto Hidroaysén "es necesario"', viewed 02/08/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/15/481618/ex-presidente-lagos-senalo-que-el-proyecto-hidroaysen-es-necesario.html>

*El Mercurio* 16/05/2011, 'Golborne y la polémica de HidroAysén: "No se trata de si queremos o no queremos tener una central"', viewed 01/10/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/16/481693/golborne-y-la-polemica-de-hidroaysen-no-se-trata-de-si-queremos-o-no-queremos-tener-una-central.html>

*El Mercurio* 20/05/2011, 'Chilenos protestaron contra HidroAysén en diversas ciudades del mundo', viewed 12/09/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/20/482799/chilenos-protestaron-contra-hidroaysen-en-diversas-ciudades-del-mundo.html>

*El Mercurio* 21/05/2011, 'Harold Castillo, E, Intendencia Metropolitana se querellará por violentos hechos tras marcha contra HidroAysén', viewed 10/10/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/21/482894/intendencia-metropolitana-se-querellara-por-violentos-hechos-tras-marcha-contra-hidroaysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 22/05/2011, 'Piñera exige a convocantes de marchas que asuman responsabilidad por violencia', viewed 21/05/11,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/22/482980/pinera-exige-a-convocantes-de-marchas-que-asuman-responsabilidad-por-violencia.html>

*El Mercurio* 25/05/2011, 'Golborne responde a NYT', viewed 12/12/18,  
[www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/25/483638/golborne-responde-a-nyt-no-recuerdo-que-eeuu-haya-firmado-el-protocolo-de-kyoto.html](http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/25/483638/golborne-responde-a-nyt-no-recuerdo-que-eeuu-haya-firmado-el-protocolo-de-kyoto.html)

*El Mercurio* 26/05/2011, 'Fernández advierte que HidroAysén podría ser inviable si se usa la carretera eléctrica', viewed 19/09/18,

<http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2011/05/26/483776/fernandez-advierte-que-hidroaysen-podria-ser-inviable-si-se-usa-la-carretera-electrica.html>

*El Mercurio* 27/05/2011, 'Obispo Infanti acusa a HidroAysén de "comprar conciencias"', viewed 12/07/16,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/05/27/484018/obispo-infanti-acusa-a-hidroaysen-de-comprar-conciencias-incluso-en-la-iglesia.html%3E>

Ibarra, V 29/05/2011, 'El "control de daños" y el plan B del grupo Matte ante polémica por HidroAysén', *El Mercurio*, viewed 02/08/18,  
<http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=85138>)

*El Mercurio* 02/06/2011, 'Fernández advierte que Chile se está quedando atrás en generación de energía', viewed 03/10/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2011/06/02/485130/fernandez-advierte-que-chile-se-esta-quedando-atras-en-generacion-de-energia.html>

*El Mercurio* 05/06/2011, 'Girardi encabeza ofensiva judicial por posibles anomalías en evaluación de HidroAysén', viewed, 15/09/18,  
<http://www.revistaei.cl/2011/05/06/girardi-encabeza-ofensiva-judicial-por-posibles-anomalias-en-evaluacion-de-hidroaysen/>

Moya, V 20/06/2011, 'Corte de Puerto Montt paraliza HidroAysén tras acoger a trámite recursos de protección', *El Mercurio*, viewed 01/10/2018,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2011/06/20/488222/corte-de-puerto-montt-paraliza-hidroaysen-tras-acoger-a-tramite-recursos-de-proteccion.html>

*El Mercurio* 28/06/2011, 'Estudio UC: Patagonia e HidroAysén hacen propaganda', viewed 01/09/18, <http://www.revistaei.cl/2011/06/28/estudio-uc-patagonia-e-hidroaysen-hacen-propaganda/#>

*El Mercurio* 1/08/2011, 'De masones a banqueros: las audiencias que han escuchado a Fernández promocionar HidroAysén', viewed 01/10/18,  
<http://www.revistaei.cl/2011/08/01/de-masones-a-banqueros-las-audiencias-que-han-escuchado-a-fernandez-promocionar-hidroaysen/>

*El Mercurio* 04/09/2011, 'Hidroaysén presenta denuncia por ataque a casa de colaboradora de la empresa', viewed 07/08/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2011/04/29/478774/hidroaysen-presenta-denuncia-por-ataque-a-casa-de-colaboradora-de-la-empresa.html>

Smith, F 24/11/2011, 'Neoimperialismo verde', viewed 01/10/18,  
<http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={b96a2253-cdea-4d40-9b17-f59d85a318ff>

*El Mercurio* 07/04/2012, 'Luz Verde para HidroAysén', viewed 09/09/18,  
[http://www.elmercurio.com/blogs/2012/04/07/3373/luz\\_verde\\_para\\_hidroaysen.aspx](http://www.elmercurio.com/blogs/2012/04/07/3373/luz_verde_para_hidroaysen.aspx)



*El Mercurio* 29/05/2012, 'Daniel Fernández reconoce que la "incertidumbre" amenaza al proyecto HidroAysén, viewed 12/10/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2012/05/29/543004/daniel-fernandez-reconoce-que-incertidumbre-amenaza-proyecto-hidroaysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 30/05/2012, 'Colbún pide frenar EIA de proyecto de transmisión de HidroAysén', viewed 05/10/18,  
<http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2012/05/30/543190/colbun-suspende-el-estudio-de-impacto-ambiental-de-hidroaysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 30/05/2012, 'Horvath: "HidroAysén es cada vez más inviable"', viewed 5/10/18, <http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2012/05/30/543196/horvath-hidroaysen-es-cada-vez-mas-inviable.html>

Concha, M & Tapia M 02/06/2012, Esta es una decisión económica y que hagan una crítica política no tiene fundamento, *El Mercurio*

Vergara, P 01/06/2012, 'Prendan la luz', *El Mercurio*

*El Mercurio* 03/06/2012, 'Con Sentido de Urgencia: editorial'

*El Mercurio* 04/06/2012, 'Decisión lamentable pero esperada: editorial'

*El Mercurio* 09/12/2012, 'Músicos se manifiestan en vivo y al aire libre por Patagonia sin Represas hoy en Santiago', viewed 13/09/18,  
<https://www.emol.com/noticias/magazine/2012/12/09/573690/musicos-se-manifiestan-en-vivo-y-al-aire-libre-por-patagonia-sin-represas-hoy-en-santiago.html>

*El Mercurio* 09/06/2013, 'Defensores de Patagonia harán campaña con postura de candidatos sobre tema energético', viewed 12/10/18,  
<https://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2013/06/09/602902/defensores-de-la-patagonia-lanzaran-campana-con-postura-de-los-candidatos-a-proyectos-como-hidroaysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 09/04/2014, 'Dirigentes sociales de la XI Región piden al Ejecutivo aprobar HidroAysén', viewed 15/09/18,  
<https://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2014/06/09/664405/ayseninos-pro-hidroaysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 19/05/2014, 'Pacheco reitera que Comité de Ministros resolverá reclamaciones por HidroAysén en próximos días', viewed 30/09/18,  
<https://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2014/05/19/660924/pacheco-comite-de-ministros-resolvera-reclamaciones-por-hidroaysen-en-las-proximos-dias.html>

*El Mercurio* 20/05/2014, 'Parlamentarios oficialistas piden a ministro Badenier rechazo definitivo de proyecto HidroAysén', viewed 25/09/18,  
<https://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2014/05/20/661201/diputados-oficialistas-piden-a-ministro-badenier-rechazo-definitivo-de-proyecto-hidroaysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 12/06/2014, 'Después de HidroAysén', viewed 12/08/18,  
<http://www.elmercurio.com/blogs/2014/06/12/22607/Despues-de-HidroAysen.aspx>

*El Mercurio* 22/01/2015, 'Gobierno deniega derechos de agua a HidroAysén y pone lápida al proyecto', viewed 09/09/18,  
<https://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2015/01/22/700315/gobierno-deniega-derechos-de-agua-a-hidroaysen-y-pone-lapida-al-proyecto.html>

*El Mercurio* 29/01/2015, 'Endesa Chile decide detener el desarrollo de proyectos HidroAysén y Punta Alcalde', viewed 06/10/18,  
<https://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2015/01/29/701455/endesa-chile-decide-detener-el-desarrollo-de-proyectos-hidroaysen-y-punta-alcalde.html>

*El Mercurio* 07/01/2016, 'Keller (Colbún): "HidroAysén se hará, pero en un formato quizás distinto"', viewed 15/10/18,  
<https://www.emol.com/noticias/Economia/2016/01/07/767392/Keller-Colbun-HidroAysen-ser-hara-pero-en-un-formato-quizas-distinto.html>

Vargas, H 20/04/2017, 'Vargas, H, Energías renovables generan el 58% de la producción que proyectaba', *El Mercurio*, viewed 12/10/2018,  
HidroAysén <http://impresa.elmercurio.com/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?dt=2017-04-20&PaginaId=2&bodyid=2>

*El Mercurio* 26/04/2017, "'Sería un error garrafal invertir en proyectos tradicionales de generación'", viewed 07/10/18,  
<http://impresa.elmercurio.com/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?dt=2017-04-26&PaginaId=2&bodyid=2>

*El Mercurio* 05/11/2017a, 'Ministro Marcelo Mena valora término del proyecto HidroAysén', viewed 10/10/18,  
<https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2017/11/05/882018/Ministro-Marcelo-Mena-valora-termino-del-proyecto-HidroAysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 05/11/2017b, 'HidroAysén: Enel y Colbún planean devolver derechos de agua al Estado', *El Mercurio*, viewed 16/07/17,  
<https://www.emol.com/noticias/Economia/2017/11/05/882008/HidroAysen-Enel-y-Colbun-planean-devolver-derechos-de-agua-al-Estado.html>

*El Mercurio* 17/11/2017a, 'Gobierno tras fin de HidroAysén: Hemos introducido el doble de energía y con energías renovables', viewed 13/10/18,  
<https://www.emol.com/noticias/Economia/2017/11/17/883819/Ministro-de-Energia-tras-fin-definitivo-a-HidroAysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 17/11/2017b, 'Colbún y Enel deciden poner la lápida a HidroAysén', viewed 12/10/18, <https://www.emol.com/noticias/Economia/2017/11/17/883781/Colbun-y-Enel-deciden-poner-la-lapida-a-HidroAysen.html>

*El Mercurio* 18/12/2017, 'Consejo de Defensa de la Patagonia: "Fin de Hidroaysén es un logro ciudadano"', viewed 12/10/18,

<https://www.emol.com/noticias/Economia/2017/11/18/883854/Consejo-de-Defensa-de-la-Patagonia-Fin-de-Hidroaysen-es-un-logro-ciudadano.html>

Ibarra Maldonado, V 3/06/2018, 'Marcela Cubillos: "Proyecto de reforma al SEIA elimina el Comité de Ministros de Medio Ambiente y también las comisiones regionales"', *El Mercurio*, viewed 20/11/18  
<http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=474566>

## **El Mostrador**

Liberona, F 2007, 'Patagonia sin Represas y libertad de expression', *El Mostrador*, viewed 12/11/16,  
<http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/opinion/2007/10/18/patagonia-sin-represas-y-libertad-de-expresion/%3E>.

*El Mostrador* 19/08/2008, 'La campaña 2.0 de Paragonia sin Represas, viewed 12/07/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2008/08/19/la-campana-2-0-de-patagonia-sin-represas/>

*El Mostrador* 10/10/2008, 'Estudio HidroAysén no esta a la altura', viewed 14/07/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2008/10/10/estudio-hidroaysen-no-esta-a-la-altura/>

Donoso, P 26/02/2009, 'Sólo los trucos políticos han mantenido vivo a HidroAysén', *El Mostrador*, viewed 01/06/18,  
[http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2009/02/26/gary-hughes-solo-los-trucos-politicos-han-mantenido-vivo-a-hidroaysen/?php%20bloginfo\(%27url%27\);%20?%3E/cultura](http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2009/02/26/gary-hughes-solo-los-trucos-politicos-han-mantenido-vivo-a-hidroaysen/?php%20bloginfo(%27url%27);%20?%3E/cultura)

*El Mostrador* 20/10/2009, 'HidroAysén: un proyecto político', viewed 12/07/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2009/10/20/hidroaysen-un-proyecto-politico/>

*El Mostrador* 21/01/2010, 'Felipe Berríos hace guiño a HidroAysén y arremete contra Tompkins y ecologistas', viewed 16/06/18,  
<http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2010/01/21/felipe-berrios-hace-guino-a-hidroaysen-y-arremete-contratompkins-y-ecologistas/>

Urquieta, C 4/10/2010 'Daniel Fernández: "Hay una campaña contra HidroAysén con un financiamiento enorme y mitos falsos"', *El Mostrador*,  
<http://www.elmostrador.cl/mercados/2010/10/04/daniel-fernandez-%E2%80%99Chay-una-campana-contrahidroaysen-con-un-financiamiento-enorme-y-mitos-falsos%E2%80%99D/>

*El Mostrador* 21/12/2010, 'El agresivo estilo de Daniel Fernández al frente de HidroAysén', viewed 17/07/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/sin-editar/2010/12/21/el-agresivo-estilo-de-daniel-fernandez-al-frente-de-hidroaysen/>  
Markari, M, 22/12/2010, 'Nuevas Trincheras', *El Mostrador*, viewed on 16/07/18, [www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2010/12/22/nuevas-trincheras](http://www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2010/12/22/nuevas-trincheras)

Liberona, F 20/03/2011, *El Mostrador*, 'Política energética eléctrica ¿a la medida de quién?', viewed 13/02/18,  
<http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/opinion/2011/03/20/politica-energetica-electrica-%C2%BFa-la-medida-de-quien/>, Política energética eléctrica ¿a la medida de quién?

*El Mostrador* 09/05/2011a, 'Hinzpeter: "Para el país sería bueno que se apruebe HidroAysén"', viewed 12/09/18,  
<http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/05/09/hinzpeter-para-el-pais-seria-bueno-que-se-apruebe-hidroaysen/>)

*El Mostrador* 09/05/2011b, 'No hay sorpresa: seremis de gobierno dan luz verde a Hidroaysén', viewed 06/09/18,  
<http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/05/09/no-hay-sorpresa-seremis-de-gobierno-dan-luz-verde-a-hidroaysen/>

*El Mostrador* 09/05/2011c, 'Senador Horvath (RN) y aprobación de Hidroaysén: "Se violentó la institucionalidad ambiental del país"', viewed 06/08/18,  
<http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/05/09/senador-horvath-rn-y-aprobacion-de-hidroaysen-se-violento-la-institucionalidad-ambiental-del-pais/>

*El Mostrador* 10/05/2011a, 'Anuncian marchas y recursos legales para frenar a Hidroaysén', viewed 16/07/2018,  
<http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/05/10/anuncian-marchas-y-recursos-legales-para-frenar-a-hidroaysen/>

*El Mostrador* 10/05/2011b, 'Citan a general Gordon por violencia de Carabineros en contra de manifestantes por Hidroaysén', viewed 16/07/18,  
[http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/05/10/citan-a-general-gordon-por-violencia-de-carabineros-en-contra-de-manifestantes-por-hidroaysen/?php%20bloginfo\(%27url%27\);%20?%3E/cultura](http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/05/10/citan-a-general-gordon-por-violencia-de-carabineros-en-contra-de-manifestantes-por-hidroaysen/?php%20bloginfo(%27url%27);%20?%3E/cultura)

*El Mostrador* 11/05/2011, 'Girardi: "El Presidente Piñera está absolutamente equivocado"' viewed 17/08/18, [www.elmostrador.cl/pais/2011/05/11/girardi-el-presidente-pinera-esta-absolutamente-equivocado/](http://www.elmostrador.cl/pais/2011/05/11/girardi-el-presidente-pinera-esta-absolutamente-equivocado/)

*El Mostrador* 13/05/2011, 'Golborne por HidroAysén: "La ciudadanía está empoderada, pero no bien informada"' viewed 12/08/18,  
[www.elmostrador.cl/pais/2011/05/13/golborne-por-hidroaysen-la-ciudadania-esta-empoderada-pero-no-bien-informada/](http://www.elmostrador.cl/pais/2011/05/13/golborne-por-hidroaysen-la-ciudadania-esta-empoderada-pero-no-bien-informada/)

*El Mostrador* 15/05/2011, 'Un 74 % de los chilenos rechaza megaproyecto hidroeléctrico en la Patagonia', viewed 03/09/18,  
<http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/05/15/un-74-de-los-chilenos-rechaza-megaproyecto-hidroelectrico-en-la-patagonia/>

Marinovic, T 18/05/2011, '¿Alguien me explica lo que está pasando?', *El Mostrador*, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2011/05/18/¿alguien-me-explica-lo-que-esta-pasando/>

Aylwin, J 17/05/2011, 'HidroAysén y los límites de la institucionalidad vigente', *El Mostrador*, viewed 05/09/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2011/05/17/hidroaysen-y-los-limites-de-la-institucionalidad-vigente/>

Huneus, C 20/05/2011, 'HidroAysén y el renacimiento de la política', *El Mostrador*, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2011/05/20/hidroaysen-y-el-renacimiento-de-la-politica>

Mendoza, M, 21/05/11, 'El NO a HidroAysén: ¡Es la gente, estúpido!', *El Mostrador*, viewed 16/8/2018, <https://www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2011/05/21/el-no-a-hidroaysen-¡es-la-gente-estupido/>

Maldifassi, J 22/05/2011, 'Aprobación de Hidroaysén', *El Mostrador*, viewed 03/07/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/opinion/2011/05/22/aprobacion-de-hidroaysen/>

*El Mostrador* 23/05/2011, 'Ojeda (DC) por prohibición de marchas: "La protesta social es legítima y no puede prohibirse"', viewed 16/08/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/pais/2011/05/23/ojeda-dc-por-prohibicion-de-marchas-la-prot-esta-social-es-legitima-y-no-puede-prohibirse>.

Gazmuri, R 24/05/2011, 'HidroAysén y el ser humano', *El Mostrador*, viewed 05/09/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2011/05/24/hidroaysen-y-el-ser-humano/>

Hödar, G 26/05/2011, 'La Concertación y la "furia verde"', *El Mostrador*, viewed 02/09/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2011/05/26/la-concertacion-y-la-furia-verde>

*El Mostrador* 28/05/2011a, Organizadores dicen que más de 90 mil personas marcharon contra Hidroaysén, mientras que Carabineros asegura que fueron 15 mil, viewed 12/07/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/05/28/organizadores-dicen-que-mas-de-90-mil-personas-marcharon-contrahidroaysen-mientras-que-carabineros-asegura-que-son-15-mil/>

*El Mostrador* 28/05/2011b, 'La contradicción de la causa medioambiental', viewed 16/08/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/opinion/2011/05/28/la-contradiccion-de-la-causa-medioambiental/>

Carmona, A 06/06/2011, 'Cómo se financia la millonaria campaña de Patagonia sin Represas', *El Mostrador*, viewed 12/12/16, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/06/06/como-se-financia-la-millonaria-campana-de-patagonia-sin-represas/%3E>.

Huneus, C 07/06/2011 'Piñera sobre una mesa de dos patas', *El Mostrador*, viewed 12/07/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2011/06/07/pinera-sobre-una-mesa-de-dos-patas/>

Bellolio 20/06/2011, 'Sedúceme', *El Mostrador*, viewed 18/09/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/opinion/2011/06/10/seduceme/>

*El Mostrador*, 31/05/2012, 'Los Matte golpean la mesa y cuestionan clima de inversión', viewed 12/09/18, [www.elmostrador.cl/pais/2012/05/31/los-matte-golpean-la-mesa-y-cuestionan-clima-de-inversion/](http://www.elmostrador.cl/pais/2012/05/31/los-matte-golpean-la-mesa-y-cuestionan-clima-de-inversion/)

*El Mostrador* 01/06/2012, 'HidroAysén: la barricada de los Matte', viewed 02/10/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2012/06/01/hidroaysen-la-barricada-de-los-matte/>

Pizzaro, R 02/06/2012, 'El ultimátum de Matte', viewed 30/09/18, [www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2012/06/02/el-ultimatum-de-matte/](http://www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2012/06/02/el-ultimatum-de-matte/)

*El Mostrador* 30/08/2012, 'Horvath (RN): "Hay algo de chantaje" de las empresas eléctricas por alertar sobre falta de variantes energéticas', viewed 03/10/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/dia/2012/08/30/horvath-rn-hay-algo-de-chantaje-de-las-empresas-electricas-por-alertar-sobre-falta-de-variantes-energeticas/>

*El Mostrador* 24/01/2014, Máximo Pacheco, nuevo ministro de Energía: "HidroAysén no está muerto", viewed 12/10/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2014/01/24/maximo-pacheco-nuevo-ministro-de-energia-hidroaysen-no-esta-muerto/>

*El Mostrador* 19/03/2014, Ambientalistas valoran decisión del Consejo de Ministros respecto a HidroAysén y esperan que lo próximo sea rechazar el EIA, viewed 28/09/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2014/03/19/ambientalistas-valoran-decision-del-consejo-de-ministros-respecto-a-hidroaysen-y-esperan-que-lo-proximo-sea-rechazar-el-eia>

López, A, 20/03/2014, 'La muerte lenta de HidroAysén', *El Mostrador*, viewed 02/10/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2014/03/20/la-muerte-lenta-de-hidroaysen/>

Cárcamo, H 11/06/2014, 'Pacheco entierra a HidroAysén culpando a empresas pero deja vivas a hidroeléctricas', viewed 12/08/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/mercados/2014/06/11/pacheco-entierra-a-hidroaysen-culpando-a-empresas-pero-deja-vivas-a-hidroelectricas/>

*El Mostrador* 13/06/2014a, 'HidroAysén: una señal de cordura', viewed 02/10/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/opinion/editorial/2014/06/13/hidroaysen-una-senal-de-cordura/>

*El Mostrador* 13/06/2014b, 'HidroAysén: una señal de cordura', viewed 07/10/10, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/opinion/editorial/2014/06/13/hidroaysen-una-senal-de-cordura/>

Sáez, J 15/06/2014, 'Rechazo a HidroAysén: Una victoria de la organización territorial', *El Mostrador*, viewed 07/10/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/opinion/2014/06/15/rechazo-a-hidroaysen-una-victoria-de-la-organizacion-territorial/>

## **La Tercera**

*La Tercera* 8/8/1998, 'Caso Ralco'.

*La Tercera* 08/08/2008, 'Eficiencia y energías renovables pueden abastecer el SIC-2025', viewed 20/08/18, <http://www.latercera.com/negocios/noticia/eficiencia-y-energias-renovables-pueden-abastecer-el-SIC-2025/104346>

*La Tercera* 15/08/2008, 'Derechos de agua complican megaproyecto de HidroAysén', viewed 15/07/18, <http://www.latercera.com/negocios/noticia/derechos-de-agua-complican-megaproyecto-de-hidroaysen/264432>

Marticorena, J 21/02/2009, 'Italiana Enel será el nuevo controlador de Enersis y mercado prevé beneficios para proyecto HidroAysén', *La Tercera*, viewed 01/07/18, [www.latercera.com/noticia/negocios/empresa/2009/02/743-103460-9-italiana-enel-sera-el-nuevo-controlador-de-enersis-y-mercado-preve-beneficios.shtml](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/negocios/empresa/2009/02/743-103460-9-italiana-enel-sera-el-nuevo-controlador-de-enersis-y-mercado-preve-beneficios.shtml)

Orrego, J 16/03/2009 'Banco Mundial e HidroAysén', *La Tercera*, viewed 20/08/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/banco-mundial-e-hidroaysen/>

Salazar, H 06/04/2009 HidroAysén y el cambio climático, *La Tercera*, viewed 29/07/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/hidroaysen-y-el-cambio-climatico/>

Rodrigo, P 07/04/2009 'HidroAysén y el cambio climático', *La Tercera*, viewed 20/08/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/hidroaysen-y-el-cambio-climatico/>

Astudillo, A 15/04/2009, 'Endesa: "HidroAysén no es una solución perfecta, pero es la más razonable"', *La Tercera*, viewed 09/07/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/endesa-hidroaysen-no-es-una-solucion-perfecta-pero-es-la-mas-razonable/amp/>

Marticorena, J Viancos, C 12/08/2009, 'HidroAysén alista campaña para promover centrales en el sur', *La Tercera*, viewed 17/08/18, [www.latercera.com/noticia/negocios/2009/08/655-167898-9-hidroaysen-alista-campana-para-promover-centrales-en-el-sur.shtml](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/negocios/2009/08/655-167898-9-hidroaysen-alista-campana-para-promover-centrales-en-el-sur.shtml)

Astudillo, A 08/09/2009, 'Diferencias sobre Hidroaysén y energía nuclear marcan debate de candidatos', *La Tercera*, viewed 12/07/18,

<http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/diferencias-sobre-hidroaysen-y-energia-nuclear-marcan-debate-de-candidatos/>

Astudillo, A 21/09/2009, 'HidroAysén: Chile debe desarrollar potencial hídrico antes que energía nuclear', *La Tercera*, viewed 17/08/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/hidroaysen-chile-debe-desarrollar-potencial-hidrico-antes-que-energia-nuclear/>

Marticorena, J 21/11/2009, 'Tokman advierte que si no se hacen las plantas de Aysén el carbón las reemplazará', *La Tercera*, viewed 15/07/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/tokman-advierte-que-si-no-se-hacen-las-plantas-de-aysen-el-carbon-las-reemplazara/>

*La Tercera* 19/01/2010, 'Ministro de Energía dice que nuevas consultas a Hidroaysén no retrasarían Proyecto', *La Tercera*, viewed 20/08/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/ministro-de-energia-dice-que-nuevas-consultas-a-hidroaysen-no-retrasarian-proyecto/>.

*La Tercera* 16/03/2010, 'Endesa anuncia inversión de US\$ 10 millones en fondo de ayuda para reconstrucción de Chile', viewed 12/10/16, <http://www.latercera.com/noticia/endesa-anuncia-inversion-de-us-10-millones-en-fondo-de-ayuda-para-reconstruccion-de-chile-2/.%3E>

*La Tercera* 01/04/2010, 'Director ejecutivo de TVN llega a vicepresidencia de HidroAysén', viewed 20/08/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/director-ejecutivo-de-tvn-llega-a-vicepresidencia-de-hidroaysen/>

Marticorena, J 02/04/2010 'HidroAysén ficha a Fernández y socios buscan acelerar definiciones del proyecto', *La Tercera*, viewed 12/06/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/hidroaysen-ficha-a-fernandez-y-socios-buscan-acelerar-definiciones-del-proyecto/>

Mladinic, H 09/04/2010, 'Fichaje de HidroAysén', *La Tercera*, viewed 15/10/18, [www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/correo-de-los-lectores/2010/04/896-224682-9-fichaje-de-hidroaysen.shtml](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/correo-de-los-lectores/2010/04/896-224682-9-fichaje-de-hidroaysen.shtml)

*La Tercera* 03/05/2010b, 'Máximo ejecutivo de Enel se reunirá con Piñera en su primera visita a Chile', *La Tercera*, viewed 12/09/16, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/enel-se-reunira-con-piñera-en-su-primera-visita-a-chile-2/.%3E>

Barrios, F 09/05/2010, 'La historia de 64 años de HidroAysén', *La Tercera*, viewed 12/06/17, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/la-historia-de-64-anos-de-hidroaysen/>

Viancos, C 05/12/2010, 'Ignacio Antoz: "Si no se dan condiciones de seguridad, es difícil seguir con HidroAysén"', *La Tercera*, viewed 18/05/17, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/ignacio-antonanzas-si-no-se-dan-condiciones-de-seguridad-es-dificil-seguir-con-hidroaysen/>



Asún, M 16/12/2010, 'Campaña de HidroAysén', *La Tercera*, viewed 16/08/18, [www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/correos-de-los-lectores/2010/12/896-331185-9-campana-de-hidroaysen.shtm](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/correos-de-los-lectores/2010/12/896-331185-9-campana-de-hidroaysen.shtm)

Fernández 30/12/2010, 'Editorial: Campaña de HidroAysén', *La Tercera*, viewed 02/08/18, <http://www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/correos-de-los-lectores/2010/12/896-334434-9-campana-de-hidroaysen.shtml>

Horvath, A 09/01/2011, 'Campanã de HidroAysén', *La Tercera*, viewed 04/08/18, <http://www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/correos-de-los-lectores/2011/01/896-336713-9-campana-de-hidroaysen.shtml>

Fernández 14/01/2011, 'Campaña HidroAysén', *La Tercera*, viewed 02/08/18, <http://www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/correos-de-los-lectores/2011/01/896-338037-9-campana-hidroaysen.shtml>

Álvarez Parra, N 27/02/2011, 'Renuncia el director del Servicio De Evaluación Ambiental de Aysén', viewed 20/10/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/renuncia-el-director-del-servicio-de-evaluacion-ambiental-de-aysen/>

Sandoval, H 21/01/2011, 'HidroAysén', *La Tercera*, viewed 08/07/18, [www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/correos-de-los-lectores/2011/01/896-335025-9-hidroaysen.shtml](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/correos-de-los-lectores/2011/01/896-335025-9-hidroaysen.shtml)

Tompkins, D 01/04/2011, 'Campaña de HidroAysén I', *La Tercera*, viewed 16/02/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/campana-de-hidroaysen-i>

Yaikin, B 03/05/2011, 'Solicitan que "ciudadanía pueda asistir" a votación de proyecto HidroAysén', *La Tercera*, viewed 23/09/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/solicitan-que-ciudadania-pueda-asistir-a-votacion-de-proyecto-hidroaysen/>

*La Tercera* 03/05/2011, Diputado Silber advierte supuestas irregularidades en proyecto Hidroaysén, viewed 12/09/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/diputado-silber-advierte-supuestas-irregularidades-en-proyecto-hidroaysen/>

*La Tercera* 04/05/2011, 'Golborne: Los gobiernos anteriores han postergado aprobación o rechazo de HidroAysén', viewed 10/09/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/golborne-los-gobiernos-anteriores-han-postergado-aprobacion-o-rechazo-de-hidroaysen/>

*La Tercera* 06/05/2011, 'Carabineros prepara servicio extraordinario para votación de Hidroaysén', viewed 20/08/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/carabineros-prepara-servicio-extraordinario-para-votacion-de-hidroaysen/>

*La Tercera* 09/05/2011a, 'Ministro del Interior y proyecto HidroAysén: "Para el país sería bueno que se apruebe"', viewed 20/09/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/ministro-del-interior-y-proyecto-hidroaysen-para-el-pais-seria-bueno-que-se-apruebe/>

*La Tercera* 09/05/2011b, 'Diputados PS acusan "presiones indebidas" de Hinzpeter a favor de HidroAysén', viewed 20/09/18,  
<http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/diputados-ps-acusan-presiones-indebidas-de-hinzpeter-a-favor-de-hidroaysen/>

*La Tercera* 09/05/2011c, 'Ministra de Medio Ambiente dijo que proceso de evaluación de HidroAysén fue "transparente"', viewed 10/09/18,  
[www.latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2011/05/680-364549-9-ministra-de-medio-ambiente-dijo-que-proceso-de-evaluacion-de-hidroaysen-fue.shtml](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2011/05/680-364549-9-ministra-de-medio-ambiente-dijo-que-proceso-de-evaluacion-de-hidroaysen-fue.shtml)

*La Tercera* 10/05/2011a 'Vallespín: Ministro del Interior dio "instrucción como patrón de fundo" para aprobar HidroAysén', viewed 13/09/18,  
<http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/vallespin-ministro-del-interior-dio-instruccion-como-patron-de-fundo-para-aprobar-hidroaysen/>

*La Tercera* 10/05/2011b, 'Citan a General de Carabineros por supuestos abusos a manifestantes contrarios a HidroAysén', viewed 12/09/2011,  
<http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/citan-a-general-de-carabineros-por-supuestos-abusos-a-manifestantes-contrarios-a-hidroaysen/>

*La Tercera* 10/05/2011c, 'Enfrentamientos entre manifestantes y carabineros en varias regiones tras aprobación de proyecto HidroAysén', viewed 23/09/18,  
<http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/enfrentamientos-entre-manifestantes-y-carabineros-en-varias-regiones-tras-aprobacion-de-proyecto-hidroaysen/>

*La Tercera* 10/05/2011d, 'HidroAysén: Titular de Medio Ambiente defiende autonomía de comité de ministros', viewed 01/09/18,  
[www.latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2011/05/680-364619-9-hidroaysen-titular-de-medio-ambiente-defiende-autonomia-de-comite-de-ministros.shtml](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2011/05/680-364619-9-hidroaysen-titular-de-medio-ambiente-defiende-autonomia-de-comite-de-ministros.shtml)

Iriarte, L 10/05/2011, 'Comisión Nacional de Energía dice que HidroAysén estabilizará los precios', viewed 01/09/18, [www.latercera.com/noticia/negocios/2011/05/655-364680-9-comision-nacional-de-energia-dice-que-hidroaysen-estabilizara-los-precios.shtml](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/negocios/2011/05/655-364680-9-comision-nacional-de-energia-dice-que-hidroaysen-estabilizara-los-precios.shtml)

*La Tercera* 11/05/2011a, 'Tribunal declara ilegal detención de manifestantes que protestaron en Santiago contra HidroAysén', viewed 13/09/18,  
<http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/tribunal-declara-ilegal-detencion-de-manifestantes-que-protestaron-en-santiago-contra-hidroaysen/>

*La Tercera* 11/05/2011b, 'Antonio Horvath: La aprobación de HidroAysén es "un traspie" para el gobierno', viewed 12/08/18,  
<http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/antonio-horvath-la-aprobacion-de-hidroaysen-es-un-traspie-para-el-gobierno/>

*La Tercera* 11/05/2011b, 'Girardi responde a Piñera por HidroAysén: "El Presidente está absolutamente equivocado"', viewed 18/07/18,  
[www.latercera.com/noticia/politica/2011/05/674-365040-9-girardi-responde-a-pinera-por-hidroaysen-el-presidente-esta-absolutamente.shtml](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/politica/2011/05/674-365040-9-girardi-responde-a-pinera-por-hidroaysen-el-presidente-esta-absolutamente.shtml)

Yaikin, B 11/05/2011b, 'Propondrán citar al Congreso a ministro del Interior por violencia de Carabineros contra manifestantes', viewed 20/09/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/propondran-citar-al-congreso-a-ministro-del-interior-por-violencia-de-carabineros-contra-manifestantes/>

*La Tercera* 12/05/2011, 'Acusan manipulación de la institucionalidad ambiental tras aprobación de Hidroaysén', viewed 13/08/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/acusan-manipulacion-de-la-institucionalidad-ambiental-tras-aprobacion-de-hidroaysen/>)

*La Tercera* 16/05/2011, 'HidroAysén: Intenso debate sostuvieron Sara Larraín y Daniel Fernández', viewed 12/09/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/hidroaysen-intenso-debate-sostuvieron-sara-larrain-y-daniel-fernandez/>)

*La Tercera* 21/05/2011, 'Horvath refuerza críticas a HidroAysén y dice que la institucionalidad ambiental fue "violentada" por los ministros', viewed 02/08/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/horvath-refuerza-criticas-a-hidroaysen-y-dice-que-la-institucionalidad-ambiental-fue-violentada-por-los-ministros/>

*La Tercera* 29/05/2011 Cristián Monckeberg califica de "aprovechamiento político" actitud de la Concertación por HidroAysén, viewed 20/08/18, *La Tercera*, [www.latercera.com/noticia/politica/2011/05/674-369238-9-cristian-monckeberg-califica-de-aprovechamiento-politico-actitud-de-la.shtml](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/politica/2011/05/674-369238-9-cristian-monckeberg-califica-de-aprovechamiento-politico-actitud-de-la.shtml)

Canales, C 02/06/2011, 'Adimark: Piñera obtiene 36% de aprobación y alcanza su nivel más bajo desde que asumió el gobierno', *La Tercera*, viewed 12/10/18, [www.latercera.com/noticia/politica/2011/06/674-370233-9-adimark-presidente-pinera-obtiene-36-de-aprobacion-y-alcanza-su-nivel-mas-bajo.shtml](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/politica/2011/06/674-370233-9-adimark-presidente-pinera-obtiene-36-de-aprobacion-y-alcanza-su-nivel-mas-bajo.shtml)).

López, A 06/06/2011, 'Cómo se financia la millonaria campaña de Patagonia sin Represas', *El Mostrador*, viewed 12/09/18, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2011/06/06/como-se-financia-la-millonaria-campana-de-patagonia-sin-represas/>

Yaikin, B 15/06/2011, 'Organizaciones ecologistas presentan reclamo por campaña de HidroAysén contra Santiaguinos', viewed 12/07/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/organizaciones-ecologistas-presentan-reclamo-por-campana-de-hidroaysen-contra-santiaguinos/>

Martínez, C 01/08/2011, 'Campaña de HidroAysén', *La Tercera*, viewed 14/07/18, [www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/corres-de-los-lectores-2011-01-8/9633845/9/campana-de-hidroaysen.shtm](http://www.latercera.com/noticia/opinion/corres-de-los-lectores-2011-01-8/9633845/9/campana-de-hidroaysen.shtm)

*La Tercera* 20/10/2011, 'Últimos siete meses de protestas dejan 1.781 detenidos y sólo 12 condenados', viewed 12/09/18 <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/ultimos-siete-meses-de-protestas-dejan-1781-detenedos-y-solo-12-condenados/>

*La Tercera* 04/04/2012, 'Vicepresidente del Senado por fallo de la Corte Suprema: "HidroAysén ganó una batalla, pero no la guerra"', viewed 29/09/18, <http://www.latercera.com/noticia/politica/2012/04/674-441836-9-vicepresidente-del-senado-por-fallo-de-la-corte-suprema-hidroaysen-gano-una.shtml>

*La Tercera* 22/04/2012, 'De manera pacífica se desarrolla acto cultural en contra de Hidroaysén en centro de Santiago', viewed 12/10/18, <http://www.latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2012/04/680-455916-9-de-manera-pacifica-se-desarrolla-acto-cultural-en-contra-de-hidroaysen-en-centro.shtml>

*La Tercera* 30/05/2012, 'Greenpeace Chile dice que recomendación de Colbún revela que HidroAysén es 'inviabile'', viewed 02/10/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/greenpeace-chile-dice-que-recomendacion-de-colbun-revela-que-hidroaysen-es-inviabile>

*La Tercera* 31/05/2012, 'Diputado PS dice que decisión de Colbún apunta a presionar al gobierno', viewed 01/10/18, <http://www.latercera.com/noticia/politica/2012/05/674-463817-9-diputado-ps-dice-que-decision-de-colbun-apunta-a-presionar-al-gobierno.shtml>

Olivares, C 07/09/2013, 'Tompkins y la Carretera Austral', *La Tercera*, Tompkins y la Carretera Austral, viewed 02/07/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/tompkins-y-la-carretera-austral>

*La Tercera* 26/11/2013, 'Aumenta dificultad para proyecto HidroAysén tras declaraciones de Bachelet', viewed 02/10/18, <http://www.latercera.com/noticia/aumenta-dificultad-para-proyecto-hidroaysen>

*La Tercera* 20/04/2014, 'Douglas Tompkins donará el parque Pumalín al Estado', viewed 27/09/18, <https://www.soychile.cl/Santiago/Sociedad/2014/04/20/243963/Douglas-Tompkins-donara-el-parque-Pumalin-al-Estado.aspx>

*La Tercera* 11/06/2014, 'Editorial: HidroAysén e institucionalidad ambiental', viewed 5/10/18, [http://www.contraloria.cl/prensa\\_cgr/litoral/2014/06/11\\_Noticias.pdf](http://www.contraloria.cl/prensa_cgr/litoral/2014/06/11_Noticias.pdf) (p. 20).

Pacheco, M 11/06/2014, 'Post HidroAysén: un camino de convergencia energética', *La Tercera*, viewed 11/09/18, [http://www.contraloria.cl/prensa\\_cgr/litoral/2014/06/11\\_Noticias.pdf](http://www.contraloria.cl/prensa_cgr/litoral/2014/06/11_Noticias.pdf) (p. 7)

*La Tercera* 17/11/2017, 'Enel y Colbún confirman el fin de Hidroaysén', viewed 16/10/18, <http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/enel-colbun-confirman-fin-hidroaysen/>

Orellana, G & Santa María, J 18/03/2018, 'Susana Jiménez, ministra de Energía: "Como país no podemos cerrarnos a ninguna alternativa"', *La Tercera*, viewed 12/11/18, <https://www.latercera.com/negocios/noticia/susana-jimenez-ministra-energia-pais-no-podemos-cerrarnos-ninguna-alternativa/103346/>

Puiu, T 11/10/2018, 'Chile just signed the cheapest unsubsidized power in the world at ¢2.91/kWh. Of course, it's solar energy', viewed 20/10/18,  
<https://www.zmescience.com/ecology/climate/cheapest-solar-power/>